Joshua Jarrett v. State of Iowa ( 2023 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 22-0707
    Filed July 26, 2023
    JOSHUA JARRETT,
    Applicant-Appellant,
    vs.
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Buchanan County, Laura Parrish,
    Judge.
    Joshua Jarrett appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief.
    AFFIRMED.
    Benjamin Bergmann and Alexander Smith of Parrish, Kruidenier, Dunn,
    Gentry, Brown, Bergmann & Messamer, L.L.P., for appellant.
    Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney
    General, for appellee State.
    Considered by Schumacher, P.J., and Chicchelly and Buller, JJ.
    2
    CHICCHELLY, Judge.
    Joshua Jarrett appeals the district court’s denial of his application for
    postconviction relief (PCR), contending his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
    properly “impeach[] the testimony of the complaining witness.” Upon our review,
    we affirm.
    I.     Background Facts and Proceedings
    In 2016, a Buchanan County jury found Jarrett guilty of second-degree
    sexual abuse, third-degree sexual abuse, and flight to avoid prosecution. See
    
    Iowa Code §§ 709.1
    , 709.3(2), 709.4(2)(b), 719.4(4) (2014). In its decision on
    direct appeal, this court provided the following summary of the facts giving rise to
    Jarrett’s conviction:
    H.K. was known to Jarrett through H.K.’s mother. H.K.’s
    father is deceased; he died when H.K. was six years old. According
    to H.K., Jarrett first made her manually stimulate him shortly after her
    father’s death. H.K. did not tell her mother about this incident
    because Jarrett told her not to. On another occasion, when H.K. was
    eight years old, Jarrett made her perform oral sex on him. Again,
    H.K. did not disclose the abuse to her mother because Jarrett told
    H.K. not to and because she did not want her mother to be upset.
    The sex acts that Jarrett made H.K. perform eventually
    progressed from manual and oral stimulation to anal and vaginal
    intercourse. If H.K. resisted, Jarrett would “be terrible” to H.K.’s
    mother afterwards. Jarrett initiated sexual encounters with H.K.
    more frequently as she grew older. At trial, when asked how many
    times Jarrett had sexual contact with her, H.K. responded it was “way
    too many to count.”
    When H.K. was in fifth grade she was provided a cell phone.
    Jarrett began to initiate sexual contact by sending H.K. text
    messages after her bedtime. H.K. testified about the content of the
    messages, stating they would say, “‘Come meet me after your mom
    is asleep’ or ‘Come meet me in the living room’ or ‘Come meet me’
    wherever.”
    According to H.K., one night, when she was fourteen, Jarrett
    sent her a text message after her bedtime to “[c]ome get me after
    your mother is asleep.” H.K.’s mother saw H.K.’s phone light up
    when she received that message, and the mother grabbed the phone
    3
    from H.K.’s hand. The mother read the text message, along with all
    of the other text messages from Jarrett to H.K. that told her to meet
    him after bedtime in various locations. H.K.’s mother and H.K. had
    a conversation outside of Jarrett’s presence; H.K. told her mother
    that “since the age of 6 . . . he would make [her] have vaginal, anal,
    and oral sex with him and that he would make [her] masturbate him.”
    H.K. was crying throughout her disclosure, and her mother was also
    upset. The mother confronted Jarrett. No one reported the abuse.
    H.K.’s mother made sure Jarrett was not alone with H.K., and Jarrett
    had no further sexual contact with H.K. from that point on.
    H.K. reported the sexual abuse to law enforcement in August
    2014. When Jarrett learned that the police were looking for him to
    investigate H.K.’s reports of sexual abuse, he fled from the state—to
    Kansas, North Carolina, Colorado, and finally Texas, where he was
    apprehended.
    State v. Jarrett, No. 17-0091, 
    2018 WL 1099268
    , at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 21,
    2018). On appeal, this court rejected Jarrett’s various claims, including a challenge
    to the district court’s denial of the admission of a video-recorded Child Protective
    Center (CPC) interview of H.K. in which she “denied any sexual abuse by Jarrett.”
    
    Id. at *2
    .
    Jarrett filed this PCR application in 2019, claiming his trial counsel was
    ineffective in failing to get the CPC interview into evidence or question H.K. about
    her prior inconsistent statements. He filed a motion for summary disposition of his
    application, which the court denied. Following a hearing, the PCR court entered a
    ruling denying Jarrett’s application. Jarrett appealed.
    II.     Standards of Review
    “We ordinarily review PCR rulings for correction of errors at law. . . . But
    when the allegation is ineffective assistance [of] . . . counsel, we review de novo.”
    Brooks v. State, 
    975 N.W.2d 444
    , 445 (Iowa Ct. App. 2022) (citations omitted).
    4
    III.   Discussion
    On appeal, Jarrett maintains his claim regarding trial counsel’s alleged
    ineffectiveness in failing to impeach H.K. with regard to her statements in the CPC
    interview in which she denied sexual abuse by Jarrett. He also challenges the
    PCR court’s denial of his motion for summary disposition on that claim. To prevail
    on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Jarrett must show (1) counsel
    breached an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted.                See Strickland v.
    Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687 (1984).
    Additional facts relevant to resolution of Jarrett’s claim include the following.
    As noted above, H.K. testified Jarrett began sexually abusing her when she was
    six years old and the abuse continued until she was between thirteen and fourteen
    years old. The summer before H.K.’s freshman year, Jarrett’s daughter S. moved
    in with H.K.’s family. H.K. told S. about the abuse by Jarrett, and S. responded
    that Jarrett “had done it to her, too.” S. eventually disclosed the abuse, and the
    Department of Human Services (DHS) became involved with the family. As part
    of the DHS investigation, the CPC scheduled an interview of H.K. On the drive to
    the interview, H.K.’s mother “told [H.K.] to lie and say that it didn’t happen to [her]
    and say that [she] didn’t think it happened to [S.]” either. H.K.’s mother told H.K.
    that if she “didn’t lie,” then the kids would be “taken away” by DHS. And the mother
    “said if [H.K.] did [lie], then she would let [H.K.] decide if [Jarrett] stayed or [left the
    family home].” H.K. “was scared” and agreed that she “would lie.” Thereafter,
    during the interview, when H.K. was asked “if anything had happened, [she] said
    no.” On the drive home, the mother asked H.K. if she had lied; H.K. “said yes.”
    H.K. then “waited for her to ask . . . if [Jarrett] was going to stay or go,” but “she
    5
    never did, and he came home.” Subsequently, H.K. reported Jarrett’s abuse to
    law enforcement.
    H.K. later “testified at Jarrett’s trial during the State’s case-in-chief and
    described the years of sexual abuse by Jarrett.” Jarrett, 
    2018 WL 1099268
    , at *2.
    But trial counsel “did not attempt to offer or cross-examine H.K. about her video-
    recorded CPC interview in which she had denied the abuse by Jarrett.” 
    Id. at *3
    .
    At the PCR hearing, trial counsel1 stated he believed “the fact that the jury never
    learned that H.K. had previously denied the abuse prejudiced” Jarrett.
    On appeal, Jarrett contends the CPC interview was admissible under a
    number of evidentiary rules, including Iowa Code section 915.38(3) and Iowa
    Rules of Evidence 5.613, 5.703, and 5.104. He further argues “[t]he failure to get
    the CPC video into evidence was not a strategic decision” because “[g]etting the
    denial in would have complemented counsel’s strategy.” We noted on direct
    appeal, “Since H.K. testified at trial, the [CPC interview] was admissible for
    impeachment as a prior inconsistent statement.”       
    Id. at *4
    . For purposes of
    evaluating Jarrett’s claim, we will assume without deciding that he could meet the
    procedural requirements of rule 5.613 and that the recorded statement could have
    complemented trial counsel’s strategy of challenging H.K.’s credibility.
    But Jarrett also must be able to establish the prejudice prong of his
    ineffective-assistance claim to be successful. See State v. Haas, 
    930 N.W.2d 699
    ,
    703 (Iowa 2019); Dempsey v. State, 
    860 N.W.2d 860
    , 868 (Iowa 2015) (“The court
    1 During his criminal trial, Jarrett was represented by Clemens Erdahl and his co-
    counsel Eric Tindal. Erdahl passed away in 2019, before Jarrett took depositions
    in this PCR action. Accordingly, our references to trial counsel’s statements or
    testimony are with regard to Tindal.
    6
    always has the option to decide the claim on the prejudice prong of the Strickland
    test, without deciding whether the attorney performed deficiently.” (quoting State
    v. Clay, 
    824 N.W.2d 488
    , 501 n.2 (Iowa 2012))). In other words, Jarrett had to
    establish “a reasonable probability . . . the result of the proceeding would have
    been different” if trial counsel had elicited evidence regarding H.K’s statements
    during the CPC interview. See 
    id.
     On this issue, Jarrett claims placing H.K.’s
    credibility in question “would have put this case into an entirely new light,” “with an
    impeached witness that the jury had to believe beyond a reasonable doubt.”
    The PCR court was not persuaded, finding:
    [E]ven if questions had been asked of H.K. regarding her prior denial,
    the explanation for the denial was persuasive—that H.K.’s mother
    had told her to lie in order to avoid removal of the children in the
    home. Bringing that evidence before the jury would perhaps have
    only cemented the jury’s belief that H.K. was more credible than her
    mother at the time of trial. There is no guarantee, or even probable
    likelihood on these facts, that the prior denial would have
    strengthened Jarrett’s denials.
    . . . . Even if counsel’s failure to get the videotaped CPC
    testimony before the jury, or their failure to conduct a different cross-
    examination of H.K. was determined to be ineffective, it was not
    prejudicial, and therefore, Jarrett’s claim must fail.
    Indeed, at the PCR hearing, trial counsel acknowledged that if H.K.’s
    inconsistent statements had been raised, H.K. “would then claim that her mother
    put her under duress,” which “was an issue” for the defense. The jury had other
    reason to question H.K.’s mother’s credibility as well. For instance, when police
    spoke to her about H.K.’s allegations of abuse against Jarrett, she called Jarrett
    and told him “he probably needed to get home” because H.K. had reported the
    abuse and the police were involved. And as this court previously noted:
    At trial, H.K.’s mother denied that H.K. had disclosed the
    sexual abuse when she caught Jarrett sending her the text message.
    7
    Even so, she acknowledged that after that incident, she did not allow
    Jarrett and H.K. to be alone together. Jarrett did not deny that he
    sent the text messages to H.K. and also did not deny that H.K.’s
    mother confronted him about it, but he claimed he told her “it was
    nothing” and she should “just let it go.”
    Jarrett, 
    2018 WL 1099268
    , at *2. The PCR court reiterated additional evidence
    corroborating H.K.’s testimony as follows:
    In addition to the testimony of H.K., the jury in this case had
    other corroborating evidence to consider in reaching a guilty verdict:
    (1) the text message from Jarrett to H.K. was acknowledged by
    H.K.’s mother and Jarrett—without a reasonable explanation as to
    what it could have meant, other than exactly what H.K. said it
    meant—that she was supposed to get him for sexual contact after
    her mother was asleep and wouldn’t be aware; (2) H.K.’s mother’s
    decision to prevent H.K. from being alone with Jarrett after seeing
    the text message; [and] (3) Jarrett’s response to the accusation was
    to abscond to Texas in an attempt to avoid contact with law
    enforcement.
    Upon our review, we agree Jarrett has failed to establish a reasonable
    probability, in light of all the evidence, that had H.K.’s testimony been impeached,
    the outcome would have been different. See Everett v. State, 
    789 N.W.2d 151
    ,
    160 (Iowa 2010). In other words, he has not shown “the possibility that this
    evidence would have impugned [H.K.’s] credibility is sufficient to undermine
    confidence in the outcome.” Cf. Millam v. State, 
    745 N.W.2d 719
    , 724 (Iowa 2008)
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Accordingly, we affirm the court’s denial of Jarrett’s motion for summary
    disposition on this claim and the denial of his PCR application.
    AFFIRMED.