In the Interest of P.B., Minor Child ( 2023 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-1467
Filed April 26, 2023
IN THE INTEREST OF P.B.,
Minor Child,
B.M., Mother,
Petitioner-Appellee,
J.B., Father,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marion County, Erica Crisp, District
Associate Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights under Iowa Code
chapter 600A (2021). AFFIRMED.
Ryan A. Genest of Simpson, Jensen, Abels, Fischer & Bouslog, P.C., Des
Moines, for appellant.
Andrew B. Howie of Shindler, Anderson, Goplerud & Weese, P.C., West
Des Moines, for appellee.
Lois Vroom, Knoxville, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.
Heard by Bower, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Tabor, JJ.
2
PER CURIAM.
A father, J.B., appeals the termination of his parental rights under Iowa
Code section 600A.8(3)(b) (2021). He contends that he did not abandon his
daughter, P.B. And he asserts that termination was not in her best interests. On
our review, we find P.B.’s mother, B.M., offered clear and convincing evidence of
abandonment. We also conclude that termination serves P.B.’s best interests.
Thus, we affirm the termination order.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
The parents married in June 2010. They welcomed their daughter, P.B., in
February 2015. Before his daughter’s birth, J.B. completed an eleven-month tour
in Afghanistan with the United States Army National Guard.1 When he returned
from service, J.B. suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), a traumatic
brain injury, sleep apnea, and nerve damage to his back and hands.2 His mental-
health issues contributed to strife in their marriage; J.B. admitted that they “were
fighting a lot at the time, a lot of arguing, and I was just not being a good husband.
I was sleeping on the couch, hanging out with friends more than I should of,
drinking a little bit more than I should of.”
By October 2015, J.B. left a note for B.M. saying that he planned to move
out: “I specifically said I think I need to either get an apartment on my own or . . .
1He also completed a two-year tour in Iraq before the marriage.
2Some of his mental-health issues may stem from the causalities of his fellow
soldiers in Afghanistan: “I lost two out of my squad July 16, 2012, and I lost four
out of first platoon January 6, 2012.”
3
move in with my parents, and we need to work on us, that I'm having all these
issues.” He left the next day for Des Moines, but left most his belongings behind.3
B.M. immediately called J.B.'s parents. They asked J.B. what the note meant. He
responded, "I don't know what it means."
B.M. filed for divorce that November. After J.B. was served with the divorce
petition, he “had a breakdown” and attempted suicide. He realized he “needed to
get help” and went to the Veterans Affairs (VA) Hospital in Des Moines. The father
entered a 90-day PTSD program. He was not allowed to leave until the program
was completed. And he stayed for 100 days. He testified that he was discharged
with a disability rating of 100 percent for his PTSD and 70 percent for his brain
injury. He had minimal contact with P.B. during this time. But, at his request, B.M.
did bring the child for two visits while he was in the hospital.
J.B. failed to respond to the divorce petition. So the district court entered a
default decree in February 2016. The court ordered J.B. to pay $114 in monthly
child support, based on the federal minimum wage. The district court awarded
sole legal custody and physical care of P.B. to B.M., who lived in Peoria, Iowa.
The decree allowed J.B. visitation, “at the times, days, and in a manner as may be
agreed upon by the parties from time to time, and not to interfere with the activities,
well-being and best interest of the child.” Plus, J.B.’s visits had to be supervised
by B.M. or another adult that she designated. J.B. testified he did not blame the
Court “by any means” for acquiescing in B.M.’s request to be in charge of visitation.
3 The mother testified that he did not tell her where he was going. But he disputes
that account.
4
Following the divorce, J.B. moved out of Iowa. He testified that the parents
of a fallen comrade loaned him money to relocate to Indiana so he could “get work
and obviously finish working on myself.” After the move, he worked full-time as a
corrections officer. Meanwhile, B.M. stayed with P.B. in Peoria. They continued
to have some contact with P.B.’s paternal grandparents, who also lived in Iowa.
However, J.B. did not have any personal contact with the child for nearly five years.
According to trial testimony, J.B. had four visits with his daughter after he
moved. Their first interaction was at the Eddyville Raceway. The second visit was
at the Blank Park Zoo in 2017. He also saw P.B. at Christmas time that year. And
B.M. recalled that J.B. “showed up randomly” on her porch when he was back in
Iowa once to visit his parents. On top of those in-person visits, J.B. testified that
he and his daughter spoke on the phone two or three times per week while he was
living in Indiana.
But things changed when both parents remarried in 2018.4 B.M.—along
with P.B.—moved to a home in Pella with her new husband, J.M.5 That year,
according to J.B.’s testimony, “all contact stopped, and I would just get voicemails.”
He remembered calling B.M. from his office phone; she picked up, then hung up,
realizing it was him. And J.B.’s mother, D.B., also testified that she saw B.M. send
a call from J.B. to voicemail.
B.M. testified that she decided in 2018 that contact between J.B. and their
daughter was no longer in the child’s best interests. Yet B.M. claimed that she
4By the time of trial, J.B. and his new wife had a five-month-old son.
5Pella was about twenty miles away from B.M.’s former home in Peoria. B.M. had
a son with her new spouse and became a stepmother to his three daughters from
a previous marriage. Their family moved to a different address in Pella in 2019.
5
never told J.B. that she was ending communication.6 But J.B. testified that he got
the message through his parents. They showed him text messages and emails
from B.M. informing them that they too would be cut off from their grandchild if they
allowed him to contact P.B.
After learning of B.M.’s decision, J.B. said he considered hiring a lawyer,
but couldn’t afford one: “I did call several, tried to reach out to several Veteran
Services to see if a lawyer could be appointed or help someone with—you know,
on disability and, unfortunately, that just wasn’t the case.” J.B.’s mother
corroborated his inability to afford legal representation: “He didn’t have the money
to do that.”7 Despite his limited means, J.B. did maintain regular employment.
Moving from Indiana, he took a job in North Carolina with a specialty lighting
company. Eighteen months later, he relocated to Virginia, where he trained young
people how to ride motocross.
P.B.’s relationship with her paternal grandparents also changed after B.M.
remarried. The couple, who lived in Sully, had been seeing P.B. two to three times
per week. Then after 2018, B.M. restricted their visits. For example, P.B. could
not stay overnight at her grandparents’ house because B.M. worried they would
allow J.B. to see her. Still, they would take P.B. camping one weekend per month.
But B.M. ended those interactions too in October 2019.
6 B.M. admitted that if J.B. had asked to see P.B., she would have said no.
7 When asked why she did not assist in lining up an attorney, the grandmother
testified that J.B. was still working through his PTSD and she “also didn’t have the
money at that point” to help.
6
That same year, J.B. tried to pay child support but did not follow through.8
In January, February, March, and April, he sent checks in the amount of $150.00.
But when B.M. waited to deposit all four checks at once that April, they were
returned for insufficient funds. B.M. testified that J.B. left an angry voicemail after
the checks bounced: “He specifically said that he didn’t want to ever have anything
to do with [P.B.] again.” J.B. disputed saying that. B.M. also testified that she had
“a stack” of checks “at home now that I haven’t bothered to take to the bank.”
B.M. petitioned to terminate J.B.’s parental rights to P.B. in November 2021.
The district court set a hearing and appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) to
represent P.B.’s interests. The GAL filed a report reflecting her conversations with
B.M. and P.B. The GAL said she “attempted to contact [J.B.] through his attorney
to conduct an interview but that never occurred.” J.B. acknowledged he and his
attorney were never able to quite manage to set up a time to talk with her, and J.B.
further acknowledged it was not the GAL's fault.
After B.M. filed her petition, J.B. met his unpaid child support obligation with
help from his mother. The grandmother testified that she was subtracting the
payment from J.B.’s inheritance: “unfortunately, [J.B.] doesn’t balance a
checkbook . . . so that’s why I took over and said, I will send the checks.”
Two days before hearing, J.B. moved for a continuance. He claimed to be
“in the process of relocating” to Knoxville, Iowa.9 He asked for six months to
“possibly reestablish a relationship with his child.” But the court denied the motion.
8 B.M. testified that J.B. stopped paying support after sending one initial check at
the “very, very beginning” of their divorce.
9 J.B. testified that he and his wife bought a home with help from her aunt and
uncle with a move-in date of next August 2022.
7
Both parents and the paternal grandmother testified at trial. The GAL filed
a report recommending termination.10 The district court terminated J.B.’s parental
rights on abandonment grounds. The court also found that termination was in the
child’s best interests. J.B. now appeals.
II. Scope and Standard of Review
We review private terminations under chapter 600A de novo. In re
C.A.V., 787 N.W.2d 96, 99 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010). We give weight to the district
court’s factual findings—particularly on credibility issues—but are not bound by
them. Id. Our primary concern is P.B.’s best interests. See id.III. Analysis
Terminations under chapter 600A follow a two-step process. In re
B.H.A., 938 N.W.2d 227, 232 (Iowa 2020). First, the petitioner must prove a
ground for termination. Id. Second, the petitioner must show termination is in the
child’s best interests. Id. The petitioner must offer clear and convincing evidence
for both steps. Id. The clear-and-convincing standard “is the highest evidentiary
burden” for civil cases. In re M.S., 889 N.W.2d 675, 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016). For
a party to meet this burden, “there must be no serious or substantial doubt about
the correctness of a particular conclusion drawn from the evidence.” Id. (citing In
re L.G., 532 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995)).
10 The GAL report also referenced a conversation with B.M. where she stated she
had “concerns about [J.B.’s] mental instability and angry outbursts, and his history
of dishonesty and substance abuse.”
8
A. Abandonment
The district court found that B.M. offered clear and convincing evidence that
J.B. abandoned P.B. See Iowa Code § 600A.8(3)(b). Parents abandon their
children under this framework when they “reject[] the duties imposed by the parent-
child relationship.” Id. § 600A.2(20). That rejection is proven if—while being able
to do so—a parent makes “only a marginal effort to provide for the support of the
child or to communicate with the child.” Id.
Thus, proof of abandonment takes two forms. Iowa Code § 600A.8(3)(b).
First, a parent abandons a child by not contributing toward the financial support of
the child in “a reasonable amount, according to the parent’s means.” Id. Or
second, by either not visiting the child, not regularly communicating with the child,
or not openly living with the child. Id. In other words, “[f]or a parent to avoid being
deemed to have abandoned the child, the parent must meet both the cash and
contact components of the statute.” In re G.D., No. 20-0984, 2021 WL 2126174,
at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 26, 2021). When reviewing the evidence, we recognize
that a parent’s subjective intent “unsupported by evidence of acts . . . manifesting
such intent” does not prevent a finding of abandonment. Iowa Code
§ 600A.8(3)(c).
We first consider J.B.’s economic contributions—the threshold element of
abandonment. See id. § 600A.8(3)(b); see also In re W.W., 826 N.W.2d 706, 710
(Iowa Ct. App. 2012). This element requires J.B. to contribute a reasonable
amount toward his daughter’s support in accordance with his means. See Iowa
Code § 600A.8(3)(b). A “reasonable amount” under section 600A.8(3)(b) differs
from court-ordered support under section 600A.8(4). W.W., 826 N.W.2d at 710.
9
While J.B. wrote support checks in 2019, he had insufficient funds in his
bank account to cover them. He did not catch up with his support obligation until
December 2021—nearly five years after the divorce. Nor has he sent P.B. any
gifts. In his defense, J.B. contends that he “needed time to seek treatment and
become stable” after the default decree instituted child support obligations. And
he insists that B.M. “would frustrate” his attempts to pay by waiting months to cash
his checks. He also points out that he was current on his obligations by the time
of the termination hearing.
In her response, B.M. notes that J.B. maintained full-time employment since
being discharged from the VA hospital, but still failed to pay child support. And
she highlights the fact that even the eleventh-hour payments came not from J.B.’s
account, but from his mother’s funds.
The district court emphasized that fact in the termination order:
Taking money out of his inheritance that he would not have had
access to does not show any type of sacrifice for his child, as he is
not out anything. All of his current income goes to support himself,
his current wife, and his infant son. He has made no effort to support
[P.B.] while this proceeding has been pending while paying lip
service to wanting to reestablish a relationship with her and
contesting this petition. The court cannot escape the conclusion that
if the petition had not been filed, the child support obligation would
have remained outstanding in its entirety.
We disagree that a parent must necessarily be “out” something to
adequately “provide for the support of the child.” See Iowa Code § 600A.2(20); In
re K.P., No. 14–2068, 2015 WL 4644800, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2015)
(reversing termination because petitioner did not offer clear proof that other parent
had financial resources to provide support). The economic support requirements
10
for section 600A.8(3) are “according to the parent’s means.” Iowa Code
§ 600A.8(3)(b).
But we are persuaded by B.M.’s argument that J.B. had the means to
contribute financially to P.B. because he maintained stable employment after
leaving Iowa. Indeed, J.B. testified to working full time in Indiana, North Carolina,
and Virginia. True, the record does not show how much he earned in those
positions. Still, we know that he remarried and was raising a child with his new
spouse, which shows he had the wherewithal to pay some amount toward P.B.’s
support. And he did make the effort, or at least the gesture, of sending monthly
checks, each for $150, in January through April 2019. But when B.M. tried to cash
them all at once, J.B.’s account contained insufficient funds.
After B.M. petitioned for termination, the paternal grandmother started
making support payments. The grandmother explained, “He had made some
attempts and, unfortunately, [J.B.] doesn’t balance a checkbook and so he thought
he had money in there and all of the checks were deposited at one time.” It is not
hard to believe that a family living paycheck to paycheck might be unable to handle
such a large withdrawal. But difficulty in balancing a checkbook is not the same
as lacking the financial means to support a child. We recognize that J.B. was
working to overcome the debilitating effects of his PTSD during this time. But his
ability to find jobs in three different states and start a new family supports B.M.’s
position that he abandoned their daughter by failing to make more than a marginal
effort at providing financial support.
Because J.B. abandoned his daughter under the financial-support prong,
we need not decide whether B.M. prevented him from regular visitation or
11
communication with the child. See Iowa Code § 600A.8(3)(b)(1). “Substantial and
continuous or repeated contact with the child is shown by: (1) financially
contributing to the support of the child in a reasonable amount according to the
parent’s means (‘cash’), and (2) maintaining sufficient contact with the child as
defined in section 600A.8(3)(b)(1)–(3) (‘contact’).” G.D., 2021 WL 2126174, at *3
(noting that “the parent must meet both the cash and contact components of the
statute” to avoid a finding of abandonment).
B. Best Interests
Ensuring a child’s best interests requires a parent to “affirmatively assume
the duties encompassed by the role.” Iowa Code § 600A.1. In determining
whether parents meet this standard, we consider whether they have fulfilled
financial obligations and demonstrated a “continued interest in the child.” That
interest is reflected in “genuine efforts” to maintain communication and to develop
and keep “a place of importance in the child’s life.” Id.
We also borrow from Iowa Code chapter 232 to flesh out the best-interests
test. B.H.A., 938 N.W.2d at 232. On that score, we prioritize the child’s safety and
the best placement to further her long-term nurturing and growth. See Iowa Code
§ 232.116(2). We know that “the caselaw has limited utility” in the best-interests
analysis, with cases coming down to their own facts. In re Q.G., 911
N.W.2d 761, 771 (Iowa 2018). Here, we have factors for and against termination.
On one hand, J.B. has not seen his daughter in four years. The child told
her GAL that she “currently does not know what he looks like.” And while—"in his
heart”—J.B. hoped she would recognize him, he testified he does not really know.
The GAL also reported that P.B. wanted her stepfather, who wishes to adopt her,
12
to be her “only dad.” See In re G.A., 826 N.W.2d 125, 131 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012).
Granted, this lack of contact is somewhat attributable to B.M.’s actions. But J.B.
saw P.B. “less than ten times” before B.M. decided to cut off contact. And he failed
to reach out to the GAL during the termination proceedings. This same lack of
effort can be seen in the fulfillment of his child support obligations. True, J.B. was
current on his support obligations by the hearing. But it is not reassuring that he
only took the obligation seriously when B.M. petitioned to terminate his rights.
J.B.’s past performance “may be indicative of the quality of the future that [he] is
capable of providing.” B.H.A., 938 N.W.2d at 233 (citation omitted).
On the other hand, J.B. regularly communicated with P.B. by phone before
B.M. cut off contact. See Q.G., 911 N.W.2d at 771 (noting that father and child
“communicated by phone for a substantial period until [mother] appeared to
present obstacles to such contact”). And though he did not find help, he did seek
legal assistance to resume contact with his daughter. He also has a strong support
system in P.B.’s grandparents. See Dale v. Pearson, 555 N.W.2d 243, 246 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1996) (noting family support helps decide a child’s best interest).
Still, B.M. asserts that, given J.B.’s absence from P.B.’s life, reintroducing
him to the child could be “highly confusing and perhaps traumatic.” When asked
by the GAL whether it was harmful for a child to have no contact with one of her
parents for four years, J.B. responded, “I agree it is harmful, yes, ma’am.” The
district court agreed, citing a recent case from our court about the potential harm
from not terminating a parent’s rights but instead “reopening the door to the father.”
See In re J.S., No. 22-0028, 2022 WL 2824778, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. July 20, 2022).
The GAL also agreed: “This little girl is a little bit confused about her name and
13
about her dads.” At the same time, the GAL acknowledged that J.B.’s mental
health had improved and that determining P.B.’s best interests was “a harder
question” than abandonment. But the GAL emphasized that the father’s recent
efforts to renew contact with P.B. were “too late.” We agree with the GAL’s
assessment. We cannot deprive P.B. of permanency by hoping that J.B. will
someday be able to meet P.B.’s needs. See B.H.A., 938 N.W.2d at 232. Chapter
600A's best-interest factors weigh in favor of terminating J.B.’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED.
All judges concur, except Tabor, J., who dissents.
14
TABOR, Judge (dissenting).
The mother’s counsel asserted at oral argument that this termination case
has “nothing” to do with the father’s military service. I strongly disagree. The
record shows a direct connection between the wounds he suffered on his tours of
duty and his inability to carry on his parenting duties. Now that his mental health
has improved, we should not write off his “potential positive contributions” to his
daughter’s life. See In re Q.G., 911 N.W.2d 761, 774 (Iowa 2018). So I respectfully
dissent on the best-interests finding. In my view, B.M. did not offer clear and
convincing evidence that P.B.’s best interests would be advanced by terminating
J.B.’s parental rights.
The father was deployed to Iraq from 2007 to 2009 and then re-deployed to
Afghanistan for eleven months after his marriage. In Afghanistan, he served as a
staff sergeant supervising other soldiers in his convoy. Their job was to clear the
road of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). He lost six members of his squad in
2012. Now the father has a VA disability rating of seventy percent for post-
traumatic brain injury from exposure to several IED device blasts and a disability
rating of one-hundred percent for his post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).11
Those conditions prompted his separation from his family and his lengthy
hospitalization. His mother described him as “very distant with the family” after his
return from Afghanistan: “I knew he had survivor’s guilt.” His mother, who had a
nursing background, also believed that when J.B. moved away from Iowa he was
“still trying to work through his PTSD and get to a good place where he felt like he
11 B.M. agreed that J.B. suffered from PTSD.
15
could be a good father to [P.B.].” But before J.B. could get a handle on his service-
related injuries, B.M. cut off all of his contact with J.B.
J.B. agreed he was “a mess” at the time of the divorce: “It’s very hard to put
into words unless you’ve served, and been there, but I came home broken 100
percent, and I still have bad days.” But J.B. testified that he was doing better by
the time of the termination hearing.
The GAL acknowledged his improvement, but emphasized that “four years
is just too long not to have contact with your child.” I question how much we can
rely on the GAL’s opinion in this case for two reasons. First, it was the mother who
thwarted J.B.’s efforts to maintain a place of importance in the child’s life. 12 See
Iowa Code § 600A.1(2). B.M. decided on her own that communicating with J.B.
was not in the child’s best interests. And given the mother’s decision to cut off
contact in 2018, it is not surprising that P.B. told the GAL in 2021 that she could
not remember what her father looked like.
Second, the GAL’s report was not balanced. She spent no time talking to
the father or the paternal grandparents.13 If she had, the report would have offered
12 If a parent takes unilateral action to shut the other parent out of the child’s life,
that parent cannot show the noncustodial parent rejected the duties imposed by
the parent-child relationship. See In re K.P., No. 14-2068, 2015 WL 4644800, at *4
(Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2015); see also In re H.N.M., No. 17-1802, 2018 WL 2731643, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. June 6, 2018) (“Although the father was not as
aggressive in seeking visitation or attempting to communicate with his daughter as
one might expect, responsibility for this situation does not fall entirely on the
father’s shoulders as the mother did her best to thwart any visits or communication
between the father and his daughter.”).
13 True, the father agreed it was not the GAL’s fault that he was not able to “set up
a time to talk with her.” But the record does not show that the GAL went out of her
way to make that connection. Rather, the GAL cross-examined the father, “I
realize my phone number was not included in the order appointing me, but did you
ever even Google me?” He agreed he had not “googled” her. In addition, this trial
16
more insight into J.B.’s service-related disabilities and his commitment to “co-
parenting” with P.B.’s mother and stepfather. J.B. testified that he understood it
would take time for P.B. to adjust to having visitation with him. But, in his view, the
child “would have the benefit of having not one but two fathers who would love her,
care for her, and support her.” P.B. would also benefit from renewing her
relationship with her parental grandparents. As our supreme court has stated:
“Families come in all shapes and sizes . . . .” Q.G., 911 N.W.2d at 774.
I also question the district court’s reliance on In re J.S., where a therapist
warned of “potential harm” from “reopening the door to the father.”
No. 22-0028, 2022 WL 2824778, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. July 20, 2022). By contrast,
this record includes no expert evidence that P.B. faced any harm from being
reintroduced to J.B. Without such evidence, the district court’s conclusion just
repeats its abandonment finding: because J.B. did not maintain contact with P.B.,
it is not in her best interest to renew that contact. That logic eliminates a
particularized best-interests analysis. We know that chapter 600A terminations
involve “a two-step process.” Q.G., 911 N.W.2d at 770. After making the threshold
showing of abandonment, “the petitioner next must show by clear and convincing
evidence termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child.” Id.exchange between the GAL and the paternal grandmother underscores the limited
nature of the GAL’s investigation:
[GAL]: I don’t have any more questions. Thank you, Your
Honor.
[D.B.]: By the way, who are you?
[GAL]: I am so sorry. . . . I’m the Guardian Ad Litem appointed
by the Court to look out for [P.B.]
[D.B.]: Okay.
[GAL]: Sorry.
[D.B.]: That’s okay.
17
(emphasis added). But the district court’s reasoning essentially creates a one-step
test, allowing proof under section 600A.8 to fulfill the obligations of section 600A.1.
This melding of the provisions is troubling because “[a]s a general rule of statutory
construction, we avoid an interpretation or application of a statute that renders
other portions of the statute superfluous or meaningless.” Little v. Davis, 974
N.W.2d 70, 75 (Iowa 2022).
Because of the imbalance of the GAL report14 and the district court’s
reasoning, I cannot find that B.M. has met her burden to show there are “no serious
or substantial doubt[s] about the correctness” of terminating J.B.’s legal
relationship with P.B. See In re M.S., 889 N.W.2d 675, 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016)
(citing In re L.G., 532 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995)). In determining best
interests, “we look to the father’s past performance, ‘for that performance may be
indicative of the quality of the future that parent is capable of providing.’” In re
B.H.A., 938 N.W.2d 227, 233 (Iowa 2020). Here, the father’s past performance
includes honorable sacrifices for his country, followed by years of struggle to
overcome the damage suffered from that service. I would find that his mettle,
resilience, and love would be valuable qualities to pass on to his daughter.
14 The responsibilities of the GAL are not discussed with the same specificity in
chapter 600A as they are in chapter 232. Compare Iowa Code § 600A.2(11), with
id. § 232.2(22)(b). Still, at minimum, in any termination proceeding, a GAL should
obtain “firsthand knowledge, if possible, of the facts, circumstances, and parties
involved” whether by conducting interviews with both parents or otherwise. Id. §
232.2(22)(b)(1), (5). This is so because “[c]onceptually, the standards and rules
applicable to terminations under one chapter should not differ from the provisions
leading to the identical result in another chapter.” In re E.J.R., 400 N.W.2d 531,
532 (Iowa 1987).