State of Iowa v. Michelle Lee Boat ( 2024 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-0934
Filed February 7, 2024
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MICHELLE LEE BOAT,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marion County, Patrick W.
Greenwood, Judge.
The defendant appeals her conviction and sentence for murder in the first
degree. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Melinda J. Nye, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ.
2
GREER, Judge.
Michelle Boat appeals from her conviction and sentence for murder in the
first degree. She argues the district court abused its discretion when denying her
motion to strike a potential juror for cause, should have granted her motion for
mistrial based on prosecutorial error because the State encouraged the jury to
consider punishment during its closing argument, and misapplied the law when
determining her reasonable ability to pay restitution during sentencing by
considering assets not subject to execution. Finding no abuse of discretion or
sentencing error, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Boat was charged with murder in the first degree in the May 18, 2020 death
of Tracy Mondabough. Mondabough—who was the paramour of Boat’s estranged
husband—died of a stab wound to the chest, which she suffered while still belted
in the driver’s seat of a truck as it was parked outside her home in Pella.1
Surveillance video showed Boat’s vehicle following Mondabough’s vehicle for
nearly an hour before the altercation, and a neighbor identified a vehicle matching
the description of Boat’s leaving the area after the altercation. Other physical
evidence also supported a determination Boat was the killer: the finger-portion of
a disposable glove found at the scene was determined to come from a glove that
was later found stuffed in the top tank of a toilet at Boat’s home, and Mondabough’s
DNA was found in the tank’s water; Boat’s hair was found on the truck steering
1 The truck was registered to Boat’s husband.
3
wheel and in Mondabough’s hand; and Mondabough’s blood and hair were found
on Boat’s car.
At the jury trial in May 2021, Boat conceded she fatally stabbed
Mondabough but argued the facts supported a conviction for manslaughter rather
than murder. Testifying in her own defense, Boat denied having any plan to kill
Mondabough; she claimed she followed Mondabough home to learn where her
husband was staying. And she pulled in beside Mondabough and walked up to
the truck with the intention of telling Mondabough to leave her husband so he would
return to her; when Boat walked up and opened the truck door (while wearing
disposable gloves), Mondabough “started hitting [her] and screaming at [her],
calling [her] a crazy bitch.” Boat had a knife sitting on her passenger seat
because—since her husband left her—she felt like she no longer had anyone to
protect her. According to Boat:
A. We were—she was hitting me and hitting me and hitting
me, and I had my hands up. She’s yelling at me, and I just—I just
stabbed. And I grabbed the knife, and I just stabbed her. And I
dropped the knife and I went around back around the car and went
home.
....
Q. Where—in the car when you pulled up next to Tracy that
day, where was the knife? A. It was on the seat.
Q. On the passenger seat? A. Yes.
Q. When you turned to get the knife, how did you grab it? A. I
don’t know. I had—I just—just turned like this because I had—my
eyes were closed and my glasses had fallen off, so I couldn’t really
see anything, so I just turned and grabbed.
Boat admitted she immediately went home, put her bloody clothes in the washing
machine, took a shower, and hid the disposable gloves in the top tank of the toilet
before answering the door to police officers’ knock. And when the police asked
4
her if she stabbed Mondabough, she lied, claiming she had not seen Mondabough
in months.
The jury found Boat guilty of murder in the first degree. The district court
later sentenced her to life in prison and imposed fines and restitution, including a
finding that she had a reasonable ability to pay $6673.75 in category “B” restitution.
Boat appeals.
II. Discussion.
A. Motion to Strike Juror.
Boat challenges the district court’s denial of her request to remove a
potential juror for cause.2 “We review the district court’s rulings on challenges to
potential jurors for cause for abuse of discretion.” State v. Jonas, 904 N.W.2d 566,
570 (Iowa 2017). And “[t]he district court is vested with broad discretion in such
rulings.” Id. at 571. Only if the district court abused its discretion in refusing to
strike for cause the potential juror and prejudice resulted, then the defendant is
entitled to a new trial. Id.; see also State v. Linderman, 958 N.W.2d 211, 218–19
(Iowa Ct. App. 2021).
Here, Boat moved to strike the potential juror for cause during voir dire
questioning, and the district court denied her motion. Then, during jury selection,
Boat exhausted her peremptory strikes—using one to strike the potential juror 2.
After exhausting her peremptory strikes, Boat requested an additional peremptory
strike and identified the juror she wished to strike. Following our supreme court’s
ruling in Jonas, because the district court denied Boat’s request for an additional
2 We refer to the potential juror as “juror 2,” which is a reference to the numbering
system used during the jury selection process.
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strike, we presume prejudice if the court abused its discretion in the earlier denial
of the motion to strike juror 2 for cause.3 See 904 N.W.2d at 583 (establishing a
three-prong test to presume prejudice in juror-disqualification appeals);
Linderman, 958 N.W.2d at 219 (explaining the “three prongs in Jonas” as being
met when the defendant (1) “moved to strike [prospective] juror A for cause, which
the court denied; (2) . . . requested the court grant an additional peremptory strike;
and (3) . . .identified a separate juror [the defendant] would have used the
peremptory strike on had the court dismissed prospective juror A for cause”). So,
our focus is on whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Boat’s
request to dismiss juror 2 for cause.
The court should grant a motion to strike a juror if “the juror holds such a
fixed opinion on the merits of the case that he or she cannot judge impartially the
guilt or innocence of the defendant.” State v. Neuendorf, 509 N.W.2d 743, 746
(Iowa 1993); see also Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.18(5)(k) (allowing a challenge for cause
when the juror has “formed or expressed such an opinion as to the guilt or
innocence of the defendant as would prevent the juror from rendering a true verdict
upon the evidence submitted on the trial”). During jury voir dire, juror 2 said she
was a witness at the trial for her ex-husband’s murder about fifteen years earlier.
3 The State asks us to overrule the presumption of prejudice established in Jonas,
904 N.W.2d at 583, arguing it “grants an incongruous remedy” because it allows a
defendant to “get the windfall of a new trial without demonstrating” the juror the
defendant maintains they would have stricken with their additional peremptory
challenge “was unfair or biased and without any harm to [his] or her right to a fair
and impartial jury.” However, “[w]e are not at liberty to overrule controlling
supreme court precedent.” State v. Beck, 854 N.W.2d 56, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014).
6
Defense counsel then had the following exchange with her outside the presence
of other potential jurors:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Does it concern you that it might be
difficult for you to sit and listen to witnesses and facts in a murder
case, with your own personal experience?
JUROR 2: Possibly, yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: What are your concerns?
JUROR 2: I don’t know. I just—I don’t know. It would just be
hard.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Would it be difficult for you
emotionally?
JUROR 2: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Do you think it would be difficult for
you to set your own experiences aside entirely?
JUROR 2: That I don’t know. I don’t know if I would be able
to do that or not.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Do you think, then, not being able to
do that might affect your ability to listen fairly and impartially and with
your full attention?
JUROR 2: It could. I just don’t know.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Have you been a juror before?
JUROR 2: No.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Have you formed any opinion about
this case?
JUROR 2: From just bits and pieces that I’ve heard, kind of.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: What have you kind of—
JUROR 2: Just from what I’ve heard on the news, mainly, I
guess.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And from what you’ve heard, has that
let you form an opinion about this case?
JUROR 2: Yes, I have.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And that would make it hard for you to
be fair and impartial, then, would you agree?
JUROR 2: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: That coupled with your own
experience of your ex-husband having been a murder victim?
JUROR 2: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And you having actually had to testify
in his murder trial?
JUROR 2: Yes.
7
Boat then moved to strike juror 2 for cause. Before ruling on Boat’s request, the
district court gave the prosecutor the chance to speak with juror 2, and the following
exchange took place:
PROSECUTOR: I just want to be clear. I want you to be clear
because we can’t speak for you. No matter what the evidence was
or wasn’t in this case, you would vote a particular way right now no
matter what happened. Is that what you’re telling us?
JUROR 2: Right now?
PROSECUTOR: Well, let’s start there. No evidence has been
presented. Not one witness, not one exhibit, not one anything. The
Court’s going to instruct all the jurors, and you might be one of them,
that they’re to base their verdict just on evidence that comes in in
court and his instructions and nothing else. All right? So that’s what
we mean by can you be fair. And so you’ve heard this and that about
this case, but all jurors may have heard a little something about this
case. But that’s not evidence. And whatever they heard can’t be
considered unless it’s also evidence in the case. Do you understand
the difference?
JUROR 2: Yeah.
PROSECUTOR: So the question is, is can you do that despite
what you’ve heard in the past, put it aside, wipe the slate clean, and
base your verdict only on the evidence you hear in court?
JUROR 2: I think so.
PROSECUTOR: Okay. And if there should be some fact or
thing that you heard outside of court before today, that doesn’t come
in. No witness talks about it. No exhibit shows it. There’s zero
evidence of it. Will you, as part of your oath that you have to take,
promise not to consider it at all yourself? That’s part one, not
consider it. It’s not evidence. Could you do that?
JUROR 2: I think so. I think so.
PROSECUTOR: All right. And the next step is, also not
discuss it with anybody else who’s on the jury.
JUROR 2: Yes.
PROSECUTOR: Could you do that? And so, not weigh it for
yourself and not say, oh, I know nobody talked about this fact in court
but I heard blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, whatever it is?
JUROR 2: Yeah.
PROSECUTOR: Right? That would be against your oath if
you did that. Do you think you could avoid doing it?
JUROR 2: Yes.
PROSECUTOR: Okay. That's all I have. Thanks.
Then the court spoke with juror 2:
8
THE COURT: Ma’am, I want to try to clarify what I think I’ve
heard you say. And sometimes it helps my mind to think of
analogies. I’m looking out the window and I see the structure of the
spectator seating for the fairgrounds. Are you familiar with that?
JUROR 2: Yes.
THE COURT: Would you agree it’s not movable?
JUROR 2: Yes.
THE COURT: It’s fixed?
JUROR 2: Yes.
THE COURT: Do you have an opinion it’s not movable or that
it’s fixed?
JUROR 2: No.
THE COURT: So could you sit and listen to the evidence that
would be presented, follow my instructions as to the law, and be fair
to both Michelle Boat and to the State of Iowa?
JUROR 2: I think so, yes.
After this response from juror 2, the district court denied the motion to strike
juror 2 for cause. Later, after Boat asked the court to reconsider its ruling and
provide her an additional peremptory strike, the court stated it denied the request
to strike juror 2 for cause:
because I am relying on the test [from Neuendorf] to be applied in
ruling on challenges for cause, which is whether the juror holds such
a fixed opinion on the merits of the case that she cannot judge
impartially the guilt or innocence of the defendant. . . . Also, the
Court is relying on Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.18(5). The
further subparagraph that seems to be implicated is K, which
provides that the juror already formed or expressed an opinion as to
the guilt of the defendant.
The Court has no recollection that [juror 2] indicated that she
did. She indicated she was having difficulty. She indicated that she
would try to be neutral, and that may not be an exact quote. The
Court does not feel that the questioning by either the State’s counsel
or the Court was so intimidating or extensive that [juror 2] simply
acquiesced in what she thought may be the proper answer. The
Court feels that she’s genuinely answered that she had no fixed
opinion on the merits of the case and that she could be impartial and
fair to the defendant as well as to the State.
Boat maintains this was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion, arguing juror 2
“expressed unequivocally that she had formed an opinion about this case based
9
on news reports she had previously heard” and only backed away from this
position after being rehabilitated by the court. She maintains juror 2’s responses
to her questions “left the distinct impression the defense would be an at an unfair
disadvantage with [juror 2] on the jury.”
We do not understand juror 2’s statements to be as strong or as clear as
Boat characterizes them. First, this is not a case where the potential juror “initially
repeatedly expresse[d] actual bias against the defendant based on race, ethnicity,
sex, or sexual orientation, both in a pretrial questionnaire and in voir dire . . . .”
Jonas, 904 N.W.2d at 575. Juror 2 responded that she thought it would be
emotionally difficult for her to sit on the jury, but—considering the types of evidence
and cases jurors are often asked to sit through—that is not uncommon for jurors.
See, e.g., State v. Hickman, 337 N.W.2d 512, 515–16 (Iowa 1983) (“Death pictures
are not ordinarily excluded because they are gruesome, as these pictures are, for
murder is by nature gruesome business.”); State v. Koehn, No. 18-2216, 2020 WL
6480860, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2020) (recognizing “photographs of small,
dead children are likely to elicit emotion from the jury”). And experiencing difficult
emotions is not necessarily the same thing as having bias or prejudice for one side
or the other. We recognize that when first asked whether she had formed an
opinion of the case, juror 2 responded, “Kind of” and then, “Yes.” But when the
prosecutor and, later, the court asked juror 2 more questions to determine whether
juror 2 had “formed . . . an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant as
would prevent the juror from rendering a true verdict upon the evidence submitted
on the trial,” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.18(5)(k), juror 2 answered she thought she could
10
base her verdict on only the evidence she heard at trial and that her opinion of the
case was not fixed.
While Boat characterizes these questions as the prosecutor’s and court’s
attempt to rehabilitate juror 2, we understand them as an attempt to better
understand juror 2’s responses to Boat’s broad, leading questions. Juror 2 had
told Boat that it would be difficult for her to be on the jury and that she already had
an opinion on the case—the prosecutor and court responded by asking whether
juror 2 could set her opinion aside and decide the case on the trial evidence. The
tenor of this discussion is not like that in Jonas, where the potential juror repeatedly
admitted that the fact the defendant was gay would influence his decision despite
the court’s continued attempt to press the potential juror into saying he would be
unbiased. 904 N.W.2d at 569–70. The brief exchange that took place here falls
far short of the “persistent questioning” in Jonas. Id. at 575 (“[W]e do not believe
the district court can rehabilitate the potential juror through persistent questioning
regarding whether the juror would follow instructions from the court.”). And the
district court, which had the opportunity to hear the questions and answers live,
while watching juror 2’s demeanor, believed “that [juror 2] genuinely answered that
she had no fixed opinion on the merits of the case and that she could be impartial
and fair to the defendant as well as to the State.” See Skilling v. United States,
561 U.S. 358, 386–87, 395 (2010) (recognizing that trial courts have a “face-to-
face opportunity to gauge demeanor and credibility,” so appellate courts should be
“resistant to second guessing the trial judge’s decisions on juror impartiality,” which
is influenced by many factors impossible to capture in a cold record).
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For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying Boat’s motion to strike juror 2 for cause.
B. Prosecutorial Error.
Boat argues she was deprived of a fair trial because of comments made by
the prosecutor during closing arguments about severity of crimes, which she
maintains was an implicit discussion of punishment; she contends her motion for
mistrial should have been granted. We review the court’s denial of this motion for
abuse of discretion. State v. Coleman, 907 N.W.2d 124, 134 (Iowa 2018).
“[T]o establish a violation of the right to a fair trial, a defendant must show
both (1) error or misconduct and (2) prejudice.” State v. Plain, 898 N.W.2d 801,
818 (Iowa 2017). “Prosecutorial error occurs ‘where the prosecutor exercises poor
judgment’ and ‘where the attorney has made a mistake’ based on ‘excusable
human error, despite the attorney’s use of reasonable care.’”4 Id. at 818 n.4
(citation omitted). If an error occurred, the critical question is whether that error
deprived the defendant of a fair trial. See State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 876
(Iowa 2003). In determining whether the defendant was prejudiced by any error,
we consider the following factors: (1) the severity and pervasiveness of the
complained-of action; (2) the significance of the action to the central issues in the
case; (3) the strength of the State’s evidence; (4) the use of cautionary instructions
4 In contrast, a claim of prosecutorial misconduct constitutes an allegation the
prosecutor “intentionally violate[d] a clear and unambiguous obligation or standard
imposed by law, applicable rule or professional conduct” or “recklessly
disregard[ed] a duty to comply with an obligation or standard.” Plain, 898 N.W.2d
at 818 n.4 (citation omitted).
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or other curative measures; and (5) the extent to which the defense invited the
error. Id. at 869.
Boat argues the prosecutor committed error when making the following
statements during closing argument:
I want to back up to this one. So I want to spend just a minute
talking about lesser-included offenses because I don’t want you to
be confused about it.
You may have noticed from all the instructions, there’s a lot of
them, that says—starts with murder one, the statements prove all
these elements. If we have, she’s guilty; if we haven’t, go to the next
one down, the next lesser-included offense.
So the process that you are to use in assessing and doing
your deliberations is to start at the highest offense, murder in the first
degree. If you find that the evidence has proved the defendant guilty
of those charges beyond a reasonable doubt, you’re done. You don’t
have to look at the next one or the next one or the next one. It’s a
downward-stepping ladder.
It is not a process where you take all of those crimes and go,
Which one sounds most like what we think happened? Because—
and it’s not that way because whether you commit murder in the first
degree of necessity, you have also committed all the lesser-included
offenses. That’s why we call them lesser-included offenses.
It’s not, Which one sounds the most alike?
It is, Which one is proved?
And it’s a downward ladder. So if you find that the State has
proven first degree murder, you don’t have to look at any of the
lesser-includeds. You don’t have to understand any of the definitions
associated with them. You’re done. That’s how it works.
It’s only if the State hasn’t proven each and every element that
you need to concern yourself at all with any of the lesser-included
offenses. It’s not a sounds-most-like process.
It has to be, What has been proven starting at the top and
moving down?
So what defenses have been put forward here? We heard
from [defense counsel] in her opening statement that it’s not murder.
It’s manslaughter. She didn’t go any farther than that. I’m sure you’ll
be hearing from [defense counsel again soon], but that’s what you’ve
heard so far.
One of the lessors—by the way, any time you’re talking about
heat of passion, you’re already down to, like, the fourth lesser
because it starts with murder in the first degree, then there’s murder
in the second degree, then there’s attempt to commit murder, then
there’s willful injury. And it’s not until the fifth lesser that you even
13
get to any discussion at all or need to consider anything about heat
of passion and/or it may be that this was some sort of unintentional
reckless killing of Tracy Mondabough.
But since counsel mentioned and it sounded like from the
defendant’s testimony that she would like you to believe that this was
just the result of this heat of passion, I’m going to spend a few
minutes talking about that with you.
Instruction No. 31, this is for voluntary manslaughter, again,
the fifth lesser-included, or I can’t remember down the line—way
below murder in the first degree. Instruction for voluntary
manslaughter is that the stabbing was done solely by reason of a
sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious
provocation.
....
And the other defense is mercy. Essentially—it may remain
unspoken, but the defendant has essentially thrown herself on the
mercy of [the jury].
Please don’t convict me of this because of my pathetic
situation.
This argument or this suggestion to you is beyond the pale
considering the defendant’s absolute merciless and viciousness of
her attack, stalking, and killing of Tracy Mondabough. Not one ounce
of mercy did she show, but, please, show mercy towards her, which
is also not a defense. But to the extent that it may be playing into
your minds, I mention it.
Then, outside the presence of the jury, Boat moved for mistrial, arguing,
Your Honor, at this time we would move for a mistrial. [Co-
counsel] and I were troubled initially when the State talked a bit about
the order and the verdict forms, suggesting in our opinion that the
order had something to do with the corresponding severity and
punishment. We became more troubled when the State . . . in talking
about our client’s plea for sympathy from if jury, that she was
essentially asking that they feel sympathetic to her and not find her
guilty of the much more serious crime.
At that point, we believe this crossed a line into a pretty clear
reference to punishment and that the jury should be taking some
consideration of what level of offense their verdict might be and
whether or not it’s a serious enough crime instead of just simply what
the facts are.
We instruct them that they have nothing to do with
punishment, and that suggestion by the State injects a consideration
for punishment.
We believe a mistrial is the only remedy. This is not
something that we can add some more specific curative instruction.
Again, we’re aware as always the jury is instructed as they are in
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Instruction No. 6. This is simply something for which the Court has
no choice but to declare a mistrial.
And, also, again, the record will reflect that there was some
language used that our client was asking the jury for mercy, which,
again, is an implication toward punishment and that they have
something to do with punishment in this case when they decide on a
verdict.
The prosecutor responded:
I don’t deny making the statements that I made. I think the
discussion of lesser-included offenses is not inappropriate. That is
essentially what the defense is going to be asking for.
There was no discussion of how long or what the punishment
was, which I didn’t do. I just pointed out that voluntary manslaughter
was four crimes down. I did not intend to, nor do I think the jury
inferred anything about what the punishments would be except they
would be, since it’s a lesser crime, less serious. And I don’t think
there’s anything inappropriate or prejudicial about those arguments
especially given the posture of this case starting off with the
defense’s essential appeal to some sort of manslaughter.
The court noted the jury was instructed it had nothing to do with punishment and
that closing arguments were not evidence. The court denied Boat’s motion, ruling
in part:
[T]he instructions are replete with the use of the words lesser-
included offenses, beginning at Instruction No. 1. The Court instructs
the jury that the Trial Information embraces the lesser-included
offenses and each is listed thereafter.
Obviously each marshaling instruction for the lesser-included
offense described the offense as a lesser-included offense and if not
proven should lead the jury to the next.
The Court cannot conclude or find that a reasonable juror
under these circumstances would be misled into believing despite
the instruction they have no role in punishment, that somehow
they're asked to [mete] out punishment by choosing a more severe
charge as opposed to a . . . lesser-included offense.
Moreover, the Court can’t conclude that a reasonable juror
would interpret [the prosecutor’s] argument in anticipation of
Defense’s request to find the defendant in a more favorable light as
somehow inappropriate . . . .
15
Boat argues the prosecutor’s repeated mention of “lesser” offenses and
emphasizing how “far down” manslaughter was constituted an impermissible
reference to punishment. See State v. Hatter, 381 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Iowa Ct. App.
1985) (“Penalties have nothing to do with the factual determination that a
defendant did or did not commit a crime.”). She also argues that directing the jury
to reject “mercy” improperly encouraged the jury to find her guilty of the harshest
crime to impose the harshest punishment. From its standpoint, the State
emphasizes it was a fair comment to respond to Boat’s own argument that the jury
consider one of the lesser-included offenses.
Boat has not pointed to any authority that holds it is improper for the
prosecutor to refer to a crimes or charge as a “lesser included” of another. And,
as the district court noted, the jury was introduced to the idea that manslaughter
was “lesser” than murder before the prosecutor’s closing argument. Plus, we note
that at the agreement of the parties, the jury was given the verdict form to consider
during closing arguments, which explains a number of references to how far
“down” the list some charges were from others—the prosecutor seems to have
been literally referencing the distance between two crimes as laid out in list form
on sheets of paper.
Like the district court, we do not understand the prosecutor’s reference to
“lesser” crimes as an implicit invocation of punishment. And the prosecutor’s
discussion of mercy was in response to Boat’s opening statement that she was at
most guilty of manslaughter instead of murder and she was “devastated” and
“heartbroken” after her husband left. See Coleman, 907 N.W.2d at 140
(recognizing the prosecutor is allowed “to make statements aimed at the theory of
16
the defense”); see also Wycoff v. State, 382 N.W.2d 462, 468 (Iowa 1986) (“We
allow a prosecutor ‘some leeway when his remarks are provoked and are offered
in retaliation to arguments for the accused.’” (quoting State v. Wright, 309 N.W.2d
891, 893 (Iowa 1981))).
The prosecutor’s statements were fair comments on the instructions and
the defense’s arguments; the prosecutor committed no error. For that reason, we
need not consider whether Boat established prejudice based on the complained-
of comments. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion
for mistrial.
C. Sentencing
Finally, Boat argues the district court improperly considered her assets that
were not subject to execution in determining her reasonable ability to pay category
“B” restitution. “We review restitution orders for correction of errors at law.” State
v. Waigand, 953 N.W.2d 689, 694 (Iowa 2021) (quoting State v. Jenkins, 788
N.W.2d 640, 642 (Iowa 2010)). “When reviewing a restitution order, ‘we determine
whether the court’s findings lack substantial evidentiary support, or whether the
court has not properly applied the law.’” State v. Klawonn, 688 N.W.2d 271, 274
(Iowa 2004) (citation omitted).
To successfully challenge her reasonable ability to pay, Boat “must
affirmatively prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the offender is unable
to reasonably make payments toward the full amount of category ‘B’ restitution.”
Iowa Code § 910.2A(2)(a) (2021). As part of her challenge, Boat was required to
complete a financial affidavit. See id. § 910.2A(2)(b). This financial affidavit must
include “the offender’s income, physical and mental health, age, education,
17
employment, inheritance, other debts, other amounts of restitution owed, family
circumstances, and any assets subject to execution . . . .” Id. § 910.1(4) (emphasis
added). Boat submitted an affidavit that included five pages of handwritten lists of
her assets, which included things like clothing, household goods, vehicles, and
medical supplies.
The district court noted the State asked that Boat pay $6673.65 in category
“B” restitution. Relying on Boat’s submitted affidavit, the court concluded that she
had “a sole or marital interest in . . . approximately $143,250.00” of assets.”5 The
court concluded that, while Boat was sentenced to life in prison and was not
employed, she had the ability to pay the $6673.65 in category “B” restitution.
Here on appeal, Boat maintains the court misapplied the law in determining
her reasonable ability to pay. She asserts that the court was wrong to consider
property that was exempt from execution when determining her net assets. See
Iowa Code § 627.6 (listing categories of items a debtor may hold exempt). She
asks that we vacate the restitution portion of her sentencing and remand for further
proceedings to determine whether she had the reasonable ability to pay the
category “B” restitution.
We take the State’s view—while section 910.1(4) only required Boat to
include in her financial affidavit assets that are subject to execution, nothing in the
statute prevented Boat from including additional assets or restricted the district
court from considering them. Rather, the district court was to make its
5 The court took the value of the property Boat provided ($296,250) and subtracted
her debts ($153,000), which included the amount owed to Mondabough’s estate,
to reach the amount of $143,250.
18
determination “[b]ased on the evidence offered at the hearing, including but not
limited to the financial affidavit . . . .” Id. § 910.2A(2)(d). Notably, Boat does not
argue that all of the assets listed were exempt from execution, and, while some
items listed might be, there were assets considered that were not. See id. § 627.6.
As an additional consideration, the district court mentioned that Boat’s husband
might have an equal or greater claim to the assets but that Boat could apply to
make installment payments over time. The district court did not err in considering
all of the information it was provided in Boat’s financial affidavit, and we affirm its
determination of Boat’s reasonable ability to pay category “B” restitution.
III. Conclusion
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Boat’s motion to
strike a potential juror for cause or in denying her motion for mistrial based on
prosecutorial error. The court also did not err in considering Boat’s assets that are
exempt from execution when determining her reasonable ability to pay category
“B” restitution.
AFFIRMED.