In the Matter of the Guardianship and Conservatorship of Lori Feistner ( 2018 )


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  •                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 17-2108
    Filed October 10, 2018
    IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP AND CONSERVATORSHIP OF
    LORI FEISTNER,
    Ward-Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Peter A. Keller, Judge.
    Lori Feistner appeals from an order establishing an involuntary
    guardianship and conservatorship.       REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH
    INSTRUCTIONS.
    Daniel M. Northfield, Urbandale, for appellant.
    Kenneth Michael Steffen, Moline, pro se guardian/conservator.
    Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
    2
    MCDONALD, Judge.
    This case arises out of the appointment of a guardian and conservator for
    Lori Feistner. On appeal, Feistner contends the district court erred in appointing
    her a guardian and conservator.
    The petitioner in this case is Lori’s brother, Kenneth (Mike) Steffen. Steffen
    filed this petition for guardianship and conservatorship because of his concern for
    his sister’s well-being. At the time of trial, Feistner was fifty-six years old. She was
    married to her husband of twenty-six years, Roger Feistner. However, Roger was
    in the process of seeking a divorce due to Feistner’s erratic and aggressive
    behavior. Roger had communicated his intent to seek a divorce to Feistner and to
    Steffen. Steffen testified he sought the guardianship and conservatorship primarily
    to help Feistner transition during the period of divorce and help her with her
    financial situation.
    Feistner’s erratic and aggressive behavior is a symptom of her mental-
    health condition. Approximately fifteen years prior to trial, Feistner begin to display
    symptoms of mental illness. Her symptoms increased over time, including mania
    that would keep her up at nights and result in aggressive or confrontational
    behavior toward others. Eventually, Feistner was diagnosed with bipolar, type I,
    disorder. She was prescribed medication for her condition, but she frequently
    failed to take her prescribed medication because of the way it made her feel and
    its adverse side effects, including weight gain. In the decade prior to trial, Feistner
    had been civilly committed on six occasions. The duration of her commitments
    ranged from several days to several weeks.
    3
    Our review of this case is for the correction of legal error. See 
    Iowa Code § 633.555
     (2017) (providing actions shall be triable at law); In re Conservatorship
    of Leonard, 
    563 N.W.2d 193
    , 195 (Iowa 1997) (stating conservatorship actions are
    reviewed for errors at law); In re Guardianship of S.K.M., No. 16-1537, 
    2017 WL 5185427
    , at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2017) (concluding guardianship proceedings
    are reviewed for errors at law). The district court’s findings are binding on us if
    supported by substantial evidence. See Leonard, 
    563 N.W.2d at 195
    . Evidence
    is substantial if a reasonable person “would accept it as adequate to reach the
    same findings.” In re Conservatorship of Deremiah, 
    477 N.W.2d 691
    , 693 (Iowa
    Ct. App. 1991). We note the district court in this case made no specific findings of
    fact on any of the issues. Instead, the district court stated it reviewed the evidence
    and found “by clear and convincing evidence that the allegations of the said
    Petition are true and material and have been fully sustained by the evidence
    offered.”
    The petitioner has the burden of proving the guardianship and/or
    conservatorship is necessary and must do so by clear and convincing evidence.
    See 
    Iowa Code § 633.551
    (1), (2). “Clear and convincing evidence is more than a
    preponderance of the evidence and less than evidence beyond a reasonable
    doubt.” In re L.G., 
    532 N.W.2d 478
    , 481 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). “It is the highest
    evidentiary burden in civil cases.” In re M.S., 
    889 N.W.2d 675
    , 679 (Iowa Ct. App.
    2016).      “It means there must be no serious or substantial doubt about the
    correctness of a particular conclusion drawn from the evidence.” 
    Id.
     Because of
    the ward’s significant interest in managing her own affairs, we cannot merely
    rubber stamp what has come before; it is our task as a court of review to ensure
    4
    the petitioner came forth with the quantum and quality of evidence necessary to
    prove his case. Cf. In re Guardianship of Hedin, 
    528 N.W.2d 567
    , 573 (Iowa 1995)
    (“Recently, several courts have agreed with commentators that a guardianship
    ‘involves significant loss of liberty similar to that present in an involuntary civil
    commitment for treatment of mental illness.’” (quoting In re Guardianship of Reyes,
    
    731 P.2d 130
    ,131 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986)).
    We first address the question of whether the petitioner proved the grounds
    necessary to establish an involuntary guardianship. The district court may
    establish an involuntary guardianship for an adult “whose decision-making
    capacity is so impaired that the person is unable to care for the person’s personal
    safety or to attend to or provide for necessities for the person such as food, shelter,
    clothing, or medical care, without which physical injury or illness might occur.”
    
    Iowa Code § 633.552
    (2)(a); accord Hedin, 526 N.W.2d at 581. This requires
    evidence
    showing that the ward or proposed ward is unable to think or act for
    himself or herself as to matters concerning the ward’s personal
    health, safety, and general welfare. In addition, the district court’s
    findings of fact based upon this evidence should support the powers
    conferred on the guardian. These powers should be articulated as
    clearly as each case permits.
    Id. at 579 (altered for readability).
    Steffen failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence a guardianship is
    necessary. Feistner suffers from bipolar disorder. Her disorder causes her to be
    manic and to be aggressive and confrontational with others. However, there is no
    evidence her capacity to make decisions is so impaired that she poses a risk of
    harm to herself. See 
    Iowa Code § 633.552
    (2)(a); Hedin, 526 N.W.2d at 581.
    5
    Indeed, the record is to the contrary. Feistner testified she could provide for herself
    and live on her own. She has a full-time job in a call center assisting in-bound
    callers. She has a car and a driver’s license. She does not have any thoughts of
    suicidal ideation or self-harm. Roger testified Feistner could live alone: “I think
    she could live alone. I think she could function on her own.” Steffen testified
    Feistner can perform the five major activities of daily living—bathing, dressing,
    transferring (movement and mobility), toileting, and eating. He testified, “She could
    function on her own.” He testified Feistner was smart, can and should be able to
    vote on her own, and can and should make a decision to remarry. In sum, there
    is no evidence establishing Feistner’s decision-making capacity is so impaired that
    she presents a risk of physical harm to herself.            The establishment of the
    guardianship was in error. See In re Guardianship and Conservatorship of Teeter,
    
    537 N.W.2d 808
    , 810 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (“The liberty interests as well as the
    stigma in being defined as an incapacitated person require before there be a
    determination of whether an adult can make responsible decisions with regard to
    his or her safety or property, there must first be a finding his or her decision-making
    process is so impaired he or she is not able to care for his or her own personal
    safety and is not able to provide necessities of life.”).
    We next address the establishment of the involuntary conservatorship. The
    district court may establish an involuntary conservatorship only upon clear and
    convincing evidence that the proposed ward’s “decision-making capacity is so
    impaired that the person is unable to make, communicate, or carry out important
    decisions concerning the person’s financial affairs.”              See 
    Iowa Code § 633.566
    (2)(a).
    6
    As with the guardianship, Steffen failed to prove by clear and convincing
    evidence the need for a conservatorship. Steffen testified his primary motivation
    for establishing a guardianship or conservatorship was his concern for Feistner’s
    ability to manage her finances after the divorce. He noted Roger managed the
    couple’s finances during the marriage so Feistner had little experience. Steffen’s
    concern is insufficient evidence to establish a guardianship.             See In re
    Guardianship of F.W. Jr., No. 11-1574, 
    2012 WL 5355801
    , at *7 (Iowa Ct. App.
    Oct. 31, 2012) (noting people may handle their finances in different ways without
    justifying a conservatorship); Teeter, 
    537 N.W.2d at 810
     (concluding foolish
    spending alone is not sufficient to demonstrate incompetency).          There is no
    evidence Feistner’s decision-making capacity is so impaired that she cannot
    manage her financial affairs. The evidence is actually to the contrary. There is no
    evidence of any past financial mismanagement. Cf. In re Guardianship of Evans,
    No. 16-2192, 
    2017 WL 4570438
    , at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2017) (finding ward’s
    inability “to make and carry out important financial decisions regarding her financial
    affairs,” as demonstrated by her history of sharing her debit card; ignorance of her
    bills and payment procedures; and inability to consistently pay her rent, supported
    the establishment of a conservatorship).
    There is no evidence from which one could infer a future inability to manage
    her affairs. As noted above, Feistner has a full-time position in a call center
    assisting in-bound callers. She has managed her own checking account for four
    decades. Her trial testimony made clear she understood her finances. She
    explained how she intended to use her property settlement in the impending
    divorce to purchase a condominium for herself because she did not want to pay
    7
    rent. She appeared knowledgeable regarding the expenses associated with daily
    living, including food, transportation, and tax expenses and how she would need
    to work to pay those items.
    In sum, there is not clear and convincing evidence nor a factual finding that
    the proposed ward had impaired decision-making capacity and the need for an
    involuntary guardianship or conservatorship. The district court erred in concluding
    otherwise. We remand this matter for entry of an order dismissing the petition.
    See, e.g., Leonard, 
    563 N.W.2d at 196
     (concluding “there was neither evidence
    nor a court finding that the [ward’s] decision-making process to handle his own
    financial affairs was impaired according to the Hedin standard” and reversing and
    remanding with instructions to dismiss the petition); Teeter, 
    537 N.W.2d at 810
    (reversing and dismissing).
    REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.