State of Iowa v. Leslie James Clark ( 2023 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 22-0477
    Filed June 21, 2023
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    vs.
    LESLIE JAMES CLARK,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Plymouth County, Daniel P.
    Vakulskas, District Associate Judge.
    A defendant appeals his sentence following a guilty plea and the revocation
    of his probation. AFFIRMED.
    Travis M. Visser-Armbrust of TVA Law PLLC, Sheldon, for appellant.
    Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney
    General, for appellee.
    Considered by Bower, C.J., and Tabor and Greer, JJ.
    2
    GREER, Judge.
    Leslie Clark pled guilty to driving while barred as a habitual offender; he
    received a deferred judgment and was placed on probation for two years in 2018.
    He then returned to his home in Minnehaha County, South Dakota. In March 2020,
    a probation violation report was filed citing Clark’s failure to pay certain ordered
    fines. The following month, the report was amended to reflect that Clark had been
    arrested in South Dakota and had not informed his probation officer. The March
    2020 arrest followed a December 2019 incident where Clark was charged in South
    Dakota with simple domestic assault (third or subsequent offense), aggravated
    domestic abuse, and false imprisonment. In the summer of 2021, he pled guilty to
    the simple domestic assault charge and was sentenced; the other two charges
    were dismissed. A probation revocation hearing was set and continued. In the
    meantime, in July of 2020, Clark incurred more South Dakota charges when he
    was charged with simple assault; he pled guilty to disorderly conduct and was
    sentenced at the end of January 2022.
    Clark’s Iowa probation revocation hearing was held that February. Clark
    testified that the court in South Dakota had agreed to craft his sentence so that
    Clark could continue to work. Toward this same goal, he asked the court to not
    sentence him to jail time or electronic monitoring in Iowa.1 He also pointed to his
    probation in South Dakota—which, if he violated, would result in years of jail time—
    and instead requested the deferred judgment be revoked but the probation
    terminated. The State recommended a ninety-day jail term. The district court
    1His employment required him to go into homes and apartment buildings, and his
    employer would not let him do so with an electronic monitoring bracelet on.
    3
    ultimately revoked the deferred judgment and sentenced Clark to fifty days in jail,
    but it allowed it to be served in Minnehaha County Jail in South Dakota—if the jail
    agreed—with work release according to the jail’s policy. The district court stated
    While I certainly understand the defendant’s request for no jail time,
    due to his employment, and I applaud the defendant for having a job,
    for maintaining the job, it’s just that he—he’s had multiple, multiple
    opportunities.
    And, I mean, looking through that criminal history, while he’s
    on probation here, still engaged in illegal criminal behavior, and while
    that’s not—apparently he’s been doing well the last few months, or
    the last however many months, regardless, that doesn’t negate the
    fact that he committed these new crimes while on probation here in
    Plymouth County. And so I have to take all of that into consideration.
    So I will sentence the defendant accordingly.
    ....
    I think this sentence is appropriate, based on the facts and
    circumstances of the case, and based on the defendant’s criminal
    history and the rehabilitation and the need to deter others for similar
    acts.
    Then, the written sentencing order stated the district court had “considered all
    sentencing options” and found the chosen sentence would “provide the [d]efendant
    with the maximum opportunity for rehabilitation,” “protect the community from
    further offenses by the [d]efendant”; and “provide sufficient deterrence to others
    who may be inclined to commit this or similar offenses.” It also said the court
    “considered the [d]efendant’s criminal record[ and] the nature of the offense
    committed” in crafting the sentence. Clark appeals.2
    “[T]he decision of the district court to impose a particular sentence within
    the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor, and [it] will only
    2 Clark has good cause for this appeal. See State v. 
    Thompson, 951
     N.W.2d 1, 5
    (Iowa 2020) (finding good cause for an appeal where the defendant “challenge[d]
    the order revoking [their] deferred judgment and entering a conviction and
    sentence” and “the alleged error arose after the court accepted [the defendant’s]
    guilty plea”).
    4
    be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of inappropriate
    matters.” State v. Formaro, 
    638 N.W.2d 720
    , 724 (Iowa 2002). “An abuse of
    discretion will not be found unless we are able to discern that the decision was
    exercised on grounds or for reasons that were clearly untenable or unreasonable.”
    
    Id.
    Clark argues the court’s explanation for the sentence was not sufficiently
    detailed and relied only on Clark’s prior criminal history and infractions while on
    probation. A sentencing court is required to state on the record its reasons for a
    particular sentence. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(3)(d). The reasons may be “terse and
    succinct” as long as “the reasons for the exercise of discretion are obvious in light
    of the statement and the record before the court.” State v. Thacker, 
    862 N.W.2d 402
    , 408 (Iowa 2015). While we need these reasons explained for our review,
    “[o]ur task on appeal is not to second-guess the sentencing court’s decision,” but
    to ensure it was made based on permissible factors. State v. Damme, 
    944 N.W.2d 98
    , 106 (Iowa 2020). “Additionally, the district court need not specifically state
    every possible sentencing factor.” State v. Mathews, No. 17-0519, 
    2018 WL 2084831
    , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 2, 2018). The district court here provided
    adequate reasoning for our review. Compare State v. Cooper, 
    403 N.W.2d 800
    ,
    802 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987) (determining the record for an unreported sentencing
    was insufficient when the district court only stated it considered “the circumstances
    of the offense, and the defendant’s prior background”), with State v. Miller,
    No. 22-0244, 
    2023 WL 1813628
    , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2023) (finding a
    sentencing court’s explanation enabled review when the court focused on the
    defendant’s criminal history but also listed other considerations).
    5
    Next, Clark argues the district court considered impermissible factors
    because it stated he had committed “new crimes” when, he asserts, he had only
    pled guilty to one count at the time. It is true that a sentencing court may not
    consider “unproven or unprosecuted offense[s] when sentencing a defendant
    unless (1) the facts before the court show the accused committed the offense, or
    (2) the defendant admits it.” State v. Witham, 
    583 N.W.2d 677
    , 678 (Iowa 1998)
    (per curiam). But Clark misremembers the evidence in front of the sentencing
    court—he had a conviction stemming from both his March 2020 and July 2020
    arrest (simple domestic assault and disorderly conduct, respectively), which he
    had already pled guilty to and was sentenced for, such that there were multiple
    “new crimes” the court could consider at the time of the probation revocation
    hearing.
    Finding no abuse of the sentencing court’s discretion, we affirm.
    AFFIRMED.