State of Iowa v. Thomas Dean Jesse ( 2024 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-0705
Filed November 13, 2024
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
THOMAS DEAN JESSE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Andrew Chappell,
Judge.
A defendant appeals the surcharge and fine imposed on his conviction for
lascivious acts with a child. SENTENCE VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED
FOR ENTRY OF CORRECTED SENTENCE.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Mary K. Conroy, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ.
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BADDING, Judge.
In a written guilty plea to lascivious acts with a child, Thomas Jesse
admitted that in 2013, he “willingly solicited a child to engage in a sex act for the
purposes of arousing or satisfying the sexual desires” of himself or the child. The
maximum and minimum punishments for the offense, a class “D” felony in violation
of Iowa Code section 709.8 (2013), were set out at the top of the plea form:
[T]he maximum punishment is an indeterminate 5 year prison
sentence and $10,245 fine and the minimum sentence is a
suspended 5 year prison sentence, supervised probation and $1,025
fine. There is a 15% surcharge on any fine.
The form also set out the terms of Jesse’s plea agreement with the State: “Imposed
five year prison sentence; prison sentence ran concurrently to the defendant’s term
of incarceration in Johnson [C]ounty case FECR132043; $1,205 fine plus
applicable surcharges.”
Following a combined sentencing hearing in this case and FECR132043,1
the district court sentenced Jesse to an indeterminate five-year term of
incarceration that was consecutive to some counts in FECR132043 and concurrent
to others. The court also ordered him to “pay a fine of $1025,” along with a “crime
services surcharge of 15%” and “a related crimes surcharge of $90.” Jesse
appeals,2 claiming (1) the $90 surcharge violated the ex post facto clauses of the
1 Jesse was found guilty of forty counts of second-degree sexual abuse in
FECR132043, which involved a different victim. Before the case was transferred
to us, the supreme court granted Jesse’s motion to sever his appeal in
FECR132043 from this appeal.
2 Because Jesse claims that part of his sentence is illegal, he has good cause to
appeal under Iowa Code section 814.6 (2023). See State v. Heginger, No. 20-
1657, 2021 WL 5105918, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2021) (finding good cause
for appeal where, even though the defendant received the agreed-upon sentence,
he claimed part of it was illegal); see also State v. Gordon, 732 N.W.2d 41, 44
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federal and state constitutions and (2) the court “abused its discretion when it
sentenced Jesse to pay a $1025 fine because the record establishes the court was
unaware the minimum fine that applied to the offense was $750, not $1025.” The
State concedes the first issue but contests the second.
I. Surcharge
Iowa Code section 911.2B (2023) requires the court to assess a sexual
abuse crimes surcharge of ninety dollars for violations of Iowa Code chapter 709.
“Section 911.2B became effective on July 1, 2015,” after Jesse committed the
crime. State v. Lopez, 907 N.W.2d 112, 123 (Iowa 2018) (citing 2015 Iowa Acts
ch. 96, §§ 15, 17). Because a “surcharge is a form of punishment,” imposition of
the $90 surcharge enacted after Jesse’s crime “increased the penalty for that
offense.” Id. (discussing the two elements required to determine an ex post facto
law); accord State v. Petty, 925 N.W.2d 190, 197 (Iowa 2019). Jesse is,
accordingly, correct that the $90 surcharge is an illegal sentence in violation of the
ex post facto clauses of the federal and state constitutions. See Petty, 925 N.W.2d
at 197. We vacate that portion of the district court’s sentence and remand for entry
of a corrected sentence. See id.
(Iowa 2007) (holding that an illegal sentence “is not subject to normal error
preservation rules and can be challenged at any time”). But see State v. Spencer,
No. 23-0844, 2024 WL 3518267, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. July 24, 2024) (dismissing
appeal for lack of good cause where defendant claimed the court “imposed an
illegal sentence by suspending the fine on the robbery charge without placing him
on probation” because he “received the sentence to which he agreed”). We
accordingly have jurisdiction over both of Jesse’s claims. See State v.
Rasmussen, 7 N.W.3d 357, 362–63 (Iowa 2024).
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II. Fine
“Our review of a sentence imposed in a criminal case is for correction of
errors at law.” State v. Wilbourn, 974 N.W.2d 58, 65 (Iowa 2022) (citation omitted).
“We will not reverse a sentence unless there is ‘an abuse of discretion or some
defect in the sentencing procedure.’” Id. (citation omitted). Jesse argues the
district court abused its discretion in imposing a $1025 fine because the court
mistakenly believed that was the minimum fine for the offense. We disagree.
Generally, “criminal defendants are sentenced based on the law that was in
effect at the time the crime was committed.” State v. Louisell, 865 N.W.2d 590,
604 (Iowa 2015). When Jesse committed the crime in 2013, the minimum fine for
a class “D” felony was $750. See Iowa Code § 902.9(1)(e) (2013) (setting a fine
of at least $750 but not more than $7500). By 2023, when Jesse was sentenced,
the minimum fine had increased to $1025. See id. § 902.9(1)(e) (2023) (setting a
fine of at least $1025 but not more than $10,245). Jesse concedes the fine
imposed by the court is within the statutory range under the law in effect at the time
of his offense. Yet he argues the record shows the court was unaware it had
discretion to impose the lower minimum fine because, among other things, no one
“mentioned the lesser penalties that could apply,” and the court imposed the $90
surcharge even though that surcharge did not exist when Jesse committed the
crime. We reject this argument for two reasons.
First, while the court must “state on the record the basis for the sentence
imposed,” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(2)(g), the court is “not obligated ‘to give its reasons
for rejecting particular sentencing options.’” Wilbourn, 974 N.W.2d at 67 (citation
omitted). “A sentencing court’s decision to impose a specific sentence that falls
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within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor.” Id.
(cleaned up). “Where a court fails to exercise the discretion granted to it by law
because it erroneously believes it has no discretion, a remand for resentencing is
required.” State v. Lee, 561 N.W.2d 353, 354 (Iowa 1997). But Jesse has the
burden to show the court “was unaware of its discretion to apply a lesser sentence
and for that reason failed to exercise its discretion.” Wilbourn, 974 N.W.2d at 67.
And “[i]n the absence of evidence establishing that the district court did not know
the relevant minimum fines . . . we will not make such an assumption.” State v.
Purdy, No. 23-0563, 2024 WL 1296267, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2024).
Jesse’s argument asks us to infer that the court intended to impose the minimum
fine for his offense, but the only time the word “minimum” appears in the record
before us was in the section of the guilty plea form listing the minimum and
maximum punishments for Jesse’s crime. The fact that the parties were unaware
of the applicable minimum fine does not show the district court was similarly
mistaken. Cf. Lee, 561 N.W.2d at 354 (remanding for resentencing when the
district court’s references to a “statutory required mandated fine” suggested an
erroneous belief that it lacked discretion to suspend the fine).
Second, and dispositively, Jesse agreed to the $1025 fine. The section of
the guilty plea form that detailed the parties’ plea agreement did not tie the amount
of the fine to the statutory minimum. While the sentencing judge was not the same
judge who accepted Jesse’s guilty plea, that written document was in the file before
the court at sentencing. And the court specifically stated that it considered “the
recommendations made by the State and defense counsel, and any plea
agreement.” “It is not an abuse of discretion for the court to impose a sentence
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consistent with the parties’ plea agreement without giving additional reasons for
rejecting other sentencing options.” Wilbourn, 974 N.W.2d at 67. Because the
fine imposed “was not the product of the exercise of trial court discretion but of the
process of giving effect to the parties’ agreement,” State v. Snyder, 336 N.W.2d
728, 729 (Iowa 1983),3 we conclude Jesse’s claim fails.
For these reasons, we reject Jesse’s claim regarding the fine imposed by
the district court, but we vacate the $90 surcharge under Iowa Code
section 911.2B and remand for entry of a corrected sentence.
SENTENCE VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED FOR ENTRY OF
CORRECTED SENTENCE.
3 Jesse argues the reasoning of Snyder is flawed. But we “are not at liberty to
overturn controlling supreme court precedent.” State v. Beck, 854 N.W.2d 56, 64
(Iowa Ct. App. 2014).