In re Marriage of Carter ( 2023 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 22-1105
    Filed July 26, 2023
    IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF BARBARA ANN CARTER
    AND LESLIE EARL CARTER
    Upon the Petition of
    BARBARA ANN CARTER,
    Petitioner-Appellee,
    And Concerning
    LESLIE EARL CARTER,
    Respondent-Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Celene Gogerty, Judge.
    Leslie Earl Carter appeals the economic provisions of the decree dissolving
    his marriage to Barbara Ann Carter. AFFIRMED.
    Colin McCormack of Van Cleaf & McCormack Law Firm, LLP, Des Moines,
    for appellant.
    Barbara Ann Carter, Pleasant Hill, self-represented appellee.
    Considered by Schumacher, P.J., and Chicchelly and Buller, JJ.
    2
    CHICCHELLY, Judge.
    Leslie (Les) Earl Carter appeals the economic provisions of the decree
    dissolving his marriage to Barbara Ann Carter. He requests that we either reverse
    the spousal support award entirely or, in the alternative, substantially reduce it.
    Les also contends the district court inequitably divided the value of a home he
    purchased during the couple’s separation. Upon our de novo review, we find the
    district court’s order is equitable with regard to both spousal support and property
    distribution.
    I.     Background Facts and Proceedings.
    Barbara and Les were sixty-five and sixty-eight years old, respectively, at
    the time of trial. They married in 1987. They lived in the Carlisle area, and each
    had one child with other partners prior to the marriage. Barbara dropped out of
    high school in the eleventh grade when she was pregnant with her first child. She
    was a stay-at-home mother and occasionally worked part-time for minimum wage.
    Les worked full-time at a trailer company and later as a machinist. Les and Barbara
    had one child together in 1988.
    In approximately 2006, Les moved in with his parents to help care for them.
    Barbara’s mother resided with Barbara for some time until she passed away
    around 2007. Barbara moved to a home in Palmyra, while Les continued to pay
    for Barbara’s living expenses. In 2012, Barbara moved to Sioux City to be closer
    to her older daughter. She testified that Les told her to go up there to be near
    family and that he was going to follow her there. Les paid the rent for Barbara but
    never moved to Sioux City.
    3
    In 2017, Barbara moved in with her brother for about six months in Carlisle.
    She then moved into an apartment in Pleasant Hill where she remained at the time
    of trial. Throughout this time, Les continued to pay Barbara’s rent. He also paid
    for a storage unit up until the time of the temporary hearing in this matter, which
    occurred in October 2021. Barbara sent her annual tax documents to Les, and he
    filed the couple’s joint tax returns.
    In 2019, Les moved to Texas to be near his sister and work full-time at her
    electrical store selling breakers. He purchased a home there that is worth over
    $200,000. Les stopped working altogether at some time in 2021. He testified that
    this timing was merely coincidental and not related to Barbara’s filing for divorce.
    Les explained that he needs surgery on his back and hips and hopes to return to
    work afterwards. He claims that he has not had the procedure yet because it took
    time to see various specialists and that he will schedule the surgery when he
    returns to Texas after trial. The district court concluded that Les was intentionally
    not working in order to lower his income for purposes of determining spousal
    support.
    Barbara testified that she sought to file for divorce in 2020 but could not
    afford an attorney. She eventually obtained pro bono representation and filed the
    underlying petition in June 2021. After the temporary matters hearing, the court
    ordered Les to pay $513 in monthly spousal support to Barbara. In June 2022, the
    court entered a final decree of dissolution of marriage, which ordered Les to pay
    $1000 per month in support to Barbara until one of them dies. The decree also
    awarded the Texas property to Les but required him to pay an equalization
    4
    payment of $46,658.50 to Barbara by September 1, 2022, or else place the
    property for sale and split the proceeds with Barbara. Les filed a timely appeal.1
    II.    Review.
    Because dissolutions of marriage are equitable proceedings, our review is
    de novo. In re Marriage of Mauer, 
    874 N.W.2d 103
    , 106 (Iowa 2016). We give
    weight to the factual findings of the district court, especially when considering the
    credibility of witnesses, but are not bound by them. 
    Id.
     We will disturb those
    findings only if they fail to do equity. 
    Id.
     “There are no hard and fast rules
    governing the economic provisions in a dissolution action; each decision depends
    upon the unique circumstances and facts relevant to each issue.” In re Marriage
    of Gaer, 
    476 N.W.2d 324
    , 326 (Iowa 1991).
    III.   Discussion.
    Les challenges the award of $1000.00 per month in spousal support to
    Barbara. We begin by noting that the district court has “considerable latitude” in
    fashioning or denying an award of spousal support based on the particular facts of
    each case. In re Marriage of Mann, 
    943 N.W.2d 15
    , 20 (Iowa 2020) (citation
    omitted). Because “the trial court [i]s in the best position to balance the parties’
    needs, . . . we should intervene on appeal only where there is a failure to do
    equity.”   In re Marriage of Gust, 
    858 N.W.2d 402
    , 416 (Iowa 2015).               “[T]he
    imposition and length of an award of traditional [spousal support] is primarily
    predicated on need and ability.” 
    Id. at 411
     (citation omitted) (“In determining need,
    we focus on the earning capability of the spouses, not necessarily on actual
    1 Barbara did not file an appellate brief.       See Iowa Ct. R. 6.903(3) (permitting an
    appellee to not file an appellate brief).
    5
    income.”). Les claims that Barbara failed to establish both her need for permanent
    support and his ability to pay such support.
    With regard to Barbara’s need, Les alleges that Barbara works only part
    time by choice and made no efforts to improve her financial situation during their
    extensive separation. On the contrary, Barbara testified that she only works part
    time because she has knee issues and arthritis. As the district court observed,
    “[h]er bank statements reflect a life of limited means and forced frugality. . . . She
    has no ability to improve her financial picture or to obtain more education or a
    better job.”
    As for Les’s ability to pay, the district court made adverse credibility findings
    and identified significant inconsistencies. The court specifically found that Barbara
    was much more credible, Les appeared evasive, and Les has been less than
    honest about his income. Les claims a total monthly income of $1800, derived
    from a combination of Social Security and Veterans Administration (VA) benefits.
    According to his financial statements, these benefits actually total just over $2000.
    The district court found that Les is also receiving income “under the table,” based
    on Barbara’s testimony that Les has worked on cars as side jobs and financial
    statements consistent with such an enterprise. Further inconsistencies observed
    by the court include the following:
    Les’[s] financial affidavit does not match the documentation
    provided by Barbara or the testimony given in this case. In his
    affidavit, as well as in a sworn interrogatory, he claimed [to] have no
    bank accounts, yet he offered his bank statements documenting his
    accounts. He listed the market value for his home and truck at
    substantially lower than the credible evidence supports. He did not
    list his trailers as assets.
    6
    The court imputed Les’s income at $6,916.83 per month, based on a seventeen-
    month average of deposits into his bank account. This window runs from July 2020
    to November 2021 and reflects that Les actually brought in more money after
    quitting his job. Les attributes all deposits that were not from Social Security or the
    VA to his sister. He provided an unsworn document, purportedly signed by his
    sister, which asserts that he owes her $20,100. Les’s sister did not testify, and
    there is no indication of the terms of repayment. Like the district court, we note
    that similar deposits were made into Les’s account before the loans from his sister
    allegedly began in May 2021. Ultimately, we share the district court’s conclusion
    that Les has an ability to pay spousal support. However, we find Les’s monthly
    income is only $4,863.69, which translates to $58,364.28 annually. The district
    court’s calculation reflects an addition error, which counted Les’s Social Security
    and VA benefits twice.
    All in all, we find the factors listed in Iowa Code section 598.21A(1) (2021)
    weigh in favor of awarding traditional spousal support to Barbara. The parties’
    marriage persisted approximately twenty years before separation, they are both of
    advanced age and cite various health issues, and Barbara has a limited earning
    capacity that prevents her from self-supporting at a standard of living comparable
    to that enjoyed during the marriage. See 
    Iowa Code § 598
    .21A(1). Like the district
    court noted, Barbara “is not asking to live as grandly as Les; she is asking to be
    able to pay her essential bills.” Despite the miscalculation in Les’s income, we find
    $1000 per month is an appropriate amount of spousal support, as we venture to
    believe the district court did not order a higher amount because it was all that
    7
    Barbara requested. For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s award of
    traditional spousal support.
    Les also argues that the district court inequitably divided the value of the
    Texas home he purchased during the couple’s separation. When dissolving a
    marriage, the district court is to equitably divide all property between the parties,
    with the exception of inherited property or gifts.2 
    Iowa Code § 598.21
    (5). “An
    equitable property division of the appreciated value of property, should be a
    function of the tangible contributions of each party, and not the mere existence of
    the marital relationship.” In re Marriage of Bulanda, 
    451 N.W.2d 15
    , 17 (Iowa Ct.
    App. 1989). Les argues that a property division should equitably divide the fruits
    of the parties’ joint efforts but Barbara provided no support, financial or otherwise,
    towards this home. On the contrary, Les testified that he was able to make the
    down payment for this home at least in part from savings accumulated while the
    couple lived together. Barbara testified that she expected to retire with Les.
    However, Les cashed out his retirement accounts prior to Barbara’s filing for
    divorce.3 Despite Les’s contentions regarding the parties’ lengthy separation,
    “[t]he date of the dissolution is the only reasonable time when an assessment of
    the parties’ net worth should be undertaken.” In re Marriage of Decker, 
    666 N.W.2d 175
    , 181 (Iowa Ct. App. 2003). Even accounting for Les spending at least some
    2 We qualify this general rule by noting inherited property and gifts will also be
    subject to division “upon a finding that refusal to divide the property is inequitable
    to the other party or to the children of the marriage.” 
    Iowa Code § 598.21
    (6).
    3 The district court found that Les cashed in his pensions, which he earned during
    the marriage, and received a total of $66,928. By our calculations, Les cashed in
    funds from an individual retirement account and a pension from 2015 to 2019 for
    a total of $76,321.
    8
    of the retirement funds on Barbara’s living expenses, we do not find the
    equalization payment arrived upon by the district court to be inappropriate or
    inequitable. Therefore, we affirm the order in this regard as well.
    AFFIRMED.