Linnhaven, Inc., and Accident Fund National Insurance Company/United Heartland v. Roger Blasdell, surviving spouse of Heather Blasdell ( 2024 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-0333
Filed October 30, 2024
LINNHAVEN, INC., and ACCIDENT FUND NATIONAL INSURANCE
COMPANY/UNITED HEARTLAND,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
ROGER BLASDELL, surviving spouse of HEATHER BLASDELL,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Coleman McAllister,
Judge.
An employer appeals the district court’s denial of its petition for judicial
review of the workers’ compensation commissioner’s decision finding that a
surviving spouse’s death benefits are not barred by the willful-injury defense of
Iowa Code section 85.16(1) (2016). AFFIRMED.
Laura J. Ostrander, Lansing, Michigan, for appellants.
Thomas Wertz of Wertz Law Firm, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.
Heard by Greer, P.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ.
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LANGHOLZ, Judge.
Tragically, Heather Blasdell died from an overdose of prescription drugs.
The workers’ compensation commissioner found that the overdose was accidental.
So the commissioner awarded her husband, Roger Blasdell, workers’
compensation death benefits. But on judicial review, Heather’s former employer,
Linnhaven, Inc., contends that her death was a suicide.1 Linnhaven thus argues
that the death benefits are barred by the willful-injury defense of Iowa Code section
85.16(1) (2016) and the commissioner’s contrary finding is not supported by
substantial evidence. And Linnhaven argues that regardless whether the death
was accidental, it was not caused by Heather’s work injury.
But this second causation issue is not properly before us because it was not
decided by the commissioner or the district court. Neither did Linnhaven ever
clearly raise the issue before the commissioner. So we cannot consider it now.
Linnhaven’s properly preserved challenge to the commissioner’s finding
that Heather’s death was accidental fails on the merits. Such factual disputes are
resolved before the commissioner. Because substantial evidence in the agency
record supports the commissioner’s finding that Heather’s death was accidental,
the commissioner’s decision must be affirmed. We thus affirm the district court’s
judgment, including its unchallenged order to remand Blasdell’s burial-expense
claim to be decided by the commissioner.
1 Linnhaven’s insurer, Accident Fund National Insurance Company/United
Heartland, is also a party to this judicial-review proceeding and the underlying
workers’ compensation proceeding. For readability, we refer only to Linnhaven.
And because Heather and her husband have the same last name, we refer to
Heather by her first name and her husband by his last name.
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I. Factual Background and Proceedings
In November 2012, Heather injured her ankle while working for Linnhaven.
She later developed lower-back pain and depression as a result of the injury. And
the workers’ compensation commissioner thus found that Heather was
permanently and totally disabled because of the injury and awarded her workers’
compensation benefits.
Heather sought mental-health counseling after the injury. She was
diagnosed with a major depressive disorder starting in 2013 and continuing up until
August 2015. Multiple counseling records note that Heather had suicidal thoughts
several times a week, but she had “no plans” and “no intent” to act on those
thoughts.
In September 2016, Heather died at her home alone. An autopsy report by
the state medical examiner found the cause of death was a “[m]ixed drug
(quetiapine and zolpidem) intoxication.” And the manner of death was
“undetermined.”
Police investigated and concluded based on the evidence at the scene,
Heather’s previous medical history, and the autopsy report that Heather either had
an accidental overdose or a successful suicide attempt. The investigation noted
that Heather had a history of suicide attempts, that she would “routinely take
excess amounts of her prescription medications to get ‘high,’” and that she “and
her boyfriend had recently broken up.” The police also discovered an undated
note in a notebook under a stack of paperwork on Heather’s bed that included
negative statements about herself, praise for her son, and a request that her friend
or mom take care of her “fur babies.” The note to her son appears unfinished,
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ending in the middle of a line and without a punctuation mark: “You have become
a strong very proud of you. I wish I could have [ . . . ].”
Heather’s son and a neighbor friend both talked with Heather early on the
morning of her death before leaving for work. They both agreed that she appeared
“high,” but that “this did not alarm them to seek medical attention for her” because
of her past history with prescription drugs. The friend “talked to Heather about
seeing each other that evening.”
From before her workplace injury until her death, Heather and Blasdell were
married but separated. So after Heather’s death, Blasdell sought death benefits
under Iowa Code section 85.31(1)(a)(1) and reimbursement for burial expenses
under section 85.28. Linnhaven denied liability, arguing that Blasdell was barred
from receiving any benefits under Iowa Code section 85.42(1)(a) because he
willfully deserted Heather and under section 85.16(1) because her death was a
suicide and thus a willful injury.
A hearing was held before a deputy commissioner, at which all parties
agreed the only issues to be decided were: (1) Linnhaven’s defense that Blasdell
willfully deserted Heather; (2) Linnhaven’s defense that the death was a willful
injury; (3) the proper rate of compensation; and (4) taxation of costs. Both
Heather’s son and Blasdell testified that they believed her death was an accidental
overdose, not a suicide. Her son—who was living with her—explained that in the
days before her death, Heather’s “emotional state was really well.” And he shared
that the night before, she was up “baking cookies and stuff” and “we had plans with
my sister to come down.” When pressed by Linnhaven, he said he thought that
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“she had taken her medicine to go to sleep, and she was unable to fall asleep and
didn’t know—didn’t realize that she had already taken it and took more.”
The workers’ compensation commissioner agreed with Linnhaven that
Blasdell willfully deserted Heather. So the commissioner denied Blasdell benefits
under Iowa Code section 85.42(1)(a). And the commissioner did not decide
whether Heather’s death was accidental or a suicide.
Blasdell then successfully petitioned for judicial review. The district court
reversed the commissioner’s decision that Blasdell deserted Heather and
remanded the case back to the commissioner to decide whether Linnhaven had
proved that Heather’s death was a willful injury. And on appeal, our supreme court
agreed “with the district court that there is not substantial evidence to support the
commissioner’s finding that [Blasdell] deserted Heather without fault by her.”
Blasdell v. Linnhaven, Inc., 989 N.W.2d 131, 140–41 (Iowa 2023). It likewise
agreed that because the commissioner “did not address Linnhaven’s claim that the
willful injury exception under Iowa Code section 85.16 bars [Blasdell’s] recovery of
the benefits,” “remand is appropriate for the commissioner to make the factual
findings necessary to decide this issue.” Id. at 141.
Two months after procedendo issued, formally concluding the appeal, the
workers’ compensation commissioner issued a remand decision. Based on the
evidence and briefing submitted prior to the first judicial-review proceeding, the
commissioner found that Linnhaven “failed to carry [its] burden of proof that
Heather’s death was a suicide under Iowa Code section 85.16(1).” The
commissioner acknowledged the counseling records stating Heather’s “‘moderate’
risk for suicide” and the undated note that “could be construed to be a suicide
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note.” But it did not find this evidence persuasive because “there is no evidence if
[the note] was written the day before death, or written months or even years prior
to death” and because of the other contrary or missing evidence. The
commissioner reasoned:
No expert has opined that Heather committed suicide. The police
investigation indicates Heather’s death was caused by an accidental
overdose or suicide. The autopsy report found that the cause of
death was undetermined. The death certificate also found that the
cause of death was undetermined. The police report noted that [her
son] and a friend believed Heather took excessive amounts of
medication to get high. [Her son and Blasdell] both testified at
hearing they believed that Heather’s death was an accidental
overdose.
And so, the commissioner ruled that Blasdell’s claim for benefits was not barred
under Iowa Code section 85.16(1)(a) and he was entitled to death benefits. The
commissioner also found that Linnhaven had not proved that the rate of benefits
should be changed from the agreed-to rate from Heather’s original award and thus
ordered Linnhaven to pay death benefits of $408.46 per week to Blasdell for so
long as he is eligible under Iowa Code section 85.31(1)(a)(1).
Blasdell petitioned for rehearing, asking the commissioner to decide his
claim for burial expenses that was not addressed in the remand decision.
Linnhaven resisted the petition, arguing that the issue was not properly before the
commissioner on remand. But Linnhaven did not file its own rehearing petition
asking the commissioner to address any other issues. The commissioner did not
grant Blasdell’s petition within twenty days, so it was “deemed to have been
denied.” Iowa Code § 17A.16(2).
Linnhaven then petitioned for judicial review of the commissioner’s remand
decision under Iowa Code chapter 17A. The one-page petition stated a single
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ground for reversal: “that substantial evidence supports none of the
Commissioner’s findings with regard to any of the issues Defendants raised in the
appeal.” In its briefing to the district court, Linnhaven clarified that the “sole issue”
was whether the court “should reverse the Commissioner’s Appeal Decision that
found Roger Blasdell entitled to death benefits despite the Claimant’s intentional
suicide and the affirmative defense of intentional injury raised by the Defendants
pursuant to Iowa Code section 85.16(1).” But rather than arguing why substantial
evidence does not support the commissioner’s finding that Heather’s death was
accidental, it focused nearly all its briefing on a new argument. Linnhaven
contended that under the statute authorizing death benefits, Iowa Code section
85.31(1)(a), “no benefits may be awarded” because Heather’s “death, regardless
of whether an intentional suicide or accidental overdose, did not arise out of or in
the course of employment.” Blasdell cross-petitioned for review of the
commissioner’s ruling, arguing that the commissioner’s failure to award burial
expenses was “affected by errors of law, is not supported by substantial evidence
in the record, and is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an
abuse of discretion[] or unwarranted exercise of discretion.”
The district court denied Linnhaven’s petition, holding that the
commissioner’s decision that Linnhaven failed to prove its willful-injury defense
was “supported by substantial evidence.” The court reasoned that “[w]hile
Linnhaven certainly can point to facts in the record that support a suspicion that
Heather’s death was a suicide, they simply have not conclusively proven that to be
the case” because “[t]here are likewise facts in the record that support a finding
that Heather’s death was the result of a tragic accidental drug overdose and not a
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suicide.” The district court did not address Linnhaven’s newfound claim that
benefits should have been denied because Heather’s death was not caused by
her employment. On Blasdell’s cross-petition, the court concluded that Blasdell
made a timely request for burial expenses but “for reasons that are unclear in the
record, the agency never acted on [his] request.” So the court decided “remand is
appropriate for the Commissioner to consider and rule on [Blasdell’s] request for
burial expenses.”
Neither party moved under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904 for the district
court to reconsider or enlarge its ruling. Instead, Linnhaven appealed, challenging
only the court’s ruling on its willful-injury defense to Blasdell’s death benefits.
II. Error Preservation on Causation
In a judicial-review proceeding under chapter 17A, we may only consider
issues that have been raised in and decided by both the agency and the district
court. See Archer Daniels Midland v. Williams, 3 N.W.3d 231, 236 (Iowa Ct. App.
2023); Hill v. Fleetguard, Inc., 705 N.W.2d 665, 670–71 (Iowa 2005). Because a
judicial-review proceeding is appellate in nature, a party cannot wait to raise an
issue “for the first time during judicial review.” Williams, 3 N.W.3d at 236. And
even when the party raises the issue before the agency, if the agency fails to
decide it, the party must “point out the issue in a motion for rehearing” before the
agency to preserve error on the issue. KFC Corp. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 792
N.W.2d 308, 329 (Iowa 2010). The same is true in the district court. To preserve
error for our review—in a judicial-review proceeding, same as any other—a party
must request a ruling by filing a motion under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904
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“when the district court fails to resolve an issue, claim or other legal theory properly
submitted for adjudication.” Hill, 705 N.W.2d at 671 (cleaned up).
Linnhaven devotes much of its briefing to arguing that the death-benefits
award must be reversed regardless of whether Heather’s death was accidental or
a suicide because Blasdell did not prove that it was causally related to injuries
arising out of and in the course of her employment. See Iowa Code § 85.31(1)(a);
Tebbs v. Denmark Light & Tel. Corp., 300 N.W. 328, 331 (Iowa 1941). But
Linnhaven failed to preserve error on this issue twice over. First, Linnhaven did
not raise this issue for the commissioner to decide. The closest it came—a stray
sentence buried in briefing in an argument that Heather’s death was a suicide and
thus proved Linnhaven’s willful-injury affirmative defense—does not suffice to raise
this distinct issue based on a different statute and a different burden than the willful-
injury affirmative defense.2 And even if that mere hint were enough to raise the
issue, when the commissioner did not decide it, Linnhaven needed to seek
rehearing to preserve error. See KFC Corp., 792 N.W.2d at 329; Williams,
3 N.W.3d at 236.
Second, Linnhaven did not preserve error in the district court because it did
not get a ruling on this issue there either. See Hill, 705 N.W.2d at 670–71.
Linnhaven did make this new causation argument in the district court—for the first
2 Three of Linnhaven’s briefs before the commissioner prior to the first judicial-
review proceeding contain the same stray sentence and factual citation in its
argument about the facts supporting a suicide finding and its willful-injury
affirmative defense: “In addition, Mr. Blasdell has provided no evidence that Ms.
Blasdell’s suicide was caused by the initial November 5, 2012 work injury to her
ankle. See all Claimant’s exhibits on file herein.” Linnhaven did not explain the
importance of this assertion nor tie it to any statutory requirement.
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time offering some legal authority and analysis. But the court decided only the
properly preserved substantial-evidence challenge to the commissioner’s finding
that Heather’s death was accidental and did not address or acknowledge
Linnhaven’s causation argument. Because the court did not rule on it, Linnhaven
had to file a 1.904 motion asking the court to enlarge its ruling to address the
causation argument. See id. So even if we could overlook Linnhaven’s failure to
preserve error before the commissioner, we still could not consider this new
argument for the first time on appeal.
At oral argument, Linnhaven urged that we can nevertheless reach this
issue because Blasdell did not raise any error-preservation concerns. But the
requirement to preserve error protects more “than simply the interests of the
opposing party.” Top of Iowa Coop. v. Sime Farms, Inc., 608 N.W.2d 454, 470
(Iowa 2000). That is especially so in a judicial-review proceeding, which involves
not just “judicial resources,” but the interests of another branch of government that
we afford respect. Id. So we must consider whether error is preserved even when
it has been ignored—or conceded—by the opposing party on appeal. See id. We
thus consider only Linnhaven’s properly preserved substantial-evidence challenge
to the commissioner’s decision.
III. Affirmative Defense of Willful Injury under Section 85.16(1)
In an appeal of a district court’s ruling on judicial review of agency action,
we apply the same statutory standards of review of the agency action as the district
court. See Carreras v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 977 N.W.2d 438, 444 (Iowa 2022).
Those standards provide that a court “shall reverse, modify, or grant other
appropriate relief” of an agency decision when that decision prejudices the judicial-
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review petitioner’s “substantial rights” because the decision is “[b]ased upon a
determination of fact clearly vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the
agency that is not supported by substantial evidence in the record before the court
when that record is viewed as a whole.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f). The workers’
compensation commissioner has been vested with discretion to make fact
determinations on compensation claims like this one. See Mike Brooks, Inc. v.
House, 843 N.W.2d 885, 889 (Iowa 2014). We thus must “accept the
commissioner’s factual findings when supported by substantial evidence.”
Williams, 3 N.W.3d at 234 (cleaned up).
Evidence is substantial if it “would be deemed sufficient by a neutral,
detached, and reasonable person, to establish the fact at issue when the
consequences resulting from the establishment of that fact are understood to be
serious and of great importance.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)(1). “Evidence is not
insubstantial just because it could lead reasonable minds to different conclusions.”
Williams, 3 N.W.3d at 234; see also Larson Mfg. Co. v. Thorson, 763 N.W.2d 842,
850 (Iowa 2009). The commissioner, as trier of fact, decides the credibility of the
witnesses, assesses the evidence, and resolves the disputed facts. Arndt v. City
of Le Claire, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394–95 (Iowa 2007). And so, like challenging a jury
verdict, a substantial-evidence challenge to the commissioner’s decision is a heavy
lift. See Sellers v. Emp’t Appeal Bd., 531 N.W.2d 645, 646 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995)
(explaining that because judicial review of agency action is “severely
circumscribed,” “[n]early all disputes are won or lost” in the agency).
Linnhaven argues that substantial evidence in the record does not support
the commissioner’s finding that Heather’s death was accidental. And it thus seeks
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reversal of the commissioner’s decision that Linnhaven failed to prove its willful-
injury affirmative defense under Iowa Code section 85.16(1). That statute provides
that “[n]o compensation . . . shall be allowed for an injury caused . . . [b]y the
employee’s willful intent to injure the employee’s self.” Iowa Code § 85.16(1). As
an affirmative defense, Linnhaven had the burden of proving it. See Nelson v.
Cities Serv. Oil Co., 146 N.W.2d 261, 264 (Iowa 1966). Before the commissioner,
Linnhaven tried to meet its burden by proving that Heather’s death was a suicide.3
No doubt, there is evidence in the record from which a reasonable mind
could reach the conclusion Linnhaven urged. Medical records showed that
Heather reported suicidal thoughts and was a moderate suicide risk. She may
have previously attempted suicide. She and her boyfriend had recently broken up.
And a note was found at her home that reads like a suicide note. But that is not
the question here. See Williams, 3 N.W.3d at 234. On substantial-evidence
review, we ask whether substantial evidence supported the findings made by the
commissioner—not whether they could support a contrary finding. See id.And we agree with the district court that substantial evidence supports the
commissioner’s finding that Heather’s death was an accident. The potential
suicide note was found in a notebook under a stack of papers on Heather’s bed—
not right next to her. It was undated. And it was unfinished. So the commissioner
could have reasonably found it merely showed Heather had been thinking about
3 The supreme court has held that even some suicides are compensable injuries
not disallowed by the willful-injury defense. See Humboldt Cmty. Schs. v. Fleming,
603 N.W.2d 759, 762–63 (Iowa 1999). But Blasdell has never argued—and the
commissioner did not find—that Heather’s death was a suicide. So we do not
consider whether Heather’s death could be a compensable injury even if it were a
suicide.
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suicide at some point in the past—not that she intended to do so when she
overdosed. Heather’s son testified that she had been doing “really well” in the
days before her death. And both he and another friend who spoke with her the
morning she died shared that they were making plans and indeed that Heather
had baked cookies just the night before. What’s more, neither the medical
examiner nor the police investigation concluded that Heather’s death was a
suicide.
With evidence pointing in both directions, we cannot say that the record
lacked substantial evidence to support the commissioner’s conclusion that
Linnhaven failed to prove its willful-injury affirmative defense. We thus affirm the
decisions of the commissioner and the district court.
Linnhaven did not appeal the district court’s order remanding the case to
the commissioner only “to consider and rule on [Blasdell’s] request for burial
expenses.” So our affirmance of the challenged ruling does not disturb the district
court’s order remanding to the commissioner for that purpose.
AFFIRMED.