In Re the Interest of A.P., Minor Child, P.B., Mother, T.W., Father ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-1144
Filed September 27, 2017
IN RE THE INTEREST OF
A.P., Minor Child,
P.B., Mother,
Appellant,
T.W., Father,
Appellant.
______________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court, Delaware County, Thomas J. Straka,
Associate Juvenile Judge.
The parents each appeal the juvenile court order terminating their parental
rights. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
Cory R. Gonzales of Law Firm of Cory R. Gonzales, P.L.L.C., Strawberry
Point, for appellant mother.
David G. Baumgartner, Strawberry Point, for appellant father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathryn K. Lang, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Kimberly S. Lange of Kimberly S. Lange Law Office, Edgewood, guardian
ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and Bower, JJ.
2
BOWER, Judge.
The parents each appeal the juvenile court order terminating their parental
rights. We find there was sufficient evidence in the record to support termination
of the parents’ rights. We determine an extension of time is not in the child’s best
interests and termination is in the child’s best interests. We also find the juvenile
court properly accepted evidence of the mother’s pending criminal charges. We
affirm the decision of the juvenile court.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
B.P., mother, and T.W., father, are the parents of A.P., born in 2015. The
Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) became involved in August 2015
after the mother, who was on probation,1 tested positive for methamphetamine.
On October 14, 2015, the child was adjudicated to be in need of assistance
under Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(b), (c)(2), and (n) (2015). The mother
attended treatment for substance abuse and the child remained in her care. She
also attended therapy for mental health concerns.
In August 2016, the mother relapsed into drug and alcohol use. She left
the child, who was then a toddler, alone in her apartment while she went out
drinking to the point she became intoxicated. The mother was charged with child
endangerment and disorderly conduct. The child was removed from the mother’s
care and placed with relatives.
In September 2016, the mother was charged with public intoxication
because she attended a meeting with her probation officer while intoxicated, and
1
The mother was previously convicted of possession of pseudoephedrine with intent to
manufacture a controlled substance, given a suspended sentence, and placed on
probation.
3
she pled guilty to this charge. The mother also pled guilty to child endangerment,
was given a suspended sentence of one year in jail, and placed on probation.
The charge of disorderly conduct was dismissed. Due to probation violations, the
mother was placed in a residential treatment facility.
After her release, in April 2017, the mother was discovered, unresponsive,
in the elevator of her apartment building. She admitted she had been drinking
alcohol and was charged with public intoxication. A few days later, she tested
positive for methamphetamine. The State recommended her probation be
revoked and she be required to serve a prison sentence.
The father had only seen the child one time—at the courthouse in relation
to a hearing. He did not participate in services. Shortly after the child was born
he was arrested on drug charges. The father pled guilty to possession of
precursors with the intent to manufacture. He was in a residential facility from
April to September 2016, and has remained on probation. The father stated he
did not make an effort to establish a relationship with the child “‘cause I was a
wreck.” He did not request visitation with the child.
The State filed a petition seeking to terminate the parents’ rights. At the
mother’s hearing, held on May 23, 2017, the mother objected to the introduction
of evidence concerning the pending charge of public intoxication from April 2017.
She stated she would be forced to either leave the State’s evidence unrebutted
or waive her right against self-incrimination. The court determined the evidence
was admissible. The mother ultimately decided not to testify. A separate hearing
for the father was held on June 27, 2017. At that time, the court reopened the
4
record to receive evidence the mother’s probation was revoked and she was
sentenced to 180 days in jail.
The juvenile court terminated the mother’s rights under section
232.116(1)(i) and (l) (2017) and the father’s rights under section 232.116(1)(e)
and (i). The court denied the mother’s request for an extension of time, noting
she would be unable to work on reunification for the next six months because
she would be in jail for that period of time. The court concluded termination of
the parents’ rights was in the child’s best interests. The parents now appeal.
II. Standard of Review
The scope of review in termination cases is de novo. In re D.W., 791
N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010). Clear and convincing evidence is needed to
establish the grounds for termination. In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa
2006). Where there is clear and convincing evidence, there is no serious or
substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the
evidence. In re D.D., 653 N.W.2d 359, 361 (Iowa 2002). The paramount
concern in termination proceedings is the best interests of the children. In re
L.L., 459 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 1990).
III. Mother
A. The mother claims there is not sufficient evidence in the record to
support termination of her parental rights. Where the juvenile court has
terminated a parent’s rights on multiple grounds, “we need only find termination
appropriate under one of these sections to affirm.” In re J.B.L., 844 N.W.2d 703,
704 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014).
5
On our de novo review, we find there is clear and convincing evidence in
the record to terminate the mother’s rights under section 232.116(1)(l). This
section provides for termination where:
(1) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of
assistance pursuant to section 232.96 and custody has been
transferred from the child’s parents for placement pursuant to
section 232.102.
(2) The parent has a severe substance-related disorder and
presents a danger to self or others as evidenced by prior acts.
(3) There is clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s
prognosis indicates that the child will not be able to be returned to
the custody of the parent within a reasonable period of time
considering the child’s age and need for a permanent home.
Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(l).
The child was adjudicated to be in need of assistance on October 14,
2015. The evidence showed the mother had a severe substance abuse disorder;
she has been diagnosed with methamphetamine, cannabis, and alcohol
dependence. She represented a danger to herself and others based on her
conviction for child endangerment and the fact she was found unresponsive due
to intoxication in April 2017. Furthermore, there was clear and convincing
evidence the child would be unable to return to the mother’s home within a
reasonable period of time. The mother had previously participated in treatment
for substance abuse, only to relapse again. “[I]n considering the impact of a drug
addiction, we must consider the treatment history of the parent to gauge the
likelihood the parent will be in a position to parent the child in the foreseeable
future.” In re N.F., 579 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998). We conclude the
juvenile court properly terminated the mother’s parental rights under section
232.116(1)(l).
6
B. The mother claims the juvenile court should have given her an
additional period of time to work toward reunification. She states she would be
able to have the child returned to her care after six months. To order an
extension, the juvenile court would need to determine “the need for removal of
the child from the child’s home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-
month period.” See Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b).
The juvenile court denied the mother’s request for an extension, noting the
mother had only recently reengaged in substance abuse treatment and had been
sentenced to jail for six months. We agree with the juvenile court’s decision.
Given the mother’s history of substance abuse and her prior unsuccessful
attempts to maintain sobriety, we find it is unlikely the need for the child’s
removal would no longer exist after six months.
C. The mother claims termination of her parental rights was not in the
child’s best interests. In determining a child’s best interests, we give
consideration to “the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-
term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional
condition and needs of the child.” Id. § 232.116(2).
We find termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best
interests. The mother was previously convicted of child endangerment because
she left her young child home alone in her apartment while she went out drinking.
The evidence shows the mother is not able to put the child’s needs before her
own. The child needs permanency, and termination of the mother’s rights is in
her best interests.
7
D. Finally, the mother claims the juvenile court should not have
considered the pending criminal charges against her. She states the only way to
rebut the State’s evidence would be to testify about the pending criminal charges
for public intoxication, which would have violated her constitutional right against
self-incrimination. She also claimed the evidence was more prejudicial than
probative.
We review evidentiary rulings in termination proceedings for an abuse of
discretion. In re N.N., 692 N.W.2d 51, 54 (Iowa Ct. App. 2004). The evidence
the mother became very intoxicated, to the point she was unconscious and was
taken to the hospital for treatment, was very probative to the issues of whether
she would be able to care for the child. We determine the evidence was not
more prejudicial than probative. See Iowa Code § 232.96(6); State v. Taylor, 689
N.W.2d 116, 129 (Iowa 2004). We also determine the use of the evidence did
not violate the mother’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. She
was not compelled to testify or provide any incriminating information. See
Conkling v. Conkling, 185 N.W.2d 777, 784 (Iowa 1971) (quoting Brown v. United
States, 365 U.S. 148, 155 (1958)) (noting a party “has the choice, after weighing
the advantage of the privilege against self-incrimination against the advantage of
putting forward his version of the facts and his reliability as a witness, not to
testify at all”). We conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
finding the evidence was admissible.
8
IV. Father
A. The father claims there is not sufficient evidence in the record to
warrant termination of his parental rights under section 232.116(1)(e) or (i). We
find there is clear and convincing evidence to terminate the father’s parental
rights under section 232.116(1)(e). The evidence showed the father had “not
maintained significant and meaningful contact with the child during the previous
six months and . . . made no reasonable efforts to resume care of the child
despite being given the opportunity to do so.” Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(e)(3).
The father only saw the child once in her life and made no effort to engage in
visitation or establish a relationship with the child.
B. The father requests an additional six months to work on
reunification with the child. The juvenile court considered the father’s lengthy
criminal history and the fact he had not taken the opportunity to be involved in the
child’s life but “simply chose not to,” and concluded “a six-month extension of
time would not likely result in the return of the child to father’s care.” We agree
with the court’s conclusion. By the time of the termination hearing, the child had
been involved in juvenile court services for almost two years and during that time
the father did not participate in services or have any interaction with the child,
making it unlikely the child could be placed in his care within the next six months.
C. The father claims termination of his parental rights is not in the
child’s best interests. “It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of
permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination under section
232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to
9
provide a stable home for the child.” In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 41 (Iowa 2010).
The father has not shown any interest in meeting the child’s needs thus far in the
child’s life. We conclude termination of the father’s rights is in the child’s best
interests.
We affirm the decision of the juvenile court terminating the parental rights
of the mother and father.
AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.