In re the Marriage of Eckard ( 2024 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-0019
Filed October 30, 2024
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF BRITTNEY R. CHAPMAN
AND JEREMY R. ECKARD
Upon the Petition of
BRITTNEY R. CHAPMAN ECKARD, n/k/a BRITTNEY R. CHAPMAN,
Petitioner-Appellee,
And Concerning
JEREMY R. ECKARD,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dickinson County, Carl J. Petersen,
Judge.
The respondent challenges provisions in the parties’ dissolution decree.
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.
Edward W. Bjornstad of Bjornstad Law Office, Spirit Lake, for appellant.
Matthew T.E. Early of Matthew Early Law Office, Spirit Lake, for appellee.
Considered by Tabor, C.J., Langholz, J., and Potterfield, S.J.* Sandy, J.,
takes no part.
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2024).
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POTTERFIELD, Senior Judge.
Jeremy Eckard appeals the decree dissolving his marriage to Brittney
Chapman (formerly Brittney Chapman Eckard). Jeremy challenges the property
distribution, the specifics of the “right of first refusal” provided in the decree, and
the court’s order regarding uncovered medical expenses for the parties’ two
children. Brittney asks that we affirm the decree and order Jeremy to pay $5000
of her appellate attorney fees. “We review dissolution cases de novo.” In re
Marriage of Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 242, 247 (Iowa 2006).
I. Property Distribution.
After identifying the parties’ marital property, determining the values, and
assigning the property to one party or the other, the court determined that Brittney
was receiving $33,042 worth of marital property while Jeremy received $112,644.
Dividing the difference in half, the court ordered Jeremy to pay Brittney $39,801 as
an equalization payment. Here, Jeremy challenges the property division, arguing
the district court should have (1) used the certified appraisal to determine the value
of the family home and (2) divided Brittney’s pension pursuant to the Benson
formula1 rather than placing the “refund value”2 as an asset on Brittney’s side of
the ledger.
1 In re Marriage of Benson, 545 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Iowa 1996) (providing a formula
to divide a defined benefit plan for the purposes of marital property settlement,
which considers the percentage of the pension attributable to the parties’ joint
marital efforts).
2 See Iowa Code § 97B.53 (2023) (providing “refund options” following termination
of employment by IPERS members).
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A. Home Value.
At trial, Jeremy introduced evidence of a certified appraisal conducted on
the family home, which gave $310,000 as the value of the home. Brittney
introduced an evaluation completed by a local realtor who visited the property,
which gave $342,250 as the home’s value. The district court concluded both
“appear[ed] to be reasonable” and averaged the two to reach its own value for the
purpose of the property distribution—$326,125. Jeremy contests this value,
broadly arguing that a certified appraisal should receive more evidentiary weight
than a “suggested list price” provided by a realtor.
“Ordinarily, a trial court’s valuation will not be disturbed when it is within the
range of permissible evidence.” In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 703
(Iowa 2007). “Although our review is de novo, we ordinarily defer to the trial court
when valuations are accompanied by supporting credibility findings or
corroborating evidence.” Id. While Jeremy suggests the type of evidence he
introduced is more worthy of being relied upon, like the district court we think both
valuations are reasonable. Determining a property’s fair and reasonable value is
not an exact science—valuation is in the realm of opinion. See Naumann v. Iowa
Prop. Assessment Appeal Bd., 791 N.W.2d 258, 262 (Iowa 2010) (discussing
property valuations by a county board of assessment). And here, both the
appraiser and the realtor used comparable sales in the area to reach a value and
even used some of the same sales in making their determinations. And each
provided a report that supported the value they determined was appropriate.
Because the value determined by the district court is within the permissible
range of the evidence presented at trial, we will not disturb it.
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B. Brittney’s IPERS.
Next, Jermey argues that Brittney’s IPERS pension should have been
divided according to the Benson formula rather than awarding Brittney the refund
value of $20,460 as an asset in the property distribution. We recognize “it is
normally desirable to divide a defined-benefit plan,” as IPERS is, “by using the
percentage method,” i.e. the Benson formula. Sullins, 715 N.W.2d at 248–49.
But here, the parties included the IPERS account in their pretrial stipulation
as an asset worth $20,460 that Brittney would receive. And Jeremy confirmed this
position during his testimony, when he asked the court to “grant to Brittney all of
her IPERS.” After the court did as requested, Jeremy filed a motion to enlarge,
wherein he wrongly claimed, “The Court failed to include Brittney’s IPERS
contained on the pretrial stipulation as part of the settlement calculation.” Jeremy
did not advocate that the pension should be divided by the percentage method.
Jeremy cannot now take a position on appeal that is different than the
position he took at the district court. Insofar as the district court’s distribution of
Brittney’s IPERS pension was in error, Jeremy acquiesced to that error. See, e.g.,
Jasper v. State, 477 N.W.2d 852, 856 (Iowa 1991) (noting one “cannot deliberately
act so as to invite error and then object because the court has accepted the
invitation”); McCracken v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 445 N.W.2d 375, 378 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1989) (“[I]t is elementary a litigant cannot complain of error which he has
invited or to which he has assented.”). We do not consider this issue further.
II. Right of First Refusal.
Jeremy asked the district court to include in the decree a “right of first
refusal” provision or “[t]he right of a parent to be offered the opportunity to have
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[care] of a child other than during a usual [parenting] period before the other parent
turns to a third-party caregiver.” Right of First Refusal, Black’s Law Dictionary
(12th ed. 2024). Brittney agreed to the provision but asked the court to set a
minimum period, so the right of first refusal would be limited to instances when the
person with parenting time was unable to care for the children for at least four
hours. The court agreed with this limitation, putting in the decree that “the right of
first refusal for care must be based upon the parent’s absence for more than four
hours.” Jeremy challenges this limitation, arguing he should have the right of first
refusal any time Brittney is unable to provide care for the minor children.
“The ‘right of first refusal’ arises from the principle that a parent has a
fundamental interest in caring for a child.” Cook v. Noriega, No. 16-1584, 2017
WL 4315053, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2017). The primary consideration in
determining whether to grant a right of first refusal and then, if granted, in
fashioning that right, is the best interests of the children. In re Marriage of
Klemmensen, No. 14-1292, 2015 WL 2089699, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 6, 2015).
As the district court recognized, these parents have a difficult time
communicating. Removing the minimum period before the right of first refusal
takes effect would increase the amount of communication needed between the two
parties and would require more exchanges of the children. See Dirks v. Eccles,
No. 19-0994, 2020 WL 2071116, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2020) (rejecting a
right-of-first-refusal provision when it would “complicate matters and create stress
and animosity between the parties”). It could also be used by “the parties to
monitor when and why the other parent is away from the children and to manipulate
schedules to maximize parenting time instead of acting in the children’s best
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interests.” In re Marriage of Johnsen, No. 20-0779, 2021 WL 2690019, at *4 (Iowa
Ct. App. June 30, 2021); accord id. (rejecting request to modify right of first refusal
to take effect at four hours rather than twenty-four as set by the district court). This
is not in the children’s best interests. We decline to modify the right-of-first-refusal
provision.
III. Uncovered Medical Expenses.
Jeremy complains he was ordered to pay 100% of the children’s uncovered
medical expenses; he maintains the expenses should have been apportioned in
proportion to the parties’ respective incomes. See Iowa Ct. R. 9.12(5).
Here, the district court concluded the parties had nearly equal incomes, with
Brittney earning $54,423 annually and Jeremy earning $52,000. Brittney was
ordered to provide health insurance, as she had it available through her employer.
Noting the similar incomes and the award of joint physical care, the district court
concluded a deviation from the child-support guidelines was appropriate and
declined to order Jeremy to pay child support.3 Then, based on all the above, the
court concluded Jeremy would be responsible for 100% of the uncovered medical
expenses rather than apportioning them between the parents. Jeremy asked the
district court to reconsider this ruling in a post-trial motion, which the district court
denied, concluding: “The Court’s decision to not order child support, require
3 The court recognized that Jeremy would be required to pay Brittney “minimal
child support” since she provides vision, dental, and health insurance; it stated it
would file a child support guideline worksheet supporting this statement. We have
not found the court’s worksheet in the record. But a worksheet filed by Brittney
and using the correct incomes shows Jeremy would be required to pay her $156.49
each month.
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[Brittney] to pay health insurance and [Jeremy] cover the noncovered expenses
was equitable and most likely financially advantages to [Jeremy].”
Rule 9.12(5) defines “uncovered medical expenses” and provides, “In cases
of joint physical care, the parents will share all uncovered medical expenses in
proportion to the parents’ respective net incomes.” “While ‘shall’ imposes a duty,
the district court is allowed to deviate where appropriate as long as [it gives] a
written reason.” In re Marriage of Cooley, No. 20-1501, 2021 WL 4592832, at *4
(Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2021); see also In re Marriage of Friest, No. 18-0337, 2019
WL 1300881, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2019) (recognizing the district court can
deviate from the guidelines regarding uncovered medical expenses when it
justified and appropriate and the court states its reasons for the variance).
Considering all of the factors relied on by the district court, we conclude the
variance was justified and appropriate; we affirm the district court’s requirement
that Jeremy pay 100% of the uncovered medical expenses.
IV. Appellate Attorney Fees.
Brittney asks that we order Jeremy to pay $5000 of her appellate attorney
fees.
Appellate attorney fees are not a matter of right, but rather rest in this
court’s discretion. Factors to be considered in determining whether
to award attorney fees include: “the needs of the party seeking the
award, the ability of the other party to pay, and the relative merits of
the appeal.”
Sullins, 715 N.W.2d at 255 (citation omitted).
While the parties earn nearly equal salaries, Brittney has been wholly
successful in this appeal, which she was required to defend. We conclude she is
entitled to an award of some of her appellate attorney fees. “But because she has
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not provided an affidavit of attorney fees with documentation to support her
request, we remand to the district court to determine the amount of [Brittney’s]
appellate attorney fees and enter judgment against [Jeremy] in a reasonable
amount.” In re Marriage of Kisting, 6 N.W.3d 326, 338 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024).
We affirm the dissolution decree entered by the district court; we remand
for the district court to determine a reasonable award of appellate attorney fees for
Brittney.
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.