State of Iowa v. Justin James Norman ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 12-1148
Filed December 24, 2014
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JUSTIN JAMES NORMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott D. Rosenberg,
Judge.
The defendant appeals his conviction for interference with official acts.
AFFIRMED.
Sally Frank of Drake Legal Clinic, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney
General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and David Porter, Assistant County
Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Mullins, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
2
MCDONALD, J.
Following a jury trial, Justin Norman was convicted of interference with
official acts, a simple misdemeanor, in violation of Iowa Code section 719.1
(2011). He appealed his conviction to the district court pursuant to Iowa Rule of
Criminal Procedure 2.73. The district court affirmed Norman’s conviction in a
written ruling and order. Norman successfully petitioned the supreme court for
discretionary review of his conviction. See Iowa Code § 814.6(2)(d); Iowa R.
App. P. 6.106. The supreme court transferred the case to this court for
disposition. Norman raises three challenges to his conviction. First, he contends
his conduct does not fall within the statutory prohibition, i.e., there is insufficient
evidence to support his conviction. Second, he contends the district court erred
in denying his motion to produce. Finally, he contends his speedy trial rights
were violated.
Norman advanced the same claims he advances now in his appeal to the
district court, and we agree with the district court’s disposition of Norman’s
claims. In sum, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, there is
substantial evidence in support of the conviction. See State v. Thomas, 561
N.W.2d 37, 39 (Iowa 1997) (“If a rational trier of fact could conceivably find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the evidence is substantial.”).
Specifically, police officers testified Norman stood with a camera in very close
physical proximity to them during their investigation of a traffic stop of someone
else despite their repeated requests to back up, and Norman thereby created a
safety concern and distraction that hindered their investigation of the traffic stop.
3
See State v. Buchanan, 549 N.W.2d 291, 294 (Iowa 1996) (“The purpose of
criminalizing conduct that interferes with official police action is to enable officers
to execute their peace-keeping duties calmly, efficiently, and without
hindrance. . . . The only question should be whether the officer’s acts were
hindered.”). Second, the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in denying
Norman’s overbroad motion to produce in a simple misdemeanor case in which
discovery is limited. See Jones v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 620 N.W.2d 242, 243-44 (Iowa
2000). Finally, Norman’s concedes his speedy-trial argument is foreclosed by
City of Des Moines v. Elliott, 267 N.W.2d 44, 46 (Iowa 1978), which holds the
speedy-trial right is inapplicable to simple misdemeanor cases. Norman also
concedes this court is not at liberty to overturn supreme court precedent. See
State v. Hastings, 466 N.W.2d 697, 700 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (noting the court of
appeals is not at liberty to overrule supreme court precedent).
Norman’s conviction is affirmed without further opinion. See Iowa Ct. R.
21.26(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), and (e).
AFFIRMED.