State of Iowa v. Mason Daniel Hampton ( 2023 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-0375
Filed December 6, 2023
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MASON DANIEL HAMPTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Jesse Ramirez, District
Associate Judge.
Mason Daniel Hampton appeals his conviction of operating while
intoxicated. AFFIRMED.
Billy J. Mallory and Trevor A. Jordison of Mallory Law, West Des Moines,
for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ.
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CHICCHELLY, Judge.
Mason Daniel Hampton appeals his conviction of operating while
intoxicated, challenging the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress
evidence obtained as a result of a traffic stop.
The night of September 18, 2022, Iowa State Patrol Trooper Ratzesberger
stopped a vehicle driven by Hampton for speeding. Based on Hampton’s license,
Trooper Ratzesberger determined Hampton was required to have an ignition
interlock device installed in the car and carry necessary paperwork but lacked both.
Trooper Ratzesberger could also smell “an odor of alcohol” emitting from the
vehicle, but he could not determine if the source was Hampton, the passenger, or
something else. He asked Hampton to join him in his squad car, and Hampton
followed him. Trooper Ratzesberger testified that Hampton had bloodshot, droopy
eyes and the smell of alcohol was so strong in the patrol vehicle that he had to roll
down the window for fresh air. When asked, Hampton declined to perform field
sobriety tests, but he agreed to provide a blood alcohol concentration (BAC)
sample “at the station.” He eventually blew a .131 BAC and was charged with
operating while intoxicated, second offense.
During the proceedings, Hampton moved to suppress the evidence
resulting from the traffic stop, claiming it was obtained in violation of his federal
and state constitutional rights. After a hearing on the motion, the district court
denied it based on clear Iowa precedent. Following a trial on the minutes, the
district court ultimately convicted Hampton. He timely appealed.
“When a defendant challenges a district court’s denial of a motion to
suppress based upon the deprivation of a state or federal constitutional right, our
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standard of review is de novo.” State v. Fogg, 936 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Iowa 2019)
(citations omitted). “We give deference to the district court’s fact findings due to
its opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses, but we are not bound by
those findings.” State v. Storm, 898 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Iowa 2017) (citation
omitted).
Hampton challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress on
constitutional grounds. While he acknowledges the officer’s actions were proper
under the federal constitution, he argues we should adopt a more stringent
standard under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution that requires the officer
to have reasonable suspicion of safety concerns before ordering a defendant out
of a motor vehicle. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6 (1977)
(holding “that once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation,
the police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating
the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures”).
But we have previously rejected this heightened standard. State v. Hanrahan,
No. 12-0012, 2013 WL 4009675, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2013) (concluding
“the trooper acted well within constitutional bounds in escorting [the defendant] to
his squad car and engaging him in conversation while typing a warning ticket”).
Moreover, “[b]ecause our supreme court has remained consistent with federal
jurisprudence . . . , we will not deviate from the course.” State v. Wenzel, 987
N.W.2d 473, 486 (Iowa Ct. App. 2022). We therefore decline to adopt an
alternative view at this time.
Hampton further contends that Trooper Ratzesberger violated his
constitutional rights because he lacked reasonable suspicion when ordering him
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out of the car. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Iowa Const. art. I, § 8. But we disagree
with Hampton’s recollection of the record. Upon our review, we find no violation of
rights because Hampton voluntarily consented. See State v. Lowe, 812 N.W.2d
554, 572 (Iowa 2012); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219
(1973). Trooper Ratzesberger asked Hampton to join him in the squad car, and
Hampton accepted. To the extent Hampton intends to argue he was coerced or
did not voluntarily consent to going to the officer’s squad car, we find his argument
waived and decline to consider it because he provides no supporting argument.
See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(3) (waiving issues inadequately argued on
appeal).
Because the officer did not violate Hampton’s constitutional rights, we affirm
the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.