Emilio Puente v. Civil Service Commission of Iowa City ( 2023 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-1619
Filed September 13, 2023
EMILIO PUENTE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF IOWA CITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Chad A. Kepros,
Judge.
Emilio Puente appeals the dismissal of his petition for judicial review
challenging a decision of the civil service commission. AFFIRMED.
Peter M. Sand, West Des Moines, for appellant.
Elizabeth Craig and Jennifer L. Schwickerath, Assistant City Attorneys,
Iowa City, for appellee.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Badding and Buller, JJ.
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BADDING, Judge.
Is a petition for judicial review the same thing as the notice of appeal under
Iowa Code section 400.27(4) (2022)? Or can it be construed in that way to confer
appellate jurisdiction on the district court? We conclude the answer to both
questions is no, and we affirm the court’s decision dismissing Emilio Puente’s
petition for judicial review against the Civil Service Commission of Iowa City for
lack of jurisdiction.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On May 31, 2022, Puente filed a pleading captioned “Petition for Judicial
Review” that sought “judicial review of a ruling made by the civil service
commission of Iowa City on or about May 5, 2022.” The first paragraph of the
petition stated venue was “proper under Iowa Code 17A.19(2).” The petition then
alleged Puente, a former peace officer for the city, submitted a letter of resignation
on February 3, 2022. But, according to the petition, “the resignation was coerced
and is therefore invalid, or that he was constructively discharged.”1
The petition further alleged that on April 13, Puente sent the city a letter
asking that his resignation be rescinded and his employment reinstated. The city
refused on April 15. Puente accordingly filed a complaint with the commission on
April 27 “to review the refusal to rescind the letter of resignation” and “reinstate his
employment after a hearing on the merits.” The city moved to dismiss the
complaint as untimely because “it was made more than 14 days beyond February
1 The petition also alleged Puente initiated a separate action for constructive
discharge and contemplated seeking “either consolidation of this petition with the
pending action in equity” or a “stay of this judicial review pending the outcome of
the equity petition.”
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3,” when Puente tendered his resignation. See Iowa Code § 400.20. The minutes
of the May 5 meeting of the commission, which were attached to the petition, show
the commission voted to dismiss the complaint.
Close to one month after Puente filed his petition, he filed a proof of service
stating “that the original notice and petition in this matter were served by certified
mail in accordance with Iowa Code 17A.19(2).” Postal receipts were attached to
the proof of service, showing the mail was addressed to the commission and an
assistant city attorney and delivered to them on June 9. A few weeks later, the
commission moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction due to Puente’s
failure to timely serve a notice of appeal of the commission’s decision as required
by Iowa Code section 400.27(4). The commission argued service by mail cannot
confer jurisdiction under chapter 400. See In re Elliott, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa
1982) (finding service by mail is not sufficient “to vest appellate jurisdiction in the
district court” under section 400.27). And the commission pointed out that Puente
never filed a notice of appeal at all. Instead, he petitioned for judicial review under
chapter 17A, which the commission argued “is not the appropriate legal process
for challenging a decision” of the commission.
In an attempt to fix the service issues, Puente filed a return of service
showing that the sheriff served the original notice and petition on a city employee
in human resources on July 5. Puente then filed a resistance to the commission’s
motion, again characterizing the action as seeking judicial review of the
commission’s decision. He argued that service of the petition and original notice
on the commission was timely under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.302(5) and
that he complied with section 400.27(4) because the “action for judicial review”
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was filed “within the time prescribed,” with personal service on the commission “as
required by the rules.” In reply, the commission repeated that Puente had not filed
a notice of appeal as required by section 400.27(4) and his petition for judicial
review should not be construed as one. As a result, the commission contended
the action should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In any event, the
commission argued Puente never accomplished timely service on the correct
person—the clerk of the civil service commission. See Iowa Code § 400.27(4).
After this error was pointed out to him, Puente secured an acceptance of service
from the commission clerk on July 26.
In its ruling, the district court observed that Puente never filed the notice of
appeal required by section 400.27 and only sought relief under chapter 17A—even
in his resistance to dismissal. The court found that chapter 17A is “not applicable
when a city police officer is challenging his termination from employment.” Instead,
the court concluded, chapter 400 provides the means to challenge the action of a
local civil service commission. And because Puente did not file a notice of appeal
with the clerk of the district court or serve one on the commission clerk, the court
found he did not substantially comply with section 400.27(4). As a result, the court
granted the commission’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
Puente filed a rule 1.904(2) motion asserting for the first time that his petition
for judicial review should be construed as a notice of appeal. Alternatively, he
asked to amend the title of the petition “from ‘Petition for Judicial Review’ to ‘Notice
of Appeal.’” The court denied the motion, and this appeal followed.
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II. Standard of Review
We review a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction for correction of errors at law. See Ortiz v. Loyd Roling Constr., 928
N.W.2d 651, 653 (Iowa 2019).
III. Analysis
Before getting to the central question on appeal, we dispose of some throw-
away claims made by Puente. The first is his suggestion that the court was not
“clear regarding the exact jurisdictional basis” on which dismissal was granted. We
summarily reject this claim. The court was very clear that it lacked jurisdiction due
to the absence of a notice of appeal, which is required by section 400.27(4). And
the law is clear that the requirements of section 400.27 are jurisdictional. See
Bogue v. Ames Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 368 N.W.2d 111, 113 (Iowa 1985) (“Controlling
Iowa precedent requires an appellant to comply substantially with the service
provisions of section 400.27 in order to vest a district court with jurisdiction to
decide an appeal from a civil service commission decision.”); Picray v. City of Des
Moines, 348 N.W.2d 645, 646 (Iowa 1984) (“The district court in this case did not
have original jurisdiction; its jurisdiction in appeals ‘is wholly statutory and depends
for its existence upon substantial compliance by the appealing party with statutory
prerequisites.’” (citation omitted)).
Next, Puente argues dismissal of a case is only authorized “for very limited
reasons,” like failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and “[t]his
was not such a case.” But lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, upon which the court
granted dismissal, is one of the bases for dismissal. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.421(1)(a).
So this argument does not get Puente anywhere.
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Finally, Puente complains the court granted dismissal on a ground that the
commission did not raise. Yet Puente acknowledges the commission’s motion to
dismiss noted that he did not file a notice of appeal. And, either way, Puente also
acknowledges this is a question of subject matter jurisdiction. Because subject
matter jurisdiction “cannot be waived by consent, waiver, or estoppel,” State v.
Mandicino, 509 N.W.2d 481, 482 (Iowa 1993), its absence “may be raised at any
time, including on the court’s own motion.” Friends of Bunker Mill Bridge, Inc. v.
Washington Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 18-0476, 2019 WL 3945965, at *1 (Iowa
Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2019); accord AJR Peakview, Inc. v. First Bank of Neb.,
No. 16-1845, 2018 WL 542706, at *2 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2018) (“[T]he
question of whether the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction is not limited
to only those arguments explicitly raised by a party, as the court may raise the
issue sua sponte.”). Indeed, “[w]hen the court’s power to proceed is at issue, the
court has the power and duty to determine whether it has jurisdiction of the matter
presented.” State v. Lasley, 705 N.W.2d 481, 486 (Iowa 2005) (citation omitted).
With those non-starters out of the way, we turn to that key jurisdictional
question. As noted above, “[u]nder section 400.27 a district court acquires
appellate jurisdiction only when the appellant substantially complies with its
provisions.” Elliott, 319 N.W.2d 244, 248 (Iowa 1982); accord Anderson v. W.
Hodgeman & Sons, Inc., 524 N.W.2d 418, 420 (Iowa 1994) (“Historically, we have
distinguished cases involving a district court’s appellate jurisdiction from those
invoking its original jurisdiction. Where a party attempts to invoke the district
court’s appellate jurisdiction, compliance with statutory conditions is required for
the court to acquire jurisdiction.”). Iowa Code section 400.27(4) provides:
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The appeal to the district court shall be perfected by filing a
notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court within the time
prescribed in this section and by serving notice of appeal on the clerk
of the civil service commission, from whose ruling or decision the
appeal is taken.
(Emphasis added.) Puente claims the court should have either construed his
petition as a notice of appeal or he should have been granted leave to amend the
title of the petition. We disagree on both counts.
On the first, Puente argues it was “an error of law for the lower court not to
consider the pleading to be an appeal of the civil service commission.” He submits
the failure to do so “would mark the ultimate in form over substance.” It’s true that,
generally, courts will not exalt form over substance. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of
Glidden v. Matt Bauer Farms Corp., 408 N.W.2d 51, 54 (Iowa 1987). Yet even the
substance of the petition sought judicial review under chapter 17A.
Still, Puente argues that “an appeal is to seek judicial review.” But judicial
review under chapter 17A “is a special proceeding” and “is in all respects
dependent upon the statutes [that] authorize its pursuit.” Anderson, 524 N.W.2d
at 420 n.1. As we recently reiterated, chapter 17A “does not apply to municipal
administrative bodies.” Mensen v. Cedar Rapids Civ. Serv. Comm’n,
No. 21-0410, 2022 WL 2160679, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 15, 2022); see also
Iowa Code §§ 17A.1(2) (“This chapter is intended to provide a minimum procedural
code for the operation of all state agencies when they take action affecting the
rights and duties of the public.” (emphasis added)); .2(1) (“‘Agency’ does not mean
. . . a political subdivision of the state or its office and units.” (emphasis added)).
Proceedings under chapter 17A are, as the commission points out on appeal,
different in kind than the statutory appeal procedure set out in section 400.27.
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For one, the two proceedings are initiated differently, with different venue
provisions and, as Puente discovered, different service requirements. Compare
Iowa Code § 17A.19(2), with id. § 400.27(4). They also have different standards
and scopes of review. Under section 17A.19(10), the “standard of review depends
on the aspect of the agency’s decision that forms the basis of the petition for judicial
review.” Burton v. Hilltop Care Ctr., 813 N.W.2d 250, 256 (Iowa 2012) (discussing
the different standards under section 17A.19(10)). But under section 400.27(3),
“[t]he scope of review for the appeal shall be limited to de novo appellate review.”
And that de novo appellate review is one “without a trial or additional evidence,”
Iowa Code § 400.27(3), unlike section 17A.19(7), which allows the court to “hear
and consider such evidence as it deems appropriate” in some cases.
Puente faults the commission for failing to cite “a case supporting a view
that the word ‘appeal’ is indispensable to subject matter jurisdiction.” But he
doesn’t cite any cases supporting his argument that a petition for judicial review is
equivalent to, or should be construed as, the notice of appeal required by section
400.27. The closest case on point that we have been able to find is Bogue, which
considered whether the district court had jurisdiction to proceed under section
400.27 when the civil service employees filed a petition for writ of certiorari, rather
than a notice of appeal. 368 N.W.2d at 113. Even though the parties agreed the
trial court could “treat[] the petition as a statutory appeal under Iowa Code section
400.27,” the supreme court found that was improper because of a defect in service.
Id. (“[T]he parties could not confer appellate jurisdiction upon the court by
consenting to try the case as an appeal.”). The court nevertheless held that
because the employees’ petition alleged the commission’s decision “contravened
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statutory authority,” they could challenge the legality of that decision through the
certiorari procedure. Id. (“A writ of certiorari will lie where an inferior board
exercising judicial functions acts illegally, and illegality is established if a board has
not acted in accordance with a pertinent statute.”). But see Van Baale v. City of
Des Moines, 550 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Iowa 1996) (“[W]e think chapter 400
proceedings must be considered the exclusive means of challenging the
arbitrariness of a civil service employee’s discharge.”).2
Importantly, the court in Bogue did not find the petition for writ of certiorari
was the same as the notice of appeal required under section 400.27. 368 N.W.2d
at 114. Instead, the employees’ challenge to the commission’s decision was
allowed to go forward under the separate certiorari procedure. Id. For the reasons
stated above, judicial review under section 17A.19 is unavailable to Puente. So
Bogue does not help Puente.
Nor does the supreme court’s decision in Cooksey v. Cargill Meat Solutions
Corp., 831 N.W.2d 94 (Iowa 2013), which Puente argues “command[s] directly the
reversal of the decision below in this case.”3 The court in Cooksey was concerned
with “whether the failure of a party to list the Employment Appeal Board (EAB) as
a respondent in the caption of a petition for judicial review of the final agency
decision is fatal.” 831 N.W.2d at 96. After surveying cases with similar errors, the
2 Van Baale was abrogated on other grounds by Godfrey v. State, 898 N.W.2d 844(Iowa 2017). Godfrey has since been overruled and the law as it existed before it
restored. See Burnett v. Smith, 990 N.W.2d 289, 291 (Iowa 2023).
3 Puente also cites Jacobs v. Iowa Department of Transportation, 887 N.W.2d 590,
591 (Iowa 2016), which considered the timeliness of a petition for judicial review
that had been electronically submitted on the last day for appeal under the statute
but returned by the clerk the next morning due to errors on the cover sheet. We
do not find that case applicable to the question presented here.
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court found the defect was not fatal because the agency was named in the body
of the petition. Id. at 104. The court reasoned “the law in Iowa for decades
traditionally has sought to avoid highly technical requirements that might serve no
useful purpose and yet deprive parties of their day in court.” Id. at 103. Yet, and
this is the part that Puente glosses over, “we must recognize that courts must follow
jurisdictional mandates imposed by valid statutes.” Id. at 103–04. Requiring
Puente to file the notice of appeal required by section 400.27, rather than a wholly
different pleading like his petition for judicial review, is not a highly technical
requirement. See id. at 110 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (favoring “the view that
cases should not be decided on technicalities,” but noting that lawyers “know what
it means to ‘name’ an agency as a ‘respondent’”); see also Jensen v. Olson, No.
21-0204, 2022 WL 122363, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2022) (finding
landowners’ “failure to pursue the statutory appeal route” under Iowa Code section
468.83 required dismissal of their petition for declaratory judgment challenging the
validity of actions taken by a drainage district’s trustees).
Lastly, Puente claims the court abused its discretion “in refusing to allow re-
styling of petition.” But Puente’s rule 1.904 motion only asked to change the title
of the pleading, not its substance. So even if Puente’s belated request had been
granted, the substance of the pleading was still one for judicial review under
chapter 17A. We accordingly find no abuse of discretion in the court’s denial of
Puente’s request.
IV. Conclusion
Because a petition for judicial review under Iowa Code chapter 17A is not
the same as a notice of appeal under section 400.27, nor can it be construed as
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such, we affirm the district court’s ruling granting the commission’s motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
AFFIRMED.