State of Iowa v. Hernandis Cortez Burks , 919 N.W.2d 766 ( 2018 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-0540
Filed June 6, 2018
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
HERNANDIS CORTEZ BURKS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Odell McGhee II,
District Associate Judge.
Hernandis Cortez Burks appeals from the judgment and sentence entered
on his conviction for possession of a controlled substance. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Martha J. Lucey, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Mullins and McDonald, JJ.
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DANILSON, Chief Judge.
Hernandis Cortez Burks appeals from the judgment and sentence entered
on his conviction for possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), in violation
of Iowa Code section 124.401(5) (2016). Burks maintains the district court should
have granted his motion to suppress and failed to provide sufficient reasons for the
sentence imposed. Because we find the motion to suppress was properly denied,
and the court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sentence, we affirm.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings.
On May 26, 2016, Burks was riding as a passenger in a vehicle stopped by
Des Moines Police Officers Brandon Holtan and Shawn Morgan. Upon speaking
with the driver and Burks, the officers observed an open bottle of an alcoholic
beverage on the front passenger floorboard. They asked the driver and Burks to
step out of the vehicle. Officer Morgan stated that while reaching for the bottle, he
smelled marijuana and saw a small burnt marijuana cigarette on the cup-holder
ashtray. Officer Morgan then found a cigar package containing raw marijuana
between the front driver seat and front passenger seat. Burks admitted the
marijuana belonged to him. Burks was charged by trial information with
possession of a controlled substance.
Burks filed a motion to suppress, arguing the evidence was obtained
through an unlawful search of the vehicle. At the suppression hearing, the State
argued Burks did not have standing to challenge the search of the vehicle because,
as a passenger, he had no legitimate expectation of privacy. The State also
asserted exceptions applied permitting the lawful search of the vehicle. The district
court determined, “Looking at the totality of the circumstance[s], the court finds that
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law enforcement legally stopped the vehicle and legally searched the inside of the
vehicle for contraband since they saw an open container in plain view. The
exigen[cy] was sufficient for a seizure of the vehicle, . . . .” The court dismissed
the motion to suppress as it related to evidence found in the search of the vehicle.
Burks waived his right to a jury trial, and after a trial on the minutes of
evidence, the district court found Burks guilty of possession of a controlled
substance. Burks was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for one hundred and
eighty days, which was suspended, and Burks was placed on probation for one
year.1 Burks now appeals.
II. Standard of Review.
We review a claim the trial court improperly denied a motion to suppress on
constitutional grounds de novo. State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Iowa 2011).
“This review requires ‘an independent evaluation of the totality of the
circumstances as shown by the entire record.’” Id. (quoting State v. Turner, 630
N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001)). “We give deference to the district court’s fact
findings due to its opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses, but we are not
bound by those findings.” State v. Tyler, 867 N.W.2d 136, 153 (Iowa 2015)
(citations omitted).
We review the challenge to the district court’s sentencing determination for
an abuse of discretion. State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 405 (Iowa 2015).
1
Burks waived reporting of the sentencing hearing.
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III. Analysis.
(1) Motion to Suppress.
Burks first asserts the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress
evidence obtained from the search of the vehicle.2 Burks asks this court to overrule
State v. Haliburton, 539 N.W.2d 339, 342 (Iowa 1995), which holds a passenger
does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle, and to find Burks
has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the search pursuant to article I,
section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. Burks also contends no exception to the warrant
requirement applies under the circumstances of this case.
The State argues even if article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution was
independently analyzed to determine a passenger of a vehicle has a legitimate
expectation of privacy, Burks’ challenge of the search of the vehicle would still fail
because the open container in plain view gave officers probable cause to search
the vehicle, or alternatively, the automobile exception applies.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,
section 8 of the Iowa Constitution protect the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.
In deciding the constitutionality of a search . . . , we take a two-step
approach. First, the defendant must show that he had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the area searched. Second, if the defendant
had a legitimate expectation of privacy, we must then decide whether
the State unreasonably invaded the protected interest.
2
We note the district court incorrectly determined Burks had standing to challenge the
search based on its application of State v. Eis, 348 N.W.2d 224 (Iowa 1984). However,
Eis involved a passenger’s challenge of the stop of a vehicle, not the search. Id. at 226.
Burks did not challenge the stop of the vehicle in this case, and Eis does not apply.
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Haliburton, 539 N.W.2d at 342 (internal citations omitted). “A warrantless search
is unreasonable unless it comes within a recognized exception such as consent,
exigent circumstances, or plain view.” State v. Brooks, 760 N.W.2d 197, 204 (Iowa
2009).
“A challenge to a search based on the Fourth Amendment ‘will stand or fall
on a defendant’s ability to show a substantive violation which in turn is based on a
showing of a legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular area searched or
the particular objects seized.’” State v. Abrams, No. 14-0260, 2015 WL 3884173,
at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 24, 2015) (quoting State v. Henderson, 313 N.W.2d 564,
565 (Iowa 1981)). “The party challenging a search must establish that his or her
own Fourth Amendment rights have been violated, not the rights of someone else
. . . .” State v. Ortiz, 618 N.W.2d 556, 559 (Iowa 2000).
It is well-established in Iowa that a passenger of a vehicle does not have a
legitimate expectation of privacy allowing the passenger to challenge a search of
the vehicle. See Halliburton, 539 N.W.2d at 342. In Halliburton, our supreme court
held Halliburton did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy because he was
merely a passenger in his mother’s vehicle. He was not the driver of
the vehicle when it was parked on the interstate and he did not drive
it to the restaurant. Although Halliburton possessed the keys to the
car at the time of the final search, there is no evidence that he was
in control of the vehicle, or otherwise possessed it at that time. To
the contrary, he never asserted a right to control access to the
vehicle during any of the searches. Additionally, his mother, the
owner of the vehicle, was always present except for a brief trip to the
restroom.
Id. at 342-43. This concept has been upheld by our court in many subsequent
cases. See Abrams, 2015 WL 3884174, at *3 (“We conclude Abrams did not have
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle searched by the officers. Abrams
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was not the driver of the vehicle. He was not the owner of the vehicle. The
evidence shows he was merely a recent passenger. Because Abrams did not have
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle, he cannot show his Fourth
Amendment rights were violated.”); State v. Arellano, No. 14-0051, 2015 WL
1054978, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2015) (“A passenger with neither a
possessory nor a property interest in a vehicle does not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the vehicle.”); State v. Cagley, No. 13-0500, 2014 WL
2884777, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 25, 2014) (“Cagley bears the burden to prove
his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search. He cannot
do so here because he did not own the car listed in the warrant nor did he drive it
to the bank. As a recent passenger in his mother’s car, Cagley could not
successfully challenge the vehicle search.” (citations omitted)).
Under our current precedent, Burks—a passenger who was not driving and
not in control of the vehicle—did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy to
challenge the search of the vehicle.3 “We are not at liberty to overturn Iowa
Supreme Court precedent.” State v. Hastings, 466 N.W.2d 697, 700 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1990). We therefore affirm the denial of the motion to suppress.
(2) Sentencing.
Burks also challenges the district court’s sentencing order. Burks contends
the district court did not provide sufficient reasons for the imposition of the
sentence as require by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)(d).
3
Because we determine Burks did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy as a
passenger of the vehicle and does not have standing to challenge the search of the
vehicle, we need not address the reasonableness of the search or the applicability of the
exceptions to the warrant requirement.
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“When ‘the sentence imposed is within the statutory maximum, we will only
interfere if an abuse of discretion is shown.’” Thacker, 862 N.W.2d at 405 (citation
omitted). “In exercising discretion, the district court must ‘weigh all pertinent
matters in determining a proper sentence, including the nature of the offense, the
attending circumstances, the defendant’s age, character, and propensities or
chances for reform.’” Id. (citation omitted). “Errors in sentencing, including
contentions the trial court failed to articulate adequate reasons for a particular
sentence, ‘may be challenged on direct appeal even in the absence of an objection
in the district court.’” Id. (citation omitted).
Burks asserts the district court did not provide sufficient reasons for the
sentence imposed because it merely checked boxes on the sentencing order
stating the court found “the following factors the most significant in determining this
particular sentence”: “[t]he nature and circumstances of the crime,” “[p]rotection
of the public from further offenses,” “[d]efendant’s criminal history,” “[d]efendant’s
substance abuse history,” “[d]efendant’s propensity for further criminal acts,”
“[s]tatutory sentence requirements,” “[m]aximum opportunity for rehabilitation,” and
“[t]he plea agreement.”4
“[R]ule 2.23(3)(d) requires the judge to include in his or her sentencing order
the reason for the sentence when the defendant waives the reporting of the
sentencing hearing.” State v. Thompson, 856 N.W.2d 915, 920-21 (Iowa 2014).
However, “[i]n this age of word processing, judges can use forms, . . . to check the
4
We acknowledge the record fails to identify a plea agreement or its terms.
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boxes indicating the reasons why a judge is imposing a certain sentence.” Id. at
921. Thus, the court’s use of a sentencing order form in this case was not
prohibited. See State v. Ferrell, No. 15-1153, 2016 WL 541411, at *2 (Iowa Ct.
App. Feb 10, 2016). In checking the particular boxes on the sentencing order, the
district court provided sufficient reasons for imposition of the sentence over and
above the boilerplate language. See Thacker, 862 N.W.2d at 408 (“While the rule
requires a statement of reasons on the record, a ‘terse and succinct’ statement
may be sufficient, ‘so long as the brevity of the court’s statement does not prevent
review of the exercise of the trial court’s sentencing discretion.’” (citation omitted)).
Because we find the sentence was within the statutory maximum and there was
no abuse of discretion, we affirm the sentence imposed by the district court.
IV. Conclusion.
We find the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress, and
its sentencing order did not constitute an abuse of discretion. We therefore affirm.
AFFIRMED.
Mullins, J., concurs; McDonald, J., concurs specially.
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MCDONALD, Judge (concurring specially)
I concur in the judgment. I write separately to note the limits of State v.
Halliburton, 539 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1995). In that case, the supreme court held the
defendant’s status as a “mere[ ] passenger” in a searched automobile was
insufficient to generate a reasonable expectation of privacy and standing to
challenge the search of the automobile. Id. at 342–43. In reaching that conclusion,
the supreme court relied on Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978). However,
Rakas did not hold a passenger could never have an expectation of privacy in an
automobile, instead it held mere passenger status, without more, was insufficient
to create an expectation of privacy and standing to challenge a search of the
automobile. The Supreme Court recently highlighted the distinction:
The Court in Rakas did not hold that passengers cannot have an
expectation of privacy in automobiles. To the contrary, the Court
disclaimed any intent to hold “that a passenger lawfully in an
automobile may not invoke the exclusionary rule and challenge a
search of that vehicle unless he happens to own or have a
possessory interest in it.” 439 U.S., at 150, n. 17, 99 S.Ct. 421(internal quotation marks omitted). The Court instead rejected the
argument that legitimate presence alone was sufficient to assert a
Fourth Amendment interest, which was fatal to the petitioners' case
there because they had “claimed only that they were ‘legitimately on
[the] premises' and did not claim that they had any legitimate
expectation of privacy in the areas of the car which were searched.”
Ibid.Byrd v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 2018 WL 2186175, at *8 (2018).
Here, the defendant has not asserted a particularized expectation of privacy
in the areas searched beyond that of a mere passenger in the automobile. This
case is thus squarely controlled by Halliburton, and I concur in the judgment.