Ernie L. Anderson and Anthony Anderson Co-Administrators and Personal Representatives of the Estate of Charlotte L. Anderson v. Lindsay M. Arndt ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-0565
Filed April 29, 2020
ERNIE L. ANDERSON and ANTHONY ANDERSON Co-Administrators and
Personal Representatives of the ESTATE OF CHARLOTTE L. ANDERSON,
DECEASED,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
LINDSAY M. ARNDT,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Harrison County, James S.
Heckerman, Judge.
The estate of Charlotte Anderson appeals the order granting summary
judgment on a wrongful death claim in favor of Lindsay Arndt. AFFIRMED.
Theodore R. Boecker Jr. of Boecker Law, P.C., L.L.O., Omaha, Nebraska,
for appellants.
James N. Daane of Mayne, Hindman, Daane, Parry & Wingert, Sioux City,
for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and May, JJ.
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DOYLE, Judge.
An intoxicated Austin Arndt was driving a Ford F-150 that struck and killed
Charlotte Anderson on July 4, 2015. Anderson’s estate filed a wrongful death suit
against Lindsay Arndt asserting she was vicariously liable for Austin’s actions
because she was on the vehicle’s certificate of title as co-owner. But the district
court found that the undisputed facts showed Lindsay transferred ownership of the
vehicle to Austin no later than June 30, 2015. On this basis, it granted summary
judgment in Lindsay’s favor. The estate appeals.
We review the district court’s ruling for the corrections of errors at law. See
Banwart v. 50th St. Sports, L.L.C., 910 N.W.2d 540, 544 (Iowa 2018). We view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the estate, granting it every legitimate
inference the facts will bear. See id. at 545. If the undisputed material facts show
Lindsay Arndt is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we will affirm the grant of
summary judgment. See id. at 544.
The owner of a vehicle is vicariously liable for damage it causes if the owner
consents to another person driving and that person acts negligently. See Iowa
Code § 321.493(2)(a) (2015). But when
[a] person who has made a bona fide sale or transfer of the person’s
right, title, or interest in or to a motor vehicle and who has delivered
possession of the motor vehicle to the purchaser or transferee shall
not be liable for any damage thereafter resulting from negligent
operation of the motor vehicle by another, but the purchaser or
transferee to whom possession was delivered shall be deemed the
owner.
Id. at § 321.493(3). Ordinarily one must transfer certificate of title for sale or
transfer of the vehicle. See id. § 321.45(2)(a) (“A person shall not acquire any
right, title, claim, or interest in or to any vehicle subject to registration under this
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chapter from the owner thereof except by virtue of a certificate of title issued or
assigned to the person for such vehicle . . . .”). But the legislature decided this
requirement “shall not apply” in determining, for the purpose of fixing vicarious
liability, whether a sale or transfer occurred. See id. § 321.493(3).
The undisputed facts show that Lindsay and Austin Arndt were married
when they acquired title to the F-150. They were co-owners on the certificate of
title. They separated and filed for divorce in October 2014. The next month, they
entered into a temporary stipulation. The resulting November 6, 2014 stipulated
temporary order provided that each party would retain possession of their
respective vehicles while the case was pending. The F-150 was in Austin’s
possession. During a January 2015 mediation, Lindsay and Austin agreed that
Austin would be awarded the F-150 in the decree. The terms of the mediation
agreement were reported to the court in June. The only issues remaining for the
court to decide at the June 30, 2015 dissolution trial concerned child custody and
matters unrelated to ownership of the F-150. The decree was entered after July
4, 2015.
In granting summary judgment on the estate’s wrongful death claim, the
district court found the undisputed facts showed that Lindsay “transferred
ownership of the F-150 to Austin no later than June 30, 2015, if not prior.” It further
found that even if ownership had not been transferred solely to Austin by the time
of trial, he was in sole possession of the vehicle on July 4, 2015. The court noted
that under the temporary order, Lindsay had no right to possess the truck or
consent to its use “and would have been in violation of [the court’s] order had she
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tried to do so.” On this basis, it held Lindsay could not be vicariously liable for
Charlotte Anderson’s death as a matter of law.
The estate argues that the certificate of title in Lindsay’s name provides a
prima facie case of ownership and the question was ultimately for the jury to
decide. The estate cites several cases, including Six v. Freshour, 231 N.W.2d
588, 591 (Iowa 1975). In Six, the defendant “testified he held title to the truck for
the convenience of his son; that his son had exclusive use of and control over it;
and that his son made the contract payments, paid license fees, and bought
insurance on the vehicle.” 231 N.W.2d at 590. But the evidence also showed that
“the truck was licensed in defendant’s name, the contract of purchase was
executed by him, and the insurance policy issued to him as owner,” besides the
defendant’s statements claiming ownership of the vehicle following the accident.
Id. On this basis, the court held that “the issue of defendant’s ownership of the
truck could not be decided as a matter of law” and “[t]he trial court was right in
submitting this question for jury determination.” Id. at 591.
Factually, this case before us is more like Hartman v. Norman, 112 N.W.2d
374, 380 (Iowa 1961), in which our supreme court held the title holder and
registered owner of a vehicle, who was named in a lawsuit alleging vicarious
liability under section 321.493, was entitled to a directed verdict because
“uncontradicted evidence” showed the driver made a bona fide purchase. The
evidence showed the driver entered an “unambiguous” written contract to
purchase the vehicle, making a down payment, and taking and retaining
possession of the vehicle. Hartman, 112 N.W.2d at 380.
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Although the case before us involves a transfer rather than a sale, the
record similarly supports a finding of transfer. Lindsay and Austin entered a
stipulation that the court accepted and incorporated into a temporary order. “A
stipulation and settlement in a dissolution proceeding is a contract between the
parties” and is entitled “to all of the sanctity of an ordinary contract if supported by
legal consideration.” In re Marriage of Briddle, 756 N.W.2d 35, 40 (Iowa 2008)
(citation omitted). To have a bona fide transfer, one party must have enforceable
rights against the other, such as those provided by contract. See Desy v. Rhue,
462 N.W.2d 742, 745-46 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (interpreting Hartman and section
321.493 in holding “a contract should be a prerequisite” to finding a bona fide sale
or transfer for the purpose of imposing vicarious liability). The stipulation,
temporary order, and settlement agreement provide enforceable rights. As the trial
court noted, Lindsay would have been violating a court order if she had tried to
assert ownership rights over the F-150 after November 2014. We conclude the
undisputed facts show that all rights and interest, including possessory rights, in
the F-150 were transferred to Austin by Lindsay before July 4, 2015. Thus she
was not an “owner” subject to vicarious liability under section 321.493(2)(a). In
view of the transfer, that she was still listed on the vehicle’s certificate of title as
co-owner is of no consequence for the purpose of fixing vicarious liability. Iowa
Code § 321.493(3).
We therefore affirm the order granting summary judgment for Lindsay Arndt.
AFFIRMED.