In the Interest of K.H., L.H., and A.S., Minor Children ( 2023 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 23-0636
    Filed June 7, 2023
    IN THE INTEREST OF K.H., L.H., and A.S.,
    Minor Children,
    A.H., Mother,
    Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Stephen A. Owen,
    District Associate Judge.
    A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
    Chad E. Schneider of Hastings & Gartin Law Group, Ames, for appellant
    mother.
    Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Michelle R. Becker, Assistant Attorney
    General, for appellee State.
    Shannon M. Leighty of the Public Defender’s Office, Nevada, attorney and
    guardian ad litem for minor children.
    Considered by Bower, C.J., and Tabor and Greer, JJ.
    2
    BOWER, Chief Judge.
    Angela is the mother of A.S., born 2014; L.H., born 2017; and K.H., born
    2018. She appeals the termination of her parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code
    section 232.116(1)(d) (2023) (A.S. and K.H.), (e) (A.S.), and (g) (all).1        She
    contends the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) failed to
    support her with appropriate services. She also maintains the court erred in finding
    the children could not be returned to her care at the present time, concluding
    termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interests, and declining
    to apply an exception.
    “We review termination of parental rights proceedings de novo.” In re J.H.,
    
    952 N.W.2d 157
    , 166 (Iowa 2020). “We are not bound by the juvenile court’s
    findings of fact, but we do give them weight, especially in assessing the credibility
    of witnesses.” In re D.W., 
    791 N.W.2d 703
    , 706 (Iowa 2010).
    Our review of termination of parental rights under Iowa Code
    chapter 232 is a three-step analysis. First, we determine whether
    any ground for termination under section 232.116(1) has been
    established. If we conclude affirmatively, we next determine whether
    the best-interest framework as laid out in section 232.116(2)
    supports the termination of parental rights. If we conclude section
    232.116(2) supports termination, we consider whether any
    exceptions in section 232.116(3) apply to preclude termination of
    parental rights.
    In re W.M., 
    957 N.W.2d 305
    , 313 (Iowa 2021) (internal quotation marks and
    citations omitted). We need not consider a step the parent does not dispute on
    appeal. In re P.L., 
    778 N.W.2d 33
    , 40 (Iowa 2010).
    1 L.H.’s biological father’s rights were not terminated at this time. A.S.’s father
    consented to termination of his parental rights. The biological father of K.H. and
    legal father of L.H. had his parental rights terminated. Neither appeals the
    termination of their parental rights.
    3
    Because we conclude the State proved termination of the mother’s parental
    rights was appropriate under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g), we need not
    address the other grounds. See In re A.B., 
    815 N.W.2d 764
    , 774 (Iowa 2012)
    (“When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory
    ground, we may affirm the juvenile court’s order on any ground we find supported
    by the record.”).
    A court may terminate parental rights pursuant to section 232.116(1)(g)
    when it finds all of the following have occurred:
    (1) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of
    assistance [(CINA)]pursuant to section 232.96.
    (2) The court has terminated parental rights pursuant to
    section 232.117 with respect to another child who is a member of the
    same family . . . .
    (3) There is clear and convincing evidence that the parent
    continues to lack the ability or willingness to respond to services
    which would correct the situation.
    (4) There is clear and convincing evidence that an additional
    period of rehabilitation would not correct the situation.
    The mother does not dispute all three children have been adjudicated
    children in need of assistance.
    The mother’s parental rights to the children’s younger siblings, J.H. and T.H.
    Jr. (then-aged one and two, respectively) were terminated on February 6, 2023.
    The mother appealed the termination of her parental rights, and this court affirmed.
    In re J.H., No. 23-0292, 
    2023 WL 3612388
    , at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. May 24, 2023);
    see also In re H.B., No. 18-0835, 
    2018 WL 3913110
    , at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 15,
    2018) (noting children with the same mother are members “of the same family”
    within the meaning of Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g)(2)).
    4
    As for services offered, the mother has been provided services to remedy
    ongoing concerns about her inadequate parenting for at least six years.2 The case
    manager, Tammy Hicks, testified, “I don’t know of any other service that they
    haven’t already received that could be provided.” The juvenile court found:
    [The mother] perceives and understands things in their basic, literal
    sense. She seems unable to carry forward the meaning of words
    and circumstances with deeper understanding. The court intends no
    disrespect.    However, her testimony supported Ms. Hicks’s
    assessment that she is able to parrot information and mimic skills
    picked up through services but cannot translate them into action for
    longer than short periods because she may not really understand the
    deeper meaning of the services and so she does not appreciate their
    relevance or utility to the goal of reunification. As such she does not
    respond to them.
    While the mother complains she has not received “appropriate” or
    “adequate” services, she does not suggest what those services might be. The
    court found:
    As Ms. Hicks testified, the family has received services since
    2016. In 2018, the first CINA cases were opened in Story County.
    They closed after the parents cooperated with services and showed
    improvement. Ms. Hicks testified that over the years the parents
    have received every service available to a family. In fact, in all of her
    years of service to [D]HHS, she has never seen parents who have
    been provided so many parenting classes. Yet, they are unable to
    appreciate the lessons and do not respond to services. The children
    have over the years been subjected to harm in their parents’ care.
    The children have been exposed to sexual abuse, physical abuse,
    they have been exposed to sex offenders, the parents have failed to
    meet the children’s medical needs, the children have been denied
    critical care including lack of supervision and the youngest have been
    diagnosed with failure to thrive. Domestic violence has been an
    issue in the past and [the mother] was injured by [her spouse] again
    in January 2023.
    2 A.S. is eight years old, and DHHS has been involved with the family either
    formally or informally since at least 2016.
    5
    The mother remains unable to appreciate danger and lacks the ability to
    safely parent her children.    It is unlikely more services would be any more
    successful in remedying the mother’s parenting deficiencies.         See J.H., 952
    N.W.2d at 171 (describing how a parent’s past conduct may be indicative of future
    care). The mother’s parental rights were properly terminated pursuant to 
    Iowa Code § 232.116
    (1)(g).
    We turn to our best-interests analysis, where we “give primary consideration
    to the child[ren]’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term
    nurturing and growth of the child[ren], and to the physical, mental, and emotional
    condition and needs of the child[ren].” 
    Iowa Code § 232.116
    (2). “[I]t is well-settled
    law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a
    ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will
    learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” In re A.S.,
    
    906 N.W.2d 467
    , 474 (Iowa 2018) (citation omitted). These children have been
    exposed to unsafe conditions due to the mother’s inability to protect or recognize
    when the children are unsafe.        Children need safe, stable, and consistent
    parenting—which the mother is unable to provide. See In re L.L., 
    459 N.W.2d 489
    ,
    495 (Iowa 1990) (“Parenting cannot be turned off and on like a spigot. It must be
    constant, responsible, and reliable.”).       Termination is in the children’s best
    interests.
    The mother argues the children are bonded together and their placement in
    separate foster homes is not in their best interests. The children were placed in
    separate foster homes because the foster parents were unable to supervise the
    three children together (all are attention-seeking and have behavioral problems
    6
    and tantrums). It is reported A.S. has made some progress with a consistent
    schedule and expectations; her behavioral outbursts have decreased while in
    foster care. A.S. has progressed out of her individual education plan, her speech
    is improving, and her medications have been adjusted. She continues to receive
    occupational and speech therapy, as well as mental-health counseling.           The
    younger two, K.H. and L.H., are on individual education and behavior plans and
    are in speech therapy. Their foster mother is a special education teacher and uses
    those skills with the children. This foster family has indicated they can be a
    permanent placement. On our de novo review, we believe termination of the
    mother’s parental rights will best advance the children’s need for permanency.
    The mother next asserts her bond with the children militates against
    termination. See 
    Iowa Code § 232.116
    (3)(c) (allowing court to avoid termination
    of parental rights where “termination would be detrimental to the child . . . due to
    the closeness of the parent-child relationship”).       The exceptions noted in
    subsection (3) “are permissive, not mandatory.” In re A.M., 
    843 N.W.2d 100
    , 113
    (Iowa 2014) (citation omitted). The parent has the burden to prove any statutory
    exception applies once the State has proved a ground for termination. A.S., 906
    N.W.2d at 476. The mother has not proved terminating her parental rights would
    be detrimental to the children due to the bond they share with her. We thus affirm.
    AFFIRMED.