In the Interest of P.J., V.P., V.P., and V.P., Minor Children ( 2018 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-0568
Filed July 18, 2018
IN THE INTEREST OF P.J., V.P, V.P., and V.P.,
Minor Children,
C.M., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Cheryl E. Traum,
District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals from the termination of her parental rights to her children.
AFFIRMED.
Jennifer Triner Olsen of Olsen Law Office, Davenport, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Anagha Dixit, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Martha L. Cox, Bettendorf, guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Mullins and McDonald, JJ.
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DANILSON, Chief Judge.
A mother appeals from the termination of her parental rights to her children,1
pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d) and (f) (2017).2
The mother claims that the evidence does not show termination of parental
rights is in the best interest of the children. She argues siblings should be kept
together, reasonable efforts were not made by the State, and the mother-child
relationship weighs against termination of her parental rights.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings.
C.M. is the mother of P.J., born in December 2009; Vo.P., born in April 2012;
and twins Va.P. and Ve.P., born in August 2013.3 In May 2015, the department
of human services (DHS) investigated concerns of abuse against P.J. by the father
of Vo.P., Va.P., and Ve.P. The father admitted to such abuse and was arrested in
July 2015. After the incident of abuse, services were offered to the mother to
address the risk of abuse to the children, domestic violence, lack of appropriate
housing, chaotic lifestyle, and unmet mental-health needs. Services went largely
unutilized and the whereabouts of the family were not well known for some time.
1
The parental rights of two putative fathers were also terminated. The putative fathers do
not appeal.
2
Section 232.116(1)(d) allows the court to terminate parental rights if the court has
previously adjudicated a child to be a child in need of assistance (CINA) and “the parents
were offered or received services to correct the circumstance which led to the adjudication
and the circumstance continues to exist despite the offer or receipt of services.”
Section 232.116(1)(f) allows the court to terminate parental rights if a child four
years or older has been adjudicated CINA, has been removed from the parents’ physical
custody for the requisite statutory period, and cannot be returned to the parent at present.
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The mother has five other children. Her parental rights to three children were terminated
by the state of Kentucky. J.J., born in 2002, is in an out-of-home placement. J.M., born
in 1999, is a teenager who is capable of self protection and is living with the mother.
3
In November 2015, the children were adjudicated to be in need of
assistance pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(b), (c)(1), (c)(2), (e), (f), (g),
(m), and (n) (2015). The children have remained in foster care since their most
recent removal and placement on February 24, 2016. P.J. is in one foster home,
brothers Vo.P and Ve.P. are in a foster home together, and Va.P. is in a third foster
home.
During these juvenile court proceedings, the mother has moved multiple
times and had various employment. Neither the housing nor the employment ever
proved long term or sufficient to provide the stability necessary for the children.
The mother underwent a substance-abuse and psychological evaluation.
No substance-abuse treatment was recommended. The mother was diagnosed
as intellectually low functioning. In response to the psychological evaluation
results, Lutheran Services, as Family Safety, Risk and Permanency (FSRP)
service provider, utilized an “easy learning nurturing handbook” to assist in
parenting education. Since July 2017, the mother has missed sixteen of thirty-
eight scheduled visitations.
On February 28, 2018, a hearing was held to determine if parental rights
should be terminated. The court terminated the mother’s parental rights to all four
children by an order filed on March 16, 2018.
II. Standard of Review.
We conduct a de novo review of termination of parental rights proceedings.
In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). Although we are not bound by the
juvenile court’s findings of fact, we do give them weight, especially in assessing
the credibility of witnesses. In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010). An
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order terminating parental rights will be upheld if there is clear and convincing
evidence of grounds for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116. Id.
Evidence is considered “clear and convincing” when there are no “serious or
substantial doubts as to the correctness [of] conclusions of law drawn from the
evidence.” Id.
III. Analysis.
Iowa Code chapter 232 termination of parental rights follows a three-step
analysis. See P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 39. The court must initially determine whether
a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) is established. Id. If a ground
for termination is established, the court must next apply the best-interest
framework set out in section 232.116(2) to decide if the grounds for termination
should result in a termination of parental rights. Id. If the statutory best-interest
framework supports termination of parental rights, the court must finally consider
if any statutory exceptions or factors set out in section 232.116(3) weigh against
termination of parental rights. Id.
A. Grounds for Termination.
The mother does not challenge the grounds on which the court found
reason to terminate her parental rights. Therefore, we do not need to review such
grounds and move on to the second part of the analysis. See id. at 40.
B. Factors in Termination.
Even if a statutory ground for termination is met, a decision to terminate
must still be in the best interests of a child after a review of Iowa Code section
232.116(2). Id. at 37. In determining the best interest, the court’s primary
considerations are “the child’s safety, the best placement for furthering the long-
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term nurturing and growth of the child, and the physical, mental, and emotional
condition and needs of the child.” Id.
Notwithstanding the mother only raised one issue—best interests—she also
contends the State has not made reasonable efforts targeted to her intellectual
deficits. However, we adopt the trial court’s findings that the mother received or
was offered services specific to her needs. The case plan was modified after DHS
discovered the mother’s intellectual deficits. To assist the mother, DHS then
modified the materials used for lower functioning individuals and, in addition,
provided “hands on guidance and redirection” during visits. And when the mother
was not attending visits, a DHS worker spoke with her to explore why she was not
attending and offer additional help. Schedule changes were offered, as were bus
tokens. A service provider gave lists of possible housing options to the parents
and either took them to look for housing or met them at residences.
The State has shown that returning the children to the mother is not in their
best interest. The mother lacks the resources, suitable housing, and employment
to provide for the children’s physical, emotional, and mental needs despite
receiving services for more than two years. See D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 708 (noting
that lower mental functioning may be a contributing factor to a parent’s inability to
provide a safe and stable home). The mother’s pattern of past behavior supports
the conclusion she will not acquire the necessary resources in the near future.
When the State proves a ground for termination, we cannot postpone a permanent
stable home for a child in hopes that the parent will eventually be able to provide
such stability long term. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 474 (Iowa 2018).
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We note, too, that the children’s physical, emotional, and mental needs are
being met in their respective foster homes. Each child is safe and doing well, and
adoption offers the best chance of permanent stability.
C. Exceptions or Factors against Termination.
Finally, we give consideration to whether any exception or factor in section
232.116(3) applies to make termination unnecessary. In her argument on the best-
interest issue, the mother also contends her parental rights should not be
terminated due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship. See Iowa Code
§ 232.116(3)(c) (noting the presence of evidence “that the termination would be
detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child
relationship” is a factor that may weigh against termination). The factors weighing
against termination in section 232.116(3) are permissive, not mandatory. See P.L.,
778 N.W.2d at 38. The court has discretion, based on the unique circumstances
of each case and the best interests of the child, whether to apply the factors in this
section to save the parent-child relationship. In re C.L.H., 500 N.W.2d 449, 454
(Iowa Ct. App. 1993).
We acknowledge the mother and the children have a bond, but it has been
adversely affected by the mother’s inconsistent visits including multiple visits that
were cancelled last minute. Whatever bond continues to exist, it does not
overcome the children’s need for permanency and security in a stable, suitable
home.
We also acknowledge that we prefer to keep siblings together. See In re
T.J.O., 527 N.W.2d 417, 420 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). Adoption may or may not allow
them to reunite. Yet, these children have been separated for more than a year,
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their lives before this last separation have been chaotic and unstable, and the
mother cannot provide them a home at present. We find that termination of the
mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. We, therefore, affirm the
termination of her parental rights.
AFFIRMED.