Michael Alexander Lajeunesse v. State of Iowa ( 2022 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 21-0817
    Filed May 25, 2022
    MICHAEL ALEXANDER LAJEUNESSE,
    Applicant-Appellant,
    vs.
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott D. Rosenberg,
    Judge.
    Michael Lajeunesse appeals the dismissal of his second application for
    postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
    Michael Lajeunesse, Anamosa, self-represented appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney
    General, for appellee State.
    Considered by Bower, C.J., Vaitheswaran, J., and Danilson, S.J.*
    *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
    (2022).
    2
    DANILSON, Senior Judge.
    Michael Lajeunesse appeals the dismissal of his second application for
    postconviction relief (PCR). While his pro se brief on appeal is not a model of
    clarity, he appears to argue the court erred in finding his claims of ineffective
    assistance of criminal trial counsel in relation to prosecutorial misconduct1 and
    “deceit and collusion”2 of counsel were procedurally barred by Iowa Code
    section 822.8 (2019).
    I.    Background Facts and Proceedings
    Lajeunesse was convicted of attempted murder and willful injury causing
    serious injury. We affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Lajeunesse, No. 17-
    0507, 
    2018 WL 1099024
    , at *1–4 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2018). However, we
    preserved various claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for PCR—including
    a claim relating to prosecutorial misconduct and a claim that his counsel engaged
    in “deceit and collusion”—because he did not sufficiently develop the claims.3 
    Id.
    at *4–6.
    Lajeunesse filed his first PCR application in April 2018. In an amended
    application, he claimed counsel was ineffective in relation to cross-examining the
    victim and incorporated his claims he raised on direct appeal, which included his
    claims relating to prosecutorial misconduct and collusion and deceit. A second
    1 Based on Lajeunesse’s appellate brief, this claim appears to center around the
    State’s alleged suppression of the complaining party’s medical records.
    2 This claim appears to focus on his counsel’s supposed collusion with the State
    surrounding the expert testimony of the medical examiner.
    3 We affirmed on Lajeunesse’s subsequent challenge to the district court’s order
    for restitution. See generally State v. Lajeunesse, No. 18-0263, 
    2018 WL 3912180
    (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2018).
    3
    amended application only raised claims concerning effectiveness of trial and
    appellate counsel in relation to the cross-examination of the complaining party and
    the sufficiency of the evidence. In denying relief, the district court only considered
    the claims raised in the second amended application. The court did not rule on his
    claims relating to prosecutorial misconduct or collusion and deceit. Lajeunesse
    appealed, and we affirmed. Lajeunesse v. State, No. 19-1715, 
    2022 WL 469408
    ,
    at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2022). In doing so, we specifically noted Lajeunesse
    moved for expanded findings relating to his pro se claims he raised on direct
    appeal, but a notice of appeal was filed prior to any district court ruling on the
    motion.4 See 
    id.
     at *4 n.5. Lajeunesse raised those claims on appeal, but we
    found error was not preserved for our review because a notice of appeal was filed
    before the motion for expanded findings was ruled upon. See 
    id.
    In December 2019, after the district court’s denial of Lajeunesse’s first
    application, but well before we affirmed on appeal, Lajeunesse filed a second PCR
    application, generically alleging ineffective assistance of his attorney in the first
    PCR proceeding.       In a subsequent filing, Lajeunesse claimed ineffective
    assistance of trial counsel, appellate counsel, restitution counsel, and appellate
    restitution counsel. He also touched on the allegations of prosecutorial error and
    “deceit and collusion.”
    In time, the State filed a motion to dismiss, arguing all of Lajeunesse’s
    claims were procedurally barred as either litigated in the first action or not proper
    4We note the September 2019 motion for expanded findings was filed pro se while
    Lajeunesse was represented by counsel. See 
    Iowa Code § 822
    .3A (Supp. 2019).
    The notice of appeal was filed by counsel.
    4
    claims in a PCR proceeding. While the State acknowledged Lajeunesse was also
    claiming ineffective assistance of first PCR counsel, the State offered no reason
    why that claim should be dismissed. The court agreed with the State that all of
    Lajeunesse’s claims were procedurally barred and granted the motion to dismiss.
    Lajeunesse now appeals.
    II.    Standard of Review
    We review the district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for correction of
    errors at law.5 Thongvanh v. State, 
    938 N.W.2d 2
    , 8 (Iowa 2020).
    III.   Analysis
    On appeal, Lajeunesse appears to argue the district court erred in
    concluding his ineffective-assistance claims concerning prosecutorial misconduct
    and deceit and collusion of counsel were procedurally barred.
    On direct appeal, as noted, Lajeunesse raised multiple other claims
    including ineffective-assistance claims relating to prosecutorial misconduct and
    “deceit and collusion” by defense counsel. See Lajeunesse, 
    2018 WL 1099024
    ,
    at *5. Because he did not sufficiently develop the claims, we preserved them for
    a possible PCR proceeding. Id. at *6.6
    5 It is apparent from our review of the State’s motion to dismiss and the court’s
    ensuing ruling thereon that, in making its conclusions of law, the court essentially
    adopted the State’s legal argument. Although the ruling is not a verbatim recitation
    of the motion, it is eerily close. We therefore choose to scrutinize the record more
    carefully in conducting our appellate review. See, e.g., NevadaCare, Inc. v. Dep’t
    of Human Servs., 
    783 N.W.2d 459
    , 465 (Iowa 2010).
    6 On direct appeal, we considered two issues relating to the sufficiency of the
    evidence. Lajeunesse, 
    2018 WL 1099024
    , at *1–4. We preserved the following
    claims for PCR: (1) counsel was ineffective by failing to obtain a toxicology expert,
    (2) counsel was ineffective by failing to provide a more definitive challenge in
    closing arguments, (3) cumulative error, (4) prosecutorial misconduct,
    5
    Lajeunesse raised some of these same claims during his first PCR
    proceeding. However, with the aid of counsel, a second amended application for
    PCR was filed on May 13, 2019, and two counts identified the issues—trial counsel
    was ineffective in failing to (1) properly investigate the case, properly cross-
    examine the victim, and contradict the State’s evidence that the victim’s injuries
    were life threatening; and (2) challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as it related
    to whether the victim’s injuries rose to the level of a serious injury. After a hearing
    on the merits, the first PCR court denied relief upon the issues in the second
    amended application but did not rule upon any other issues. Lajeunesse, pro se,
    moved for expanded findings on the claims, but his counsel filed a notice of appeal
    before the district court ruled on the motion.7
    Lajeunesse raised the claims again in his second PCR proceeding. In
    dismissing the second PCR application, the court reasoned Lajeunesse did not
    preserve his claims “for appellate review” by raising them in the criminal
    proceeding and they could not be raised for the first time on PCR. The court found
    all ineffective-assistance claims were either fully litigated or waived in the first
    proceeding and Lajeunesse offered no “sufficient reason . . . why these claims
    were not raised in his first [PCR] proceeding.” So the court found the claims were
    barred by Iowa Code section 822.8 and dismissed the second application.
    (5) complaints about photographic evidence, (6) there was no record he was read
    his Miranda rights, (7) the court was biased against him, (8) deceit and collusion
    by counsel, (9) spoliation, and (10) other complaints about the prosecutor’s
    conduct. See 
    id.
     at *4–6
    7 In the motion, Lajeunesse argued first PCR counsel was never his attorney and
    his pleadings were the application and his “entire pro se supplemental brief.”
    6
    In assessing whether the court was correct, we look to Iowa Code section
    822.8, which provides:
    All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this
    chapter must be raised in the applicant’s original, supplemental or
    amended application. Any ground finally adjudicated or not raised,
    or knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived in the proceeding
    that resulted in the conviction or sentence, or in any other proceeding
    the applicant has taken to secure relief, may not be the basis for a
    subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground for relief
    asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was
    inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended
    application.
    On direct appeal, we preserved Lajeunesse’s claims concerning
    prosecutorial misconduct and collusion of counsel for possible PCR, and he
    forwarded those claims during the first PCR action.             So he satisfied the
    requirement that he raise these available grounds for relief in the original action.
    See 
    Iowa Code § 822.8
    . After clearing that hurdle, and as we quite recently
    explained, “the statute sets out three categories that may not be the basis of a
    subsequent application: (1) grounds finally adjudicated, (2) ground not raised, or
    (3) grounds knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived . . . in another
    proceeding that applicant has taken to secure relief.”        Hasselmann v. State,
    No. 21-0483, 
    2022 WL 951084
    , at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2022).
    First, the court did not enter an adjudication on the specific claims identified
    on this appeal, and second, the claims did not go unraised in the first PCR
    proceeding. So the only remaining basis for barring them procedurally at this point
    would be if the claims were “knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived” in the
    first proceeding. See 
    id.
     The district court summarily decided any claims not fully
    litigated “were waived,” but it offered no reason why. The court alternatively found
    7
    “these claims were not raised in his first [PCR] proceeding,” and Lajeunesse failed
    to present a “sufficient reason” for not raising them. See 
    Iowa Code § 822.8
    .
    It is true that we found Lajeunesse failed to preserve error on his un-ruled
    upon claims because his counsel filed a notice of appeal before his motion for
    expanded findings was ruled on by the court. See Lajeunesse, 
    2022 WL 469408
    ,
    at *4 n.5. But failure to preserve error on a claim and waiver thereof are two
    different things. See Perez-Fuentes v. State, No. 15-0584, 
    2016 WL 4384490
    , at
    *4 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2016). Also of note is the fact that the motion for
    expanded findings on the claims was filed pro se. While the court may have been
    without the authority to consider the motion due to a recently enacted statute at
    the time, see 
    Iowa Code § 822
    .3A (Supp. 2019),8 the motion was at least a signal
    to counsel that Lajeunesse wanted rulings on the claims. Rather than forward a
    motion that the court could undoubtedly consider, counsel filed a notice of appeal,
    thus depriving the district court of jurisdiction and leading to our conclusion that
    error was not preserved on the claims. Absent preservation of error, we also did
    not enter an adjudication on the claims. It is certainly true that the filing of a notice
    of appeal normally operates as a waiver and abandonment of a post-trial motion.
    See IBP, Inc. v. Al-Gharib, 
    604 N.W.2d 621
    , 628 (Iowa 2000). But “[w]aiver is the
    voluntary relinquishment of a known right,” 
    id. at 629
    , and “ineffective assistance
    of first PCR counsel”—which was Lajeunesse’s initial substantive claim for relief in
    8 Section 822.3A prohibits an applicant “who is currently represented by counsel”
    from filing any pro se document and provides the court shall not consider such
    documents.
    8
    the second action—“could prevent . . . waiver of his claims from being knowing,
    voluntary, and intelligent.” Hasselmann, 
    2022 WL 951084
    , at *4.
    Before the district court was the State’s motion to dismiss. Dismissal is only
    appropriate at this stage “[i]f the application . . . on its face shows no right of
    recovery under any state of facts.” Belk v. State, 
    905 N.W.2d 185
    , 188 (Iowa
    2017). Courts are required to “view the applicant’s allegations ‘in the light most
    favorable to the [applicant] with doubts resolved in that party’s favor.’”         
    Id.
    (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
    However, a review of the proceedings in Lajeunesse’s first PCR application
    provides illumination that Lajeunesse was given an opportunity for a hearing on
    the merits on all of his issues, including the issues he raises in this proceeding. In
    that proceeding, an order was entered on March 7, 2019, fixing a trial date and
    stating all pleadings would be closed sixty days before trial, and requiring a trial
    brief setting forth the issues to be addressed to be filed ten days before the trial.
    On April 25, 2019, although represented by counsel, Lajeunesse, filed a document
    entitled “Pleadings before trial to begin—60 days.” In the document, Lajeunesse
    sets out five issues related to medical records, prosecutorial misconduct, the
    blurred photo, inconsistent statements, and jury instruction twenty-seven. Near
    the end of the trial, Lajeunesse told the court that he did not get to present his
    evidence. In response, the district court asked him what he wanted to present and
    gave him a full opportunity to present whatever evidence he wanted to include in
    the record. Lajeunesse then asked for various exhibits to be admitted, which the
    court accepted, except one that was not pre-filed.        After concluding with the
    9
    exhibits, Lajeunesse asked the court, “Are we done for the day?” The court asked
    in response, “Are you ready?” And Lajeunesse responded, “Yes Sir.” The trial then
    concluded. Although Lajeunesse was given the opportunity to present whatever
    evidence he wanted to enter, as we have noted, the court did not rule upon
    Lajeunesse’s pro se claims.
    On this record, a conclusion that Lajeunesse did not voluntarily, knowingly,
    and intelligently waive the claims raised in this appeal is not inconceivable.
    However, we decline to assume trial counsel was ineffective, and it is certainly
    plausible that trial counsel spoke with Lajeunesse, Lajeunesse agreed to forego
    his remaining claims, and, subsequently, had a change of mind when he filed the
    instant application.
    Nonetheless, the most important point here is that Lajeunesse has not
    alleged in this proceeding that his trial counsel was ineffective in his first PCR
    proceeding by filing the notice of appeal before the district court ruled upon his
    motion to enlarge. In failing to allege trial counsel was ineffective for filing the
    notice of appeal prior to resolution of his motion to enlarge, he has voluntarily
    waived his right to raise such a claim.9 And accordingly, the claims he has filed in
    this second PCR proceeding are barred.
    9 We also note the motion to enlarge only addressed a claim relating to medical
    records and did not address the claims of deceit, collusion, or prosecutorial
    misconduct.
    10
    We conclude the claims Lajeunesse pinpoints in this appeal are
    procedurally barred.   We affirm the dismissal of Lajeunesse’s second PCR
    application.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-0817

Filed Date: 5/25/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/25/2022