City of Tiffin v. City of Coralville ( 2023 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-1312
Filed June 7, 2023
CITY OF TIFFIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
CITY OF CORALVILLE,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________
CITY OF CORALVILLE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CITY OF TIFFIN, IOWA,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Jason D. Besler,
Judge.
A municipality appeals the denial of its petition for declaratory judgment.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Robert W. Goodwin of Goodwin Law Office, P.C., Ames, and Crystal K.
Raiber and Robert S. Michael of Holland, Michael, Raiber & Sittig PLC, Iowa City,
for appellant.
Kevin D. Olson, Coralville, for appellee.
Heard by Bower, C.J., and Tabor and Greer, JJ. Chicchelly, J., takes no
part.
2
GREER, Judge.
In the never-ending saga of Forevergreen Road,1 we are again wrestling
with a stalemate over the City of Tiffin’s ability to extend that road over
undeveloped real estate in Johnson County to reach a new Interstate 380
interchange. The stalemate pits the interests of Tiffin against the mutual interests
of the Ruth E. Rarick Trust (the Trust), which owns land in Johnson County, and
the City of Coralville.2 The Trust deeded 7.63 acres of its Johnson County land to
Coralville just as Tiffin was starting condemnation proceedings to acquire some of
the Trust’s land for the road.
In this appeal, Tiffin and Coralville are the litigants. Two earlier appeals
before our court dealt with Forevergreen Road, but those cases only involved the
Trust and Tiffin. See generally City of Tiffin v. TAT, LLC, No. 20-0912, 2021 WL
2452060 (Iowa Ct. App. June 16, 2021); Ruth E. Rarick Tr., 2021 WL 2453375.
1 In one of our earlier decisions involving this road, we quoted the district court:
There are now six cases that have been filed that are related to this
case, none of which are individually assigned to any judge of the
Sixth Judicial District: CVCV081144 (a certiorari action brought by
the Trust, which was dismissed by agreement of the parties on
January 6, 2020); CVCV081458 (a certiorari action brought by the
Trust); CVCV081474 (a certiorari action brought by the City of
Coralville, Iowa); CVCV081479 (a declaratory judgment action
brought by Tiffin); EQCV081622 (an Iowa Code chapter 6B claim
brought by the City of Coralville, Iowa); and EQCV081617 (an Iowa
Code chapter 6A and 6B claim brought by the Trust and Clint Rarick).
Ruth E. Rarick Tr. v. City of Tiffin, No. 20-0955, 2021 WL 2453375, at *2 n.1 (Iowa
Ct. App. June 16, 2021).
2 An individual, Clint Rarick, has a leasehold interest in the Trust’s land. In addition
to the previous cases already listed, there was reference in the pleadings filed in
this matter to a petition filed by the Trust (CVCV082400) and a petition filed by
Rarick (CVCV082399), which also raise claims against Tiffin under Iowa Code
chapters 6A and 6B (2021) and a statement that EQCV081617 was dismissed by
Rarick.
3
Because of strategic moves3 by the Trust, which originally owned the land, and
Coralville, which now owns the land, we were asked to decide if the development
of the road served a public purpose and would be a public improvement under
Iowa Code section 6A.22(2) (2019). City of Tiffin, 2021 WL 2452060, at *3–5. We
said, as it relates to the ability to condemn for a public purpose, the answer is yes.
Id. at *5. And in that same appeal, we agreed with the Trust that the validity of the
quit claim deed between it and Coralville was not properly before the court and
then reversed the district court ruling invalidating the deed. Id. at *6. On the same
day as that appellate decision was filed, we reversed the district court’s dismissal
of the Trust’s petition for writ of certiorari and found that Tiffin had not complied
with the condemnation requirements by providing the Trust with an appraisal and
offer for its possibility for a reverter interest in the land. See Ruth E. Rarick Tr.,
2021 WL 2453375, at *5–7.
Now, following the district court’s denial of Tiffin’s requested relief in an
action for declaratory judgment against Coralville, Tiffin appeals. In this round,
Tiffin asked the district court to declare Tiffin had the authority to build the road
3 The district court described the relationship between Coralville and the Trust:
On August 22, 2019, and prior to Tiffin taking additional action
on their resolution [to condemn], the Trust executed a Quit Claim
Deed conveying the subject property to Coralville, but with a
reversion clause. This Quit Claim Deed was recorded on August 23,
2019. The Quit Claim Deed grants Coralville the subject property
with the agreement Coralville will not assess any costs to the Trust
for the construction of the proposed public road. Furthermore, the
location of the public road must be mutually agreed upon by
Coralville and the Trust. Finally, in the event Coralville does not
construct this road within five (5) years the subject property reverts
back to the Trust.
(Footnote omitted.)
4
and to invalidate the quit claim deed between the Trust and Coralville. The district
court found (1) the Trust was an indispensable party and its exclusion from the
case meant it could not set aside the quit claim deed and (2) because the land was
owned by Coralville, Tiffin could not use eminent domain to take the land. Tiffin
argues the Trust was not an indispensable party to the question of Coralville’s
jurisdiction; the district court should have invalidated the quit claim deed to the
extent it operated to give Coralville authority to build a street; and that Tiffin—not
Coralville—has the jurisdiction, control, and authority to acquire the land. Because
the Trust was not brought in as an indispensable party, and because of concerns
over judicial economy and so that the issues can be fully and finally decided, we
reverse and remand for a determination of one lingering issue impacting our ability
to resolve the issues before us today.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings.
The Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT) built a new interchange at
Interstate 380 and Forevergreen Road in the City of North Liberty, which included
paving a new portion of Forevergreen Road in North Liberty. Tiffin asked it to also
connect that portion of Forevergreen Road to the portion of the road in Tiffin, but
the DOT declined. Tiffin, claiming that the DOT then told the city it bore the
responsibility of connecting the roads, eventually created the plan seen below, on
which we have identified important landmarks and those communities having
jurisdiction over the properties.
5
Avenue
Jasper
Johnson County North Liberty
Trust Land
Old Park Road
Tiffin Coralville
The portion of the land between New Park Road and Jasper Avenue in
unincorporated Johnson County was owned by the Trust. In total, Tiffin needed
“0.75 acres in fee simple title, 0.21 acres permanent easement, and 0.85 acres
temporary construction easement” from the Trust’s land to be able to finish the
project.
Coralville had concerns about the early iterations of Tiffin’s plan, and it
believed Johnson County, North Liberty, Tiffin, and Coralville should collaborate to
come up with the best option—Coralville’s city engineer, Scott Larson, sent Tiffin
his recommendations, which Tiffin declined to follow.4
4The suggestion, which was submitted into evidence by Coralville, was described
by Larson as a quick sketch that “took [him] about 20 minutes to put together.” The
image is dated and does not show New Park Road. But it reflected Coralville’s
main concern that the intersection be designed with Forevergreen Road and Old
Park Road/Jasper Avenue converging at a ninety-degree angle.
6
Tiffin and the Trust were unable to agree to a voluntary acquisition of the
land, so Tiffin began condemnation proceedings under Iowa Code chapter 6A; the
Tiffin City Council passed the resolution authorizing condemnation on August 20,
2019. On August 22, the Trust signed a quit claim deed giving the 250 feet of land
needed for the road to Coralville. The deed stated that if after five years Coralville
had not built the connecting road in a way agreed upon by the Trust and Coralville,
then the land would revert to the Trust. It also stated that Coralville would not
charge the Trust any assessment on the extension. Coralville’s city council passed
a resolution to accept the deed and began paying property taxes for the land. Tiffin
filed a petition for declaratory judgment against Coralville, but not the Trust, calling
the quit claim deed a “sham,” and asked the district court to:
declare and construe the parties’ relative rights and authority; that
the [c]ourt declare that the City of Tiffin, Iowa has full and complete
authority to proceed with and complete its Forevergreen Road
project, including condemnation of the 250 feet strip of the [Trust]
land Quit Claim Deeded to the City of Coralville, Iowa; that the City
of Coralville cannot in any way interfere with nor impede the City of
Tiffin, Iowa’s Forevergreen Road Project; for such other relief as may
be appropriate to adjudge and declare the parties’ relative right.
Coralville answered, urging the district court to “either refrain from declaring the
rights of the parties . . . [or] declare that [Tiffin] does not have the power and
authority to acquire the property owned by [Coralville] via the use of eminent
domain.” It also filed a counterclaim (1) stating the land deeded to them was now
public property, which could not be condemned by another municipality and
(2) requesting Tiffin be “permanently enjoined from acquiring the [p]roperty rights”
7
to the 250 feet the Trust deeded to Coralville.5 In a separate filing, Coralville also
petitioned the district court to (1) prohibit the condemnation Tiffin had begun until
Tiffin proved it had the authority to do so and (2) require Tiffin to properly comply
with all of the condemnation procedures, some of which Tiffin had missed, before
they continued. These two proceedings were consolidated.
Trial was held in January 2022, and both parties filed post-trial briefs in lieu
of closing arguments. The district court ruled that it could not set aside the quit
claim deed because the Trust was an indispensable party not included in the action
and, because Coralville owned the land, it was public property not able to be taken
by eminent domain. It also granted Coralville an injunction preventing Tiffin from
pursuing condemnation of the land through eminent domain.6 Both parties filed
Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904 motions to expand, which the district court
denied apart from a nunc pro tunc ruling to correct a scrivener’s error. Tiffin now
appeals.
II. Analysis.
On appeal, Tiffin argues the Trust was not an indispensable party necessary
to invalidate the quit claim deed; the district court should have invalidated the quit
claim deed; and Tiffin has the jurisdiction, control, and authority to acquire the land.
5 There was also a third claim—that the declaratory judgment action was not ripe
for adjudication due to a pending action alleging the taking is not for a public
purpose—which Coralville formally dropped before trial began.
6 The district court did make a caveat—if the land reverted back to the Trust, a new
quit claim deed was issued, or the land was no longer held for public purpose, the
injunction would dissolve. It also noted that the ruling “express[ed] no opinion as
to Tiffin’s authority to condemn the private property interest that the Trust has in
this property under the [quit claim deed], with it potentially reverting back to the
Trust.”
8
But, because we can resolve the issue on whether or not the Trust is an
indispensable party as to the viability of the quit claim deed, we begin there.
Tiffin asked the district court to set aside the quit claim deed, in part because
it believed the deed to be a “sham”—in Tiffin’s post-trial brief, it alleged the property
was conveyed to Coralville only to “try and stop Tiffin’s public improvement
project.” In its initial ruling, the district court found that “as a factual matter it [was]
very difficult, if not impossible, to void the Quit Claim Deed without hearing from
representatives from the Trust” and that “the Trust has an interest that is clearly
impacted by any decision regarding the Quit Claim Deed. . . . The Court finds it
cannot issue a Declaratory Judgment against the Quit Claim Deed without
impairing the Trust’s rights and interests.”7 The district court explained:
The Court finds the property could possibly revert back to the
Trust, pursuant to the terms of the Quit Claim Deed, and that there
is a private interest the Trust has in this property. . . .
The Court finds that there is no manner in which the Court
could invalidate the Quit Claim Deed that does not impair or impact
the Trusts’ rights and interests. The Trust cannot have the
conveyance of the property it initiated via the Quit Claim Deed
invalidated without having an opportunity to defend its conveyance
via the Quit Claim Deed. The Court finds no manner that it could
both invalidate the Quit Claim Deed and not impact the [T]rust’s
interests in this matter. Furthermore, given that there is a pending
action involving the Trust and this Quit Claim Deed it is better to allow
this question to be resolved in that litigation, where all parties have
the opportunity to be heard regarding it. The Court finds the Trust is
an indispensable party regarding whether to invalidate the Quit Claim
Deed, and the Court will not entertain setting it aside as a result.
7The district court made the distinction that the Trust was “not an indispensable
party as it pertains solely to Coralville’s interest” in the land.
9
(Emphasis added.) Consequently, the district court declined to address the validity
of the deed and instead determined “the sole issue of Tiffin’s rights in relation to
Coralville’s interests in the [deeded] property.”
A party is indispensable if the party’s interest is not severable,
and the party’s absence will prevent the court from rendering any
judgment between the parties before it; or if notwithstanding the
party’s absence the party’s interest would necessarily be inequitably
affected by a judgment rendered between those before the court.
Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.234(2).
We agree with the district court that the Trust was an indispensable party to
the question of the validity of the quit claim deed and its terms. Likewise, the
various conflicting filings and positions taken throughout the tenure of the case
requires that the interests of the Trust, Tiffin, and Coralville be addressed in one
case. For example, although it no longer has legal effect because our court
reversed the ruling, see City of Tiffin, 2021 WL 2452060, at *6, one of the many
district court judges touching these cases previously determined the deed was
invalid.8 In that case, Coralville’s interests were impacted without its participation
8 That court held:
[The Tiffin City Administrator]’s affidavit, which is not refuted by any
affidavit testimony offered by the Trust, establishes that
Forevergreen Road is an existing city street in Tiffin, and pursuant to
the above-cited provisions of Iowa Code chapter 306, Tiffin has the
authority to control, extend, and construct a new portion of
Forevergreen Road in Tiffin. Further, the [c]ourt concludes the
undisputed facts, as established by the affidavit of [the
administrator], show the Quit Claim Deed from the Trust to Coralville
is invalid because the south 250 feet of the Trust’s property referred
to in the Quit Claim Deed does not adjoin Coralville. It also is
undisputed that the [DOT] originally intended to construct
Forevergreen Road through North Liberty to Jasper Avenue in Tiffin,
which then was a gravel two-lane road. Changes to the [DOT]’s
construction plans necessitated that the Tiffin portion of
Forevergreen Road have to cross a small portion of the
10
and, looking forward, we think it is possible the same thing could happen to the
Trust. At the oral arguments in the current case, Tiffin argued it was not necessary
to decide the validity of the deed as to the Trust because that issue was severable
from the Coralville issues, but Tiffin’s appellate brief references the “sham” deed9
multiple times. And, we note that shortly before the trial date, Tiffin attempted to
consolidate additional matters, including a matter involving the Trust, arguing there
were “common questions of law and fact” making it necessary to determine the
rightful owner of the property.10
Before we can answer the questions over the road construction, we must
answer the preliminary question of who owns the property. That question requires
input from all the parties to the deed in one proceeding before we can move
forward with the remaining issues.11 Without the Trust involved, as the district
Trust’s/Coralville’s property. Coralville has no jurisdiction and control
over this area pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 306.
. . . Despite the fact that the Trust deeded the property to
Coralville, Tiffin retains the authority and jurisdiction to condemn this
portion of the Trust’s property because the land is not currently
devoted to a public use through action to be taken by Coralville, and
Tiffin’s construction of Forevergreen Road in Tiffin is a public
purpose that supports exercise of eminent domain over the Trust.
9 In its appellate brief, Tiffin defined sham as “one in good form but false in fact.”
10 The Trust, Tiffin, and Coralville all agreed to a consolidation of all matters but
Tiffin refused to move the trial date, so the district court denied the request to
consolidate the Trust issues.
11 In determining whether we could bypass a review of the quit claim deed issue
against the Trust, we considered whether issue preclusion might apply to resolve
any subsequent action against the Trust over the deed validity. But, from the
limited record on the issue, we cannot say that the question is identical, especially
in light of the parties’ initial thoughts that the Trust was a necessary party to that
question. See Emps. Mut. Cas. Co. v. Van Haaften, 815 N.W.2d 17, 22 (Iowa
2012) (“The party invoking issue preclusion must establish four elements: ‘(1) the
issue in the present case must be identical, (2) the issue must have been raised
and litigated in the prior action, (3) the issue must have been material and relevant
to the disposition of the prior case, and (4) the determination of the issue in the
11
court noted, there was no way to determine if the deed was made in good faith;
and, to void the deed would take away the benefits of the contract, such as the
guarantee that the Trust would not be charged an assessment, without allowing
the Trust the opportunity to defend its deed.
Still, though we agree with the district court the Trust is an indispensable
party, the proper remedy was for the district court to “order the party brought in”
rather than dismiss the claim. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.234(3); see JAKS Props., LLC v.
St. Croix Hospice, LLC, No. 17-1198, 2018 WL 5846088, at *9 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov.
7, 2018).12 So, we reverse the district court’s ruling and remand the case with
instructions to order that the Trust be brought into the case and to address the
prior action must have been essential to the resulting judgment.’” (citation
omitted)). Likewise, it might be argued that the Trust and Coralville had different
motivations for entering into the deed. Finally, in one of many rulings in the
plethora of cases filed over this road situation, in response to Tiffin’s argument that
our prior opinions established binding precedent as to these facts, one of the
district court judges said
[w]hile the trial court for these matters may ultimately also determine
that Tiffin’s Forevergreen Road project is a public use, serves a
public purpose, and is a public improvement, neither the prior
opinions of the Johnson County District Court nor unpublished
opinion of the Iowa Court of Appeals are opinions that constitute
binding precedent upon this Court.
Thus, for all involved, judicial economy is served by adding the Trust to the current
action and having the last judge who heard the case decide the deed issue so that
it is resolved as to all parties. See City of Johnston v. Christenson, 718 N.W.2d
290, 300 (Iowa 2006) (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 68 (Am. L.
Inst. 1982) (“When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a
valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the
determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether
on the same or a different claim.”)).
12 Tiffin argues Coralville did not raise the Trust as an indispensable party until its
post-trial brief, which was offered in lieu of closing arguments. Insofar as this is an
error-preservation argument, we are unpersuaded because the issue of an
indispensable party can be raised for the first time on appeal. See In re Estate of
Darrah, No. 21-1082, 2022 WL 3906754, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2022) (citing
Ditch v. Hess, 212 N.W.2d 442, 450 (Iowa 1973)).
12
question of the validity of the deed as to the Trust and how that impacts the rights
of Tiffin to proceed in this action.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.