In the Interest of R.N., Minor Child ( 2024 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1186
Filed October 2, 2024
IN THE INTEREST OF R.N.,
Minor Child,
K.D., Mother,
Appellant,
J.N., Father,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Decatur County, William Price,
Judge.
A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental
rights. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
Amanda Demichelis of Demichelis Law Firm, P.C., Chariton, for appellant
mother.
Diana L. Rolands of Rolands Law Office, Osceola, for appellant father.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Dusty Lea Clements of Clements Law & Mediation, Newton, attorney and
guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ.
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CHICCHELLY, Judge.
The mother and father of R.N., born in September 2022, separately appeal
the termination of their parental rights. The mother challenges each step of the
termination analysis, In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 472–73 (Iowa 2018) (describing
the three-step analysis), and asks for more time. The father challenges the
evidence supporting the grounds for termination and contends the Iowa
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) failed to make reasonable
efforts to return the child to his custody. After considering each of their arguments,
we affirm the termination of both the mother’s and father’s parental rights to R.N.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The juvenile court removed the child from the parents’ custody because the
child tested positive for fentanyl and methamphetamine at birth and was
hospitalized for withdrawal symptoms. Although the mother denied using
methamphetamine during her pregnancy, she admitted she used fentanyl and
being present while others used methamphetamine. The father knew the mother
had substance-use issues, but he denied knowing she used during her pregnancy.
Based on the mother’s substance use and the father’s lack of insight and protective
capabilities, the juvenile court adjudicated the child to be a child in need of
assistance (CINA) in October 2022.
Concerns about the parents’ ability to provide safety and stability for the
child persisted during the CINA case. The mother was incarcerated in the State
of Missouri from July 2023 to May 2024. The mother admits that before her
incarceration, she was using methamphetamine and failed to complete substance-
use treatment. The father never progressed beyond fully supervised visits with the
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child or showed insight into his role in the child’s removal. The father failed to
complete a parenting assessment and informed workers that he did not intend to
prevent the mother from seeing the child after her release from prison.
Based on the lack of progress during the CINA proceedings, the State
petitioned to terminate both the mother’s and father’s parental rights in
February 2024. The termination hearing was held in April and continued in June,
just five days after the mother was released from prison. In a July order, the
juvenile court terminated both the mother’s and father’s parental rights under Iowa
Code section 232.116(1)(e) and (h) (2024).
II. Discussion.
We review the termination of parental rights de novo. See In re W.M., 957
N.W.2d 305, 312 (Iowa 2021). “We are not bound by the factual findings of the
juvenile court, though we give them respectful consideration, particularly with
respect to credibility determinations.” Id. The State must prove the grounds for
termination by clear and convincing evidence, meaning “there are no ‘serious or
substantial doubts as to the correctness [of] conclusions of law drawn from the
evidence.’” Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
A. Mother’s Appeal.
We first consider whether clear and convincing evidence shows the grounds
for terminating the mother’s parental rights. Because the juvenile court terminated
the mother’s parental rights on two statutory grounds, we may affirm if either
ground is supported by the record. See id. at 313.
To terminate parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h), the
court must find:
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(1) The child is three years of age or younger.
(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of
assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of
the child’s parents for at least six months of the last twelve months,
or for the last six consecutive months and any trial period at home
has been less than thirty days.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child
cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided
in section 232.102 at the present time.
The mother does not dispute that the State proved the first three elements for
termination under section 232.116(1)(h). Instead, she argues the State failed to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that “the child cannot be returned to the
custody of the child’s parents as provided in section 232.102 at the present time.”
Id. § 232.116(1)(h)(4). A child cannot be returned to the parents as provided in
section 232.102(6) if the child will suffer harm that would justify a CINA
adjudication. “At the present time” means at the time of the termination hearing.
See In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 168 (Iowa 2021) (interpreting the phrase as used
in Iowa Code section 232.116(1)).
The mother claims that the child can be returned to her custody because
she completed substance-use treatment while incarcerated and was taking
medication to help her maintain sobriety. But the mother was released from prison
only days before the second date of the termination hearing. Because the mother
has been battling substance use for at least six years and her ability to remain
sober outside the controlled environment of prison remains untested, the child
could not be returned to her custody at the time of the termination hearing. The
child was also removed from the mother’s custody while still hospitalized after birth
and has never been returned to her custody. The mother has never provided for
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the child’s daily care and had no contact with the child for about one year, more
than half the child’s life. On this record, clear and convincing evidence supports
terminating the mother’s parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h).
We next consider “whether the best-interest framework as laid out in
section 232.116(2) supports the termination of parental rights.” See A.S., 906
N.W.2d at 473 (citation omitted). When determining best interests, we “give
primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the
long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and
emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2); accord In
re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 528 (Iowa 2019) (stating that “we look to the child’s
long-range as well as immediate interests, consider what the future holds for the
child if returned to the parents, and weigh the child’s safety and need for a
permanent home” (cleaned up)).
The child had been removed from the mother’s custody three times longer
than required by statute. Once the statutory period for termination has passed, we
view the proceedings with a sense of urgency. See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489,
494–95 (Iowa 2000). The child could not be returned to the mother’s custody at
the time of the termination hearing, and we cannot continue to deny the child
permanency based on the hope that the mother may one day be able to meet the
child’s needs. See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 112 (Iowa 2014) (“[W]e cannot
deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination
under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and
be able to provide a stable home for the child.” (citation omitted)). As the guardian
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ad litem noted in her position statement following the termination hearing, the
foster family provides safety and stability and is willing to adopt the child:
The child will be two years old in September. The child has been in
her current foster home since September 27, 2022. The current
foster home is the only home the child knows. The child is extremely
bonded to the foster parents and the other children in the home. The
foster parents are willing and able to adopt if the Court terminates
the parent’s parental rights.
Although termination may hurt the mother, the child’s needs now supersede hers.
See In re C.S., 776 N.W.2d 297, 300 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (“[A]t some point, the
rights and needs of the child[] rise above the rights and needs of the parent.”).
Termination is in the child’s best interests.
Turning to the last step of the termination analysis, “we consider whether
any exceptions in section 232.116(3) apply to preclude termination of parental
rights.” See A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 473 (citation omitted). The mother asks us to
apply the exception in section 232.116(3)(c), which applies if “clear and convincing
evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the child at the time due to
the closeness of the parent-child relationship.” But the mere existence of a parent-
child bond alone is not enough. W.M., 957 N.W.2d at 315. To avoid termination
under section 232.116(3)(c), the mother bears the burden of showing by clear and
convincing evidence “that, on balance, [the parent-child] bond makes termination
more detrimental [for the child] than not.” Id. The child was removed from the
mother’s custody at birth, and mother has not had contact with the child for over
half of the child’s life. The record does not show the strength of the mother’s bond
with the child outweighs the child’s need for permanency such that termination of
her parental rights will harm the child.
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As an alternative to termination, the mother asks us to delay permanency
for six months. See Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b) (allowing the court to continue a
child’s placement for up to six months if the need for the child’s removal from the
home will no longer exist at the end of that period). But to delay permanency, we
must “enumerate the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes
which comprise the basis for the determination that the need for removal of the
child from the child’s home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-
month period.” Id. There is no basis for making this finding. Moreover, we have
already noted that the child has been removed from the mother’s custody three
times longer than section 232.116(1)(h) requires. Delaying permanency longer is
both unwarranted and contrary to the child’s best interests.
B. Father’s Appeal.
The father also challenges the State’s proof of the grounds for termination.
Like the mother, the father does not dispute that the State proved the first three
requirements for termination under section 232.116(1)(h). He contends there is
not clear and convincing evidence showing the child could not be returned to his
custody at the time of the termination hearing. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h)(4);
A.B., 956 N.W.2d at 168. The gist of his argument is that termination stems from
the mother’s substance use while pregnant and it is unfair to deny his relationship
with the child on this basis, a continuation of his attempt to downplay his role in the
child’s CINA adjudication and termination of his parental rights.
Clear and convincing evidence shows the child could not be returned to the
father’s custody at the time of the termination hearing. During the CINA
proceedings, the father attended only one of the child’s medical appointments and
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never progressed beyond fully supervised visits. Service providers reported that
the father arrived late to visits without items the child needed. The father had no
specific plans for the child’s return to his custody, nor did he have the items needed
to care for the child in his home. In addition, there were concerns about the father’s
ongoing relationship with the mother, with whom the father maintained frequent
contact despite her incarceration. One of the HHS case managers assigned to
work with the family expressed concern that “it seems like [the mother] is fully in
control of [the father]’s life and is making decisions that are going to impact him
and he doesn’t know it.” The father denies this is true, but he allowed the mother
to have contact with the child without HHS approval and told workers that he would
not prevent contact further contact between them. His actions show that he does
not view the mother as a threat to the child’s safety despite her substance use.
The father is unable protect the child from harm or provide for the care the child
needs. Clear and convincing evidence supports terminating the father’s parental
rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h).
Finally, the father claims that HHS failed to make reasonable efforts toward
reunification. See Iowa Code § 232.102 (stating that HHS must “make every
reasonable effort to return the child to the child’s home as quickly as possible
consistent with the best interests of the child”). Although these efforts are not a
strict substantive requirement for termination, they impact the State’s burden of
showing a child cannot be safely returned to a parent’s custody. L.T., 924 N.W.2d
at 527. The father argues that any inability to return to the child to his custody is
due to HHS failing to provide services “to address his social inadequacies in
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recognition of drug influences on [the] mother’s actions or behaviors” and denying
his request for increased visitation with the child.
Although HHS has a duty to make reasonable effort, a parent must object
when they believe the services offered by HHS are inadequate. See In re L.M.,
904 N.W.2d 835, 839–40 (Iowa 2017). Objections should be made “early in the
process so appropriate changes can be made.” Id. at 840 (citation omitted). A
dialogue between parents and HHS is encouraged. In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144,
147 (Iowa 2002) (noting that it “may help the parties comply with the case
permanency plan”). But if a parent requests services and is unsatisfied with HHS’s
response to that request, “the parent must come to the court and present this
challenge.” Id. Failing to do so will waive any challenge to the sufficiency of
services provided by HHS. See id. at 148 (holding that a father waived his
challenge to the sufficiency of services provided by the department by waiting until
the eve of termination to raise it to the juvenile court). Although the father
requested additional visitation from HHS workers, he never raised his claim about
the sufficiency of services to the court.
Setting aside error-preservation concerns, these services would not have
impacted the finding that the child could not be returned to the father’s custody at
the time of the termination hearing. The juvenile court found the father was not
credible in his claims to HHS and his testimony at the termination hearing that he
had “no knowledge” of the mother’s drug use during pregnancy. Providing the
father with services to recognize the mother’s drug use and additional visitation
would not have changed the result of the proceedings. We therefore affirm.
AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.