In the Interest of A.M., Minor Child ( 2022 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-0218
Filed April 13, 2022
IN THE INTEREST OF A.M.,
Minor Child,
C.F., Mother,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Stephen A. Owen,
District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to a child.
AFFIRMED.
Brian T. Bappe of Bappe Law Office, Nevada, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Toby J. Gordon, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Andrew Meyer of Newbrough Law Firm, LLP, Ames, attorney and guardian
ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Chicchelly, JJ.
2
VAITHESWARAN, Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to a child, born in
2020. She contends (1) the department of human services failed to make
reasonable efforts toward reunification; (2) termination was not in the child’s best
interests; and (3) she should have been afforded an exception to termination based
on her bond with the child.
Shortly after his birth, the child “suffered severe head and lung injuries at
the hands of his father.”1 A.M., 2021 WL 5106043, at *1. The district court ordered
the child removed from parental care. The parents stipulated to his adjudication
as a child in need of assistance. The court later afforded the mother a six-month
extension to facilitate reunification. In time, the court ordered termination of her
parental rights. The child remained out of the mother’s care from the time of
removal through the termination hearing thirteen months later.
The mother does not challenge the ground for termination cited by the
district court. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h) (2021) (requiring proof of several
elements, including proof the child cannot be returned to parental custody). But
her challenge to the department’s reasonable-efforts obligation is effectively a
challenge to that ground. See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492–93 (Iowa 2000)
(noting certain specified grounds for termination “contain a common element which
implicates the reasonable effort requirement” and stating, “The State must show
1 The father’s parental rights were terminated before the mother’s. He appealed,
and this court affirmed the termination. In re A.M., No. 21-1225, 2021 WL
5106043, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2021). An earlier opinion addressed service
of process on the father. See In re A.M., No. 21-0772, 2021 WL 3660866, at *1
(Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2021).
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reasonable efforts as a part of its ultimate proof the child cannot be safely returned
to the care of a parent.”).2 We will consider the mother’s reasonable-efforts
argument in that context.
The mother appears to argue that she was entitled to more visits with the
child. At the same time, she testified there were no services the department should
have offered that it did not. In any event, the mother failed to fully participate in
the visits she was given. The department case manager testified she was
scheduled for eighteen visits between the previous hearing and the termination
hearing and she only attended “one or two.” In light of her minimal participation in
scheduled visits, we conclude the department did not violate its reasonable-efforts
mandate by failing to increase the number of visits. We further conclude the State
proved that the child could not be returned to her custody as required by section
232.116(1)(h).
Termination must be in the child’s best interests. See Iowa Code
§ 232.116(2). The mother argues termination was not in the child’s best interests
because “she had routine contact with the child and she was an active participant
in visitation services.” The number of missed visits undercuts that assertion. The
mother also contends the child’s father was the parent who was responsible for
the abuse. True. But the department reported that she “continue[d] to support [the
child]’s abuser” and had not “gained insight into how continuing a relationship with
[the child’s] abuser put [the child] in harm’s way.” In the department words, the
mother “minimize[d] the abuse [the child] endured.”
2The lettering of those grounds was modified following the court’s opinion in that
case.
4
The mother conceded she “sided with” the father when the department tried
to “blame” him, even though the child “ended up in the hospital near dead.” Her
belated recognition that there was “no excuse for” that is less persuasive than the
department’s assessment of her caretaking abilities. The agency reported that she
could not “be relied upon to meet all of [the child’s] daily needs and assure [the
child’s] medical needs” were “met on a consistent basis.” The case manager
testified, the child would “likely always have these needs” and, given the mother’s
“lack of engagement . . . throughout the case,” reunification would place him “at
significant risk of harm.”
Six additional months of services would not have alleviated the concerns,
as the mother urges. The mother received a six-month extension, and her
participation in services during that period waned rather than improved. On our de
novo review, we conclude termination was in the child’s best interests.
We are left with the question of whether an exception to termination was
warranted based on the parent-child bond. See id. § 232.116(3)(c). The child was
removed from parental care less than three weeks after his birth. The department
reported that while the mother was “able to be attentive and affectionate towards”
the child during supervised visits, she appeared “to have more of a sibling
attachment . . . than a parent-child bond.” Given the child’s serious medical needs
and the mother’s disengagement from services designed to attune her to those
needs, we conclude the exception to termination was appropriately not invoked.
We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights to the child.
AFFIRMED.