State of Iowa v. Alfred Ali Mohammad Younes ( 2024 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-1950
Filed October 30, 2024
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ALFRED ALI MOHAMMAD YOUNES,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Jason A. Burns,
Judge.
A criminal defendant appeals the sentence imposed by the district court.
AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Nicholas E. Siefert, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ.
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AHLERS, Judge.
Alfred Younes pleaded guilty to one count of escape from custody as an
aider and abettor, a class “D” felony, in violation of Iowa Code section 719.4(4)
(2023). He and his wife helped their son leave the country while the son was on
pretrial release to avoid trial on pending felony charges for attempted murder, first-
degree robbery, and first-degree theft. The district court sentenced Younes to a
term of imprisonment not exceeding five years and a fine. Younes appeals. He
challenges his sentence, arguing the district court erred by relying on community
deterrence as the only factor in determining his sentence.1
When, as here, the sentence imposed is within statutory limits, we review
for abuse of discretion. State v. McCollaugh, 5 N.W.3d 620, 627 (Iowa 2024). The
decision to impose a sentence that falls within statutory limits has a strong
presumption in its favor and will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion or
the consideration of an improper factor. Id.
The goals of sentencing are to “provide maximum opportunity to rehabilitate
the defendant and to protect the community.” Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 106.
Sentencing courts are to consider the nature and circumstances of the offense,
characteristics of the offender, prior criminal record, employment status, family
circumstances, and other relevant factors that would satisfy the goals of
1 Because Younes challenges his sentence rather than his guilty plea and the
sentence was neither mandatory nor agreed-upon, he has established good cause
that permits us to hear his appeal despite his guilty plea. See State v. Damme,
944 N.W.2d 98, 100, 105 (Iowa 2020) (interpreting Iowa Code
section 814.6(1)(a)(3)).
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sentencing. Id. But the court is not permitted to consider only a single factor.
State v. Johnson, 513 N.W.2d 717, 719 (Iowa 1994).
The court fulfilled its obligation here. The court explicitly considered multiple
factors when determining the sentence by stating, “The reasons for this sentence
are the nature and circumstances of the offense; the personal characteristics of
yourself, Mr. Younes; the court believes that this sentence will hold you
accountable, but more than that, serve as a deterrent for future offenses by other
people in similar situations.” Younes argues the mention of the factors other than
community deterrence was merely cursory. He points to mitigating factors,
including his education, employment history, family responsibilities, and lack of
criminal history.
We are not persuaded by Younes’s argument. The court received the
presentence investigation report (PSI), to which Younes made no objection
relevant to this appeal. The PSI included details about all the mitigating details
Younes highlights. We view the court’s reference to Younes’s “personal
characteristics” as an acknowledgment of these details, even though terse. See
State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Iowa 2015) (finding a “terse and succinct”
statement sufficient “when the reasons for the exercise of discretion are obvious
in light of the statement and the record before the court”).
Additionally, the court noted the “nature and circumstances of the offense.”
Younes’s written guilty plea acknowledged that the minutes of testimony were
substantially correct insofar as necessary to provide a factual basis for his guilty
plea. The minutes reveal that Younes’s son was charged with attempted murder
based on allegations that he tackled a woman, strangled her into
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unconsciousness, and stole her earrings. While the son was on supervised pre-
trial release, Younes sold the family vehicle, rented a van, and drove the son to an
airport where the son boarded an international flight. When questioned, Younes
lied to the police and told them the son had been left at home and likely committed
suicide. Soon after, Younes booked his own one-way ticket out of the country
before being apprehended at the airport.
Younes emphasizes that his culpability was limited to that of an aider and
abettor in the crime of escape. While that is true, he still came up with a plan to
aid his son, lied to law enforcement, and attempted to leave the country before his
involvement was discovered. These were the nature and circumstances of the
offense the court cited as one factor in arriving at Younes’s sentence.
We understand Younes’s argument to be that the court considered
community deterrence as the only factor in arriving at the sentence, rather than
arguing that community deterrence was an improper factor.2 As discussed, the
court considered the mitigating factors Younes claims it ignored and considered
other factors in arriving at the sentence. Even though it emphasized the need for
community deterrence in its reasoning, the court made it clear the prison sentence
was based on the consideration of multiple sentencing factors.
Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
2 Nor could Younes persuasively argue that community deterrence is not a proper
sentencing factor. See State v. Jones-Baker, No. 22-0105, 2022 WL 3072056,
at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2022) (recognizing both general and specific
deterrence as proper sentencing factors).