Freddy Douglas Crisp v. State of Iowa ( 2024 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-1294
Filed October 2, 2024
FREDDY DOUGLAS CRISP,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Calhoun County, Blake H. Norman,
Judge.
Freddy Crisp appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief.
AFFIRMED.
Jack Bjornstad of Jack Bjornstad Law Office, Spirit Lake, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Greer, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and Bower, S.J.* Buller, J., takes
no part.
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2024).
2
BOWER, Senior Judge.
Freddy Crisp appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief
(PCR). He alleges he received ineffective assistance of counsel from his trial
attorney. Upon our review, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
A jury found Crisp guilty of first-degree murder, and the district court
sentenced Crisp to life in prison. At trial, evidence was presented showing Crisp
and the victim, Dale Potter, drank alcohol throughout the afternoon outside of
Crisp’s residence and eventually began arguing and yelling at each other. Early
the following morning, they left and returned in Crisp’s truck. Crisp’s neighbor
witnessed the two men sitting in the truck and soon afterward heard a loud noise.
The neighbor observed Potter “slumped over” in the truck.
Crisp then entered his home and—according to his wife—woke her up,
asked for help, and called 911. Crisp had a gun, which his wife placed in a laundry
basket. The police arrived, and Crisp admitted to an altercation with Potter in
Crisp’s truck. He made no mention of acting in self-defense. A single spent bullet
casing was found in Crisp’s truck and was subsequently determined to have come
from Crisp’s gun.
Initially, Crisp asserted Potter had pulled out his own gun and threatened to
commit suicide, Crisp tried to take the gun from Potter, and the gun accidentally
discharged. He stated his own gun stayed holstered during the incident. After
investigation, it was determined the fatal injury to Potter came from Crisp’s gun.
Only then did Crisp admit firing his gun.
3
Crisp appealed, and this court affirmed his conviction. State v. Crisp,
No. 16-1252, 2017 WL 6033872, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2017). We preserved
some claims made on direct appeal for possible postconviction relief.
Crisp initiated this PCR action in 2018. His PCR application alleged in part
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to sufficiently investigate evidence of
Potter’s character and propensity for violence.
Following trial, the district court entered an order denying Crisp’s PCR
application. The district court noted on direct appeal this court had determined the
evidence of Potter having a “rap sheet” and being on an FBI watch list was properly
excluded in his underlying criminal trial. Additionally, the district court found Crisp’s
and his wife’s attempts to assert they knew additional facts concerning Potter’s
character and propensity for violence were not credible. Crisp appeals.
II. Standard of Review
To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Crisp must show
trial counsel beached an essential duty and prejudice resulted from the breach.
See Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 866, (Iowa 2012); State v. McPhillips,
580 N.W.2d 748, 754 (Iowa 1998). We may affirm if either of the elements is
lacking. See Lamasters, 821 N.W.2d at 866. To prove a breach of duty, Crisp
must prove trial counsel’s performance was not within the standard of reasonable
competence. See id. Prejudice is present if the result of the proceeding would
have differed absent counsel’s errors. See id. We presume counsel was
competent, and Crisp has the burden of proof to prove otherwise. See State v.
Spurgeon, 533 N.W.2d 218, 219 (Iowa 1995). Generally, this court reviews denials
of applications for postconviction relief for correction of errors at law. Sauser v.
4
State, 928 N.W.2d 816, 818 (Iowa 2019). However, because Crisp’s ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim is based upon a constitutional violation, review is de
novo. See Linn v. State, 929 N.W.2d 717, 729 (Iowa 2019).
III. Analysis
Crisp claims although the trial court granted the State’s motion in limine
barring evidence of Potter being on an FBI watch list and references to his “rap
sheet,” trial counsel should have offered other relevant evidence of Potter’s violent
character.1 This supplementary evidence Crisp and his wife provided included
assertions Potter was involved in a militia; was sent to a psychiatric ward for setting
himself on fire twice to avoid physical altercations; was present at the 2014 Bundy
Ranch incident2; had a history of assaultive behavior; and was allegedly involved
with sex, gun, and drug trafficking; Crisp and his wife also asserted that law
enforcement had been warned to approach Potter with caution. Crisp asserts his
trial counsel not only knew about this supplementary evidence, but consciously
chose not to present it. Crisp argues counsel’s trial strategy undermined his
justification defense and he was prejudiced because the evidence would have
“tipped the scales” in favor of proving justification/self-defense.
1 In the direct appeal, a panel of our court found the district court’s exclusion of
evidence about the FBI watch list and Potter’s “rap sheet” was proper as the
probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. Crisp, 2017 WL 6033872, at *4.
2 The Bundy Ranch incident was an armed dispute in 2014 between Cliven Bundy,
a cattle rancher, and the United States Bureau of Land Management (BLM). The
confrontation occurred after a twenty-one-year legal dispute where the BLM
obtained court orders directing Bundy pay over $1 million in grazing fees because
of Bundy’s usage of federal land adjacent to Bundy’s ranch in Nevada.
5
The district court determined all the supplemental evidence was not
credible. We agree. After the shooting, Crisp’s story about the incident changed
several times. During trial, his testimony regarding self-defense was inconsistent
from what he stated during the 911 call: he did not inform the dispatcher he was in
fear for his life. Crisp, 2017 WL 6033872, at *3. But he also stated he shot Potter
because Potter threatened his life. He also admitted he could have removed
himself from the truck. Additionally, on direct examination, Crisp admitted several
portions of his original version of events were false. He first testified the shooting
occurred due to Potter’s statements “about wanting to rape or have sex with
[Crisp’s] daughter” and Potter punching him in the lip. However, on cross-
examination, Crisp contradicted his statement asserting Potter’s words caused him
to shoot Potter because other people had said things about his daughter before.
He had also told officers he initiated the altercation, undermining his assertion that
the punch from Potter preceded the shooting. Also on cross-examination, Crisp
stated Potter did not say anything before pulling out his gun, which contradicted
his previous assertion that Potter stated he wanted to have sex with Crisp’s
daughter.
Although counsel could have attempted to present the supplemental
evidence not barred by the motion in limine at trial, the decision not to present the
information fails to rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. Even if the
evidence might have been credible, the decision of counsel to not use the
purported evidence fell within counsel’s trial strategy in defending Crisp. See State
v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260, 266 (Iowa 2010).
6
Finally, even if we determined Crisp’s counsel breached an essential duty,
Crisp was not prejudiced. To establish prejudice, Crisp must show “there is a
‘reasonable probability that, but for the counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.’” State v. Hopkins, 576 N.W.2d 374,
378 (Iowa 1998) (quoting Stickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). Due
to the inconstancies in Crisp’s testimony, the 911 call, and conversations with law
enforcement, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find Crisp was
not justified in his actions. The decision by counsel to abstain from presenting
further evidence of Potter’s alleged violent character does not rise to a reasonable
probability of a different outcome.
Because Crisp has failed to show he received ineffective assistance of
counsel, we affirm the court’s denial of his PCR application.
AFFIRMED.