In re Marriage of Burmeister ( 2023 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-1949
Filed July 26, 2023
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF CARRIE L. BURMEISTER
AND KURT L. BURMEISTER
Upon the Petition of
CARRIE L. BURMEISTER,
Petitioner-Appellee,
And Concerning
KURT L. BURMEISTER,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Louisa County, John M. Wright,
Judge.
Kurt Burmeister appeals the division of property in the decree dissolving his
marriage to Carrie Burmeister. AFFIRMED.
Andrew B. Howie of Shindler, Anderson, Goplerud & Weese, P.C., West
Des Moines, for appellant.
Maegan M. Gorham of Lane & Waterman LLP, Davenport, for appellee.
Considered by Schumacher, P.J., and Chicchelly and Buller, JJ.
2
CHICCHELLY, Judge.
Kurt Burmeister appeals the division of property in the decree dissolving his
marriage to Carrie Burmeister. He contests the award of a $107,026 equalization
payment to Carrie, challenging the inclusion of his premarital property in the
property division and the valuation of the property. Following a de novo review,
we affirm the trial court’s division of property and the resulting equalization
payment. We decline Carrie’s request for appellate attorney fees.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.
Carrie and Kurt began their relationship in July of 2011. After a few months
of dating, Carrie began staying at Kurt’s home in Grandview, where she would
cook, clean, do household chores, and help care for Kurt’s minor son. In early
2013, Carrie assisted in the start up of Kurt’s business, CJ Tire & Service, by
performing manual labor to remodel the planned site of the business. In
September of 2015, Kurt purchased a house in Columbus Junction colloquially
referred to by the couple as “the Barn House”. Kurt and Carrie moved into the
Barn House with Kurt’s minor son and were married soon after.
Kurt obtained a bridge loan for $51,424 that he used as a down payment to
purchase the Barn House. He satisfied the loan by selling his home in Grandview
for $123,500. Kurt also used $53,600 from the same sale to complete
improvements to the Barn House. However, expenditures on these improvements
were withdrawn from the couple’s joint bank account, an account controlled by Kurt
into which all of Carrie’s income was automatically deposited. Throughout the
marriage, Carrie worked and contributed financially to the household through this
joint bank account. Carrie did not earn wages for a period of the marriage. But
3
during this time, Carrie worked at CJ Tire & Service Monday through Friday from
9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. and Saturdays from 7:00 a.m. to noon without pay.
Carrie petitioned to dissolve the marriage in May 2021. During the trial, Kurt
argued that the down payment he provided for the Barn House, the $53,600 he
obtained by selling his personal property to fund improvements on the house, and
other smaller items should be considered premarital property and set aside from
the division between the parties. Carrie conceded, and the trial court agreed, that
the down payment for the barn house should be excluded from the divisible
property. However, the trial court included the $53,600 and other small items Kurt
objected to in its calculation of the total marital assets. Because Kurt was awarded
a greater portion of the marital property, the court ordered him to pay Carrie a
$107,026 equalization payment.
II. Scope of Review.
We review dissolution proceedings de novo. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; In
re Marriage of Mauer, 874 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Iowa 2016). We give weight to the
district court's fact findings, even though they are not binding. See Mauer, 874
N.W.2d at 106. We only contradict the findings of the district court if they fail to
yield an equitable result. See id.III. Property Division.
Upon the dissolution of a marriage in Iowa, the court divides all property,
except inherited property and gifts received by one party, equitably between the
parties. Iowa Code § 598.21 (2021). An equitable division is not necessarily an
equal distribution of the assets. In re Marriage of Hoak, 364 N.W.2d 185, 194
(Iowa 1985). Instead, the court must determine what is equitable under the
4
circumstances. Id. The court makes this determination by considering the factors
listed in Iowa Code section 598.21.
Kurt contends that the trial court included in the divisible marital property
certain items that should have been set aside as premarital property. He claims
the $53,600 in revenue from the sale of his premarital home that he spent on
improvements to the Barn House should be fully credited to him. Additionally, Kurt
challenges the court’s inclusion of a 2004 GMC vehicle ($6500), inclusion and
valuation of a Mediapolis Savings Bank account ($17,088), and inclusion and
valuation of the couple’s livestock ($6000). Kurt concludes that by excluding and
revaluing these items, the equalization payment should be reduced from $107,026
to $66,701.
A. Premarital Property
Kurt argues that because there was a discrepancy in the amount of property
each party brought into the marriage and the marriage was of short duration,
certain premarital property should have been set aside from the divisible assets.
However, Iowa’s statutory scheme requires the court to divide all property of the
parties, including property owned prior to the marriage. In re Marriage of Fennelly,
737 N.W.2d 97, 102 (Iowa 2007). The trial court may not “separate the [premarital]
asset from the divisible estate and automatically award it to the spouse that owned
the property prior to the marriage.” In re Marriage of Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 242, 247
(Iowa 2006). The “property brought to the marriage by each party” is only one of
the factors considered by the trial court when dividing marital assets. Iowa Code
§ 598.21; Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d at 102.
5
The trial court acted equitably by including Kurt’s premarital property in the
division of marital assets. Although Kurt brought more financial assets into the
marriage than Carrie and the couple’s marriage was not lengthy, Carrie made
significant contributions to the marriage. A party’s contribution to their marriage is
measured by more than income. In re Marriage of Miller, 552 N.W.2d 460, 465
(Iowa Ct. App. 1996). In denying Kurt’s motion to enlarge and amend, the trial
court reasoned that “[Carrie] provided convincing evidence that she financially
contributed to the household during the premarital relationship and during the
marriage. Furthermore, she contributed her services to the household, including
caring for [Kurt]’s child.” We defer to the trial court’s findings regarding Carrie’s
contribution to the marriage, as well as its determination that this contribution
warranted the division of the property. We note especially that the $53,600 Kurt
received from selling his premarital home was placed in a joint bank account where
Carrie’s income was also directly deposited, becoming intermingled with marital
assets. Additionally, Carrie’s unpaid labor contributed to the establishment of
Kurt’s business and its day-to-day operations. Considering her contribution to the
business, we find it was equitable for the trial court to include the value of the
Mediapolis Savings Bank account, which belongs to the business, in the marital
property division.
Kurt also challenges the trial court’s consideration of the cohabitation period
that preceded the couple’s marriage. He cites In re Marriage of Naylor, in which
the appellant contended a “period of cohabitation prior to their marriage should be
considered as part of the marriage for the purposes of dividing property.”
No. 17-0770, 2018 WL 5850223, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2018). In rejecting
6
that argument, the court noted that Iowa Code section 598.21 “does not identify
premarital cohabitation as a relevant consideration.” Id.Naylor is distinguishable because the trial court did not equate Carrie and
Kurt’s cohabitation period with marriage. Rather, the court merely looked to their
history for information about Carrie’s relationship to the property in question and
the extent of her past contributions. Although the statute does not specifically
mention consideration of a cohabitation period, it does include a provision allowing
the court to include other factors it determines to be relevant to the individual case.
See Iowa Code § 598.21(5)(m). Here, the couple’s cohabitation prior to their
marriage is relevant because it establishes Carrie’s continued contributions to the
care of Kurt’s children and the building of his business. Again, the latter
contribution is especially pertinent to the division of the Mediapolis Savings Bank
account. But even without considering the parties’ premarital relationship, it is
equitable to divide Kurt’s premarital property based on the contributions Carrie
made during the marriage.
B. Valuation
Finally, Kurt challenges the trial court’s valuation of the Mediapolis Savings
Bank account and the couple’s livestock. He claims that the Mediapolis Savings
account was a business account that could change significantly in value day-to-
day depending on the operations of C.J. Tire and Service. He also complains that
the trial court failed to credit his testimony that the cattle are worth $2800, not
$6000.
“Ordinarily, a trial court's valuation will not be disturbed when it is within the
range of permissible evidence.” In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 703
7
(Iowa 2007). “Although our review is de novo, we ordinarily defer to the trial court
when valuations are accompanied by supporting credibility findings or
corroborating evidence.” Id.Regarding the Mediapolis Savings Bank account, Kurt argues that the
account was misvalued but fails to state how this court should value the account.1
Kurt instead complains that the trial court’s valuation, which is based on the
account balance as of May 26, 2022, did not reflect the account’s true value
because the account was regularly depleted to pay for inventory and other
expenses. This argument is refuted by Kurt’s own testimony that, “The first of the
month, I could have $30,000 in [the account]. I could have $35,000 in there. But
all my parts and tires and most of my bills are due on the 10th. So when I make
payments out on the 8th, I might have $5500 left.” The trial court addressed Kurt’s
argument in its denial of his motion to reconsider, enlarge, and amend. It
reasoned, “As for the business bank account the court found [Carrie]’s evidence
more convincing. The court can accept that the bank account fluctuated.
However, there is nothing that convinces the court that it did so significantly day
by day.” Ultimately, the court valued the account at $17,088, which was the
account’s actual statement balance three weeks prior trial.
We find the court’s valuation easily falls within the range of permissible
evidence. See In re Marriage of McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 679 (Iowa 2013).
Not only was the trial court’s valuation of $17,088 close to the account’s average
value of $14,750 based upon the high and low figures provided by Kurt in his
1 Kurt initially argued that the account should be entirely set aside and did not
provide an alternative valuation for the account should this court deny that request.
8
testimony, it was the actual statement balance of the account just prior to the date
of trial. Moreover, Kurt fails to provide additional information to refute the findings
of the trial court. Presumably, he could have submitted the account’s transaction
history to directly establish that the account fluctuates day to day. However, he
did not do so. We therefore defer to the well-reasoned determination of the trial
court and find that it did not err in valuing the Mediapolis Savings Bank account at
$17,088.
Regarding the cattle, we find that the trial court’s valuation of $6000 was
within the range of permissible evidence. Kurt claims that the couple had three
cows at the time of trial. This contention is directly contradicted by Kurt’s testimony
that there were three cows and three calves at the time of trial.2 The trial court’s
valuation of the cattle was based on Kurt’s testimony that each cow was worth
$1200 and each calf was worth $800. Because the court’s valuation is in line with
the evidence, it did not err in valuing the cows/calves at $6000.
Overall, the trial court’s division of the property was equitable and its
valuation of the property was within the range of permissible evidence. On this
basis, we affirm the $107,026 equalization payment.
IV. Attorney Fees
Carrie requests an award of appellate attorney fees. “Appellate attorney
fees are not a matter of right, but rather rest in this court’s discretion.” We consider
“the needs of the party seeking the award, the ability of the other party to pay, and
the relative merits of the appeal.” In re Marriage of Geil, 509 N.W.2d 738, 743
2 Although the parties had only three cows when Carrie left, each birthed a calf
before the trial.
9
(Iowa 1993). Because Kurt’s appeal was not frivolous and Carrie is in a sufficiently
stable financial position to pay her own attorney fees, we decline to award Carrie
appellate attorney fees.
AFFIRMED.