State of Iowa v. Deshaun Lonte Trombone ( 2018 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-0776
Filed May 2, 2018
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DESHAUN LONTE TROMBONE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Glen E. Pille, Judge.
DeShaun Trombone appeals the district court’s sentencing order on
remand. AFFIRMED.
Karmen R. Anderson of Anderson & Taylor, P.L.L.C., Des Moines, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield and Tabor, JJ.
2
VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.
DeShaun Trombone entered Alford pleas1 to possession of a simulated
controlled substance (MDMA) with the intent to deliver, as well as another crime.
On appeal, the court of appeals concluded the possession crime lacked a factual
basis. State v. Trombone, No. 15-1696, 2016 WL 5484893, at *2-3 (Iowa Ct. App.
Sept. 28, 2016). We stated:
The minutes of testimony show officers found eighty-one “multi-
colored tablets” they initially thought were MDMA, but after testing,
the pills were determined to be caffeine. [It was] noted Trombone,
on occasion, had taken “small yellow pills and multi-colored pills.”
The record lacks any specific reference to Trombone selling the
caffeine pills or representing the caffeine pills as MDMA.
Id. at *3. We vacated this portion of Trombone’s conviction and remanded “to allow
the State to demonstrate whether a factual basis exists.” Id.
On remand, the State filed a notice of additional/substituted witnesses. The
notice elaborated on the nature of the pills and stated the officer’s belief that the
number and packaging was consistent with possession to deliver or distribute. The
district court found, “[T]he additional Minutes do substantiate the charge of
Possession of a Simulated Controlled Substance with Intent to Deliver.” The court
concluded “the original sentence shall stand.” In this appeal from the remand
order, Trombone contends his prior appellate attorney was ineffective in “fail[ing]
to request an appropriate remedy thereby prejudicing him when he was
resentenced.”
1
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). An Alford plea allows a defendant to
plead guilty to a crime without admitting to the underlying facts that establish the crime.
See id.3
In the first appeal, this court ordered a remedy authorized by the Iowa
Supreme Court. See Rhoades v. State, 848 N.W.2d 22, 33 (Iowa 2014) (“Because
it is possible the State can establish a factual basis, the district court should order
the court in the criminal case to give the State the opportunity to establish a factual
basis.” (citing State v. Gines, 844 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Iowa 2014), and Ryan v. Iowa
State Penitentiary, 218 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Iowa 1974))). Accordingly, Trombone
cannot establish his appellate attorney was ineffective in failing to argue for a
different remedy. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (setting
forth elements of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim).
We affirm the district court’s judgment and sentence on remand.
AFFIRMED.