ConAgra Foods, Inc. and Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Leslie Moore ( 2022 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-0339
Filed May 25, 2022
CONAGRA FOODS, INC. and OLD REPUBLIC INS. CO.
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
LESLIE MOORE,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Jeanie K. Vaudt, Judge.
An employer appeals a judicial review order affirming an award of workers’
compensation. AFFIRMED.
Kent M. Smith of Smith Mills Schrock Blades P.C., West Des Moines, for
appellants.
Benjamin R. Roth of Fulton, Martin & Andres, P.C., Waterloo, for appellee.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Greer and Ahlers, JJ.
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TABOR, Presiding Judge.
ConAgra Foods, Inc. (ConAgra) appeals two findings by the Iowa Workers’
Compensation Commission: (1) that Leslie Moore sustained a permanent
impairment to his hip and lower back resulting from an injury on the job and (2) that
the work-related injury led to a forty-percent industrial disability. Considering the
commissioner’s credibility determinations and applying the deferential standards
of review, we affirm both findings.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
ConAgra hired Moore in 2001 and continues to employ him as a production
technician. In June 2016, while on the job, Moore felt a “pop” while twisting to lift
a stack of boxes to place on a machine. He recalled immediate pain to his left hip
from the movement. Moore reported the injury to a supervisor and filled out an
incident report. After returning from vacation, Moore’s hip pain persisted. So he
decided to see the company doctor, David Kirkle. Dr. Kirkle examined Moore’s hip
and detected signs of arthritis. The doctor released Moore for work without
restrictions while recommending naproxen, an anti-inflammatory drug, for his pain
and stiffness.
Moore returned to his job the next day and was notified by a human
resources representative that ConAgra no longer considered his injury to be work
related. Two months later, Moore saw his orthopedic doctor, Roswell Johnston,
for an evaluation of his left hip. Moore explained the June work incident and the
sharp stabbing pain he felt. Dr. Johnston examined Moore’s hip, finding that it did
not show any signs of arthritis. Dr. Johnston diagnosed Moore with a strain to his
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sartorius muscle, which is a superficial anterior thigh muscle. The doctor advised
Moore to avoid activities that would aggravate his condition.
Moore returned to work, but his hip pain did not go away. On top of that,
his back started to cause him problems. Because of this, he saw a provider at his
primary care clinic. The provider proscribed naproxen and physical therapy.
Compliant, in late 2016 and into early 2017, Moore attended physical therapy,
which helped alleviate his pain. But the relief was short lived. Moore returned to
the primary care clinic with similar back pain. Moore also missed significant time
from work in February and March 2017 because of that pain. Later in 2017, Moore
returned to physical therapy, complaining of left hip pain. The pain was severe
enough that he missed work in August and early September 2017. Back on the
job, Moore’s symptoms emerged again. Moore received lumbar facet injections
for the pain in late September, early November, and mid-January 2018. The
repeated treatments corresponded to increased pain from working. Moore also
received radiofrequency ablation in February 2018.
Then in May 2018, Moore petitioned for workers’ compensation benefits,
alleging he sustained injuries to his hip and back at work. At the arbitration hearing,
Moore testified that, up to the hearing date, he was receiving care for his hip and
back pain and also undergoing physical therapy. Both Moore and ConAgra
solicited expert opinions for the hearing. ConAgra offered an opinion from
Dr. Charles Mooney, who found no permanent impairment related to Moore’s hip
or back. Dr. Mooney also recommended no additional care or work restrictions for
Moore. In contrast, Moore provided an independent medical examination from
Dr. David Segal, who found that Moore had a nineteen-percent permanent
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impairment. Moore also offered the opinion of Dr. Johnston who believed that
Moore’s work injury was a substantial factor in causing his hip issues and agreed
with Dr. Segal’s impairment finding.
The deputy commissioner ruled that (1) Moore proved an ongoing
impairment to his hip and low back caused by the work injury and (2) his
impairment merited an award of forty-percent industrial disability. ConAgra
appealed the arbitration decision; the workers’ compensation commissioner
affirmed. Upon judicial review, the district court decided substantial evidence
supported the commissioner’s finding of permanent impairment and the industrial
disability award was not irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. ConAgra now
challenges the judicial review decision.
II. Scope and Standards of Review
The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 17A of the Iowa Code
(2018), governs our review. See Iowa Code § 86.26; Meyer v. IBP, Inc., 710
N.W.2d 213, 218 (Iowa 2006). “Under the Act, we may only interfere with the
commissioner’s decision if it is erroneous under one of the grounds enumerated in
the statute, and a party’s substantial rights have been prejudiced.” Meyer, 710
N.W.2d at 218 (citing Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)). In workers’ compensation cases,
the district court serves as an appellate court correcting any legal error by the
commissioner. See Grundmeyer v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 649 N.W.2d 744, 748
(Iowa 2002). And in reviewing the district court’s ruling, we apply the chapter 17A
standard to decide whether we reach the same result as that court. Clark v. Vicorp
Rests. Inc., 696 N.W.2d 596, 603 (Iowa 2005).
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But the standard of review varies depending on what aspect of the decision
is challenged. See Burton v. Hilltop Care Ctr., 813 N.W.2d 250, 255–56 (Iowa
2012). For ConAgra’s causation claim, we limit our review to whether the
commissioner’s finding is supported by substantial evidence when the agency
record is viewed as a whole. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f); Cedar Rapids Cmty.
Sch. Dist. v. Pease, 807 N.W.2d 839, 844–45 (Iowa 2011) (“Medical causation
presents a question of fact . . . . We will therefore only disturb the commissioner’s
finding of medical causation if it is not supported by substantial evidence.”).
“Evidence is substantial if reasonable minds could accept it as adequate to reach
the same findings.” Tim O’Neill Chevrolet, Inc. v. Forristall, 551 N.W.2d 611, 614
(Iowa 1996). The commissioner is charged with weighing the evidence, and we—
as the reviewing court—“liberally and broadly construe the findings” to uphold that
decision. Finch v. Schneider Specialized Carriers, Inc., 700 N.W.2d 328, 331
(Iowa 2005). When reviewing the commissioner’s findings, we examine whether
the evidence supports the findings made, not whether the evidence would support
a different finding. Meyer, 710 N.W.2d at 218.
For the industrial disability claim, we must decide whether the
commissioner’s finding was “[b]ased upon an irrational, illogical, or wholly
unjustifiable application of law to fact that has clearly been vested by a provision
of law in the discretion of the agency.” See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(m); see also
Larson Mfg. Co. v. Thorson, 763 N.W.2d 842, 856–57 (Iowa 2009). “[W]e
recognize that the commissioner is routinely called upon to make such
assessments and has a special expertise in the area that is entitled to respect by
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a reviewing court.” Neal v. Annett Holdings, Inc., 814 N.W.2d 512, 527 (Iowa
2012).
III. Analysis
ConAgra brings two claims: (1) the district court wrongly decided substantial
evidence supported the commissioner’s causation and permanency findings and
(2) the district court should have determined that the commissioner’s industrial
disability finding was irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.
A. Substantial Evidence
ConAgra argues that the record lacks substantial evidence to support the
commissioner’s decision that Moore’s symptoms after August 2016 were causally
related to his work injury two months earlier. The employer alleges that Moore’s
medical records instead document “an ongoing personal condition that was not
permanently aggravated or ‘lighted up’ by the minor work injury.” ConAgra points
to Moore’s previous treatment for his knees, as well as his reports of lower back
pain and earlier chiropractic treatment. ConAgra argues that the commissioner
did not explain why Moore’s “pre-existing back treatment was immaterial.”
But ConAgra’s argument misses the mark for three reasons. First, Moore
injured his hip at work. By contrast, he received treatment earlier for his knees
and back. Second, the commissioner identified Moore’s pre-existing knee and
back problems but noted no record of Moore experiencing hip pain or ongoing back
discomfort until the work injury in June 2016. And based on the expert testimony
of Dr. Segal and Dr. Johnston, the commissioner found support for the connection
between Moore’s sensation of a “pop” in his hip and persistent pain in his hip and
groin area. Ultimately, the commissioner held that the “evidence supports Moore’s
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preexisting low back condition was aggravated, accelerated, worsened, or ‘lighted
up’ by the work injury, and that the work injury also caused him to develop a
permanent impairment to his hip.” See Nicks v. Davenport Prod. Co., 115 N.W.2d
812, 815 (Iowa 1962) (clarifying that worker’s pre-existing condition at time of injury
is not a defense against a compensation claim).
Third, the employer’s characterization of Moore’s work injury as “minor” was
contradicted in the record. Before June 2016, Moore had received non-invasive
treatment for his back. After the work injury, Moore received injections and
radiofrequency ablation. Moore also testified that the pain he endured after the
work injury was “horrible” and “not even close to the same amount of pain” as he
experienced before the injury. The deputy commissioner found Moore to be a
credible witness, “considering his eye contact, demeanor, and consistency in his
statements and testimony.” It is the commission’s role “to determine the credibility
of the witnesses.” Arndt v. City of Le Claire, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394–95 (Iowa 2007).
And the “reviewing court only determines whether substantial evidence supports a
finding according to those witnesses whom the commissioner believed.” Id.(cleaned up). We accept the commissioner’s assessment of Moore as a credible
witness; and, in turn, look to his testimony to bolster the bottom line: his work injury
aggravated any pre-existing back condition.1
1 ConAgra asserts that Moore never missed work following the June 2016 injury.
But the commissioner made a different finding, crediting evidence that Moore
missed four months because of his work injury. We defer to the commissioner’s
fact finding and consider Moore’s time off work as confirming the severity of his
injury.
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Finally, ConAgra asks us to weigh the relative credibility of the medical
experts. But such weighing is outside our mission. Rather, it is within the “peculiar
province” of the commission whether to accept or reject an expert opinion. Pease,
807 N.W.2d at 845. “The courts, in their appellate capacity, are not at liberty to
accept contradictory opinions of other experts in order to reject the finding of the
commissioner.” Id. at 850 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The
deputy commissioner was persuaded by the opinions of Dr. Johnston and
Dr. Segal. Both doctors believed Moore’s hip complaints were causally related to
his work injury, and that Moore sustained permanent hip impairment as a result of
that injury. The deputy commissioner rejected the contrary view of Dr. Mooney—
ConAgra’s retained expert, noting that Dr. Johnston and Dr. Segal had “superior
training.” Because the commission’s credibility determinations are well supported
in the record, we do not disturb them. See Forristall, 551 N.W.2d at 614.
Substantial evidence supports the commissioner’s determination that
Moore’s hip and back pain is causally related to his work injury.
B. Industrial Disability
ConAgra next claims the industrial-disability award of forty-percent was
irrational, illogical, and wholly unjustifiable because Moore worked full time with no
change in his employment and with no loss of earnings. But Moore did not need
to show an actual reduction in his earnings to prove an injury-caused reduction in
earning capacity.2 See St. Luke’s Hosp. v. Gray, 604 N.W.2d 646, 653 (Iowa
2000).
2 For injuries occurring after July 1, 2017, if an employee eligible for compensation
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In assessing an industrial-disability award, the commissioner considers “all
the factors that bear on the claimant’s actual employability.” Larson, 763 N.W.2d
at 857 (cleaned up). These factors include “age, education, qualification,
experience, and inability due to injury, to engage in the employment for which the
claimant is fitted.” Thilges v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 528 N.W.2d 614, 616 (Iowa
1995). At the time of the arbitration hearing, Moore was fifty-nine years old. He
had a high school education and had worked for ConAgra for two decades. While
he kept his job as a production technician, he reported intermittent pain from
performing his duties.3 He also testified that ConAgra did not allow employees to
work with any physical restrictions: “you had to be at a hundred percent to be at
your job.” The commissioner also considers a claimant’s functional impairment in
determining the extent of industrial disability. Westling v. Hormel Foods Corp., 810
N.W.2d 247, 253 (Iowa 2012). Here, the commissioner credited Dr. Segal’s
assignment of a nineteen-percent permanent impairment rating. Considered
together, these factors validate the commissioner’s determination that Moore’s
employability suffered because of his hip injury.
Because the commissioner considered the proper factors in assessing
Moore’s industrial disability and because the reduction in earning capacity
returns to work or is offered work for which the employee receives or
would receive the same or greater salary, wages, or earnings than
the employee received at the time of the injury, the employee shall
be compensated based only upon the employee’s functional
impairment resulting from the injury, and not in relation to the
employee’s earning capacity.
Iowa Code § 85.34(2)(v). The parties agree that this legislative change does not
apply to Moore.
3 Moore testified that after three days of working twelve-hour shifts at ConAgra, he
spends the fourth day recuperating at home because his body is “sore.”
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assigned by the commissioner is supported by substantial evidence, we decline to
reverse the award. See Keystone Nursing Care Ctr. v. Craddock, 705 N.W.2d
299, 307 (Iowa 2005). As the district court reasoned, the commissioner’s forty-
percent industrial disability award is not so “out of plumb” with the facts here as to
render it irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. See Myers v. F.C.A. Servs.,
Inc., 592 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Iowa 1999).
AFFIRMED.