State of Iowa v. Valon Jackson Jr. ( 2024 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-0788
Filed April 10, 2024
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
VALON JACKSON JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Tod Deck, Judge.
Valon Jackson Jr. appeals the restitution order and sentences entered after
his convictions. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Ella M. Newell, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ.
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CHICCHELLY, Judge.
Valon Jackson Jr. appeals the restitution order and sentences entered after
his convictions for second-degree arson, first-degree criminal mischief, and
third-degree burglary. He contends the State did not meet its burden in
establishing the restitution amount and that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion by failing to consider certain mitigating factors. Upon our review, we
affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
In the early morning of August 22, 2021, the Sioux City Fire Department
responded to a fire at an after-hours nightclub where patrons could pay a cover
fee to hang out after the bars closed. Local law enforcement had been concerned
about the club for some time because it had become a hotbed for criminal activity,
including “murders, shootings, [and] drug activity.”
The fire department put out the fire and discovered the remnants of three
improvised incendiary devices.1 After reviewing surveillance footage and
investigating the scene, the fire department concluded “that the fire was
intentionally set for the purpose of causing property damage.”
The next day, Jackson confessed to the arson. He detailed to law
enforcement “why he placed the incendiary devices where he did, how he put the
incendiary devices together, where he gained his training or experiences with
similar devices” and explained he started the fire with good intentions. Jackson
1 Improvised incendiary devices are also commonly referred to as a “Molotov
cocktail,” which is “comprised of a glass bottleneck and a cloth ‘wick.’” See State
v. Vaughan, 859 N.W.2d 492, 495 (Iowa 2015).
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felt law enforcement was not doing enough to quell the criminal activity and burned
the building to shut the business down.
Jackson was charged with second-degree arson, first-degree criminal
mischief, and third-degree burglary. The proceedings were suspended for several
months to evaluate Jackson’s competency. After the court determined that he was
competent to stand trial, a bench trial was held in February 2023. After hearing
testimony about the fire and the resulting property damage, the court convicted
Jackson as charged. The court sentenced Jackson as a habitual offender to an
indeterminate term of incarceration not to exceed fifteen years for each count with
a three-year mandatory minimum. The court ordered the sentences to run
concurrently. It also ordered Jackson to pay $183,035.49 in restitution to the
building’s owner. He appeals his sentence, challenging the restitution award and
arguing that the court abused its sentencing discretion.
II. Substantial Evidence Supporting Restitution Award.
Jackson first challenges the restitution, arguing that the evidence does not
support the amount awarded. The Iowa Code provides that when a defendant is
found guilty, the court “shall order that pecuniary damages be paid by each
offender to the victims of the offender’s criminal activities.” Iowa
Code § 910.2(1)(a) (2023). “Pecuniary damages” are those recoverable in a civil
action that are “not paid by an insurer.” Id. § 910.1(6). The State bears the burden
to establish the amount of damages and the court must “determine whether the
court’s findings lack substantial evidentiary support.” State v. Roache,
920 N.W.2d 93, 99–101 (Iowa 2018) (cleaned up) (citation omitted). Our review is
for correction of errors at law, and we will affirm the award “if it is within a
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reasonable range of the evidence.” State v. Watts, 587 N.W.2d 750, 751–52
(Iowa 1998).
At trial, the State introduced two forms of evidence calculating the property
damage. The first was an exhibit provided by the insurance company that broke
down the losses incurred. Because the nightclub was so damaged that it required
demolition, the list of losses included the replacement value of the building
($259,349.00), the cost of cleaning repairs to the neighboring building ($8806.49),
demolition costs ($28,280.00), and lost rental income ($6600.00), for a total loss
of $303,035.49. The second form of evidence concerning damages was the
building owner’s testimony, in which he verified that the insurance company did an
assessment and concluded the building needed demolition because the damage
was too extensive. The building owner also confirmed the itemized amount for
each category of damage and that he had received approximately $120,000 from
the insurance company. Based on the evidence, the court concluded that the
restitution amount was $183,035.49, the total damage assessment minus the
insurance payout. See Iowa Code § 910.1(6) (excluding damages covered by
insurance proceeds from pecuniary damages).
Jackson relies on State v. Bonstetter and claims the State did not meet its
burden in establishing the damages because additional testimony was needed.
637 N.W.2d 161, 170 (Iowa 2001) (reversing a restitution order for lack of
substantial evidence). But in Bonstetter, the court concluded that a bill from a
third-party alone is not enough to prove costs “are necessary, fair, and
reasonable.” Id. The State here provided both the exhibit itself and the building
owner’s testimony. The testimony corroborates the figures from the exhibit and
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confirmed the insurance payout. We afford the district court “broad discretion in
determining the amount of restitution when the record contains proof of a
reasonable basis from which the amount may be inferred.” State v. Shears,
920 N.W.2d 527, 530 (Iowa 2018). Because the restitution amount is “supported
by substantial evidence,” we affirm. See id.III. Alleged Abuse of Sentencing Discretion.
Jackson next argues the district court abused its sentencing discretion by
failing to consider mitigating factors and declining to suspend incarceration in favor
of probation. When sentencing, the court “has broad discretion to impose the
sentence it determines is best suited to rehabilitate a defendant and protect
society.” State v. West Vangen, 975 N.W.2d 344, 355 (Iowa 2022). This discretion
“to impose a particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong
presumption in its favor” and we will only reverse for an abuse of such discretion.
State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). An abuse of discretion occurs
when “the decision was exercised on grounds or for reasons that were clearly
untenable or unreasonable.” Id. Due to the discretionary nature of sentencing,
consideration of proper factors and the goals of sentencing “will not always lead to
the same sentence.” Id. at 725. In making its sentencing decision, the court
referenced several factors to “provide maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation
of the defendant and protection of the community from further offenses,” including
“the defendant’s age, the defendant’s prior record, the nature of the offense
committed, the contents of the presentence investigation report, and the financial
condition of the defendant.” These are nearly identical to the statutory factors and
are proper for the court to consider when sentencing. See Iowa Code § 907.5(1).
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Jackson argues that he had “strong familial supports in the community” and
manageable mental-health symptoms, and that the court “ignored” these
considerations. But the record shows the contrary. The sentencing court
expressly considered these factors despite not being “required to specifically
acknowledge each claim of mitigation urged by [the] defendant.” State v. Boltz,
542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). In fact, the court discussed these factors
at length when sentencing Jackson:
The court does not believe that the crimes as they were
committed in this instance were impulsive or rash. . . .
The acts that occurred required advanced planning and
required changes in the plan over the course of the commission of
the offense. The materials had to be gathered. The devices had to
be assembled. The defendant was at the club earlier, came back,
someone there, he left again, came back, retrieved the devices and
entered through a back door. Those things to me are not indicative
of impulsive or rash behavior.
. . . And I think, more importantly, an act for which even if the
motivations behind it were somehow related to mental health
concerns, the opportunities to pause and not continue with the
course of action were many and there was many points in time when
the defendant could have changed his mind and stopped moving
forward the way he had.
....
All of that said, the court does find that there was some role
of mental health in these offenses, and I’ve struggled a little bit about
how to address that and how to work that into my sentencing
considerations. But had this been something that truly was an
impulsive or rash act that had some direct causal relationship to the
mental illness or more direct causal relationship, I maybe [would]
have been more receptive to an idea of probation. But in this
instance, for the reasons I’ve already stated but also because of the
dangerousness of the act itself . . . . that deserves some
punishment. . . .
. . . You’ve previously served a prison sentence. You’ve
previously been on supervision and probation, and that has not
appeared to resolve the issues. You’ve had supervision in the
community through mental health committals with regard to your
mental health, and that did not resolve the issues.
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The court weighed the evidence related to Jackson’s mental health against the
severity of the offense itself. Jackson fails to explain how the court’s determination
is somehow “untenable or unreasonable.” See Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 724.
Because the court considered only permissible factors when making its sentencing
decision, it did not abuse its discretion.
IV. Disposition.
Because we find that substantial evidence supports the restitution award
and the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.