State of Iowa v. Ashlie Danielle Rosales ( 2023 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-1077
Filed August 9, 2023
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ASHLIE DANIELLE ROSALES,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Plymouth County, Jeffrey L. Poulson,
Judge.
Ashlie Rosales challenges her convictions for possession and delivery of
methamphetamine. AFFIRMED.
Joel E. Fenton of the Law Offices of Joel E. Fenton, PLC, Des Moines, for
appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Olivia D. Brooks, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Ahlers, P.J., Badding, J., and Danilson, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2023).
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AHLERS, Presiding Judge.
Following a bench trial, the district court found Ashlie Rosales guilty of
delivery of methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine. The charges
stemmed from allegations that a confidential informant (CI) working with law
enforcement purchased methamphetamine from Rosales in a “controlled buy.”1
Rosales appeals. She contends there is insufficient evidence establishing
that she was the person who sold methamphetamine to the CI. She also contends
her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly investigate the allegations
and to secure expert testimony about controlled-buy protocols.
We address the second issue first and make quick work of it. We are
without authority to decide ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct
appeal. See Iowa Code § 814.7 (2022) (“An ineffective assistance of counsel
claim in a criminal case shall be determined by filing an application for
postconviction relief pursuant to chapter 822. . . . [T]he claim shall not be decided
on direct appeal from the criminal proceedings.”); State v. Tucker, 959 N.W.2d
140, 154 (Iowa 2021) (“[B]ecause we have just upheld the constitutionality of
section 814.7, this court is without the authority to decide ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claims on direct appeal.”). As a result, we decline to address Rosales’s
claims that she received ineffective assistance of counsel.
As for Rosales’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review for
correction of errors at law. See State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189, 202 (Iowa
1 Although there are alternative definitions, one definition of a controlled buy is
“when a confidential informant or undercover agent uses money from the
government to buy drugs as part of an investigation.” See United States v.
Chisholm, 940 F.3d 119, 121 n.1 (1st Cir. 2019).
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2022). We review sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges following a bench trial
the same as we do following a jury trial. State v. Myers, 924 N.W.2d 823, 826
(Iowa 2019). That means we affirm if the verdict is supported by substantial
evidence. Id. In determining whether substantial evidence supports the verdict,
we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision. Id. at
826–27. This includes giving that decision all legitimate inferences and
presumptions that can be deduced fairly and reasonably from the evidence.
Crawford, 972 N.W.2d at 202. Evidence is substantial if it is sufficient to convince
a rational trier of fact that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
The CI testified at trial that he used forty dollars given to him by law
enforcement to buy methamphetamine from Rosales. The crux of Rosales’s
argument is that her convictions are based entirely on the credibility of the CI’s
testimony, as law enforcement did not adequately monitor the controlled buy.
Rosales claims the CI’s testimony is not corroborated and the testimony alone is
insufficient to find her guilty of the charges.
We reject Rosales’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge for several
reasons. First, the testimony of the CI alone is sufficient to support the convictions.
See State v. Arne, 579 N.W.2d 326, 328 (Iowa 1998) (finding that testimony from
an informant amounted to sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s
conviction); State v. Keys, No. 15-1991, 2017 WL 1735617, at *10 (Iowa Ct. App.
May 3, 2017) (“While Keys denied he was the one who sold methamphetamine,
direct testimony from a confidential informant is sufficient to establish the elements
of the crime.”).
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Second, Rosales’s attack on the sufficiency of the evidence is, at its core,
a challenge to the CI’s credibility. But disputes over credibility of witnesses are for
the fact finder to sort out, not us. See State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Iowa
2006) (“It is not the province of the court, in determining [a] motion [for judgment
of acquittal], to resolve conflicts in the evidence, to pass upon the credibility of
witnesses, to determine the plausibility of explanations, or to weigh the evidence;
such matters are for the [fact finder].” (first two alterations in original) (quoting State
v. Williams, 695 N.W.2d 23, 28 (Iowa 2005))). The fact that the witness was a CI
does not impose a different standard, as a CI is treated like any other witness, with
the determination of the credibility of that witness being up to the fact finder. See
Arne, 579 N.W.2d at 328 (“This court has never applied a higher standard of proof
when weighing the testimony of an informant witness in a criminal trial, and we
decline to do so now. The witness’s status as a paid informant is merely one fact
that the jury may consider in deciding whether to believe the witness’s testimony.”).
And here, the district court expressly found the CI credible. So, we reject Rosales’s
argument based on credibility of the CI.
Third, any challenge based on law enforcement’s failure to adequately
monitor the controlled buy raises credibility issues that are for the fact finder to
resolve. See id. (“Arne also claims that no reasonable [fact finder] could believe
[the CI] because [the CI] may have used drugs, he was paid for his services, the
police did not adequately supervise the drug buys, and [the CI]’s testimony was
contradicted by other witnesses. These arguments are insufficient to discredit [the
CI]’s testimony as a matter of law.”). The district court resolved this credibility issue
against Rosales by finding Rosales guilty. We do not get to substitute our
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judgment for that of the fact finder, so Rosales’s challenge on this basis fails. See
Musser, 721 N.W.2d at 761.
Finally, although corroboration is not required, there is corroborative
evidence. Uncontested evidence at trial established that the CI began working
with law enforcement to conduct controlled buys in order to favorably resolve his
own drug charges. The CI set up a meeting with Rosales through a messaging
app. Law enforcement officers saw the message exchange on the CI’s phone
before the controlled buy occurred. While the messages could have meant
something else, they were consistent with a drug sale being set up and thus
corroborative of the CI’s testimony. The CI and Rosales agreed to meet in an alley
a few blocks from Rosales’s residence—a location they had used for prior drug
transactions. They agreed to walk toward each other in the alley until they ran into
each other. Before heading out to meet with Rosales, a law enforcement officer
conducted a pat-down search of the CI from head to toe and found nothing on him
before giving him forty dollars in cash. An audio recording device was then placed
on the CI, and the CI began walking in the direction of Rosales’s known residence.
While the CI left the sight of law enforcement officers, the audio recording reveals
the CI moving at a walking pace with gravel crunching under his feet. Evidence
established the alley in which the CI was to meet Rosales was gravel. A short time
later the CI is heard speaking with a female. The conversation ended with the CI
saying, “Later, Miss Ashlie.” Crunching gravel can then be heard as the CI made
his way back to the officers immediately after the conversation. The CI was
searched again and found to have no cash on him, but he did have a package of
methamphetamine. While not dispositive in and of itself, this evidence is
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corroborative of the CI’s testimony that he used the cash provided by law
enforcement to purchase methamphetamine from Rosales.
For all of the reasons noted, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the district court’s ruling, we conclude substantial evidence supports Rosales’s
convictions. As a result, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.