Willie James Herron, Jr. v. State of Iowa ( 2022 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 19-1909
    Filed April 27, 2022
    WILLIE JAMES HERRON, JR.,
    Applicant-Appellant,
    vs.
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert B. Hanson,
    Judge.
    Willie Herron appeals the denial of his second application for postconviction
    relief. AFFIRMED.
    Ronald W. Kepford, Winterset, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant
    Attorney General, for appellee State.
    Considered by Tabor, P.J., May, J., and Vogel, S.J.*
    *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
    (2022).
    2
    VOGEL, Senior Judge.
    In 2009, sentence was imposed upon Willie Herron’s convictions for two
    counts of first-degree burglary and one count of first-degree robbery. We affirmed
    on direct appeal, rejecting his various claims of error, abuse of discretion, and
    ineffective assistance of counsel. See generally State v. Herron, No. 09-1836,
    
    2011 WL 662412
     (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2011). Procedendo issued in April 2011.
    Herron filed his first application for postconviction relief (PCR) in September
    2011. That application was denied by the district court. We affirmed, rejecting
    Herron’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial and PCR counsel. See generally
    Herron v. State, No. 14-1196, 
    2016 WL 5929980
     (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2016).
    Procedendo following that appeal issued in early March 2017.
    Nearly ten months later, in late December 2017, Herron filed the PCR
    application precipitating this appeal. Citing the supreme court’s recent decision in
    State v. Plain, 
    898 N.W.2d 801
     (2017), he argued his right to an impartial jury
    drawn from a fair cross-section of the community was violated. In an amended
    application, he added claims that trial, appellate, and his first PCR counsel were
    ineffective in failing to raise the fair-cross-section claim.
    In time, the State filed a motion for summary disposition, arguing Herron’s
    application was barred by the three-year statute of limitations contained in Iowa
    Code section 822.3 (2017), the second application was not promptly filed after the
    conclusion of the first proceeding within the meaning of Allison v. State,1 and Plain
    1  See 
    914 N.W.2d 866
    , 891 (Iowa 2018) (holding that where a timely application is
    filed within the statute of limitations alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel,
    the filing of a successive application that alleges ineffective assistance of
    postconviction counsel in presenting the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel
    3
    is not entitled to retroactive treatment. The court denied the motion on the basis
    that genuine issues of material fact remained, and the matter proceeded to trial.
    Following trial, the district court concluded the application was untimely,
    Plain is not entitled to retroactive treatment, and none of Herron’s prior attorneys
    rendered ineffective assistance in failing to raise the issue. The court denied
    Herron’s application, and this appeal followed.
    We ordinarily review the denial of a PCR application for legal error, but our
    review is de novo when claims of ineffective assistance of counsel come into play.
    Sothman v. State, 
    967 N.W.2d 512
    , 522 (Iowa 2021).
    Herron first argues the court erred in finding his application was untimely.
    He asserts his application was promptly filed following the conclusion of the first
    proceeding within the meaning of Allison. Herron did not file his second application
    until nearly ten months after the conclusion of the first proceeding. We decline
    Herron’s invitation to reevaluate what qualifies as prompt, and we summarily
    conclude his second application was not prompt within the meaning of Allison.
    See, e.g., Maddox v. State, No. 19-1916, 
    2020 WL 5230367
    , at *3 (Iowa Ct. App.
    Sept. 2, 2020) (finding 121 days, or roughly four months, does not qualify as
    prompt), further review denied (Oct. 28, 2020); Polk v. State, No. 18-0309, 
    2019 WL 3945964
    , at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2019) (finding application filed “nearly
    six months” after procedendo issued was not filed promptly within the meaning of
    Allison).
    claim, the filing of the second application relates back to the time of the filing of the
    original application so long as the successive application is filed promptly after the
    conclusion of the original action).
    4
    Herron goes on to argue the filing of his application roughly six months after
    the Plain decision satisfies the promptness requirement. But six months is also
    not prompt. Maddox, 
    2020 WL 5230367
    , at *3; Polk, 
    2019 WL 3945964
    , at *1.
    And the Allison decision was narrow and “says what it says.” Velazquez-Ramirez
    v. State, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 
    2022 WL 108542
    , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. 2022). “[B]y
    its plain terms, Allison only applies to second PCRs ‘filed promptly after the
    conclusion of the first PCR action.’” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted). Having concluded
    Allison does not save the application from the statute of limitations, we find it
    unnecessary to address Herron’s position on what types of claims Allison allows
    to be brought in a successive application.2
    Next, Herron argues the district court erred in determining Plain is not
    entitled to retroactive treatment. It is true that Plain serves as “a new ground of
    law under section 822.3.” Thongvanh v. State, 
    938 N.W.2d 2
    , 16 (Iowa 2020).
    That said, it “does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.”          
    Id.
    “Because Plain cannot retroactively apply to [Herron’s] jury-composition claim, he
    has no viable jury-composition claim in this PCR proceeding.” Nelson v. State,
    No. 18-1928, 
    2020 WL 7021509
    , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2020). And because
    Herron’s conviction was final when Plain was decided, he cannot rely on it to
    support his claims of ineffective assistance of prior counsel, which we thus find
    unnecessary to address. See, e.g., Bol v. State, No. 19-0225, 
    2020 WL 3571807
    ,
    at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 1, 2020).
    2We note our recent “definitive” conclusion that the legislature invalidated Allison’s
    relation-back doctrine as it relates to applications filed on or after July 1, 2019. See
    Brooks v. State, No. 20-1652, 
    2022 WL 951080
    , at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 30,
    2022).
    5
    We affirm the denial of Herron’s PCR application.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-1909

Filed Date: 4/27/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/27/2022