State of Iowa v. Donnell E. Thomas ( 2024 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-0530
Filed June 5, 2024
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DONNELL E. THOMAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Plymouth County, Steven J.
Andreasen, Judge.
Donnell Thomas appeals his convictions for possession of a firearm by a
felon, operating while intoxicated, and possession of marijuana. CONVICTIONS
AFFIRMED; SENTENCES VACATED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Ella M. Newell, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joshua A. Duden, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ.
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BOWER, Chief Judge.
Donnelle Thomas appeals, claiming his right to a speedy trial was violated.
He further alleges there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty of possession
of a firearm by a felon and possession of marijuana. Finally, he claims the district
court considered an impermissible factor during sentencing and failed to state
sufficient reasons from imposing consecutive sentences. We find Thomas’s claims
of a speedy trial violation and insufficient evidence to be without merit. However,
both parties agree the sentencing procedure was flawed, and this case should be
remanded for resentencing. We, therefore, affirm Thomas’s convictions, vacate
the sentencing order, and remand for resentencing.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On March 24, 2022, Thomas went on a road trip to Minnesota from Omaha,
Nebraska. He was accompanied by his friend, his friend’s girlfriend, and her sister.
During the drive, marijuana was smoked in the vehicle. At some point, Thomas
agreed to drive the sister back to Sioux City, Iowa, and the pair stopped at a hotel.
Before going to bed, Thomas bought a large bottle of wine and proceeded to drink
the entirety of it himself. Thomas finished the bottle around 2:30 or 3:00 a.m. on
March 25, 2022.
About five hours later, between 7:30 and 8:00 a.m., Thomas and the sister
resumed their drive to Sioux City. The pair drove for over three hours before
arriving in LeMars, Iowa. After stopping at a red light, Thomas put the car in park
and fell asleep.
Off-duty deputy Pat Heissel noticed Thomas’s van parked halfway up onto
the curb and halfway into the lane of traffic. Deputy Heissel pulled up behind the
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vehicle and approached the driver’s side window. He saw Thomas and a female
passenger appeared to be sleeping. Deputy Heissel called the non-emergency
number and tapped on the window of the van to get the attention of the driver.
Once Thomas awoke, he informed Deputy Heissel he was going to Sioux City, and
he had been driving for some time. Meanwile, LeMars police officer Jacob
Bergman arrived. Thomas told Officer Bergman he was tired and was attempting
to pull off the road to sleep.
While speaking with Thomas, Officer Bergman believed Thomas was
intoxicated based on Thomas’s “red and bloodshot and watery” eyes and the odor
of alcohol emanating from him. Thomas admitted he drank a bottle of wine the
night before. Officer Bergman conducted field sobriety tests to determine whether
Thomas was operating while intoxicated. Thomas failed each of the three standard
field sobriety tests and was arrested and transported to the Plymouth County Jail
where he provided a breath test resulting in a blood alcohol concentration of 0.110.
Following his arrest, officers inventoried Thomas’s car prior to it being impounded.
During the search of Thomas’s car, officers discovered a loaded .44 caliber
magnum handgun, marijuana, and “the remnant ‘roaches’ of marijuana ‘joints’”
inside the van. The smell of burnt marijuana was also prevalent in the car.
According to the police, the loaded handgun was located under the driver’s seat,
where it would have been easily accessible to the driver, observable from where it
was in the car, and was easily identifiable even before picking it up. A substance
found in a plastic bag in the front center console tested positive for marijuana. The
bag containing alleged “roaches” was not tested.
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Thomas initially acknowledged the gun belonged to him, but he later
testified it belonged to a friend and he was unaware it was in the vehicle. Thomas
admitted he smoked marijuana prior to being stopped but testified he did not
believe there was any marijuana in his vehicle since leaving Minnesota.
Thomas was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon; possession
of ammunition by a felon; operating while intoxicated—first offense; and
possession of marijuana—first offense. Counts one and two were enhanced as
Thomas was a habitual offender under Iowa Code section 902.8 (2022). In
June 2022, Thomas failed to appear for a pretrial hearing and a warrant was
issued. In August, the warrant was recalled when Thomas appeared for a bond
forfeiture hearing. On September 19, 2022, Thomas filed two motions to dismiss,
claiming his right to a speedy trial was violated. Both motions were denied. The
State dismissed count II, possession of ammunition by a felon. After a three-day
jury trial, Thomas was convicted of all counts. Thomas was sentenced to an
indeterminate fifteen-year suspended prison term on count I, and sixty days, all but
ten days suspended, in jail on counts III and IV, set to run consecutively.
Additionally, Thomas was fined $1250 with a fifteen percent surcharge for count III
and $430 with a fifteen percent surcharge for count IV. The court suspended the
fine for count I. Thomas appeals.
II. Speedy Trial
Thomas claims his right to a speedy trial was violated. We review Thomas’s
claim the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on speedy trial
grounds for an abuse of discretion. State v. Winters, 690 N.W.2d 903, 907 (Iowa
2005). “When speedy trial grounds are at issue, however, the discretion given to
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the district court narrows.” Id. “Statutes and rules implementing the right to a
speedy trial receive a liberal construction, designed to effectuate their purpose of
protecting citizens’ liberty.” State v. Taylor, 881 N.W.2d 72, 76 (Iowa 2016)
(internal marks and citation omitted).
A defendant “must be brought to trial within [ninety] days after indictment is
found or the court must order the indictment be dismissed unless good cause on
the contrary is shown.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.33(2)(b). The case must be dismissed
unless at least one of three things has occurred: (1) the defendant has waived his
right to a speedy trial; (2) the delay is attributable to the defendant; or (3) there is
good cause for the delay. See, e.g., State v. Hamilton, 309 N.W.2d 471, 475 (Iowa
1981) (addressing waiver of delay); State v. Peterson, 288 N.W.2d 332, 335 (Iowa
1980) (holding the State established good cause for delay); State v. Ege, 274
N.W.2d 350, 354–55 (Iowa 1979) (finding delay attributable to the defendant).
Thomas asserts the State failed to prove one of the three exceptions to his
speedy trial right applied and therefore his convictions should be vacated and
remanded to the district court for dismissal.
The State counters good cause existed for the delay as Thomas left Iowa,
returned to Nebraska after pleading not guilty, and then failed to appear in court.
The district court determined good cause existed for the delay, referencing the
COVID-19 pandemic and “abnormal and persistent scheduling issues from priority
criminal cases.” The court also noted “Mr. Thomas has not been in custody since
posting bond shortly after [the] trial information was filed or shortly after his arrest
and prior to that initial 90-day deadline with the recall of the prior warrant. He has
remained out of custody throughout that entire time.” The court further noted
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“[t]here is nothing in the record to suggest that Mr. Thomas’s ability to present a
defense based upon staleness of evidence or otherwise has been affected.” We
further observe the court discussed Thomas’s failure to appear, as it implicated his
speedy trial claim, at the pretrial conference as follows:
It is this Court’s belief and conclusion that the fact that this matter
was set for trial within the 90 days and that Mr. Thomas failed to
appear for a pretrial conference in which he was ordered to
personally appear and a warrant was issued for his arrest constitutes
good cause under rule 2.33 for his case not to be tried within 90 days
after the filing of the trial information.
We find no abuse of the court’s discretion in finding there to be good cause
for the delay. We affirm the district court’s ruling.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Thomas challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
convictions for possession of a firearm by a felon and possession of marijuana.
We review sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims for correction of errors at law. State
v. Kelso-Christy, 911 N.W.2d 663, 666 (Iowa 2018). Our review is “highly
deferential to the jury’s verdict. The jury’s verdict binds th[e] court if the verdict is
supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Mong, 988 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Iowa
2023) (quoting State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 2021)). Substantial
evidence exists when the evidence “would convince a rational fact finder the
defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Meyers, 799 N.W.2d 132,
138 (Iowa 2011). “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State
and make all reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the evidence.”
State v. Hickman, 623 N.W.2d 847, 849 (Iowa 2001). This includes all “legitimate
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inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the
record evidence.” State v. Booker, 989 N.W.2d 621, 626 (Iowa 2023).
To convict Thomas of possession of a firearm by a felon, the State must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt Thomas “knowingly had a firearm in his
possession or under his dominion and control.” To convict Thomas of possession
of marijuana, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt he “knowingly or
intentionally possessed marijuana, a controlled substance.” For both offenses, the
State had to provide evidence of actual or constructive possession. The State
relied on a theory of constructive possession for both issues.
Actual possession is when the contraband is “found on the defendant’s
person.” State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336, 341 (Iowa 2021). “A person who has
direct physical control of something on or around [his][her] person is in actual
possession of it.” State v. Maghee, 573 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Iowa 1997). Constructive
possession is when the defendant has knowledge of and the authority to control
the contraband. State v. Reed, 875 N.W.2d 693, 706 (Iowa 2016); see State v.
McMullen, 940 N.W.2d 456, 462 (Iowa 2019). Constructive possession is often
proved by inferences “based on the location of the contraband and other
circumstances.” State v. Thomas, 847 N.W.2d at 443 (citing State v. Vance, 790
N.W.2d 775, 784 (Iowa 2010)). But more than mere proximity to the contraband
is required to show dominion over it. Reed, 875 N.W.2d 693, 705–06. When the
defendant does not exclusively possess the place where the contraband is found,
more evidence of possession is needed. State v. Kern, 831 N.W.2d 149, 161 (Iowa
2013).
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Courts will consider several nonexclusive factors when determining whether
the defendant possessed the contraband, including any incriminating statements
or actions made by the defendant, any fingerprints recovered, and any other
circumstances linking the defendant to the illegal items. Id. at 161. Additionally,
in motor vehicle cases, courts may also consider factors like plain view, the
contraband’s proximity to the defendant’s personal effects, the location of the
contraband, ownership of the vehicle, and any other suspicious activity on the
defendant’s part. State v. Gore, No. 21-1692, 2023 WL 152559, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct.
App. Jan. 11, 2023) (quoting State v. Kemp, 688 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Iowa 2004)).
“Even if some of these facts are present, we are still required to determine whether
all of the facts and circumstances . . . allow a reasonable inference that the
defendant knew of the drugs’ presence and had control and dominion over the
contraband.” Id.Thomas argues there is insufficient evidence to prove he knowingly
possessed a firearm or marijuana. Thomas claims he did not have knowledge of
the firearm’s presence in his vehicle. Thomas also argues there was no testimony
regarding whether the marijuana was found with his personal effects or if his
passenger had any of her belongings in the front center console. He asserts there
was insufficient evidence to show he had possession of a firearm and marijuana
and his conviction should therefore be overturned.
The State counters by offering up his incriminating statements and evidence
of the location of the contraband. Thomas told Officer Bergman that “the gun in
the vehicle belong[ed] to him,” and “he [had] several other weapons, other guns
just the same as th[e] one found in his car.” The State reasons Thomas’s
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statements allowed the jury to fairly infer he exercised dominion over the firearm.
Regarding the marijuana, the State claims the drugs were discovered in the center
console within Thomas’s reach while driving and Thomas testified he knew there
was marijuana in the car, despite claiming he had not used marijuana in years.
From this, a jury could reasonably infer the illegal drugs belonged exclusively to
Thomas.
We also conclude there was sufficient evidence to support Thomas’s
convictions in both regards. Thomas admitted to the officers there was a gun in
the vehicle in initial interviews. The marijuana and gun were found in a van
belonging exclusively to Thomas. He had knowledge both items had been in his
van when he first began his trip. All items were found in areas Thomas would have
had direct access to at all times during the trip. Accordingly, we affirm.
IV. Sentencing Discretion
Thomas argues the district court relied on an improper factor—credit for
time served for parole eligibility—when issuing his sentence. He claims the district
court arrived at its sentence to minimize the extent of the credit given to him should
his probation be revoked. We review challenges to a sentence for correction of
errors at law. State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002).
“A sentence will not be upset on appellate review unless the defendant
demonstrates an abuse of trial court discretion or a defect in the sentencing
procedure such as the trial court’s consideration of impermissible factors.” State
v. Witham, 583 N.W.2d 677, 678 (Iowa 1998). When suspending a sentence,
however, courts consider a multitude of factors not limited to a defendant’s age,
criminal history, employment, family circumstances, mental-health and substance-
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use history, the nature of the offense, and “[s]uch other factors as are appropriate.”
Iowa Code § 907.5. A court is tasked with providing a sentence for “maximum
opportunity for the rehabilitation of the defendant, and for the protection of the
community from further offenses by the defendant and others.” See id. § 901.5.
At sentencing, the district court stated:
[A]lso in regard to the consecutive nature of these sentences, part of
that is based upon the fact that the sentence under Count 1 is being
suspended. The Court believes that it is appropriate in this case given that
Mr. Thomas’s prior record that if he is unsuccessful on probation and if the
probation were to be revoked in the future and that prison term imposed,
that having these counts run consecutive so that it would minimize the
extent of credit given to Mr. Thomas would be appropriate.
Thomas reasons this statement by the court demonstrated that it considered how
much time he served when imposing his sentence and fashioned a sentence to
increase the amount of time he would spend in prison.
Thomas alleges the district court further abused its discretion by failing to
explain why it imposed a consecutive sentence beyond the mere fact there were
“separate and distinct crimes.” Trial courts must state on the record their reasoning
for imposing a particular sentence. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(3)(d). Further, the court
must provide specific reasoning for why it chose to impose consecutive sentences
as opposed to concurrent sentences. State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d 269, 275 (Iowa
2016). Thomas contends the court failed to illuminate its specific reasons for why
the consecutive sentences were warranted.
The State concedes the district court referenced credit for time served for
parole eligibility when imposing Thomas’s sentence. It admits this qualifies as an
improper factor for consideration by the district court. Therefore, we need not
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address the merits of Thomas’s claim relating to consecutive sentences; we vacate
the sentences and remand for resentencing.
CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCES VACATED AND REMANDED
FOR RESENTENCING.