Tyson James Ruth v. State of Iowa ( 2021 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-0125
Filed July 21, 2021
TYSON JAMES RUTH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Greene County, Gina Badding,
Judge.
Tyson Ruth appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief.
AFFIRMED
Christopher A. Clausen of Clausen Law Office, Ames, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kyle Hanson, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Mullins, P.J., and May, J. and Potterfield, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2021).
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MULLINS, Presiding Judge.
Tyson Ruth appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief
(PCR). He argues the district court erred in denying his claims that his criminal
counsel was ineffective in (1) allowing him to enter a plea that was coerced and
not voluntary and (2) not filing a motion to suppress on the basis he was denied
his constitutional right to a neutral and detached magistrate issuing search
warrants.
On the former issue, Ruth cites boilerplate authorities on the issues of
standard of review, an applicant’s burden to establish ineffective assistance in a
PCR proceeding, and pre-plea irregularities that would warrant challenging a plea.
In light of those boilerplate authorities, he asserts he would not have pled guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial if his counsel “filed the motion [to
suppress] which Ruth had requested.” Ruth’s willingness to go to trial is highly
suspect given the significant concessions the State offered under the plea deal.
He offers no argument challenging the strength of the State’s multiple charges
against him, nor asserting any factual or legal defenses to any of the charges.
Either way, beyond boilerplate citations and bare conclusory assertions relevant
to knowing and voluntary guilty pleas, he provides us with no meaningful
authoritative legal framework on the issue, so we deem the argument waived. See
Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(3) (“Failure to cite authority in support of an issue may
be deemed waiver of that issue.”); In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000)
(“A broad, all encompassing argument is insufficient to identify error in cases of de
novo review.”); Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 876 (1996) (“[W]e will not
speculate on the arguments [a party] might have made and then search for legal
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authority and comb the record for facts to support such arguments.”); Inghram v.
Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 215 N.W.2d 239, 240 (Iowa 1974) (“To reach the merits
of this case would require us to assume a partisan role and undertake the
appellant’s research and advocacy. This role is one we refuse to assume.”).
Further, he does not explain how he wanted his counsel to frame a motion
to suppress, or how counsel adhering to the same would have resulted in counsel
doing a better job, nor does he “state the specific ways in which counsel’s
performance was inadequate and identify how competent representation probably
would have changed the outcome.” Dunbar v. State, 515 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Iowa
1994). In any event, we agree with the district court that the record of the plea
hearing presumptively reflects the plea was voluntary, and Ruth failed to overcome
that presumption, so counsel was not ineffective. See State v. Nosa, 738 N.W.2d
658, 661 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007).
On the latter issue, Ruth asserts the issuing magistrate represented his
father—who obtained guardianship over Ruth’s children—in the guardianship
proceeding around the time two search warrants were issued and for several years
prior, issuance of the first search warrant would have been favorable to the
magistrate’s client in obtaining a guardianship, and issuance of the second search
warrant would be beneficial to extend the guardianship, both, in turn, benefiting the
magistrate financially. Ruth maintains his counsel was ineffective in failing to move
to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the search warrants based on the
magistrate’s alleged conflict of interest.
But Ruth’s analytical approach largely targets the magistrate not recusing
herself, as opposed to an ineffective-assistance framework. As to his counsel’s
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performance, he merely states “counsel failed to investigate and develop the claim
in a motion to suppress the evidence found as a result of both search warrants.”
Ruth must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) his counsel
failed to perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Lopez, 907 N.W.2d 112, 116 (Iowa
2018). We “may consider either the prejudice prong or breach of duty first, and
failure to find either one will preclude relief.” State v. McNeal, 897 N.W.2d 697,
703 (Iowa 2017) (quoting State v. Lopez, 872 N.W.2d 159, 169 (Iowa 2015)).
On appeal, Ruth does not even assert his counsel was aware of a potential
conflict. At the PCR trial, Ruth testified he urged his counsel to move to suppress
evidence based on the magistrate’s alleged conflict. Ruth’s trial counsel
acknowledged in his testimony he puts every piece of ammunition possible into a
motion to suppress—“any viable grounds,” without going into “kitchen sink” tactics.
He also confirmed he would have looked into any potential conflicts of interest of
which he was made aware. Counsel could not specifically recall if Ruth asked him
to explore a conflict of interest, but if Ruth had, counsel would have at least
explored and researched the issue. Absent notations of such of a notification in
his file, he opined “it didn’t happen,” and nothing about the magistrate’s name
alerted him to look into potential conflicts. The district court found counsel more
credible, as do we. Further, the magistrate pointedly testified her relationships with
clients would not compromise her oath as to granting or denying search warrants—
if she felt her oath was compromised, she would send the matter to a different
magistrate. The magistrate stated, aside from the guardianship proceeding (which
was ultimately voluntary) and attending the same church, she only did taxes for
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Ruth’s parents. She added her relationship with Ruth’s parents had no bearing on
authorizing search warrants. Her search warrant authorizations were
“independent determination[s]” despite her purported relations with Ruth’s parents.
So, upon the evidence presented, the question before us is whether an
attorney fails to perform an essential duty in failing to investigate unknown and
arguably frivolous conflicts of interests as to every presiding judicial officer? We
answer that question in the negative. Even if we were to assume counsel breached
an essential duty in failing to investigate or challenge the magistrate’s ethical ability
to authorize the search warrants, Ruth has failed to explain, let alone show by a
preponderance of the evidence, how the result of the proceeding would have been
different before a different magistrate. Thus, he has failed to meet his burden to
show prejudice.
We affirm the denial of Ruth’s PCR application.
AFFIRMED.