In the Interest of R.R. nd P.A. ( 2021 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-0733
Filed August 18, 2021
IN THE INTEREST OF R.R. AND P.A.,
Minor Children,
R.A., Father,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clay County, Andrew Smith, District
Associate Judge.
The father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his children.
AFFIRMED.
Lisa K. Mazurek of Miller Miller Miller P.C., Cherokee, for appellant father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Diane Murphy Smith, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Shannon Lee Sandy of Sandy Law Firm, P.C., Spirit Lake, attorney and
guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., Ahlers, J., and Doyle, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2021).
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AHLERS, Judge.
The father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his children, R.R.
(born in 2013) and P.A. (born in 2010).1 He claims the Iowa Department of Human
Services (DHS) failed to make reasonable efforts toward reunification. See Iowa
Code § 232.102(7) (2021) (requiring the DHS to “make every reasonable effort to
return the child[ren] to the child[ren]’s home as quickly as possible consistent with
the best interests of the child[ren]”). Specifically, he argues the substance-abuse
services offered to him were “unreasonable” based on the temporary unavailability
of in-person treatment due to the COVID-19 pandemic. He also asserts it was
unreasonable for Family Centered Services (FCS) to offer solution-based
casework at the same time it was supervising family visits with the children. The
juvenile court had this to say about the father’s reasonable-efforts claims:
[B]oth parents were directed to treatment providers, had the
opportunity to participate in both inpatient and outpatient treatment,
and were reminded repeatedly of the need for consistency in follow-
through with those services. Any inability to meet that goal of
maintaining sobriety is attributable to the lack of follow-through from
the parents and not in any way attributable to the FCS provider or
the particular manner in which those services were presented to the
parents.
....
With respect to the specific argument that lack of face-to-face
contact negatively impacted the services provided to these parents,
that argument is not supported by the evidence. Both parents had
the opportunity for face-to-face contact with providers by July or
August of 2020. Despite arguments to the contrary, urinalysis was
occurring as [the father] had already attempted to cheat at least two
tests by that time. Both parents were aware at that time of the
recommendation for inpatient treatment. By the beginning of August
. . . [the father] had declared he would not attend inpatient treatment
despite the recommendation. . . . Both parents continued to use, test
1The mother’s parental rights to the children were also terminated, but she does
not appeal.
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positive, and attempt to cheat drug testing well after the resumption
of in-person services.
The father argues that not enough testing was conducted in
this matter. However, the testing which was conducted, combined
with [the parents’] attempts to cheat drug testing throughout the
course of the case, is sufficient to demonstrate continued use by both
parents. It is not clear what benefit would be achieved from
additional testing.
The State argues the father failed to preserve error on his reasonable-
efforts claims. The father claims error was preserved by contesting termination
and raising the reasonable-efforts issue at the termination hearing. We agree with
the State.
“The Department has an obligation to make reasonable efforts toward
reunification, but a parent has an equal obligation to demand other, different, or
additional services prior to a permanency or termination hearing.” In re A.A.G.,
708 N.W.2d 85, 91 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005). Our supreme court has explained the
parent’s obligation as follows:
If a parent has a complaint regarding services, the parent must make
such challenge at the removal, when the case permanency plan is
entered, or at later review hearings. Moreover, voicing complaints
regarding the adequacy of services to a social worker is not
sufficient. A parent must inform the juvenile court of such challenge.
In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Iowa 2002) (internal citations omitted). Nothing
in the record shows the father raised any concerns with the substance-abuse
services offered before the termination hearing. Similarly, the father’s complaint
about FCS providing solution-based casework at the same time it supervised visits
was not brought to the juvenile court’s attention until the termination hearing.
Informing the juvenile court of claimed inadequacies of services for the first time at
the termination hearing is too late. “[I]f a parent fails to request other services at
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the proper time, the parent waives the issue and may not later challenge it at the
termination proceeding.’” Id.; accord In re T.S., 868 N.W.2d 425, 442 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2015). We conclude the father waived the reasonable-efforts issues he
raises on appeal by failing to inform the juvenile court of the challenges at removal,
when the case permanency plan was entered, at a review hearing, or at any other
time before the termination hearing.
The father raises no other challenge to the termination of his parental rights,
so we affirm without further consideration.
AFFIRMED.