State of Iowa v. Samuel Edward Seidell Jr. ( 2022 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-0493
Filed March 30, 2022
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SAMUEL EDWARD SEIDELL JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Mark J. Smith, Judge.
Samuel Seidell Jr. appeals the district court’s denial of his application to
modify his sex offender registration requirements. AFFIRMED.
John O. Moeller, Davenport, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Chicchelly, JJ.
2
BOWER, Chief Judge.
Samuel Seidell Jr. appeals the district court’s denial of his application to
modify his sex offender registry (SOR) requirement. Finding no abuse of discretion
or consideration of improper factors, we affirm.
I. Background Facts.
In 2010, Seidell pleaded guilty to third-degree sexual abuse, in violation of
Iowa Code sections 709.4(1) and 709.4(2)(b) (2009), a forcible felony.1 He
received a ten-year prison sentence, was placed on the SOR, and would be on
lifetime special sentence parole upon release from prison. He is required to
register for life as the offense is an “aggravated offense against a minor” under
Iowa Code section 692A.101(2).
Seidell was released to a work release facility in 2014 and successfully
completed his sex offender program requirements in 2015. Seidell is considered
a Tier III sex offender, see Iowa Code § 692A.102(1)(c)(10), which requires he
regularly report to a parole officer and report to the sheriff four times per year. He
is also subject to the 2000-foot residency restrictions imposed by Iowa Code
section 692A.114.
In June 2020, Seidell obtained a stipulation from the Iowa Department of
Corrections (DOC) that he had fulfilled the criteria to apply for modification of the
1 The statutory provision states, “A person commits sexual abuse in the third
degree when the person performs a sex act[,] . . . [t]he act is between persons
who are not at the time cohabitating as husband and wife[,] and . . . [t]he other
person is twelve or thirteen years of age.” Iowa Code § 709.4(2)(b). Seidell
admitted that when he was seventeen years old he placed his penis into the vagina
of a twelve-year-old.
3
2000 foot residency restriction of his SOR terms.2 Seidell then filed his application
for modification in the district court, which the State resisted.
At the hearing, Seidell testified he was working, “staying out of trouble, clean
and sober, following the parole guidelines,” and complying with the residency
requirements. He asked for a full release from the SOR. Seidell’s counsel
indicated he was not eligible for full release but understood his age precluded a
recommendation for full release by the DOC.3
The now-adult victim, K.S., made a statement to the court opposing
Seidell’s release:
I remember when I was [twelve] literally sitting at—you know, in court
and I remember the judge before saying that I was supposed to get
a letter in the mail whenever he was getting released. I now have
my own child, and so I don’t know how long he’s been out of prison,
not to mention a family member of his just contacted me two days
ago asking me to just let it go and to lift the restraining order.
Also, in his statement he just made he still believes that he did
not rape anyone or he didn’t harm me or he didn’t do anything wrong.
. . . . I can’t wipe those memories out of my head. I can’t wipe out
the fear that I have for my child to go to school. . . . I can’t—if he sees
no wrong in his actions, I mean, who’s to say, like, it wouldn’t happen
again or worse or—you know what I mean?
In its ruling, the court noted Seidell had received disciplinary reports while
incarcerated and in the work release center. The district court also noted that
because Seidell was not at a “very low risk” of reoffending under the evaluation
criteria, the DOC would only stipulate to modification of the 2000-foot residency
2 The stipulation verified (1) it had been at least five years since Seidell was
required to register as a sex offender, (2) Seidell had completed all required sexual
offense treatment programming, (3) a sex offender risk assessment had been
completed, and Seidell was determined to be at low or below-average risk to
reoffend, and (4) he was not incarcerated. See Iowa Code § 692A.128 (2020)
(establishing the criteria for SOR requirement modification).
3 Seidell attempted to testify his ineligibility was due to his age and the court could
nonetheless provide him with a full release from SOR restrictions.
4
restriction. The court noted the difference between the victim’s description and the
offense and Seidell’s:
In investigating the sex offense, the author of the evaluation indicates
that the victim stated that she fell asleep on the couch and awoke to
find Mr. Seidell on top of her. The victim further claimed that Mr.
Seidell then had unprotected vaginal intercourse with her. She
further indicates that she told him to get off of her. Mr. Seidell, in his
interview with the evaluator on May 28, 2020, indicated that the
intercourse was consensual and he committed the sex act
“unintentionally.”
The court then described Seidell’s testimony at the hearing:
The court observed Mr. Seidell via video on Zoom. The court was
appalled at the lack of remorse exhibited by Mr. Seidell during his
testimony and lack of empathy for the victim who he knew was
listening to the testimony by phone. Mr. Seidell still refuses to take
full responsibility for the sex abuse perpetrated on this then [twelve]-
year-old girl. He stated at the end of the hearing that, “I’m not this
monster that my victim claims me to be. I didn’t rape her while she
was sleeping.” He was then cut off by his attorney, who indicated
that we are not re-litigating this case.
While this is true, the court does take into consideration the
appalling lack of remorse exhibited by Mr. Seidell during the hearing.
His facial expressions and demeanor during the victim’s statement
also indicate to the court that he does not fully comprehend the
gravity of perpetrating sexual abuse on [a] [twelve]-year-old girl who
is now an adult. Given the victim’s statement, this incident has had
a lifelong impact on her.
The court denied Seidell’s application, concluding:
In deciding whether or not to grant the requested relief to
Mr. Seidell, the court considers the safety of the community as well
as Mr. Seidell’s accomplishments since release from prison. In
weighing these factors, the court finds that Mr. Seidell’s testimony,
as well as his demeanor during the hearing, indicate that he is not
fully aware of the impact that he has had on this victim. Given this
fact, the court finds that he is still a threat to the community given his
minimization of what he did when he committed sexual abuse on a
[twelve]-year-old child.
5
On appeal, Seidell asserts the court erred in denying his application for
modification in light of the DOC stipulation to modification and the court considered
an improper factor in its ruling.
II. Scope and Standard of Review.
Iowa Code section 692A.128 provides that the district court
may consider modification of the sex offender registration obligation
if certain criteria are met. This initial threshold determination is
reviewed for correction of errors at law. Any other questions
involving interpretation of Iowa Code chapter 692A are also
reviewable for correction of errors at law.
Fortune v. State, 957 N.W.2d 696, 702–03 (Iowa 2021) (citations omitted).
III. Discussion.
Seidell seems to assert that because he obtained a stipulation from the
DOC, the court was required to modify his SOR terms. However, section
692A.128(2) states “[a]n application shall not be granted unless” certain threshold
requirements are met. Id. at 703 (“The statute generally provides that in order to
be considered for modification, the offender must satisfy several threshold
requirements.”). The DOC stipulation is one of those criteria. See Iowa Code
§ 692A.128(2)(e). But meeting the threshold requirements does not require
modification. As noted by our supreme court,
Once the initial threshold is met, the district court may grant
modification. . . . [T]he term “may” ordinarily vests the trial court with
discretion. “An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court
exercises its discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable
or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” “A ground or reason is
untenable when it is not supported by substantial evidence or when
it is based on an erroneous application of the law.”
Fortune, 957 N.W.2d at 703 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
6
If the applicant meets the threshold statutory requirements, the district court
decides whether the registration requirements should be modified. Id. at 705. The
district court is to consider
only those factors that bear on whether the applicant is at low risk to
reoffend and there is no substantial benefit to public safety in
extending the registration requirements. We note that “low risk” does
not mean no risk. As noted by one authority, “professional norms
prohibit psychosexual evaluators from making ‘statements asserting
that [an individual] is no longer at any risk to reoffend.’” [Wayne A.]
Logan, [Database Infamia: Exit from the Sex Offender Registries,]
2015 Wis. L. Rev. [219,] 232 (quoting Ass’n for Treatment of Sexual
Abusers, Practice Standards and Guidelines for the Evaluation,
Treatment, and Management of Adult Male Sexual Abusers 22
(2005)); see also Patterson v. Foote, 204 P.3d 97, 102 (Or. Ct. App.
2009) (“The requirement that the petitioner prove that he or she no
longer poses a ‘threat to the safety of the public’ likewise provides no
support for the state’s insistence upon proof of a complete and total
absence of a risk of reoffense.”). And, conclusory appeals to public
safety do not defeat a modification application. The threat to public
safety must be tied to the individual applicant and the record
established in each case.
Id. at 706.
Seidell argues the court considered an irrelevant factor—his lack of
remorse. He asserts that lack of remorse is not a risk factor considered in the
scientific tests and therefore it should be given no weight. We cannot agree. The
supreme court in Fortune found that “the district court erred in relying on a lack of
remorse that did not have a factual basis in the record.” Id. at 709 (emphasis
added). Thus, the court implies lack of remorse is a proper factor to consider if
there is a factual basis for the finding. Seidell does not challenge the court’s finding
of lack of remorse.
The court considered proper factors and did not abuse its discretion in
denying the application to modify. We therefore affirm.
AFFIRMED.