State of Iowa v. Alfred Ali Mohammad Younes ( 2024 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 23-1950
    Filed October 30, 2024
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    vs.
    ALFRED ALI MOHAMMAD YOUNES,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Jason A. Burns,
    Judge.
    A criminal defendant appeals the sentence imposed by the district court.
    AFFIRMED.
    Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, Assistant
    Appellate Defender, for appellant.
    Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Nicholas E. Siefert, Assistant Attorney
    General, for appellee.
    Considered by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ.
    2
    AHLERS, Judge.
    Alfred Younes pleaded guilty to one count of escape from custody as an
    aider and abettor, a class “D” felony, in violation of Iowa Code section 719.4(4)
    (2023). He and his wife helped their son leave the country while the son was on
    pretrial release to avoid trial on pending felony charges for attempted murder, first-
    degree robbery, and first-degree theft. The district court sentenced Younes to a
    term of imprisonment not exceeding five years and a fine. Younes appeals. He
    challenges his sentence, arguing the district court erred by relying on community
    deterrence as the only factor in determining his sentence.1
    When, as here, the sentence imposed is within statutory limits, we review
    for abuse of discretion. State v. McCollaugh, 5 N.W.3d 620, 627 (Iowa 2024). The
    decision to impose a sentence that falls within statutory limits has a strong
    presumption in its favor and will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion or
    the consideration of an improper factor. Id.
    The goals of sentencing are to “provide maximum opportunity to rehabilitate
    the defendant and to protect the community.”         Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 106.
    Sentencing courts are to consider the nature and circumstances of the offense,
    characteristics of the offender, prior criminal record, employment status, family
    circumstances, and other relevant factors that would satisfy the goals of
    1 Because Younes challenges his sentence rather than his guilty plea and the
    sentence was neither mandatory nor agreed-upon, he has established good cause
    that permits us to hear his appeal despite his guilty plea. See State v. Damme,
    
    944 N.W.2d 98
    , 100, 105 (Iowa 2020) (interpreting Iowa Code
    section 814.6(1)(a)(3)).
    3
    sentencing. 
    Id.
     But the court is not permitted to consider only a single factor.
    State v. Johnson, 
    513 N.W.2d 717
    , 719 (Iowa 1994).
    The court fulfilled its obligation here. The court explicitly considered multiple
    factors when determining the sentence by stating, “The reasons for this sentence
    are the nature and circumstances of the offense; the personal characteristics of
    yourself, Mr. Younes; the court believes that this sentence will hold you
    accountable, but more than that, serve as a deterrent for future offenses by other
    people in similar situations.” Younes argues the mention of the factors other than
    community deterrence was merely cursory.               He points to mitigating factors,
    including his education, employment history, family responsibilities, and lack of
    criminal history.
    We are not persuaded by Younes’s argument. The court received the
    presentence investigation report (PSI), to which Younes made no objection
    relevant to this appeal. The PSI included details about all the mitigating details
    Younes highlights.       We view the court’s reference to Younes’s “personal
    characteristics” as an acknowledgment of these details, even though terse. See
    State v. Thacker, 
    862 N.W.2d 402
    , 408 (Iowa 2015) (finding a “terse and succinct”
    statement sufficient “when the reasons for the exercise of discretion are obvious
    in light of the statement and the record before the court”).
    Additionally, the court noted the “nature and circumstances of the offense.”
    Younes’s written guilty plea acknowledged that the minutes of testimony were
    substantially correct insofar as necessary to provide a factual basis for his guilty
    plea. The minutes reveal that Younes’s son was charged with attempted murder
    based    on    allegations   that   he   tackled   a    woman,    strangled   her   into
    4
    unconsciousness, and stole her earrings. While the son was on supervised pre-
    trial release, Younes sold the family vehicle, rented a van, and drove the son to an
    airport where the son boarded an international flight. When questioned, Younes
    lied to the police and told them the son had been left at home and likely committed
    suicide. Soon after, Younes booked his own one-way ticket out of the country
    before being apprehended at the airport.
    Younes emphasizes that his culpability was limited to that of an aider and
    abettor in the crime of escape. While that is true, he still came up with a plan to
    aid his son, lied to law enforcement, and attempted to leave the country before his
    involvement was discovered. These were the nature and circumstances of the
    offense the court cited as one factor in arriving at Younes’s sentence.
    We understand Younes’s argument to be that the court considered
    community deterrence as the only factor in arriving at the sentence, rather than
    arguing that community deterrence was an improper factor.2 As discussed, the
    court considered the mitigating factors Younes claims it ignored and considered
    other factors in arriving at the sentence. Even though it emphasized the need for
    community deterrence in its reasoning, the court made it clear the prison sentence
    was based on the consideration of multiple sentencing factors.
    Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
    AFFIRMED.
    2 Nor could Younes persuasively argue that community deterrence is not a proper
    sentencing factor. See State v. Jones-Baker, No. 22-0105, 
    2022 WL 3072056
    ,
    at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2022) (recognizing both general and specific
    deterrence as proper sentencing factors).
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 23-1950

Filed Date: 10/30/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2024