In Re the Marriage of Shane Ruckman and Mary Ruckman Upon the Petition of Shane Ruckman, and Concerning Mary Ruckman ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 13-1920
Filed July 30, 2014
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF SHANE RUCKMAN
AND MARY RUCKMAN
Upon the Petition of
SHANE RUCKMAN,
Petitioner-Appellee,
And Concerning
MARY RUCKMAN,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Kathleen A.
Kilnoski, Judge.
Mary Ruckman appeals from the district court’s ruling denying her petition
to modify the parties’ dissolution decree to change the physical care placement
of the parties’ children pursuant to a conditional provision set forth in the original
decree. REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Marti S. Sleister, Council Bluffs, for appellant.
Stephen C. Ebke of Porter, Tauke & Ebke, Council Bluffs, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ.
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DOYLE, J.
We are presented with a difficult and unusual issue. Shane and Mary
Ruckmans’ 2007 dissolution decree, approved by the district court after the
parties’ entered into a written settlement agreement, contained a provision
providing that if Mary met certain conditions, physical care of the parties’ children
would be transferred from Shane to her. In 2013, Mary filed a petition to modify
the decree, asserting she had met the conditions set forth in the 2007 decree and
requesting the decree be modified to place the children in the parties’ joint
physical care. Ultimately, the district court found, as argued by Shane, that Mary
was required to prove there had been a substantial change in circumstances to
warrant modification of the physical-care placement. The court concluded Mary
did not meet that burden, and it denied her petition. Mary appeals, and upon our
de novo review, we conclude the decree should be modified from the physical-
care placement with Shane to a joint-physical-care arrangement as requested by
Mary based upon her satisfaction of the conditions in the decree and the best
interests of their children. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s ruling and
remand with directions.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The parties married in 2002. They have two children, born in 2002 and in
2004. In September 2007, Shane filed a petition for dissolution of the parties’
marriage, seeking the parties be awarded joint custody of their children, with the
children being placed in his physical care. At that time, Mary was twenty-five and
Shane was thirty-years old.
3
Later that month, the district court entered its decree dissolving the
parties’ marriage. The decree stated the parties had “entered into a written
agreement settling all of the issues involved in this dissolution of marriage,” and
“[e]ach and all of the terms, provisions, and agreements between the parties set
out in [the decree]” were approved by the court. The decree noted the court
“reserve[d] jurisdiction to enforce the terms of [the decree] by process of
contempt and by such other manner as contemplated by Iowa law.”
The decree awarded joint legal custody of the children to both parties, and
the children were placed in Shane’s physical care. Mary was awarded visitation
with the children every weekend, with Shane having the children on “occasional
weekends” as agreed to by the parties. However, the decree went on to state:
Once [Mary] earns between $20,000 and $30,000 a year
and is able to support herself and the children in her care, with
proof that she has suitable housing and each child has their own
room, primary physical care shall be transferred to [Mary]. The
children shall remain in [the same school district] regardless of
which parent has their primary physical care, unless both parents
move out of [that school district]. The above visitation schedule
shall then be in effect for [Shane] or unless otherwise agreed upon
between the parties.
In March 2013, Mary filed her petition to modify the parties’ dissolution
decree. She asserted there had been a substantial change in circumstances
since issuance of the decree; specifically, she had met the conditions set forth in
the 2007 decree, and she requested the children’s placement in Shane’s physical
care be modified to place the children in the parties’ joint care. She also
requested her support obligation be terminated.
Shane filed his answer and requested Mary’s motion be denied in its
entirety. He affirmatively stated the purpose of the conditional paragraph in the
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parties’ 2007 decree “was based on the ability of [Mary] to provide more stability
and a set schedule for the children,” and he resisted her request for joint physical
care based on “the length of time since the original [d]ecree, the stability for the
children[,] and the potential negative effect any such change requested by [Mary]
would have on [the children].” Additionally, he requested Mary’s child support
obligation be reviewed based upon her increased income.
A hearing on Mary’s petition was held in October 2013. Mary testified she
was not represented in the original dissolution proceedings because she could
not afford an attorney at that time. She testified that Shane was represented,
and it was his attorney that drafted the stipulation and decree that the parties
signed. She testified she agreed to the arrangement because she thought that
was what was best for her children at that point in time and that she would get
custody of her children in the future if she met the conditions set forth in the
provision.
Mary testified she had met the conditions in the provision of the decree,
and though the decree provided that she would get physical care of the children
when satisfying the conditions, she was only seeking joint physical care of the
children. She testified she would keep the children in the same school district,
but she admitted it would be a longer commute for the children—approximately a
thirty-five minute drive as opposed to Shane’s ten to fifteen minute drive.
However, she testified that although the children would be in the car longer, it
would not be an additional burden to the children because Shane dropped the
children off at school approximately an hour early every day.
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Mary further testified that she believed a shared custody arrangement
would be in the children’s best interests. She testified the change would be an
easy adjustment for the children since they already spent two days at her home
every week, and she testified the children had requested more time with her than
the decree provided. She testified she and Shane were able to communicate
about the children without problems and each supported the other’s relationship
with the children. She noted that in addition to paying her required child-support
obligation and her half of the children’s medical bills, she also voluntarily paid for
the children’s dental insurance and half of the costs of daycare. Mary requested
the decree be modified for the parties to share physical care of the children and
that Shane equally share in transportation. She also requested that the visitation
provision be modified to give her and Shane two uninterrupted weeks in the
summer for visitation and to change the parties’ holiday visitation schedule to
rotate holidays every other year, rather than every other holiday as set out in the
decree.
Shane testified and admitted that Mary had met the conditions of the
provision in the parties’ decree to change custody, but he testified changing the
care arrangement now would “disrupt the stability [the children were] used to.”
He testified he believed the drive to and from school from Mary’s home would be
approximately forty-five minutes, not thirty-five, and he testified that a change in
care would be
just more wear and tear on [the children]. They’re going to have to
obviously probably get up earlier, and with sports and stuff like that,
if school gets out, she’s going to have to transport them from school
and then back out to school by 6:30 or so. Practice could run until
8:00, 8:30. It’s going to vary, and then turn around and they get
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back to her house. If it’s late, I mean, you got supper, homework,
showers, things of that nature.
He testified that Mary was a good mother and overall the parties got along and
were able to communicate, but he did not believe the children would benefit from
any additional time with her. However, he did request the court modify the
decree to provide him additional visitation with the children on the weekends. He
also requested Mary’s child-support obligation be reviewed.
Following the hearing, the district court entered its ruling denying Mary’s
request for modification. The court concluded that, under the circumstances of
the case
in which the children have been in the [physical care] of [Shane] for
six years, . . . Mary should have the burden of showing that there
has been a substantial change in circumstances and that she can
minister more effectively to the children than Shane, or that a
shared physical care arrangement will promote the children’s best
interests better than the current plan.
The court further concluded Mary had not met that burden, finding that although
Mary was dedicated to the children and had maintained an important place in
their lives “despite the physical distance between her home and theirs,” there
“simply was no evidence that the children would benefit from a shared care plan.”
The court found “Shane has done an admirable job as their primary physical care
parent,” and he “has encouraged the children’s ongoing relationship with their
mother while providing exceptional stability and nurturing care for them.”
Additionally, applying the applicable lower burden for modification of
visitation provisions of a decree, see In re Marriage of Brown, 778 N.W.2d 47, 51
(Iowa Ct. App. 2009), the court determined the decree should be modified to
award Shane one weekend per month, finding “Shane rarely was able to have
7
the children on the weekends since Mary was given visitation every weekend.”
The court also modified the decree to grant each parent two weeks of extended
summer vacation with the children, but it declined Mary’s request to change the
holiday visitation schedule. Finally, the court found there had been a substantial
change in Mary’s income since the time of the original decree and her support
obligation should be increased as set forth in the child support guidelines.
Mary now appeals.
II. Scope and Standards of Review.
“We review an order modifying a decree for dissolution of marriage de
novo.” In re Marriage of Sisson, 843 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Iowa 2014). We give
weight to the district court’s findings, especially regarding the credibility of
witnesses, but are not bound by them. Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(g); see also id.
We afford the district court “considerable latitude” in its determination “and will
disturb the ruling only when there has been a failure to do equity.” In re Marriage
of Okland, 699 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Iowa 2005); see also Sisson, 843 N.W.2d at
870. We note that “[p]rior cases have little precedential value, and we must base
our decision primarily on the particular circumstances of the parties presently
before us.” In re Marriage of Malloy, 687 N.W.2d 110, 113 (Iowa Ct. App. 2004).
III. Discussion.
On appeal, Mary contends she was not required to show a material
change in circumstances to enforce the parties’ stipulated agreement approved
by the court and incorporated into the dissolution decree. Alternatively, she
argues that even if she was required to show a substantial change in
circumstances, she met her burden by meeting the conditions set forth in the
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relevant provision of the decree. Finally, she argues the district court erred in its
child support calculation. We address her arguments in turn.
A. The Effect of the Decree’s Custody-Transfer Provision.
Iowa Code chapter 598 sets forth the factors we are to consider in
determining child custody. See Iowa Code § 598.41 (2007)1; see also In re
Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 697-99 (Iowa 2007). Section 598.41 first
states:
The court may provide for joint custody of the child by the
parties. The court, insofar as is reasonable and in the best interest
of the child, shall order the custody award, including liberal
visitation rights where appropriate, which will assure the child the
opportunity for the maximum continuing physical and emotional
contact with both parents after the parents have separated or
dissolved the marriage, and which will encourage parents to share
the rights and responsibilities of raising the child unless direct
physical harm or significant emotional harm to the child, other
children, or a parent is likely to result from such contact with one
parent.
Id. § 598.41(1)(a). The legislature has defined the “best interest of the child” as
including, but not limited to, “the opportunity for maximum continuous physical
and emotional contact possible with both parents, unless direct physical or
significant emotional harm to the child may result from this contact.” Id.
§ 598.1(1).
Once child custody has been determined and set in a decree, chapter 598
only expressly provides authority to modify that custody determination in three
sections: 598.21D (“Relocation of parent as grounds to modify order of child
custody”), .41C (“Modification of child custody or physical care—active duty”),
1
We cite the 2007 Code of Iowa, the Code in effect at the time the dissolution
decree was entered, but we note the relevant sections of chapter 598 have not been
substantively since amended.
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and .41D (“Assignment of visitation or physical care parenting time—parent
serving active duty—family member”). Nevertheless, our courts have long
permitted custody determinations be modified after established, but “only for the
most cogent reasons.” In re Marriage of Frederici, 338 N.W.2d 156, 158 (Iowa
1983); Jensen v. Jensen, 25 N.W.2d 316, 321 (Iowa 1946) (“When a child is
legally placed in a home where it receives good treatment and moral training, it
should never be removed from that home, except for the most cogent reasons.”).
Consequently, a party seeking modification ordinarily shoulders a heavy burden:
[T]he applying party must establish by a preponderance of
evidence that conditions since the decree was entered have so
materially and substantially changed that the children’s best
interests make it expedient to make the requested change. The
changed circumstances must not have been contemplated by the
court when the decree was entered, and they must be more or less
permanent, not temporary. They must relate to the welfare of the
children. A parent seeking to take custody from the other must
prove an ability to minister more effectively to the children’s well
being.
Frederici, 338 N.W.2d at 158; see also Jensen v. Jensen, 114 N.W.2d 920, 921
(1962) (“The changed circumstances, we have often said, must be substantial
and such as was not within the knowledge or contemplation of the parties or the
court when the original award was decreed.”); Crockett v. Crockett, 106 N.W.
944, 946 (Iowa 1906) (“[I]n the light of the statute, and giving construction
thereto, we have held repeatedly that a decree fixing custody . . . is conclusive,
unless it shall be made to appear that by reason of some change of circumstance
or condition not known to, or within the contemplation of, the court, an
enforcement of its decree will be attended by positive wrong or injustice.”).
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That being said, a line of case law in Iowa has permitted a trial court to
retain jurisdiction to review certain provisions of a decree without showing any
change of circumstances. See In re Marriage of Schlenker, 300 N.W.2d 164,
165-66 (Iowa 1981) (citing In re Fenchel, 268 N.W.2d 207, 209 (Iowa 1978); In re
Stom, 226 N.W.2d 797, 799 (Iowa 1975); Shipley v. Shipley, 182 N.W.2d 125,
127 (Iowa 1970); Wells v. Wells, 168 N.W.2d 54, 57 (Iowa 1969); Tallarico v.
Tallarico, 164 N.W.2d 805, 807 (Iowa 1969); Betzel v. Betzel, 163 N.W.2d 551,
554-55 (Iowa 1968)). In Betzel, the supreme court explained the reason for this
deviation from the ordinary standard:
“At the time the court grants a divorce it may not be able to
make a final determination of the issue of custody and may
therefore award custody temporarily, or make a probationary
arrangement, with the expectation that the application for a final
award will be heard at a later date. Likewise the court may enter an
order for temporary custody when the plaintiff takes a voluntary
nonsuit. However, the [c]ourt, when granting a divorce, should not
make a mere temporary order for custody when this can be
avoided. A temporary order in such a case is apt to cause
hardship, unhappiness, and instability in the lives of the parents
and children.”
163 N.W.2d at 555 (quoting 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation, § 809, p.
919) (internal original alterations omitted). While this practice has been highly
discouraged, our supreme court has not forbidden the practice.2 See id.
(“Although stopping short of forbidding the practice, we have discouraged the
retention of jurisdiction to modify divorce decrees without a showing of change of
2
We note we are not the only state to disfavor these provisions. In fact, as the
Vermont Supreme Court recently noted, a majority of states have held that such
provisions, under direct attack, are unenforceable and improper. See Knutsen v.
Cegalis, 989 A.2d 1010, 1014 (Vt. 2009) (citing numerous rulings in support of its
statement and that, “[i]n contrast, [it was] able to find only two courts that have upheld
such provisions under direct attack.”) (emphasis added). However, that is not the case
before us. Rather, Shane attacks the provision collaterally, even though the provision
was set forth in the agreement drafted by his own counsel.
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circumstances.”); but see In re Marriage of Mitchell, 531 N.W.2d 132, 133 (Iowa
1995) (citing Schlenker for the proposition that “provisions of a dissolution decree
are final as to circumstances then existing and matters will not be relitigated in
the absence of a showing of a change of circumstances”). In Schlenker, the
court again stated there may be justification from departing from the ordinary
change-in-circumstances standard in “exceptional cases,” although it did “‘not
foresee circumstances in which a dissolution court is justified in issuing its decree
piecemeal.’” 300 N.W.2d at 165-66 (Iowa 1981) (quoting Fenchel, 268 N.W.2d at
209). Yet, it reiterated that without express language in the decree
“unequivocally” providing for later trial court review, any statements concerning
retention of jurisdiction in a decree would be construed as the trial court’s
intention to require the regular change-in-circumstances standard for
modification. Id. at 166. The court then cited two cases to distinguish how the
court’s intent would be interpreted: “Betzel, 163 N.W.2d at 555 (language not
intended to permit modification without proof of change of circumstances),” and
“Wells, 168 N.W.2d at 57 (stipulation of parties and language of decree clearly
demonstrate intent to modify without requiring a change of circumstances).” Id.
In Wells, the court was faced with a decree containing a provision similar
to the one in this case. 168 N.W.2d at 57. In that case, the parents entered into
a stipulation, approved by the trial court and incorporated in the parents’
dissolution decree, that the “matter of custody of the children herein provided for
may be reviewed at the request of either [parent], the application therefor to be
heard on or about July 15, 1966, and without the burden on either party of having
to show change in circumstances.” Id. at 56. Based upon the parents’ stipulation
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and the court’s approval that a change of circumstances need not be shown, the
court determined the original decree was not final and proceeded to consider the
merits of the applications for modification without requiring a showing of a
substantial change in circumstances. Id. at 57, 60-61. Instead, in reviewing the
original custody determination, the court only considered the best interests of the
children. Id. at 60-61.
Despite the supreme court’s declaration in Schlenker in 1981 that
jurisdiction-retention provisions in dissolution decrees were discouraged, the
practice continued. This court was faced with a similar provision in In re
Marriage of Vandergaast, 573 N.W.2d 601, 602 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997), more than
fifteen years later. In Vandergaast, during the parents’ original dissolution
proceeding in October 1995, the parents entered into a stipulated agreement
placing physical custody of their children in the father’s care. 573 N.W.2d at 602.
Their agreement further provided that after June 1, 1996, the mother could
“without the necessity of showing a change of circumstances, request automatic
review of the custodial arrangement.” Id. at 602-03. The district court approved
the parents’ stipulation. Id. The mother filed her request for modification of the
decree in June 1996 seeking, among other things, that the children be placed in
her physical care. See id. at 602. Ultimately, the district court, without
addressing whether there had been a substantial change in circumstances to
warrant modification, determined the children should be placed with the mother
and modified the parents’ decree. See id. The father appealed the court’s
decision not to employ the usual change-in-circumstances standards in
considering modification, and we upheld the district court’s ruling en banc by a
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majority of three judges, with two judges dissenting. Id. at 602-03. The majority
concluded the facts did not present “one of the rare occasions allowing a
departure from the general rule.” Id. at 603. Nevertheless, because the parents
entered into the stipulation voluntarily and the trial court lent its approval, the
court concluded variance from the ordinary standard was appropriate, explaining:
It would be unfair to [the mother] to now rule such stipulation was
void and that she was under a burden to show a substantial change
in circumstances. Such would involve detrimental reliance on the
part of [the mother]. In addition, the children have been with her for
a substantial period of time following the modification. The
circumstances of this case lead us to conclude that it would be
contrary to the best interests of the children to once again change
their primary placement.
Id. at 603. However, the majority went on to state:
We find in future cases that prior to entering any provision
into a decree of dissolution allowing future review of child custody
without the necessity of a showing of a change in circumstances,
the trial court must require a showing that the case is within the
exceptional circumstances contemplated by the supreme court in
Schlenker. Such showing must be on the record and a finding
stating the reasons for the stipulation must be stated in the decree.
Id.
Again, although these provisions are strongly disfavored, we are
presented with another decree containing a jurisdiction-retention provision that
does not expressly state the reasons for including the provisions. However,
there is no question the parties’ agreed to the provision, and the court approved
of and incorporated the provision in its decree. As in Wells and Vandergaast,
and as approved of in Schlenker, the district court’s intent to retain jurisdiction of
the custody matter is unequivocally set forth in the parties’ decree. Under the
language of Schlenker, like in Wells, this is one of the exceptional cases
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contemplated by Schlenker where the court chose to retain jurisdiction and not
require a showing of a substantial change in circumstances. See Schlenker, 300
N.W.2d at 165-66. Shane cannot now point out that these provisions are
disfavored to his benefit, particularly in light of the fact he chose to include the
provision in his proposed settlement agreement despite case law recommending
against this type of provision. Here, the provision was ultimately agreed to by
Shane and Mary, and it was approved by the court. Consequently, Mary was not
required to show the ordinary standard in seeking modification of the custody
provision of the dissolution decree.
Additionally, we note flaws in Shane’s argument that the original decree
contemplated Mary would be required to establish the ordinary standards for
modification. First, the decree expressly sets out the limited conditions Mary was
required to meet to obtain physical care of the children, and those were clearly
the only conditions contemplated at the time of the decree to justify transfer to
Mary. Moreover, there was nothing in the decree to alert Mary that she would
have to establish more than those mere conditions, namely, that she could prove
her ability to minister more effectively to the children’s well-being. See Frederici,
338 N.W.2d at 158. Additionally, in applying the ordinary modification standards,
Mary would be required to establish the changed circumstances were not
contemplated by the court when the decree was entered, see id.; yet, given those
conditions were expressly set forth in the decree, there is no possible way she
could show those conditions were not contemplated at the time of the entry of the
decree. Upon our de novo review of the record and the applicable law, Mary did
15
not have the burden to show that there had been a substantial change in
circumstances for modification.
B. Custody Determination.
Once the parent seeking modification of the care provisions has
established the existence of a substantial change in circumstances, the parent
must next ordinarily prove the ability to offer superior care to the children than
that of the custodial-caregiver. Id. at 161; see also Melchiori v. Kooi, 644 N.W.2d
365, 368 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002). However, if the parties are on equal footing, such
as in a joint-physical-care-modification case, those parties bear the same burden
as the parties in an initial custody determination, and the question is which parent
can render “better” care. Melchiori, 644 N.W.2d at 369; see also In re Purscell,
544 N.W.2d 466, 468 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (“[N]either parent should have a
greater burden than the other in attempting to gain custody in an original custody
proceeding.”). Although Mary is not presently the children’s physical caregiver,
we conclude that, given the language of the provision in the decree along with
Mary’s request for joint physical care with Shane rather than requesting transfer
of physical care to her, it is not required that Mary establish she would be a
superior caregiver than Shane and could minister to the children’s needs more
effectively than Shane.
In so concluding, we rely upon Wells and chapter 598. It is clear that in
determining child custody and care, “the best interests and welfare of the children
stand as the paramount and controlling factor, being superior to any claim or
interest of either parent,” no matter whether the custody determination is the
initial or a subsequent review. See Wells, 168 N.W.2d at 60 (Iowa 1969); see
16
also Iowa Code § 598.41(1)(a); Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(o); Braunschweig v.
Fahrenkrog, 773 N.W.2d 888, 891 (Iowa 2009) (stating section 589.41(1)(a)
“gives the court discretion to determine custody and physical care arrangements
for the best interest of the child”); Ladd v. Ladd, 176 N.W. 211, 212 (Iowa 1920)
(“So far as [the child’s] future custody is concerned, his best interest is
paramount to any right of his father to his custody.”). The court in Wells did not
require either parent to establish superior care over the other in fashioning its
custody determination; rather, it noted it had before it “two competing parents,
each standing in about the same position with regard to pre-divorce conduct,
both presently suitable to have custodial rights.” 168 N.W.2d at 60. The court
did comment that under the facts of its case, the children whose custody was at
issue had “lived under a divided custody arrangement since the original decree”
and “[r]esultantly no problem [was] presented relative to removal of any of them
from an established suitable home in which they [had] become adjusted and
[were] happy.” Id. at 61. Looking at the children’s best interests, the court
determined the parents’ two biological children should be placed in the mother’s
custody under the facts of the case. Id. Similarly, in Vandergaast, this court
considered the best interests of the children in affirming the district court’s
modification of the children’s physical-care placement from their father to their
mother’s care, and the majority found changing custody again at that juncture
“would be contrary to [their] best interests.” 573 N.W.2d at 603. We did not
require the mother establish she could provide superior care than the children’s
father. See id. Consequently, we conclude the children’s physical-placement
hinges solely upon what is in their best interests.
17
In Hansen, the Iowa Supreme Court revisited the issue of joint physical
care, finding the past ideology that the best interest of a child was “rarely served
by joint physical care” was no longer an automatic presumption. 733 N.W.2d at
692, 696. The court did not go so far as to find joint physical care was favored in
child custody cases, but it found, “in light of the changing nature of the structure
of families and challenges to the sweeping application of psychological parent
attachment theory, . . . the joint physical care issue must be examined in each
case on the unique facts.” Id. at 695. Ultimately, the court concluded:
All other things being equal, . . . we believe that joint physical care
is most likely to be in the best interest of the child where both
parents have historically contributed to physical care in roughly the
same proportion. Conversely, where one spouse has been the
primary caregiver, the likelihood that joint physical care may be
disruptive on the emotional development of the children increases.
Id. at 697-98.
Given our legislature’s directive that a child’s best interests are served by
“the opportunity for maximum continuous physical and emotional contact
possible with both parents” and that joint physical care is permissible, we
conclude, under the facts of this case, that changing the children’s care from
Shane’s physical care to joint physical care between the parents is in the
children’s best interests. See Iowa Code §§ 598.1(1), .41(1)(a), .41(5)(a). There
is no evidence whatsoever that any “direct physical or significant emotional harm”
may result from this arrangement. See id. In fact, the record establishes the
opposite. Here, our de novo review of the record shows two parents who have
provided a textbook example of cooperation in a joint custody situation. Each
parent has supported the other’s relationship with the children. Neither parent
18
has indicated any problem with the other until Mary decided to request joint care,
something even lesser than had been originally agreed to by the parties. Though
Shane contends the move to joint physical care will disrupt the children’s lives,
we conclude any disruption will be minimal and offset by the children’s benefit of
having maximum contact with each of their parents. Mary does not live so far
away as to make a shared-care arrangement difficult, particularly in light of the
fact that she already has the children two of the seven days every week and that
Shane has them at school early every morning anyway. The record evidences
that both parents frequent the children’s activities and can coordinate their
schedules to share care of these great children to afford them maximum contact
with each parent. While there is no question that Shane has provided the
children excellent care, he has not shouldered the burden alone. Both he and
Mary, along with their significant others, have worked together to raise the
children thus far to outstanding results. These children are so fortunate to have
loving parents who can communicate with each other and work together for their
best interests. Given the parties’ stipulation, approved by the court, and
considering the children’s best interests under the facts of this case, we conclude
the decree should be modified to provide the parents joint-physical care.
C. Child Support.
In light of our conclusion that the decree should be modified to provide the
parties joint physical care, the case must be remanded to the district court to
recalculate the parties’ child support obligations, if any. See In re Seay, 746
N.W.2d 833, 835 (Iowa 2008) (discussing “application of the offset method for
calculating child support in cases involving joint physical care). Additionally, the
19
parties should submit to the district court “either individually or jointly, a proposed
joint physical care parenting plan” addressing “how the parents will provide a
home for the [children], how the [children’s] time will be divided between the
parents and how each parent will facilitate the [children’s] time with the other
parent, . . . and any other issues the court may require.” See Iowa Code
§ 598.41(5)(a). The court should determine the joint physical care parenting plan
and schedule, and it court should distribute transportation costs equally between
the parties.
IV. Conclusion.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s ruling on Mary’s
petition for modification of the parties’ dissolution decree, finding her petition to
change to a joint-physical-care arrangement should have been granted, based
upon the parties’ agreement and trial court’s adoption and approval of the
agreement containing a jurisdiction-retention provision, as well as the best
interests of the children. Accordingly, we remand to the district court for entry of
an order consistent with this opinion. Costs of this appeal are taxed to Shane.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.