State of Iowa v. Cassidy Christopher Young ( 2023 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-0823
Filed July 13, 2023
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CASSIDY CHRISTOPHER YOUNG,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Butler County, Chris Foy, Judge.
Cassidy Young appeals following his Alford pleas to two counts of lascivious
acts with a child. AFFIRMED.
David James Hanson (until withdrawal), Fayette, and Karmen Anderson,
Des Moines, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Nicholas E. Siefert, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Ahlers, P.J., Badding, J., and Scott, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2023).
2
SCOTT, Senior Judge.
Cassidy Young appeals following his Alford pleas to two counts of lascivious
acts with a child.1 Young asserts the post-plea competency assessment and the
presentencing investigation, neither of which was conducted in-person, deprived
him of due process. He also contends the court erred in denying his motion for
new trial based on newly discovered evidence, i.e., an affidavit that another man
was living with victim’s mother at the relevant time period, and his motion in arrest
of judgment on grounds his pleas were not knowing and voluntarily entered. Even
assuming Young has good cause to appeal, his contentions lack merit. So, we
affirm.
I. Background Facts.
Young was charged with two counts of second-degree sexual abuse,
class “B” forcible felonies. Iowa Code § 709.3 (2020). The State alleged Young
sexually abused a child on February 24 and March 3, 2020. Each count being
subject to a twenty-five-year term of imprisonment with a mandatory minimum of
seventeen years, which, if run consecutively, would require a minimum thirty-four-
year term of imprisonment. Id. §§ 902.9, .12.
On January 19, 2022—the morning jury trial was to begin—the State offered
to enter into a plea agreement whereby Young would plead guilty to two counts of
1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970); see State v. Chapman, 944
N.W.2d 864, 872 (Iowa 2020) (“‘An Alford plea is different from a guilty plea in that
when a defendant enters an Alford plea, he . . . does not admit participation in the
acts constituting the crime.’ . . . Rather, the defendant declares that he is choosing
to plead guilty to a lesser charge instead of facing trial on a greater charge because
the available evidence makes conviction likely, not because he admits he
committed the charged crime.” (internal citation omitted)).
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lascivious acts with a child, which are class “C” non-forcible felonies with no
mandatory minimum terms, with the two ten-year terms to be served consecutively.
See id. §§ 709.8, 902.9(d). Young entered Alford pleas pursuant to the plea
agreement; while not admitting he committed the acts he did acknowledge the
evidence was such that a jury could find him guilty and that the reduction in the
potential sentence was a “good enough reason . . . to agree to be treated like” he
was guilty.
The district court determined:
Mr. Young, based on the discussion we’ve had this morning, I am
satisfied and I am finding specifically that you do understand and you
are aware of the elements of the amended charges, the potential
penalties that you face by pleading guilty to the amended charges,
and the rights that you’re giving up by entering Alford pleas and not
going forward with the trial.
Based on what’s in the Minutes of Testimony and the
summary of evidence provided by [the prosecutor] I am satisfied that
there’s a factual basis to support treating you as guilty of the two
amended charges.
I am also—I also find that the—the charging and sentencing
concession that the State is making—primarily the charging
concession, provides a sufficient basis for the court to accept a
guilty—or to treat you like you’re guilty despite your unwillingness to
admit guilt.
The district court accepted Young’s Alford pleas and informed Young of his right
to file a motion in arrest of judgment. The court filed an order noting the change
of plea, ordered a presentence investigation (PSI), and again noted the necessity
of a timely motion in arrest of judgment.
On March 2, the defense contemporaneously filed an “application for mental
evaluation and determination of competency, request for stay of proceedings, and
request for hearing” and a motion in arrest of judgment asserting “the plea was not
knowingly or voluntarily entered.”
4
On March 7, a PSI report was filed with the court. In that report, the
evaluator indicated:
Mr. Young was set up to be interviewed for this report by
phone. From the start of the interview he was disrespectful when
asked to clarify even basic demographical information. When he was
asked about what he was accused of doing and claimed he did not
do anything and hung up, terminating the interview. Butler County
Jail staff were able to get Mr. [Young] complete the presentence
packet for this report. Mr. Young provided some information but it
was generally vague and unable to be verified.
On March 11, after a hearing,2 the district court found “probable cause to
believe that Defendant suffers from a mental disorder which prevents him from
understanding the proceedings in this case or assisting effectively in his own
defense” and ordered a competency evaluation of Young.
A competency evaluation report prepared by Abraham Assad, MD, was filed
with the court on April 21. Dr. Assad noted these sources for information:
-- Interview on April 14, 2022, approximately 125 minutes
-- Court Order for the Examination of Competency
-- Presentence Investigation Report, dated March 6, 2022
-- Medical Records from Farid Manshadi, MD, dated August 11, 2015
to June 1, 2016
-- Social History Records
-- Butler County Jail Records
-- Law Enforcement Records
The evaluator opined:
At this time I believe Mr. Cassidy Christopher Young is
competent to stand trial. He meets criteria for [two disorders]. He
does not report, endorse, or manifest any symptoms currently
influencing his understanding of the legal process or his ability to
assist legal counsel. He understands the charges against him. He
has a rational and factual understanding of the court process,
including key personnel and their functions. He is able to work
effectively with his defense counsel without interference of any
psychological symptoms. He is aware of appropriate courtroom
2 We have no transcript from that hearing.
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behavior and is able to manage his own behavior. His current
medication regimen would not be expected to interfere with his ability
to receive a fair trial.
On April 29, Young filed a “motion for new trial” on grounds “the verdict is
contrary to the weight of the evidence” and “Defendant has not received a fair and
impartial trial.”
A reported hearing was held on May 9, at which the court considered
Young’s competency and pending motions. With respect to competency, the
defense did not present any evidence but asserted Dr. Assad’s evaluation was
“problematic” because it was not an in-person evaluation but telephonic. In
addition, defense counsel stated Young reported he was “not on his medications
on the day he was evaluated.” The court noted that even so, Dr. Assad found him
competent.
The court noted it had requested the evaluation “more as a precaution as
anything else.” Continuing, the court noted:
It’s been the court’s opinion and its observation in its dealings
with you that you are competent to understand the proceedings, that
you are competent to understand the nature and the severity of the
charges against you; and based on my observations in your
interactions with [defense attorney] Mr. Metcalf, it appears to the
court that you are capable of communicating with him in a manner
which he can—so that he can assist you in defending you, that you
can assist him in preparing your defense.
. . . I was satisfied, based on our—our dealings on January
19th of this year, that you were competent at the time that you
entered your Alford pleas.
My concern, when I ordered this most recent evaluation, was
that I did not want to proceed to sentencing with a person that was
not capable of understanding what was taking place. And the
evaluation that Dr. Assad has conducted and has prepared a report
on concludes that you are capable of understanding the
proceedings.
6
The court found Young competent,3 lifted the suspension of the
proceedings, and moved to the motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment.
The defense argued it had newly discovered evidence that could be helpful
if presented to a jury. Defense counsel acknowledged the information that another
man living with the victim’s mother was “[o]n its face” not “totally exculpatory, but
it puts another male in the picture.”4
The court addressed Young directly:
[I]t’s the court’s view that because you did enter Alford pleas, what
other information or other exculpatory evidence there may have been
at the time of trial, whether your attorney knew about it or not, I don’t
believe that it’s—it’s relevant; and I don’t believe it’s something that
the court can or should rely on as a basis for setting aside your Alford
pleas.
At the time of your plea change, we spent a fair amount of
time talking. And when I say we, you and I, and obviously the
attorneys were there and participated. But there was a fair amount
of conversation about what evidence the State was relying on.
You were not admitting guilt. You were indicating that the
different reasons we discussed on the record at the time of the plea
change, that it was to your benefit for the court to accept your Alford
plea, treat you as though you were guilty, so that in exchange, you
would no longer be facing two class “B” felonies, each carrying a
prison sentence of up to 25 years, each of them carrying a mandatory
minimum sentence of at least 17 years in prison, that it was to your
benefit to avoid those more serious charges.
The court rejected the assertion made in the motion in arrest of judgment
that the pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. It summarized:
And based on what was covered during the plea change
proceedings, which shown up or reported in the transcript of that
3 A written ruling concerning the considerations of the court and its findings was
filed that same date.
4 The evidence outlined at the plea hearing included images found of inappropriate
conduct with an identifiable child when analyzing Young’s phone. Some of the
images showed a man’s hand. Another was a “selfie.” The defense asserted the
new evidence was that the hand in the images could be those of the man living
with the mother at the relevant time.
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proceeding, it’s the court’s opinion that your plea was knowingly and
voluntarily entered, Mr. Young.
There were times you—you wanted to be able to speak
privately with your attorney as we were taking the—the plea change
or engaging in that hearing. You were given those opportunities.
After any time you took a break—I won’t say every time but
most times after you took a break, I asked you whether you had an
opportunity to get your questions answered by Mr. Metcalf, and I
think most every time you indicated you had.
And you know, to the extent there were any times in the plea
change proceedings where it was unclear to me whether you truly
understood or appreciated what was taking place, within, you know,
a short time later after a particular response you gave that raised a
question in my mind, I didn’t have to wait much more than a minute
or two for you to make another response or ask a question that made
it clear to me you were understanding what was happening.
I mean there was a couple times you made what I would
consider sort of a snappy comment, and the only way that those
comments would have made any sense is that you understood what
was happening. You may have disagreed with how everything was
going to be playing out, but you certainly understood what was
happening and appreciated the significance of your Alford pleas.
And for that reason, I am satisfied that your plea was knowingly and
voluntarily entered.
Moving on to sentencing, the defense objected to the PSI being conducted
telephonically. The court confirmed the plea agreement included a joint
recommendation of sentence. The court acknowledged it had no personal
knowledge how PSI reports were prepared and asked “what different information
would there be in the PSI if the court were to require somebody meet with
Mr. Young in person.” It asked the defense to “specifically identify matters in his
PSI that are incorrect or incomplete.” Counsel asked that Young be allowed to do
so, which the court reluctantly allowed. Young noted his weight and height were
incorrect and then objected to the investigator’s rudeness and antagonism.
Both parties recommended that the court impose the sentence agreed
upon. The court found the joint recommendation appropriate, noting:
8
There were two separate offenses here. One was committed
in February of 2020. The other was committed in March of 2020.
For that reason, I do believe consecutive sentences are appropriate.
I’ve noted this before, but I’ll just repeat that there is no mandatory
minimum time on either one of these. And with good conduct credit
and other credits that are available, it’s entirely possible that you will
not serve anywhere close to the maximum indeterminate sentence
on either one of these offenses.
Ultimately, that will depend on how you conduct yourself once
you're in prison and how—how you proceed. I mean, sex offender
treatment will certainly be required as part of your sentence on each
of these convictions. And I appreciate you—you maintain that you’re
not guilty.
I will tell you, Mr. Young, you’re not the first person. I’ve had
people found guilty by a jury who maintain they’re innocent. And at
this point, the court is satisfied that the State’s got the right person
here and it is appropriate for the court to impose sentence on each
of these charges.
Certainly, a factor the court considers in its decision is whether
you take responsibility. And you deny responsibility for any
inappropriate contact with the victim in this case.
The court imposed consecutive indeterminate ten-year terms and entered
judgment consistent with the plea agreement. Young now appeals.
II. Authority to consider on appeal.
Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2022) limits the direct appeal of a guilty
plea to a class “A” felony unless the defendant establishes “good cause.” We must
determine whether Young has good cause to appeal from his Alford pleas. State
v. Tucker, 959 N.W.2d 140, 153 (Iowa 2021).
Our supreme court has liberally interpreted good cause to mean the
defendant need only show a “legally sufficient reason.” Id. (quoting State v.
Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 104 (Iowa 2020)). What constitutes a legally sufficient
reason is context specific. Id. This court has concluded “that good cause exists
to challenge competency at the time of the plea irrespective of whether the issue
was contested below.” State v. Cue, No. 19-2150, 2020 WL 6157813, at *3 (Iowa
9
Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2020), further review denied (Dec. 22, 2020); see also State v.
Chindlund, No. 20-1368, 2021 WL 2708944, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 30, 2021).
Our supreme court has agreed the defense raised a legally sufficient reason to
appeal to address a claim the district court failed to sua sponte order a competency
examination. State v. Newman, 970 N.W.2d 866, 870–71 (Iowa 2022). The State
assumes Young has good cause to appeal.
III. Discussion.
Turning to the merits of his appeal, Young first argues that because Iowa
Code section 812.4(1)5 refers to a person “arriving at a psychiatric facility for the
performance of the evaluation,” an in-person competency evaluation is implied and
required to satisfy his due process rights. Yet, he cites no Iowa or federal court
case to support that assertion.
“The trial of an incompetent defendant in a criminal matter violates the
defendant’s due process rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.” State v. Lyman, 776 N.W.2d 865, 871 (Iowa
2010), overruled on other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott Int’l Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699,
707 (Iowa 2016); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996). “In
Iowa, we define the test as whether ‘the defendant is suffering from a mental
disorder which prevents the defendant from appreciating the charge,
understanding the proceedings, or assisting effectively in the defense.’” Lyman,
N.W.2d at 874 (quoting Iowa Code § 812.3(1)). Our review is de novo. Id. at 873.
5 Section 812.4 governs hearings to determine competency, and subsection (1)
provides, “A hearing shall be held within fourteen days of the arrival of the person
at a psychiatric facility for the performance of the evaluation, . . . .”
10
The case Young does cite, which is a California unpublished opinion, offers
him no support. People v. Ward, No. C088158, 2021 WL 717597 (Cal. Ct. App.
Feb. 24, 2021). Ward involved a defendant who refused to meet with the
competency evaluator, leaving the evaluator unable to offer an opinion as to
competency. 2021 WL 717597, at *3. Young cites to the testimony of the evaluator
that an interview with the defendant was a “critical step” when evaluating
competency, and that “[w]ithout a personal evaluation, it would be inappropriate to
offer opinions about a defendant.” Id. Using this testimony, Young contends an
in-person interview is constitutionally required.
Yet, Young does not mention that the Ward appellate court found there was
nonetheless substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding the defendant was
competent to stand trial, noting the defendant’s interviews with detectives, his
expressed understanding of the basic criminal procedure, and statements in court,
and his ability to assist counsel in his defense. See id. at *5–6. Young does not
contend Dr. Assad was unable to offer an opinion as to his competency and does
not identify any deficiency with the competency evaluation itself—other than it was
not in-person. Dr. Assad’s report to the court provided his observations during the
teleconference interview about Young’s capacity to appreciate the charges and
understand the legal proceedings in which he was involved. So, too, the district
court made findings that Young understood what was happening and appreciated
the significance of his Alford pleas. Young has failed to meet his burden to
overcome the presumption of competence. See Lyman, 776 N.W.2d at 874.
We also reject Young’s second assertion, that the lack of a face-to-face PSI
interview denied him his right “to confront accusers,” citing the Sixth Amendment
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to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Iowa Constitution.
Again, Young does not cite authority for this proposition, which by itself is sufficient
to deem the issue waived. Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(3) (“Failure to cite authority
in support of an issue may be deemed waiver of that issue.”). Moreover, his right
to confront witnesses did not apply after accepting a plea of guilty. See Iowa R.
App. P. 2.8(b)(4) (stating that “before accepting a guilty plea, . . . the defendant
has a right to be tried by a jury, and at trial has . . . the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses against the defendant” (emphasis added)).
Young next contends the district court erred in denying his motion for new
trial/in arrest of judgment based on newly discovered evidence. “We review a
denial of a motion in arrest of judgment for abuse of discretion and will reverse
only if the ruling was based on reasons that are clearly unreasonable or
untenable.” State v. Myers, 653 N.W.2d 574, 581 (Iowa 2002).
Here, the court found the purported new evidence was not relevant because
Young had chosen to accept the plea agreement to avoid a possible conviction
and longer sentence. Young now seeks to frame his claim as one of actual
innocence, relying on Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 795, 797 (Iowa 2018)
(recognizing a “freestanding claim of actual-innocence,” and holding “[for an
applicant to succeed . . . the applicant must show by clear and convincing evidence
that, despite the evidence of guilt supporting the conviction, no reasonable fact
finder could convict the applicant of the crimes for which the sentencing court found
the applicant guilty in light of all the evidence, including the newly discovered
evidence”). But the defense acknowledged at the hearing, the evidence was not
“totally exculpatory, but it puts another male in the picture.” And Young himself
12
stated, “A reasonable jury could have found me guilty. A reasonable jury could
have also found me innocent, Judge.”
We have reviewed the court’s reasons for denying the motion in arrest of
judgment, we find no abuse of discretion. We affirm.
AFFIRMED.