In the Interest of M.B., A.B., and N.B., Minor Children ( 2024 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-1701
Filed January 10, 2024
IN THE INTEREST OF M.B., A.B., and N.B.,
Minor Children,
S.P., Father,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, Kimberly Shepherd,
District Associate Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Jennifer Margret Triner Olsen, Davenport, for appellant father.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Dion D. Trowers, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Barbara Maness, Davenport, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor
children.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ.
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CHICCHELLY, Judge.
The father of A.B. and N.B. appeals the order terminating his parental
rights.1 He challenges each of the three steps in the termination analysis under
Iowa Code chapter 232 (2023). See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010)
(“Termination of parental rights under chapter 232 follows a three-step analysis.”).
He also asks for more time. Because the evidence supports termination, we affirm.
We begin our analysis by determining whether a ground for termination
exists under section 232.116(1). Id. The juvenile court terminated the father’s
parental rights under section 232.116(1)(d), (e), and (h), but the father only
challenges termination under section 232.116(1)(e). Because the father does not
dispute there is clear and convincing evidence showing the grounds for termination
under section 232.116(1)(d) and (h), we may affirm on those grounds without
further discussion. See id. at 707 (noting that “we may affirm the juvenile court’s
termination order on any ground that we find supported by clear and convincing
evidence”); In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010) (stating that “we do not have
to discuss [the first step]” when a parent fails to dispute the existence of all grounds
for termination under section 232.116(1)).
Because the father does not challenge all grounds for termination relied on
by the juvenile court, we move to the second step of the termination analysis and
“apply the best-interest framework set out in section 232.116(2) to decide if the
grounds for termination should result in a termination of parental rights.” D.W.,
791 N.W.2d at 706–07. We must “give primary consideration to ‘the child’s safety,
1 The mother of M.B., A.B., and N.B. also appealed the termination of her parental
rights, but the supreme court dismissed her appeal as untimely.
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. . . the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the
child, and . . . the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.”
Id. at 708 (alterations in original) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(2)).
We agree with the juvenile court’s determination that termination is in the
children’s best interests. The children came to the attention of the Iowa
Department of Health and Human Services after testing positive for
methamphetamine at birth in October 2021. Days later, the juvenile court removed
the children from the parents’ custody. The court returned the children home in
December 2022, but the parents’ ability to provide stability was short-lived; the
court removed the children less than one month later based in part on the father
relapsing in his methamphetamine use. By the August 2023 termination hearing,
almost two years after these proceedings began, the father was still unable to
resume care for the children. In the termination ruling, the court noted at length
the specific needs these children have and the upheaval they have endured. We
agree with the juvenile court that the children “cannot wait any longer for their
parents to fully address their mental health, substance abuse, and relationship
concerns, and to guarantee safety and stability for these children.” Clear and
convincing evidence shows termination is in the children’s best interests. See In
re C.S., 776 N.W.2d 297, 300 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (recognizing that “at some
point, the rights and needs of the children rise above the rights and needs of the
parent”)
Having determined that termination is in the children’s best interests, we
move to the third step of the termination analysis and “consider if any statutory
exceptions set out in section 232.116(3) should serve to preclude termination of
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parental rights.” D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707. The father claims there is clear and
convincing evidence of the ground stated in section 232.116(3)(c): that termination
will hurt the children because of the closeness of the parent-child relationship. As
the parent resisting termination, the father bears the burden of proving
section 232.116(3)(c) applies. See In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018).
Even if the father meets this burden, we note that the decision to avoid termination
under section 232.116(3) is “permissive, not mandatory.” Id. at 475. But
considering that the father failed to attend visits with the children consistently and
provided, at most, one month of day-to-day care for these children in the two years
since they were born, we cannot find that termination will harm the children.
The father wants more time. Under Iowa Code section 232.104(2)(b), the
court can continue a child’s placement for six months if doing so will eliminate the
need for the child’s removal. But before doing so, the court must “enumerate the
specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which comprise the
basis for the determination that the need for removal of the child from the child’s
home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” Iowa Code
§ 232.104(2)(b). On the record before us, we cannot find that giving the father
more time will change the outcome. See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 112 (Iowa
2014) (“[W]e cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a
ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will
learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” (citation
omitted)). It will, however, delay the permanency these children require.
We affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED.