State of Iowa v. Bobby Fitzgerald Hunt, Jr. ( 2023 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 22-0843
    Filed April 12, 2023
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    vs.
    BOBBY FITZGERALD HUNT JR.,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Jeffrey D. Bert, Judge.
    Bobby Hunt Jr. appeals his convictions and sentences on two counts of
    homicide by vehicle.       AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND
    REMANDED.
    Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Maria Ruhtenberg,
    Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
    Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney
    General, for appellee.
    Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ.
    2
    CHICCHELLY, Judge.
    Bobby Hunt Jr. appeals his convictions and sentences on two counts of
    homicide by vehicle: one involving operating under the influence and the other
    involving reckless driving. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence showing
    he committed homicide by vehicle by operating under the influence and contends
    the district court improperly sentenced him on both counts. Because substantial
    evidence supports the jury’s verdict, we affirm Hunt’s conviction of homicide by
    vehicle by operating under the influence. But based on the “one homicide” rule,
    we vacate the judgment and sentence entered on his conviction of homicide by
    reckless driving. We remand for the entry of a corrected judgment and sentencing
    order.
    I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
    A jury found Hunt guilty of homicide by vehicle for causing the death of Alex
    Marietta in June 2021. At around 3:00 p.m., Hunt was driving a red SUV on East
    Kimberly Road in Davenport. Other motorists observed the SUV travelling at a
    high rate of speed. One driver watched Hunt pass her on a gravel shoulder before
    cutting across two lanes of traffic. His driving was so notable that the driver took
    a photo of the SUV while stopped at a red light.
    Hunt was heading west in the northernmost lane of traffic as he approached
    the traffic control at the intersection of East Kimberly Road and Davenport Avenue.
    The light for the traffic on Kimberly changed to red well before Hunt reached the
    intersection. One witness described the light as “deep red” when Hunt drove
    through, meaning it was red long enough that several vehicles traveling on
    Davenport Avenue had entered the intersection.
    3
    Marietta was bicycling south on Davenport Avenue on his way home from
    work. As Marietta reached the north side of the intersection, Hunt’s vehicle shot
    in front of him. Hunt never slowed and was traveling at seventy-one miles per
    hour.1 With no time to react, Marietta’s bicycle struck the passenger side of the
    SUV. The force of the collision broke the front tire in half and upended the bicycle.
    Despite wearing a helmet, Marietta suffered extensive head trauma and died
    instantly.
    Although the force of the collision shattered the rear passenger-side window
    and damaged the body of the SUV significantly, Hunt did not stop. He instead
    drove to his apartment and called 911 about fifteen minutes later. During the call,
    he acknowledged that a bicyclist was badly injured. But Hunt claimed he could not
    stop at the scene because he needed to get his child somewhere and was in the
    middle of traffic.
    Corporal Erin Pape was the first law enforcement officer to question Hunt
    outside his apartment building. Hunt told her that the traffic light was yellow at the
    time of collision and again claimed he could not stop after because of heavy traffic.
    Hunt also claimed that he stopped in a parking lot to call 911 but his phone battery
    was dead. While they spoke, Hunt took two sips from a bottle of brandy before
    Corporal Pape confiscated it.
    At trial, Corporal Pape testified about her observations of Hunt during the
    interview.    She told the jury that she immediately noticed Hunt’s eyes were
    bloodshot and watery, which could result from intoxication or crying. Because she
    1   The speed limit was forty-five miles per hour.
    4
    was sick and using mentholated cough drops, Corporal Pape could not detect any
    odor on his breath. Over time, she noted other behaviors that showed Hunt could
    have been intoxicated:
    He couldn’t seem to stay on one topic very long. There was a lot of
    bouncing around, a lot of elevation and emotion, and at some points,
    he was getting very close to my face, to where it made me
    uncomfortable, and so, that behavior seemed to become more
    prominent and more aggressive as the incident went on.
    Officer Luke Figie, a traffic investigator, arrived at the apartment complex to
    take over the investigation.   Officer Figie testified he could smell an odor of
    alcoholic beverage emitting from Hunt, which got stronger as Hunt drew closer.
    When asked, Hunt stated the only thing he had to drink after the collision was the
    “two or three” sips of brandy that he took in front of Corporal Pape. Officer Figie
    also observed Hunt display a “rash of emotions up and down” during the
    conversation. The change in Hunt’s demeanor became most apparent when
    Officer Figie informed him that he was requesting a warrant to test Hunt’s blood.
    Hunt became increasingly agitated before fleeing on foot. The ensuing chase
    lasted about ten minutes before Hunt surrendered.
    A sample of Hunt’s blood was drawn three and one-half hours after the
    collision. Testing showed a blood alcohol concentration of 0.131 and the presence
    of cocaine and marijuana metabolites. At trial, a criminalist explained a method
    used to extrapolate a person’s blood alcohol concentration at an earlier time.
    Using this method, he estimated that Hunt’s blood alcohol concentration would
    have been between 0.166 and 0.210 at the time of the collision if Hunt had
    consumed no alcohol after.     He also extrapolated what Hunt’s blood alcohol
    concentration would have been at the time of the collision if Hunt drank three-
    5
    fourths of the bottle of brandy after, estimating it would have been between 0.106
    and 0.150.
    The State obtained several recordings of Hunt’s SUV traveling on Kimberly
    Road and showed them at trial. One recording was taken by a camera mounted
    on a city transit bus that Hunt passed shortly before the intersection. It shows
    Hunt’s speed relative to the bus, which was traveling at thirty-eight miles per hour.
    The bus recording also shows few vehicles on the road near Hunt after the
    collision, contradicting statements Hunt made during the 911 call and his interview
    with Corporal Pape. Another recording was taken by a dashboard camera installed
    in a vehicle heading east on Kimberly Road that was stopped at the intersection
    when the collision occurred. The traffic light is red when the recording begins, and
    it shows Hunt’s vehicle entering the intersection about six seconds later. Video
    taken by a traffic camera mounted on the intersection of Brady Street and Kimberly
    Road shows Hunt’s vehicle running a red light shortly after the collision with
    Marietta.
    A jury found Hunt guilty of homicide by vehicle by operating under the
    influence, operating under the influence, homicide by vehicle by reckless driving,
    and leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death. The district court merged
    the conviction for operating under the influence with the conviction for homicide by
    vehicle by operating under the influence and sentenced Hunt to incarceration for
    a term not to exceed twenty-five years. It sentenced Hunt to incarceration for terms
    of fifteen years each for homicide by vehicle by reckless driving and leaving the
    scene of an accident resulting in death. The court ordered Hunt to serve the three
    sentences consecutively, and Hunt appealed.
    6
    II. Sufficiency of the Evidence.
    Hunt first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
    conviction for homicide by vehicle by operating under the influence. We review
    this claim for correction of errors at law. State v. Jones, 
    967 N.W.2d 336
    , 339
    (Iowa 2021). In doing so, we view the evidence and any reasonable inferences
    drawn from it in the light most favorable to the State. 
    Id.
     If substantial evidence
    supports the verdict, we affirm. 
    Id.
    The State charged Hunt with two counts of homicide by vehicle. One count
    was based on Hunt operating under the influence, see 
    Iowa Code § 707
    .6A(1)
    (2021), and the other was based on reckless driving, see 
    id.
     § 707.6A(2). Hunt
    does not dispute the verdict based on reckless driving but argues there is
    insufficient evidence to show his intoxication caused Marietta’s death.
    The trial court instructed the jury that it could find Hunt guilty of the charge
    if the State proved:
    1. On or about June 3, 2021, the defendant:
    a. operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of
    alcohol or a drug or a combination of such substances; or
    b. operated a motor vehicle while having a concentration of
    .08 or more; or
    c. operated a motor vehicle while any amount of a controlled
    substance is present in his system as measured in the defendant’s
    blood or urine.
    It is not necessary for all jurors to agree to just (a) or (b) or (c).
    It is only necessary that each juror agrees to at least one of these
    three alternatives.
    2. The defendant’s act or acts set out in Element 1
    unintentionally caused the death of Alex Marietta.
    Cause is established if the defendant’s act or acts set out in
    Element 1 were a substantial factor in bringing about the death of
    Alex Marietta, and the death of Alex Marietta would not have
    happened except for those acts.
    7
    The State presented evidence showing Hunt’s blood alcohol concentration was
    more than .08 at the time of the collision and he tested positive for both cocaine
    and marijuana, establishing the first element of the charge. But Hunt challenges
    the second of element, arguing the evidence does not show he “was feeling the
    effects of alcohol and drugs immediately after the accident.”
    Substantial evidence shows Hunt’s intoxication caused Marietta’s death.
    Although Hunt seemed composed while talking to law enforcement at first, his
    composure in the face of what occurred could result from his intoxication. But over
    time, Hunt showed more erratic behavior with Corporal Pape noticing he changed
    topics and bounced around. After Officer Figie told Hunt that he was requesting a
    warrant to draw Hunt’s blood, Hunt became agitated and uncooperative before
    fleeing. One can reasonably conclude that running from law enforcement shows
    Hunt’s decision making was impaired by intoxication. That same poor decision
    making could have led to Hunt’s excessive speeding, as well as his inability to
    perceive2 or judge the changing light, which led to him running the light at least six
    seconds after it changed to red. Hunt argues that it was this reckless driving that
    caused Marietta’s death without acknowledging that reckless driving can result
    from intoxication.   Because sufficient evidence supports a finding that Hunt’s
    intoxication caused Marietta’s death, we affirm his conviction for homicide by
    vehicle by operating under the influence.
    2 Hunt’s statement that the light was yellow at the time of the collision suggests
    that his perception was impaired.
    8
    III. Sentence.
    Hunt also contends the sentences imposed on his convictions for homicide
    by vehicle by operating under the influence and homicide by vehicle by reckless
    driving violate the one-homicide rule. See State v. Ceretti, 
    871 N.W.2d 88
    , 96
    (Iowa 2015) (noting the trial court is prohibited from entering judgments and
    imposing sentences for multiple homicide offenses when a defendant is convicted
    of killing only one person). The State agrees. We therefore vacate the judgment
    and sentence entered on Hunt’s conviction of homicide by vehicle by reckless
    driving, and we remand for the entry of a corrected judgment and sentencing order
    consistent with this opinion.
    AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 22-0843

Filed Date: 4/12/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/12/2023