State of Iowa v. Brady Murphy ( 2022 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-0938
Filed April 13, 2022
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
BRADY MURPHY,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cass County, Margaret Reyes,
Judge.
A defendant appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence based
on the allegedly unlawful stop of his vehicle. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Robert G. Rehkemper of Gourley, Rehkemper & Lindholm, P.L.C., West
Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Israel Kodiaga, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by May, P.J., and Schumacher and Badding, JJ.
2
BADDING, Judge.
When does crossing a traffic line cross the line into reasonable suspicion
that criminal activity is afoot? Brady Murphy was pulled over after crossing the
right fog line once while driving down a two-lane divided highway at night. He was
arrested for operating while intoxicated. Murphy unsuccessfully sought to
suppress all evidence derived from the traffic stop, arguing that under State v.
Tague, 676 N.W.2d 1977, 204 (Iowa 2004), “a single, isolated movement over a
fog line” does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop.
After objectively reviewing the totality of the circumstances, we agree and reverse
and remand for further proceedings.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Shortly before midnight on February 27, 2021, a sheriff’s deputy was
travelling south on a two-lane divided highway in rural Iowa when he saw an
oncoming pickup truck driven by Murphy approaching in the northbound
lane. According to the deputy’s arrest report, which was attached to the minutes
of evidence, the truck’s “passenger side tires crossed the fog line and went onto
the shoulder of the road.” Wanting to investigate further, the deputy made a U-turn
and followed the truck. By the time the deputy activated his emergency lights to
initiate a traffic stop, the truck had entered a residential area. After pulling into a
driveway, Murphy exited the truck to talk to the deputy. Murphy acknowledged
that he had crossed the fog line as he passed the deputy on the highway.
While talking to him, the deputy discovered an open beer can in the center
cup holder of Murphy’s truck and observed signs of intoxication in Murphy. He
asked Murphy to perform field sobriety tests, which Murphy failed. A preliminary
3
breath test showed intoxication over the legal limit, and Murphy was arrested for
operating while intoxicated. After arriving at the county jail, Murphy provided a
chemical breath sample that registered an alcohol concentration of 0.141.
The State filed a criminal complaint against Murphy for operating while
intoxicated, first offense under Iowa Code section 321J.2(2)(A) (2021). Murphy
moved to suppress all evidence derived from the traffic stop, arguing the deputy
did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle, thereby
violating his rights under the United States and Iowa Constitutions.
At the suppression hearing, when asked by the State to describe what he
observed of Murphy’s vehicle, the deputy testified: “I noticed that vehicle leave the
road with its passenger side tires. . . . He was off on the shoulder, then back on
the road. It wasn’t sustained.” He was unable to estimate how far off the road
Murphy’s vehicle traveled. But on cross-examination, the deputy said that
Murphy’s truck “left the road significantly” after crossing the right fog line and that
it was “back on the road” in what he described as “a pretty sudden movement.”
The deputy testified that he initiated the traffic stop because he had previously
dealt with impaired or intoxicated drivers, as well as those who had “drifted off the
road” due to tiredness or medical issues, so he wanted “to see what this particular
issue was.”
After reviewing the deputy’s testimony and dashboard camera footage of
the roadway encounter, the district court denied Murphy’s motion to suppress. The
court reasoned:
When looking at the totality of the circumstances surrounding
this traffic stop, the court finds that [the deputy] had grounds for an
investigatory stop. It was nearly midnight on a dark two-lane highway
4
when the deputy witnessed [Murphy’s] vehicle veer off the roadway
onto the gravel shoulder where it straddled the fog-line as the two
vehicles met and passed each other. The court finds these facts to
be distinguishable from those set out in Tague where the defendant
“just barely” crossed the left lane line before immediately returning to
his traffic lane.
Following this adverse ruling, Murphy stipulated to a trial on the minutes and was
found guilty by the district court. Murphy now appeals the suppression ruling on
the narrow issue of whether the deputy had reasonable suspicion to initiate an
investigatory stop.
II. Analysis
Murphy argues the district court erred in finding his case distinguishable
from Tague, 676 N.W.2d at 204, which held that an officer who observed a driver
“crossing the edge line for a brief moment” did not have reasonable suspicion to
stop the vehicle for investigatory purposes. The court in Tague reasoned that “any
vehicle could be subject to an isolated incident of briefly crossing an edge line of
a divided roadway without giving rise to the suspicion of intoxication or fatigue.”
607 N.W.2d at 205. Central to the court’s reasoning was that “[t]here was no
testimony as to any factors, which would support a reasonable suspicion,” that the
defendant was driving under the influence such as weaving, veering between
lanes, or erratic speed changes. Id. at 204–05 (distinguishing cases in which
reasonable suspicion existed because defendant was driving erratically in general,
in addition to crossing lane lines). Murphy urges us to follow Tague, the facts of
which he asserts are “almost identical to the case at bar,” to conclude that his one-
time act of crossing the fog line did not give rise to reasonable suspicion for a traffic
stop.
5
“A traffic stop is unquestionably a seizure.” State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d 288,
292 (Iowa 2013); accord Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). Because
Murphy’s challenge is based on the prohibition against unreasonable seizures
under both article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution and the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution,1 we review the denial of his motion to suppress
de novo. See State v. Struve, 956 N.W.2d 90, 95 (Iowa 2021). In exercising de
novo review, we independently evaluate the totality of the circumstances as shown
by the record and defer to the district court’s fact findings, although we are not
bound by them. Id.As mentioned, the fighting issue in this appeal is whether there was
reasonable suspicion for the deputy to stop Murphy’s vehicle. 2 A traffic stop may
be conducted for investigative purposes but is only reasonable “when articulable
facts and all the circumstances confronting the officer at the time give rise to a
reasonable belief that criminal activity may be afoot.” McIver, 858 N.W.2d at 702.
Thus, the totality of the circumstances must be considered when determining
whether reasonable suspicion existed to initiate the stop in the first place. Id. The
1 In the absence of argument to the contrary, we will apply the United States and
Iowa constitutional provisions in the same manner. State v. McIver, 858 N.W.2d
699, 702 (Iowa 2015).
2 The State raises an alternative argument that the traffic stop was supported by
probable cause because the deputy witnessed Murphy violate Iowa Code section
321.306(1), which requires a vehicle traveling on a divided highway with three or
more lanes to “be driven as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane.” We
agree with Murphy that the State cannot raise this argument for the first time on
appeal. See State v. Steffens, 889 N.W.2d 691, 697 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) (finding
the State did not preserve its reasonable-suspicion argument where that argument
was not raised before or addressed by the district court). But even if we were to
entertain it, the statute plainly does not apply here because the roadway at issue
is divided into two lanes, not “three or more.” See Iowa Code § 321.306(1).
6
State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop. Tague, 676 N.W.2d at 204.
“If the State does not meet this burden, the evidence obtained through the stop
must be suppressed.” State v. Louwrens, 792 N.W.2d 649, 651–52 (Iowa 2010).
Reasonable suspicion is “more than a hunch, suspicion, or gut feeling.” State v.
Gallardo, No. 14-0350, 2015 WL 5278948, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2015)
(per curiam); accord Tague, 676 N.W.2d at 204.
In distinguishing Tague, the district court noted that Murphy’s truck
“remained on the shoulder straddling the fog line more than just briefly before
returning to the roadway.” Cf. 676 N.W.2d at 203 (highlighting the fact that
defendant’s vehicle had “just barely crossed the left edge line for a brief
period”). Plus, the court credited the deputy’s testimony that Murphy’s movement
back onto the road was “sudden.” While these are relevant circumstances to be
considered in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, we do not agree with the
court’s conclusion that they gave rise to reasonable suspicion that criminal activity
was afoot. See McIver, 858 N.W.2d at 703.
Even if the movement of crossing the fog line itself was arguably more
dramatic here than that in Tague, the bottom line is that there was no testimony or
other evidence presented as to any other factors that would support a reasonable
suspicion of Murphy’s intoxication beyond that single act. See 676 N.W.2d at 205.
The Tague court made clear that “an isolated incident of briefly crossing an edge
line of a divided roadway” is insufficient on its own to justify a stop based on the
driver’s suspected intoxication or fatigue. Id. at 205 (emphasis added). In cases
in which reasonable suspicion was found in the traffic-stop context, the court in
7
Tague specifically noted there was evidence of excessive speeding, swerving,
repeated lane crossings, and otherwise erratic driving so as to give rise to a
reasonable belief that the driver was impaired. See id. Those other factors are
not present here.
Perhaps the closest case to the facts presented here is State v. Fielder,
No. 10-0289, 2010 WL 4485898, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2010), which is cited
and distinguished by Murphy in his appellate brief. In that case, the officer was
patrolling at around 10:30 p.m. on the Fourth of July when he observed Fielder’s
vehicle pass in front of him and make “two sudden movements off onto the
shoulder” of the highway within a matter of seconds. Fielder, 2010 WL 4485898,
at *1. As the officer followed Fielder’s vehicle, he again saw Fielder’s tires touch
the fog line for a couple of seconds. Id. The officer reported that all three instances
occurred within a one-half mile distance. Id. Based on those circumstances, this
court concluded that the traffic stop initiated by the officer was supported by
reasonable suspicion. Id. at *2. We reasoned that, although there was not
“overwhelming evidence,” the erratic driving when coupled with the Fourth of July
holiday, which is often “associate[d] with alcohol consumption and late-night
driving,” was sufficient to give rise to a reasonable belief that Fielder was driving
while intoxicated. Id.
Unlike in Fielder, the deputy here acknowledged that what he observed was
a single, isolated movement over the fog line. He did not otherwise testify that
Murphy was weaving, driving erratically, or speeding. At most, the deputy
described Murphy’s movement over the fog line and back onto the road as “pretty
sudden.” He also testified Murphy’s truck “left the road significantly.” But the dash-
8
cam video recording does not support the deputy’s descriptions. See State v.
Tangara, No. 09-0587, 2009 WL 3775149, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2009)
(noting officer’s description of defendant’s driving behavior was “not evidenced on
the video recording, which the officer testified captured all observations” and
therefore declining to consider it). As the district court noted, the video recording
more accurately shows that Murphy’s truck “straddled” the fog line such that the
passenger side tires were the only parts touching the gravel shoulder of the road. It
is also notable that the deputy’s dashboard camera captured Murphy’s truck
straddling the right fog line just as it was coming around a curve that headed in a
leftward direction. After navigating the curve, Murphy continued on the fog line for
only one to two more seconds before returning to the roadway.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, we cannot conclude the deputy
had reasonable suspicion to stop Murphy’s vehicle. Consistent with Tague, and
other cases in line with its facts, we do not believe Murphy’s one-time act of
crossing the fog line with his truck’s passenger side tires gave rise to a reasonable
suspicion that he was driving while intoxicated. See, e.g., State v. Lobo, No. 17-
1768, 2019 WL 762192, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2019) (Tabor, P.J.,
dissenting) (collecting cases that found no reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop).
By focusing only on whether Murphy’s truck crossed the fog line “just barely” and
for how long, the district court overlooked the important point from Tague—that
there must be more than a single instance of poor driving so as to distinguish
between everyday drivers who make a momentary mistake and those who are
reasonably suspected to be driving while impaired. See 676 N.W.2d at 205
(recognizing that failure to stay within lane lines “happens all too often” from drivers
9
“talking on their cell phone, looking at a map, adjusting the radio, adjusting the
heater, defroster or air condition, or checking on a child restrained in the back
seat”).
Like Murphy, we find it significant that the State failed to cite a single case
from our appellate courts concluding “that a stop of a vehicle was constitutional
based upon a single, isolated incident of crossing an edge or fog line.” All of the
cases upholding investigative traffic stops based on reasonable suspicion involved
“more than a person weaving within their own lane or ‘briefly crossing an edge line
of a divided roadway.’” See Lobo, 2019 WL 762192, at *3 (collecting cases finding
reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop). Indeed, the only case cited by the State
as comparable to this one involved a vehicle that made a wide turn on a corner,
crossed “the center line on occasion,” and weaved over the fog line before
“crossing a rumble strip, leaving the travel portion of the highway, and driving on
the shoulder until” coming to a stop sign. See State v. Sorenson, No. 14-1101,
2016 WL 718984, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2016).
Because we conclude the deputy did not have reasonable suspicion to stop
Murphy’s vehicle, the stop constituted an unlawful seizure under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa
Constitution. Accordingly, all evidence obtained as a result of that seizure must
be suppressed. We thus reverse the denial of Murphy’s motion to suppress,
vacate his conviction and sentence, and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. See State v. Stevens, 970 N.W.2d 598, 611 (Iowa 2022).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.