In the Interest of L.L., Minor Child ( 2021 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-0106
Filed July 21, 2021
IN THE INTEREST OF L.L.,
Minor Child,
K.K., Mother,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Delaware County, Thomas J. Straka,
Associate Juvenile Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child.
AFFIRMED.
William A. Lansing of William A Lansing, P.C., Dubuque, for appellant
mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Ellen Ramsey-Kacena, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Daniel H. Swift of Swift Law Firm, Manchester, attorney and guardian ad
litem for minor child.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Mullins and May, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child, born in
2019. She contends she was denied (1) “her state and federal constitutional rights
to due process by the failure to provide a transcript of trial proceedings prior to the
filing of this Petition on Appeal”; (2) “reasonable effort services by [the department
of human services’] failure to facilitate residential chemical dependency treatment
after [she] had been evaluated with a recommendation for such”; and (3) her
“request for a 6-month extension to allow her to accomplish residential chemical
dependency treatment.”
The first issue has been resolved against the mother. See In re T.S, 868
N.W.2d 425, 434 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (“There is no per se due process violation
inherent in the unavailability of the hearing transcript for termination appeals.”);
see also In re L.M., 654 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Iowa 2002) (rejecting a constitutional
challenge to the reduced time for filing a notice of appeal in termination-of-parental-
rights appeals); In re C.M., 652 N.W.2d 204, 212 (Iowa 2002) (holding “the
expedited appellate procedure in termination-of-parental-rights cases that permits
only a petition on review rather than full briefing does not violate constitutional
requirements of procedural due process or equal protection”). T.S. is controlling.
The second issue implicates the department’s obligation to make
reasonable efforts to reunify parent and child or finalize a case permanency plan.
See In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 528–29 (Iowa 2019) (explaining the reasonable-
efforts requirement). In evaluating this issue, the factual context is key.
The mother’s parental rights to an older child were terminated in mid-2019,
based on her use of methamphetamine and “concerns that [she] was not
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appropriately addressing [the child’s] medical issues.” Later the same year, the
mother gave birth to the child who is the subject of this appeal. In early 2020, the
mother admitted she was still using methamphetamine. She voluntarily placed the
child with the child’s paternal grandmother, who had custody of the older child.
She agreed to seek mental-health and substance-abuse assessments.
The mother tested positive for methamphetamine in May 2020. She
obtained an evaluation and began participating in outpatient treatment. However,
she did not provide “the consistent negative drug screens as requested to show
her sobriety.” The department reported that she exhibited “the same behaviors as
when [the department] terminated [her] parental rights on the[] older son.”
Shortly before the termination hearing in late 2020, the department received
the results of an evaluation the mother underwent in the summer of 2020, which
recommended inpatient treatment. The mother now argues the department
violated its reasonable-efforts mandate by failing to facilitate her participation in
inpatient treatment. On our de novo review of the record, we disagree.
The department filed an affidavit listing the services afforded the family,
including “[s]ubstance abuse evaluation and treatment, random UA’s, mental
health services, medication management and visitation for [the mother].” The
department caseworker conceded the agency did not facilitate the mother’s
placement at a residential drug treatment facility but stated it was generally up to
the parent to follow-up. The evaluation report supports the testimony. The report
placed the onus on the mother to call the facility “and speak with an intake
counselor” about residential placement.
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Even if the department had an obligation to facilitate inpatient treatment, the
mother was reluctant to pursue that type of treatment. As the juvenile court found:
Mother testified that had she known this recommendation [for
inpatient treatment] earlier, she would have participated in inpatient
substance abuse treatment and she should be given an extension of
time in order to this. The court finds mother’s testimony to be suspect
in this regard. As indicated in the Court’s prior termination order . . . ,
mother attempted inpatient treatment . . . but left the facility after less
than 24 hours. She then attempted inpatient treatment at [another
facility] but left after approximately 1 week. Mother made no
indication to the Court as to how her dedication to inpatient treatment
is now somehow different.
There is no question the mother was well-intentioned; she testified she
wanted “to live a normal life” and was “really trying now.” But her participation in
outpatient services did not yield the hoped-for results. The mother tested positive
for methamphetamine three weeks before the termination hearing. A department
social worker opined the child could not be safely returned to her care “[b]ecause
of her recent drug test results.” At the end of the day, we conclude the mother’s
lack of progress toward sobriety was not a result of failed efforts on the
department’s part.
This brings us to the final issue, whether the juvenile court should have
granted the mother more time to work toward reunification. See Iowa Code
§§ 232.104(2)(b), .117(5) (2020). In denying her request, the court stated the
mother “did not present any plan to the Court which would indicate how things
would be different in 6 months when things have not changed over the last 2
years.” We agree with the court’s assessment. The department social worker
recommended against granting the mother more time to participate in services
because she was not “engaged as she should be” and she did “the bare minimum
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but [did not] follow through all the way, like, with drug testing.” And, as noted, the
mother was afforded a lengthy period of time to participate in substance-abuse
treatment dating back to the inception of the older child’s case. For these reasons,
we affirm the court’s denial of the request for additional time.
The juvenile court order granting the State’s petition to terminate the
mother’s parental rights is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.