State of Iowa v. Amy Lois Rasmussen ( 2023 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-1144
Filed August 30, 2023
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
AMY LOIS RASMUSSEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Boone County, Stephen A. Owen,
District Associate Judge.
Amy Rasmussen challenges the sentences imposed following her Alford
plea. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Maria Ruhtenberg,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, Nick Siefert and Kyle Hanson, Assistant
Attorneys General, and Kelly Lynch, Law Student, for appellee.
Considered by Schumacher, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and Gamble, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2023).
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GAMBLE, Senior Judge.
Amy Rasmussen pleaded guilty to two counts of assault causing bodily
injury via an Alford plea1 in exchange for the dismissal of a related simple
misdemeanor charge. Rasmussen stipulated the minutes of testimony contained
strong evidence that could establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and a jury
could find her guilty. The minutes established that Rasmussen confronted three
women outside city hall following a city council meeting. Rasmussen pushed L.H.
over a wall resulting in injuries. She attacked A.B. causing her to fall to the ground.
Once she was down, Rasmussen struck A.B. multiple times and kicked her
causing injuries. Rasmussen admitted to police, “I kicked her ass” referring to A.B.
H.S. was elbowed in the head and witnessed the assault on the other women.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State agreed to dismiss a separate
charge of simple misdemeanor assault involving H.S. and Rasmussen agreed to
the entry of a no contact order for H.S. in the case of the other two victims. The
plea agreement provided the parties were free to argue at sentencing. The
prosecutor recommended one year incarceration on each count with all but seven
days suspended to be served concurrently followed by two years of probation.
Rasmussen requested a deferred judgment and probation. The district court
sentenced Rasmussen to one year on each serious misdemeanor count of assault
causing bodily injury to be served consecutively for a term of two years in prison
and entered no contact orders for all three women.
1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37–38 (1970) (permitting a criminal
defendant to enter a guilty plea without admitting guilt by acknowledging strong
evidence of guilt and voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly agreeing to allow
the court to consider such strong evidence of guilt in accepting the guilty plea).
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Rasmussen now appeals claiming the district court considered improper
factors at sentencing and otherwise abused its discretion when imposing
sentencing. Rasmussen also challenges the district court’s ability to impose a no
contact order related to the dismissed simple misdemeanor charge.
“‘Our review of a sentence imposed in a criminal case is for correction of
errors at law.’ We will not reverse a sentence unless there is ‘an abuse of
discretion or some defect in the sentencing procedure.’” State v. Damme, 944
N.W.2d 98, 103 (Iowa 2020) (internal citations omitted). “An abuse of discretion
will only be found when a court acts on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent
clearly unreasonable.” State v. Hopkins, 860 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Iowa 2015)
(citation omitted). Because we presume a sentence is valid, “[a] defendant must
affirmatively show that the sentencing court relied on improper evidence to
overcome this presumption of validity.” State v. Wickes, 910 N.W.2d 554, 572
(Iowa 2018).
First, we address good cause. Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2022)
requires defendants appealing from a guilty plea to any offense other than a class
“A” felony establish good cause. Good cause is established when a defendant
appeals the sentence imposed and that sentence is “neither mandatory nor agreed
to in the plea bargain.” State v. Wilbourn, 974 N.W.2d 58, 66 (Iowa 2022) (quoting
Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 100). And when a defendant brings multiple claims
following a guilty plea, once one claim satisfies this requirement all of the
defendant’s claims are properly before this court for review. Id. That is because
“[a]n appellate court either has jurisdiction over a criminal appeal or it does not.
Once a defendant crosses the good-cause threshold as to one ground for appeal,
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the court has jurisdiction over the appeal.” Id. As Rasmussen contends the district
court considered improper factors when reaching a sentencing determination, and
the imposed sentence was not mandatory nor agreed to by the parties, she has
crossed the good-cause threshold, and we consider all of her claims on appeal.
Moving on to the merits of Rasmussen’s appeal, we address her first claim,
that the district court abused its discretion in imposing sentencing. Rasmussen
contends the district court improperly considered a victim impact statement from
the would-be victim associated with the dismissed simple misdemeanor
charge, H.S. See Iowa Code § 915.10(3) (limiting who qualifies as a “victim” for
purposes of victim impact statements). While we agree that H.S. did not qualify as
a victim for the purposes of providing a victim impact statement, we generally “trust
that our district court, when weighing [victim impact] statements as part of the
sentencing determination, will filter out improper or irrelevant evidence.” State v.
Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756, 764 (Iowa 1998). However, when there is evidence the
district court actually considered the statement for the purposes of sentencing,
then we must vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. See State v.
Matheson, 684 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Iowa 2004) (determining the district court
considered an impermissible victim impact statement because the court overruled
an objection to its admission and nothing in the record suggested the court later
concluded the statement could not be considered). Here, H.S. presented a victim
impact statement over Rasmussen’s objection, but the court explicitly stated it
would “consider it only as it concerns the case regarding [H.S.] I do understand
that there’s going to be some ongoing matter, in terms of a no contact order.” This
demonstrated the court understood it could not consider H.S.’s statements for
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purposes of sentencing Rasmussen on the two counts of assault causing bodily
injury. Given this acknowledgment by the district court, we do not assume the
court improperly considered the statement when reaching a sentencing
determination.
Rasmussen also takes issue with the district court relying on her making
“statements in the community, . . . taking pride in that consequence” and her
“apparent pride in the offense and her lack of remorse” when reaching its
sentencing determination. She contends this was based on unproven portions of
the two victim impact statements given by A.B. and L.H. However, L.H. provided
a screen shot of Rasmussen’s social media post in which Rasmussen stated, “You
run pretty well for a gimp!” and included an address and time that corresponded
with L.H.’s location where L.H. had been walking with a cane as a result of her
injuries from Rasmussen. We think it was permissible for the district court to
consider the social media post to conclude Rasmussen lacked remorse and took
pride in her assault of others. As to Rasmussen’s claim that the district court relied
on unproven allegations of harassment and domestic abuse contained in A.B. and
L.H.’s statements, she has shown nothing to suggest the district court relied on
those allegations and did not filter them out when making a sentencing
determination, as we presume the district court does. See Sailer, 587 N.W.2d at
764; State v. Olsen, No. 19-1960, 2020 WL 5650580, at *4–5 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept.
23, 2020).
Rasmussen complains the district court did not consider the many letters
written in support of her, the fact this was a first offense, or any other mitigating
factor. Indeed, “[a] sentencing court is to consider any mitigating circumstance
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relating to the defendant.” State v. Crooks, 911 N.W.2d 153, 173 (Iowa 2018)
(alteration in original) (quoting State v. Witham, 583 N.W.2d 677, 678 (Iowa 1998)).
But Rasmussen’s complaints about the weight the district court placed on certain
factors, whether complaining the court weighed certain factors too heavily or not
enough, do not establish the district court abused its discretion. See State v.
Wright, 340 N.W.2d 590, 593 (Iowa 1983) (“The right of an individual judge to
balance the relevant factors in determining an appropriate sentence inheres in the
discretionary standard.”). Likewise, to the extent Rasmussen complains that the
district court did not adopt either party’s sentencing recommendation and instead
fashioned an independent sentence within the statutory limits, she cannot show
the district court abused its discretion. See State v. Thomas, 547 N.W.2d 223, 225
(Iowa 1996) (“The sentencing court, however, is generally not required to give its
reasons for rejecting particular sentencing options.”).
The district court provided a thorough explanation of its reasons for rejecting
the recommendations of counsel and for imposing the maximum sentence
provided by law. The court considered all of the factors set forth in Iowa Code
section 907.5 including the mitigating factors. We are satisfied the record supports
the sentence. See State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 553 (Iowa 2015) (“[A] district
court did not abuse its discretion if the evidence supports the sentence.”). The
sentencing court did not abuse its discretion. See State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d
720, 724 (Iowa 2002) (“[T]he decision of the district court to impose a particular
sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor,
and will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of
inappropriate matters.”).
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Next, we address Rasmussen’s claim that the district court could not impose
the no contact order with respect to H.S. As a result, she argues imposition of the
no contact order amounted to an illegal sentence. She contends the court could
not impose the no contact order because the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction even though she consented to the imposition of the no contact order.
See State v. Mandicino, 509 N.W.2d 481, 482 (Iowa 1993) (recognizing subject
matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by consent). In making such contention, she
notes there was no adjudication of the simple misdemeanor charge related to H.S
because it was dismissed as part of the plea agreement.
But Rasmussen conflates the concepts of subject matter jurisdiction and
judicial authority. “A constitution or a legislative enactment confers subject matter
jurisdiction on the courts.” State v. Weiderien, 709 N.W.2d 538, 540 (Iowa 2006)
(quoting In re Est. of Falck, 672 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Iowa 2003)). Iowa Code
chapter 664A provides the district court subject matter jurisdiction to enter no
contact orders against those guilty of a public offense referred to in
section 664A.2(1). So the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to enter a
no contact order.
The real crux of Rasmussen’s claim is that the district court lacked authority
to enter the no contact order on the dismissed charge. See id. But a party can
consent to the court’s authority. Mandicino, 509 N.W.2d at 483. Here, Rasmussen
consented to the no contact order at sentencing and acknowledged that consent
in her appellate brief. In exchange for the dismissal of the simple misdemeanor
assault charge involving H.S., Rasmussen agreed the district court would enter a
no contact order for H.S. in this case. This consent granted the district court
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authority to issue the no contact order as part of the plea agreement. The State
likens her consent to the no contact order to instances where a defendant consents
to the payment of costs and fees associated with dismissed charges as part of a
plea agreement. See State v. Petrie, 478 N.W.2d 620, 622 (Iowa 1991) (permitting
parties to consent to payment of costs and fees for dismissed criminal charges as
part of a plea agreement). We find the two instances to be similar, and the
comparison reenforces our conclusion that Rasmussen was able to consent to the
district court’s authority to enter the no contact order even though it related to the
dismissed charge. As a result, imposition of the no contact order did not result in
an illegal sentence.
Because Rasmussen cannot demonstrate the district court abused its
discretion in imposing sentencing or that her sentence was illegal, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.