Roger Christopher McGhee v. State of Iowa ( 2023 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-0075
Filed June 7, 2023
ROGER CHRISTOPHER McGHEE,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Amy M. Moore, Judge.
Roger McGhee appeals from the denial of his application for postconviction
relief. AFFIRMED.
Audra F. Saunders of Anderson & Taylor PLLC, Des Moines, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Bower, C.J., Vaitheswaran, J., and Vogel, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2023).
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VOGEL, Senior Judge.
Roger McGhee appeals from the denial of his application for postconviction
relief (PCR), contending both ineffective assistance of defense counsel and
ineffective assistance of PCR counsel. Because McGhee was not denied the
effective assistance of defense counsel, and he must raise his claims regarding
ineffective assistance of PCR counsel in a separate action, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
This case stems from McGhee’s 2019 convictions for repeated sexual
offenses against his minor daughter L.M. The State’s witnesses at his criminal trial
included L.M., L.M.’s mother, L.M.’s brother, and an expert regarding the general
nature of child forensic interviews. After trial, the jury found McGhee guilty of
sexual abuse in the third degree, lascivious acts with a child, and assault with intent
to commit sexual abuse. A panel of this court affirmed his convictions on direct
appeal. See State v. McGhee, No. 19-0344, 2020 WL 2488191, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct.
App. May 13, 2020).
In July 2020, McGhee filed his PCR application. After a trial, the PCR court
denied his application in full. McGhee appeals.
II. Standard of Review
“We generally review a district court’s denial of an application for [PCR] for
errors at law.” Doss v. State, 961 N.W.2d 701, 709 (Iowa 2021). “However, a PCR
application alleging ineffective assistance of counsel raises a constitutional claim,
and ‘[w]e review postconviction proceedings that raise constitutional infirmities de
novo.’” Krogmann v. State, 914 N.W.2d 293, 306 (Iowa 2018) (alteration in
original) (quoting Castro v. State, 795 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Iowa 2011)).
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III. Discussion
McGhee argues his defense counsel was ineffective in several ways:
(1) failure to call an expert defense witness, (2) failure to object to hearsay
evidence, (3) introduction of hearsay evidence, (4) failure to object to the State’s
closing argument, (5) failure to file a motion in arrest of judgment, (6) failure to
object to unfairly prejudicial evidence, and (7) failure to object to impermissible
witness vouching. He also argues (8) his PCR counsel was ineffective for failing
to call L.M.’s mother as a witness during the PCR trial.
“To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the applicant
must demonstrate both ineffective assistance and prejudice.” Ledezma v. State,
626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001). “Both elements must be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence.” Id. To establish ineffective assistance, “the
applicant must demonstrate the attorney performed below the standard demanded
of a reasonably competent attorney.” Id. To establish prejudice, “the applicant
must demonstrate ‘that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Id.
at 143 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)).
A. Expert defense witness
McGhee argues his defense counsel should have called an expert witness
in his defense to counter the State’s expert. However, at the PCR hearing, he
presented no evidence of a defense expert who would have bolstered his defense.
Without such evidence, he cannot prove his defense counsel was ineffective for
failing to call an expert. See Dunbar v. State, 515 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Iowa 1994) (“[I]t
is not enough to simply claim that counsel should have done a better job.”).
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B. Object to hearsay evidence
McGhee argues his defense counsel should have objected to certain
hearsay evidence during trial. He asserts L.M.’s mother, L.M.’s brother, and a
police detective all testified—in general terms—to what L.M. told them about the
abuse and the prosecutor referred to L.M.’s out-of-court allegations during opening
arguments. Even if we assume all of these statements were inadmissible hearsay,
L.M. testified to the specific allegations during trial, and he does not challenge the
admissibility of her testimony. Thus, all of the challenged statements were
cumulative to other properly admitted evidence, and his counsel was not ineffective
for failing to object to these statements. See State v. Neitzel, 801 N.W.2d 612,
623 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011) (“[W]e will not find prejudice if the admitted hearsay is
merely cumulative.” (quoting State v. Hildreth, 582 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Iowa 1998)).
C. Introduction of hearsay evidence
McGhee argues his own defense counsel introduced prejudicial hearsay
evidence, specifically a recording of L.M.’s forensic interview that contained her
detailed allegations of abuse. However, his defense counsel testified during the
PCR trial that he played the recording to point out inconsistencies in L.M.’s
testimony and to show her demeanor changed from calm during the forensic
interview to frightened during trial. Counsel also testified he met with McGhee
before trial and they decided “the benefit from playing [the recording] outweighed
any potential harm.” Thus, the decision to introduce into evidence a recording of
the forensic interview was a reasonable trial strategy and not ineffective assistance
of counsel. See State v. Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d 778, 786 (Iowa 2006) (stating
counsel was not ineffective for having “made a reasonable decision concerning
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trial tactics and strategy, even if such judgments ultimately fail” (quoting Brewer v.
State, 444 N.W.2d 77, 83 (Iowa 1989)).
D. The State’s closing argument
McGhee argues his defense counsel should have objected to references to
evidence not in the record during the State’s closing argument. A prosecutor “is
entitled to some latitude during closing argument in analyzing the evidence
admitted in the trial.” State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 874 (Iowa 2003) (quoting
State v. Phillips, 226 N.W.2d 16, 19 (Iowa 1975)). “Moreover, a prosecutor may
argue the reasonable inferences and conclusions to be drawn from the evidence.”
Id. “A prosecutor may not, however, express his or her personal beliefs.” Id.McGhee asserts these statements from the State’s closing argument were
improper:
What Mr. McGhee wants you to believe is that this is just all made
up. For what reason? Don’t know. What’s the motivation? What
does [L.M.] get out of this by making this up? By coming in here and
talking about her body parts and her dad’s body parts, starting back
in February of last year having to talk to multiple people over and
over about what happened to her? What does she get out of it? He
wants you to believe that it’s a story, that she came up with this story
for whatever reason and then she stuck with it, and she came in here
and she told you these things, and she just made it all up, but there
are too many details that [L.M.] can provide, and there are too many
details that the police discovered during their investigation to have it
be just that, to have it be a story. It’s just not a story.
....
. . . He wants you to think that it’s a story, that she came up
with this or maybe that she and her mother came up with this, but all
of the pieces line up much too perfectly for this to be a story. This is
not a story. This happened to [L.M.].
These statements are reasonable inferences and conclusions and otherwise
entirely consistent with L.M.’s testimony and the other evidence in the record. See
Graves, 668 N.W.2d at 874. To the extent McGhee also argues the prosecutor
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impermissibly commented on the credibility of witnesses here, we again find these
comments were fair inferences from the record and within the prosecutor’s latitude
rather than impermissible vouching. See id. Thus, his defense counsel was not
ineffective for failing to object to the State’s closing argument.
E. Motion in arrest of judgment
McGhee argues his counsel should have filed a motion in arrest of
judgment. “A motion in arrest of judgment is an application by the defendant that
no judgment be rendered on a finding, plea, or verdict of guilty. Such motion shall
be granted when upon the whole record no legal judgment can be pronounced.”
Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(3)(a). “[T]he term ‘whole record’ . . . does not refer to the
evidence of the trial itself.” State v. Oldfather, 306 N.W.2d 760, 762 (Iowa 1981).
“A motion in arrest of judgment may not be used to challenge the sufficiency of
evidence.” State v. Dallen, 452 N.W.2d 398, 399 (Iowa 1990). Instead, after a
guilty verdict, a defendant may use a motion in arrest of judgment to challenge
whether the criminal statute applies to the facts of the case. Oldfather, 306 N.W.2d
at 763 (“If the underlying statute is not applicable, granting a new trial would leave
the original charge intact and would merely perpetuate the issue. And entering
judgment, void under the circumstances, would obviously be inappropriate. Arrest
of judgment appears to be the only suitable vehicle by which to raise the issue
after trial.”).
The exact nature of McGhee’s claim is unclear. In his brief to us, he alleges
the State, possibly improperly, provided certain information to L.M. and her mother
before trial, which may have influenced their testimony. Even if we assume this is
true, it does not void his convictions or otherwise prevent judgment from being
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pronounced. Rather, his claim relates to the weight of the evidence to support his
convictions, which is not a proper basis for a motion in arrest of judgment. See
Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(3)(a); Dallen, 452 N.W.2d at 399. Furthermore, McGhee’s
defense counsel testified the information in question had no value to the trial.
Thus, even if a motion in arrest of judgment were a proper basis here, McGhee
has not shown any prejudice resulted from providing the information to the
witnesses. Therefore, his counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion in
arrest of judgment.
F. Unfairly prejudicial evidence
McGhee argues his counsel should have objected to unfairly prejudicial
testimony during this exchange between the State and L.M.’s mother:
Q. When the two of you were intimate with each other, did
[McGhee] ever ask you to do anything in particular regarding your
appearance or your hair? A. Yes.
Q. What did he ask you to do? A. To wear pigtails.
Q. Okay. What did you think about that? A. It was—it made
me feel a little uncomfortable, but I didn’t—I didn’t care for it.
Q. Did you do it? A. A couple times but not—not often.
Q. Was there a particular nickname that he asked you to call
him? A. Sometimes he would ask me to call him Daddy but not often.
McGhee asserts the only reason for this testimony “was to leave an impression on
the jury that McGhee was sexually attracted to children.” McGhee also asserts
that statements during trial that he fathered a child with another woman during his
relationship with L.M.’s mother were also solely intended to place him in a negative
light.
McGhee’s defense counsel testified he did not object to the intimate details
because he did not want to draw attention to them. He also testified he believed
the testimony about the intimate details and the other child were not helpful to the
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State’s case, specifically calling the other child “a non-issue.” His counsel’s
decision to not object to this testimony was a reasonable trial strategy. See
Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d at 786.
Nevertheless, the district court questioned whether counsel’s decision to
not object to testimony about the intimate details was “a sound strategic plan.”
Even if we were to find counsel was not “reasonable” in failing to object to any of
this testimony, L.M. otherwise gave detailed and compelling testimony during the
trial that was supported by other evidence. On direct appeal, we recognized she
“provided vivid and detailed descriptions of the acts committed by McGhee.”
McGhee, 2020 WL 2488191, at *1. Her testimony was supported by other
witnesses and sex-related exhibits in the record. Her mother’s brief description of
McGhee’s intimate details—which manifested “not often” during their multi-year
relationship—and other references to him fathering another child do not undermine
our confidence in his convictions in the face of the other evidence admitted at trial.
Therefore, counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to testimony about
McGhee’s intimate details and his other child.
G. Witness vouching
McGhee argues his counsel should have objected to impermissible witness
vouching. “[O]pinions on the truthfulness of a witness should generally be
excluded because weighing the truthfulness of a witness is a matter reserved
exclusively to the fact finder.” State v. Myers, 382 N.W.2d 91, 95 (Iowa 1986).
On appeal, it is not clear which statements McGhee asserts were
impermissible vouching. While he does not identify specific statements to us, the
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PCR court analyzed two statements. First, the following exchange occurred
between the State and a police detective:
Q. And as you spoke with [L.M.], without saying exactly what
she told you, did she describe multiple distinct incidents of sexual
abuse by her father? A. Yes, she did.
Q. Was she consistent throughout her account with you?
A. Very.
This exchange simply reflects the detective’s opinion that L.M. was consistent in
describing the sexual abuse. The detective does not offer an opinion on the
truthfulness of L.M.’s allegations or otherwise vouch for her credibility.
Second, L.M.’s mother testified she did the following after L.M. first told her
about the abuse, “I told [L.M.] I was going to call the cops, and I told her it was very
serious what she was saying so I needed her to make sure she was telling me the
truth because it was really serious.” Similarly, this statement merely shows L.M.’s
mother told her to tell the truth. Her mother does not offer an opinion on whether
those allegations were true or otherwise vouch for L.M.
McGhee also argues the State elicited improper vouching testimony from
him when the prosecutor asked him on cross-examination if he believed L.M.
“made everything up.” While the PCR court did not address this questioning, we
bypass error-preservation concerns to note McGhee’s defense counsel had no
reason to object. McGhee’s trial defense was to deny the abuse occurred.
Throughout trial, his counsel questioned the accuracy of L.M.’s allegations and
pointed out perceived inconsistencies in her statements. With L.M.’s credibility at
the heart of his defense, McGhee should have welcomed the opportunity to
personally cast doubt on her accusations during cross-examination. His counsel
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was not ineffective for failing to object to this questioning as impermissible
vouching.
H. Ineffective assistance of PCR counsel
Finally, McGhee argues his PCR counsel should have called L.M.’s mother
as a witness to support his PCR claims. We do not decide this issue on direct
appeal, and McGhee must raise his PCR counsel’s effectiveness in a separate
PCR application. See Goode v. State, 920 N.W.2d 520, 526–27 (Iowa Ct. App.
2018).
IV. Conclusion
We reject all of McGhee’s claims that his defense counsel was ineffective.
He must raise the effectiveness of his PCR counsel in a separate action.
AFFIRMED.