Douglas Kent Lindaman v. State of Iowa ( 2023 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-1032
Filed April 12, 2023
DOUGLAS KENT LINDAMAN,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mitchell County,
Rustin T. Davenport, Judge.
An applicant appeals the denial of his third postconviction-relief application.
AFFIRMED.
Douglas K. Lindaman, Charles City, self-represented appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Kyle Hanson, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
2
SCHUMACHER, Judge.
Douglas Lindaman, a former attorney1, was convicted in 1988 after pleading
guilty to two counts of lascivious acts with a child. The convictions were premised
on sexual acts Lindaman engaged in with an eleven-year-old boy. He served two
consecutive five-year terms in prison. His conviction was upheld on direct appeal,
and two prior postconviction-relief (PCR) applications—one in 1991 and the other
in 1997—were denied.2 Lindamen filed a third PCR application on March 12, 2021,
which was denied.
Lindaman now appeals the denial of his third PCR application. According
to his appellate brief:
Lindaman outlined a claim of actual innocence pertaining to health
care, like the treatment for ego-dystonic homosexuality, (similar to
involuntary intoxication) based upon: (A) the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of art. I, section 6, Iowa constitution as to
accessing health care; (B) pursuing and obtaining safety and
happiness in art. I, section 1, Iowa constitution as to accessing health
care; (C) psychological torture under the 8th amendment to the U.S.
constitution and art. I, section 17 to the Iowa constitution by denial of
access to health care.
He further alleges his direct appeal and first PCR should be considered void
because he lacked an attorney in each instance after electing to proceed pro se.
And he believes “Iowa’s legal officials traditionally live in a litigation bubble of
1 Lindaman’s law license was revoked in 1989. See Comm. on Pro. Ethics &
Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass’n v. Lindaman, 449 N.W.2d 341 (Iowa 1989).
2 This court reversed Lindaman’s sentence on direct appeal because the district
court considered unproven allegations of criminal acts. State v. Lindaman, No. 88-
1756 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 27, 1989). Both dismissals of prior PCR applications
were affirmed by this court. Lindaman v. State, No. 91-0737 (Iowa Ct. App.
Mar. 24, 1992); Lindaman v. State, No. 97-724 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 27, 1998).
3
discrimination and denial as to equal protection analysis over privileges and
immunities for gay sex offenders.”
We determine Lindaman’s claims are untimely. A PCR application “must
be filed within three years from the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the
event of an appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued.” Iowa Code
§ 822.3 (2021). Lindaman’s judgment was final in 1988—he is well past the three-
year time-bar. As a result, his claims are time-barred.
That said, the “limitation does not apply to a ground of fact or law that could
not have been raised within the applicable time period.” Id. Lindaman asserts that
Schmidt v. State, which recognized a right to bring a freestanding actual innocence
claim to challenge a conviction based on a plea agreement, is a new ground of law
that resets the three-year period. 909 N.W.2d 778, 795 (Iowa 2018). But
Lindaman is not actually raising an actual innocence claim. Actual innocence
claims are premised on the applicant “claiming he or she is factually and actually
innocent.” Id. at 797. Here, Lindaman’s claim is one “pertaining to health care”—
he asserts the sex offender treatment program (SOTP) discriminates against gay
offenders. (Emphasis added.) But challenging the SOTP does nothing to
undermine the factual basis for Lindaman’s conviction. Lindaman does not allege
factual and actual innocence. In fact, he admits to having committed the act.
Therefore Schmidt does not act as a new ground of law for time-bar purposes.
To the extent Lindaman’s argument could be interpreted as an actual
innocence claim based on his assertions that he was involuntarily intoxicated at
the time of the offense due to “ego-dystonic homosexuality,” his claim is still time-
barred by section 822.3. “We have found Schmidt does not apply to overcome the
4
statute of limitations where the evidence put forward to support a claim of actual
innocence was available to the applicant or could have been discovered with due
diligence within the limitations period.” Quinn v. State, 954 N.W.2d 75, 77 (Iowa
Ct. App. 2020). Lindaman raised the issue of his mental state related to “ego-
dystonic homosexuality” in his first PCR application in 1991—within the three-year
time frame from when judgement was final. The facts Lindaman relies on to
support his actual innocence claim were available to him within the section 822.3
timeframe and cannot be used to circumvent the time-bar.3
Because Lindaman’s application is time-barred by the three-year statutory
limit imposed by section 822.3, we affirm the district court’s denial of Lindaman’s
PCR application.
AFFIRMED.
3Lindaman’s claims are also barred under section 822.8. Because his claims have
been raised in prior proceedings, they may not be the basis for later applications.
See Iowa Code § 822.8.