Darryl Tyson v. State of Iowa ( 2023 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-0104
Filed July 26, 2023
DARRYL TYSON,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Paul D. Miller (summary
disposition) and Ian K. Thornhill (motion for postconviction DNA testing), Judges.
Darryl Tyson appeals the denial of his second application for postconviction
relief and his motion for DNA testing. AFFIRMED.
Erin Patrick Lyons of Juvenile Public Defender’s Office, Waterloo, for
appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Ahlers, P.J., Buller, J., and Danilson, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2023).
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DANILSON, Senior Judge.
Darryl Tyson appeals the denial of his second application for postconviction
relief (PCR), challenging the court’s ruling on his motion for DNA testing. Upon
our review, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
The specific factual bases of Tyson’s convictions are largely irrelevant for
purposes of this appeal. In 2012, he pled guilty to first-degree burglary, second-
degree robbery, third-degree sexual abuse, and second-degree theft following a
sexual assault and robbery of an 81-year-old woman in her Cedar Rapids home.
The district court sentenced Tyson to respective prison terms not exceeding
twenty-five years, ten years, ten years, and five years and ordered them to run
consecutively, for a total of fifty years. He did not file a direct appeal.
Tyson initiated his first PCR application in 2012. In addition to other claims,
Tyson challenged the DNA testing in his case. Following a hearing, the court
denied his application, stating in part, “Tyson did not prove in the instant case that
his suggestions for challenging the DNA evidence would have even the possibility
of reaching different conclusions.” Tyson appealed the court’s ruling on a different
issue, arguing he “did not understand that he was pleading to consecutive
sentences totaling 50 years” and his PCR counsel was ineffective “in the
presentation of this claim.” See Tyson v. State, No. 15-1863, 2017 WL 1088102,
at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2017). This court rejected Tyson’s claims and
affirmed the denial of his PCR application. See id. at *1–2.
Tyson filed this PCR application in 2018, raising a claim of actual innocence,
contending “DNA found in discovery is not a match to that of applicant an[d]
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applicant ha[s] personel [sic] documents to prove his claim.” Tyson then filed a
motion for postconviction DNA testing of evidence seized during his underlying
criminal proceeding under Iowa Code section 81.10 (Supp. 2019).1 He claimed
“DNA analysis on evidence [secured in relation to the crime] would provide
exculpatory evidence substantiating his innocence and identify the actual
perpetrator of the crime.” The State resisted, arguing Tyson’s motion was
“deficient in several areas,” and further stating, “There’s been nothing provided to
this court that calls into question that the prior DNA testing [connecting Tyson to
the crime] was flawed in any way.” Following a hearing, the court denied Tyson’s
motion for DNA testing, finding the motion failed under section 81.11(1)(a), based
on Tyson’s concession he was not requesting DNA profiling using “a new method
or technology that [wa]s substantially more probative” than the DNA profiling
previously performed. See Iowa Code § 81.11(1)(a).
The State then filed a motion for summary disposition, claiming Tyson’s
PCR application was outside the three-year statute of limitations. The court
granted the State’s motion, concluding Tyson’s arguments regarding an alibi and
DNA found in discovery were not newly-discovered evidence and there was no
genuine issue of material fact regarding his actual-innocence claim. Tyson
appeals the court’s rulings on his motion for DNA testing and his PCR application.
1 Tyson initiated his PCR application in 2018, but he filed his motion for DNA testing
in late 2019, so we apply sections 81.10 and 81.11, as amended effective July 1,
2019, to his claim. Cf. State v. Beeman, No. 20-1288, 2021 WL 4891010, at *1
(Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2021).
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II. Standard of Review
We review the court’s ruling on the issue of DNA testing and the court’s
statutory interpretation for errors at law. See Mark v. State, No. 09-0800, 2013
WL 5498146, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2013). We also review the summary
disposition of PCR applications for errors at law. See Dewberry v. State, 941
N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 2019). “[F]or a summary disposition to be proper, the State
must be able to prevail as if it were filing a motion for summary judgment in a civil
proceeding.” Id. (quoting Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 784 (Iowa 2018)).
III. Discussion
On appeal, Tyson contends the court erred in “denying his motion for
postconviction DNA testing and, consequently, in granting the State’s motion for
summary judgment.” With regard to his PCR application, Tyson’s argument hinges
on the court’s denial of his motion for DNA testing. Specifically, Tyson claims the
court erred in its “rigid” interpretation of section 81.11(1) in denying his motion.
Iowa Code section 81.10(1) states:
A defendant who has been convicted of a felony or aggravated
misdemeanor and who has not been required to submit a DNA
sample for DNA profiling may make a motion to the court for an order
to require that DNA analysis be performed on evidence collected in
the case for which the person stands convicted.
The court “shall grant an application for DNA profiling if all of the following apply”:
a. The forensic sample subject to DNA profiling is available
and . . . DNA profiling has been previously performed on the forensic
sample and the defendant is requesting DNA profiling using a new
method or technology that is substantially more probative than the
DNA profiling previously performed.
b. A sufficient chain of custody has been established for the
forensic sample.
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c. The identity of the person who committed the crime for
which the defendant was convicted was a significant issue in the
crime for which the defendant was convicted.
d. The forensic sample subject to DNA profiling is material to,
and not merely cumulative or impeaching of, evidence included in
the trial record or admitted to at a guilty plea proceeding.
e. The DNA profiling results would raise a reasonable
probability that the defendant would not have been convicted if such
results had been introduced at trial.
Iowa Code § 81.11 (emphasis added).
The facts relevant to this issue are as follows. During the criminal
investigation of the victim’s residence, a number of items were collected for testing,
including a yellow top cover bed linen, a pink blanket, a yellow blanket, purple
pants and top, a pair of boxer shorts, a white towel, and denim jeans. A sanitary
napkin the victim wore after the assault was also collected, and buccal swabs were
taken directly from her vaginal and anal areas. Several of these pieces of evidence
contained seminal fluid (the pink blanket, sanitary napkin, and buccal swabs of the
victims vaginal and anal areas), which were then sent to the Iowa Division of
Criminal Investigation (DCI) for DNA testing. Meanwhile, a buccal swab from
Tyson’s mouth was also taken.
There is no dispute the DNA profile extracted from DCI testing of the
forensic samples was linked to the DNA profile listed in the online database for
Tyson as well as the buccal swab taken directly from him. At the hearing on his
first PCR application, Tyson agreed the DNA found on the victim’s pink blanket,
anal swab, vaginal swab, and sanitary napkin produced match to him in the
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combined DNA index system.2 He also acknowledged the police obtained a buccal
swab from him during an interview after the crime that matched the DNA found on
the forensic samples.3 Tyson also introduced the DCI report at the hearing and
agreed the report “basically said the DNA was [his].”
More than four years later, at the hearing on his motion for DNA testing,
Tyson specified he was requesting “retest[ing]” of the DNA found on the forensic
samples tested during the initial criminal investigation. The following colloquy took
place on this issue:
Q. [COURT]: Are you asking for a retest of the known forensic
samples that [the State] just listed that we know were tested that are
referred to, at least from what I’ve seen, in the prior post-conviction
ruling? Are you asking for those to be retested? And/or is there
separate forensic samples that you’re asking for a first test on? And,
if so, what are those forensic samples? A. [PCR COUNSEL]: I think
that what we would be asking to have tested would be—I think that
the State’s right that the statute is seemingly limited to the testing of
existing forensic samples, and there are known existing forensic
samples in this case as—as the State previously referenced. And I
think that the items or materials that did not have, I guess, bodily fluid
on them that were not submitted to the lab would not be something
that would necessarily fall within the gamut of the statute as far as
what the Court could order to be retested. So with respect to what
we are most interested in having retested would be the DNA found
in the pink blanket, the sanitary napkin, and the anal and vaginal
swabs of the victim.
Q: Okay. So those are the forensic samples that you’re asking
the Court to order to be tested? A: Yes.
....
Q: Okay. So we’ve got at least this one set that’s been tested
that we’ve talked about, and I understand that. Do you know of other
forensic samples . . . that were not tested that you’re seeking to have
tested? A: No, your Honor.
Q: Okay. So we’re just talking about retests? A: Yes.
2 Tyson alleged the match was “bogus.” He also pointed to some discrepancies in
the spelling of his name in the DNA reports, but he did not disagree the reports
referred to him.
3 He alleged the officers “framed me on my DNA that they took from me.”
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(Emphasis added.)
The court then turned to Iowa Code section 81.11, which it ultimately found
dispositive and fatal to Tyson’s request:
Q [COURT]: All right. So under 81.11(1)(a), in order—my
reading of this is in order for me to order a retesting, you have to
show that there’s some new method or technology that would be
substantially more probative than the testing that was done before.
Unless I missed it, I have zero evidence of that. I think the statement
you made was that was 2012, it’s now 2020, it’s got to be better. To
me, that’s not enough. So do you have some expert testimony,
evidence, opinion, or something that tells me that the DNA testing
that could be done on these samples today is substantially more
probative than the DNA testing that was done back in 2011 or 2012,
whenever it was? A [PCR COUNSEL]: No, I do not.
Q: Okay. . . . You have conceded that you don’t have
evidence of a new method or technology that is substantially more
probative, so I find that your application fails under [Iowa Code
section] 81.11(1)(a) because I have zero evidence that retesting
these samples, these forensic samples which you specifically asked
to be retested, can be done with a new method or technology that is
substantially more probative than the testing previously performed.
Because I find that, I don’t need to go into any of the other factors
under subsection (1) of 81.11 because, as that Code section states,
“all the following must apply.” That one has not been established, so
we’re done. The application is denied.
(Emphasis added.)
Upon our review, we concur in the court’s determination that section
81.11(1)(a) provides no relief for Tyson, given his concession that he was not
“requesting [retesting] using a new method or technology that is substantially more
probative than the DNA profiling previously performed.” In interpreting a statute,
“our primary goal is to give effect to the legislature’s intent as expressed in the
statute’s words.” State v. Davis, 922 N.W.2d 326, 330 (Iowa 2019). In Davis, our
supreme court also observed,
We seek a reasonable interpretation which will best effectuate the
purpose of the statute . . . . We give words their ordinary meaning
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absent legislative definition. Interpreting a statute requires us to
assess it in its entirety to ensure our interpretation is harmonious with
the statute as a whole rather than assessing isolated words or
phrases.
Id. (internal citations omitted). The ordinary meaning and only reasonable
interpretation of the phrase “if all of the following apply,” as used in section 81.11(1)
is that each requirement in paragraphs 81.11(1)(a)–(e) must be satisfied to be
entitled to DNA testing under that section. Inasmuch as Tyson concedes he could
not establish the requirement in paragraph 81.11(1)(a), he is not entitled to DNA
testing pursuant to that section. We next consider whether Tyson was entitled to
DNA testing pursuant to section 81.10.
Upon our review, of the district court’s written and oral ruling denying the
motion for DNA testing, we conclude the court did not address the issue of whether
Tyson was entitled to such testing pursuant to section 81.10. And Tyson did not
file a motion to enlarge to obtain a ruling relative to section 81.10. See Sandoval
v. State, 975 N.W.2d 434, 438 (Iowa 2022) (finding error not preserved where “the
district court did not rule” on the claims); Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 862
(Iowa 2012) (“When a district court fails to rule on an issue properly raised by a
party, the party who raised the issue must file a motion requesting a ruling in order
to preserve error for appeal.” (quoting Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537
(Iowa 2002))). Accordingly, we affirm on this issue.
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Subsequently, with regard to Tyson’s PCR application, the court addressed
Tyson’s claim of actual innocence on the basis “the DNA found in discovery was
not his”4 and concluded in relevant part:
Under the applicable law stated above, the Court finds that for
Mr. Tyson to prevail on his actual innocence claim, he must meet the
procedural requirements, including the statute of limitations. Mr.
Tyson attempted to do so through the filing of a motion for DNA
profiling. Following a hearing on the motion, this Court denied said
motion. . . . . Thus, Mr. Tyson cannot get around the statute of
limitations on this attempted “ground of fact.”
....
. . . Mr. Tyson has not produced any new evidence that would
show by clear and convincing evidence that, despite the evidence of
guilt supporting the conviction, no reasonable fact finder could
convict the applicant of the crimes for which the sentencing court
found the applicant guilty in light of all the evidence.
....
For all the above reasons, the Court finds there is no genuine
issue of material fact regarding Mr. Tyson’s actual innocence claim.
We discern no error in this ruling. Tyson did not present any new evidence
to support his claim of actual innocence, and the facts he relies on to support his
actual-innocence claim were available to him within the section 822.3 timeframe
and cannot be used to circumvent the time-bar. See Schmidt v. State, 909
N.W.2d 778, 797 (Iowa 2018) (“For an applicant to succeed on a freestanding
actual-innocence claim, the applicant must show by clear and convincing evidence
that, despite the evidence of guilt supporting the conviction, no reasonable fact
finder could convict the applicant of the crimes for which the sentencing court found
the applicant guilty in light of all the evidence, including the newly discovered
evidence.”); Quinn v. State, 954 N.W.2d 75, 77 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020) (“We have
4 Tyson also argued “he ha[d] an alibi that he was not in Iowa on the date of the
offense,” but he does not reraise that claim on appeal.
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found Schmidt does not apply to overcome the statute of limitations where the
evidence put forward to support a claim of actual innocence was available to the
applicant or could have been discovered with due diligence within the limitations
period.”).
We affirm the denial of Tyson’s request for DNA retesting and the dismissal
of his second application for postconviction relief.
AFFIRMED.