South Central Iowa Landfill Agency v. Elliott J. Corwin, Tassie L. Corwin and All Parties in Possession ( 2024 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-1232
Filed November 13, 2024
SOUTH CENTRAL IOWA LANDFILL AGENCY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ELLIOT J. CORWIN, TASSIE L. CORWIN, and ALL PARTIES IN POSSESSION,
Defendants-Appellants.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Madison County, Randy Hefner,
Judge.
Defendants appeal the district court ruling awarding plaintiff title by adverse
possession. AFFIRMED.
Daniel M. Manning, Jr. of Lillis O’Malley Olson Manning Pose Templeman
LLP, Des Moines, for appellants.
Brett T. Osborn and Emily Douglas Moore of Abbott Osborn Jacobs PLC,
West Des Moines, for appellee.
Heard by Schumacher, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, J.J.
2
SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge.
Elliot and Tassie Corwin (the Corwins), husband and wife, appeal the district
court’s ruling on a petition to quiet title brought by South Central Iowa Landfill
Agency (SCILA). In its petition, SCILA asserted it holds lawful title to a roughly
fourteen-acre plot of land (the disputed parcel). The Corwins answered SCILA’s
petition, asserting they purchased the land from a trust in 2020 and SCILA’s claim
was barred by the one-year statute of limitations in Iowa Code section 614.14(5)
(2022). The Corwins also counterclaimed, arguing that title should be quieted in
their favor. In its competing motion for summary judgment, SCILA also argued that
even if SCILA is not the titleholder of record, SCILA became the disputed parcel’s
rightful owner by adverse possession. Following denial of the competing summary
judgment motions, the district court held a three-day bench trial. After additional
post-trial briefing, the district court ruled the statute of limitations did not apply and
SCILA established ownership by adverse possession. The Corwins appeal.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
This appeal is about three adjacent parcels of land located just east of
Winterset on the south side of Highway 92. The Corwins own a roughly twenty-
acre, rectangularly shaped area, bordered on its north by Highway 92 and formerly
used as a rock quarry pit (the Corwin property). Immediately to the south of the
Corwin property is a roughly fourteen-acre trapezoidal area of generally
undeveloped land (the disputed property). Surrounding these two properties to the
west, south, and east, SCILA owns a large area of land (the SCILA property) on
which it conducts active landfill operations directly south of the disputed parcel.
The following image was admitted into evidence as Exhibit B. We include
3
it here only to help explain the physical relation of the parcels to one another. At
the top of the image, Highway 92 is marked with “IA 92.” The rectangular Corwin
property and trapezoidal disputed property both lie in the upper left half of the
image. They are surrounded by Highway 92 at the top and surrounded on their
left, right, and bottom by a large area mostly outlined with a thick, bright line
(generally, the SCILA property).
At one point, Lawrence Gardner held title to the SCILA property, the Corwin
property, and the disputed property. In 1971, he and his wife, Leona, sold some
of this property on contract to Robert Rice. Rice operated a sanitary landfill on the
property he purchased from the Gardners. Because of county zoning ordinances,
Rice obtained a special-use permit allowing operation of a landfill on the property.
This permit included the disputed property in the land authorized for use. In
January 1980, the Gardners conveyed the property under contract to Rice by deed.
At its core, this appeal arises from the legal description of the land subject
to the Gardner-Rice contract and deed. Both the 1971 contract and 1980 deed
described the property as “approximately 248 acres” and separately described the
4
disputed property. But both the contract and subsequent deed contained the
words “and except” before the description of the disputed property.1
Four months after the 1980 conveyance, Rice sold the property to SCILA.
The sales contract required Rice to assign any licenses and permits issued for the
land to SCILA. SCILA was deeded the same property interest as held by Rice and
assigned the special-use permit that enabled SCILA to continue landfill operations
on the SCILA property and the disputed property.
Whether Gardner retained ownership of the disputed property after the
Gardner-Rice sale is an underlying issue in this proceeding. Any remaining
property interest Lawrence Gardner held at his death was devised to Leona in
1985. Neither Lawrence nor Leona ever claimed ownership of the disputed parcel.
They never objected to either Rice’s or SCILA’s use of the property. Nonetheless,
in 1996 a change of title certificate was issued to the Madison County Auditor that
reported Leona Gardner as owner of both the Corwin property and the disputed
property, referring to it collectively as “Parcel C.”
In 2014, Leona remarried. She and her new husband transferred property
into the “Leona M. Carlson Revocable Trust Under Agreement Dated October 6,
1 Evidence presented raised doubt about the source of the “and except” language
in the 1971 contract. An early draft of the contract, which was presumably created
by the professional working with the parties to the Gardner-Rice sale, had a
handwritten mark crossing out “and except” before the separate description of the
disputed parcel. If the Gardner-Rice sale intended to convey disputed property,
the estimate of “approximately 248 acres” would be accurate, but the separate
description of the disputed parcel would be superfluous. But if the words “and
except” were meant to remain and carve out the disputed parcel from the property
conveyed, the actual total acres would be 227. Rice’s ten year of use of the
disputed parcel for landfill operations, without objection from Gardner, would also
remain unexplained.
5
1993” (the trust). The transferred property included the Corwin property. But the
disputed property was not transferred. Leona never transferred any interest in the
disputed property before her death in 2019.
After Leona’s death in 2019, the trustee began efforts to sell the property.
At that time, the trust believed the property to consist only of the Corwin property.
The property’s marketing brochure advertised the property as “twenty acres, more
or less.” The brochure included a plat map and aerial photos with superimposed
boundary lines based on information obtained from the Madison County Assessor,
both graphics depicting the boundaries of the Corwin property only. Still, the
southern border of the trust’s property was uncertain when the trust began
marketing the property for sale. So the trust engaged a surveyor to determine the
boundary.
In November 2019, the trust and the Corwins entered a contract for the
purchase of the advertised property. The purchase agreement between the
Corwins and the trust required the property survey be completed.
The survey showed the property contained both the Corwin property and
the disputed property, roughly thirty-two acres. The Corwins were interested in
including the newly discovered property in the purchase agreement, but SCILA
appeared to be using the property. So, on November 30, 2019, the trust’s real
estate agent contacted SCILA to offer the option to purchase the newly discovered
property. SCILA informed the trust’s agent it believed SCILA was the true owner
and stated SCILA would investigate further. On December 17, 2019, SCILA filed
an affidavit of possession under Iowa Code section 614.17A in which SCILA
6
claimed record title ownership of the disputed parcel. SCILA then provided a copy
of the affidavit of possession to the trust’s agent on January 6, 2020.
Having learned of SCILA’s ownership claim over the disputed property, the
Corwins retained counsel and requested a title opinion be conducted. The Corwins
received the completed title opinion on June 2, 2020. The opinion reported that
the trust held title to the Corwin property but that the disputed property remained
titled under Leona Gardner.2
On June 5, 2020, the Corwins and the trust closed on a renegotiated
property sale. The final purchase agreement included an addendum to the original
contract. The renegotiated sale included the roughly twenty-acre Corwin property,
for the original purchase price of $77,500, to be conveyed by a trustee’s warranty
deed and the roughly fourteen-acre disputed property, for an additional $5000, to
be granted by a trustee deed without warranty.
In February 2022, SCILA brought the underlying action to quiet title to the
disputed parcel and listed any parties with potential adverse claims to title,
including the Corwins, as defendants. Only the Corwins answered with an adverse
claim to the title. In their answer and counterclaim, the Corwins argued SCILA’s
quiet title action should be barred by the one-year statute of limitations provided in
Iowa Code section 614.14(5)(b) and further claimed they acquired fee title by the
2020 trustee’s deed without warranty.3 Both parties moved for summary judgment.
2 After her death, any property Leona still personally owned was gifted to the trust
by her will, which was admitted to probate without present administration in June
2020. Leona’s will did not appear in the disputed property’s chain of title until
April 1, 2022, after SCILA filed its action to quiet title.
3 SCILA claims the Corwins have no ownership interest in the disputed property.
First SCILA maintains that, despite the ambiguities in the chain of title, the
7
In its motion, SCILA urged the court that even if SCILA is not the title holder of
record, SCILA is entitled to absolute title and fee simple absolute in the disputed
property through adverse possession. Both motions were denied.
The district court held a three-day bench trial in May 2023. After the
submission of post-trial briefing, the district court held section 614.14 did not bar
SCILA’s petition and ruled that SCILA successfully established ownership through
adverse possession. The Corwins appeal.4
II. Standard of Review
An action to quiet title is an action in equity. Larman v. State, 552
N.W.2d 158, 161 (Iowa 1996). We review the district court’s findings de novo. Id.“Because our review is de novo, we ‘examin[e] both the facts and law and
Gardner-Rice sale conveyed the disputed parcel to Rice who later transferred
ownership to SCILA. SCILA further asserts that even under the Corwins’
arguments, the trust held no interest in the property when it closed on the sale to
the Corwins. According to SCILA, the record owner at the time of the sale was still
Leona, since Leona’s will did not appear in the chain of title until after this action
to quiet title was filed. Although the trustee deed without warranty purported to
convey the disputed parcel to the Corwins, such a deed could convey only the
same property interest as held by the seller, see Winkler v. Miller, 6 N.W. 698, 699
(Iowa 1880), which SCILA claims was nothing. So, the argument goes, the
Corwins could not have received any interest in the disputed property.
Even assuming this issue is preserved, because we affirm the district court’s
ruling on adverse possession, we need not reach this argument.
4 After both parties submitted their briefing on appeal, SCILA moved to strike
arguments it claimed were raised for the first time in their reply brief. It is
inappropriate for an appellant to raise issues for the first time in a reply brief.
Young v. Gregg, 480 N.W.2d 75, 78 (Iowa 1992). The Corwins did not present the
argument that SCILA’s 2019 affidavit of possession was null and void until their
reply brief. Similarly, the Corwins did not allege an easement based on water flow
until their reply brief. These arguments are stricken, and we will not consider them
on appeal. Regardless, the affidavit-of-possession argument would have no legal
consequence on this appeal as the statute of limitations issue it relates to is
controlled by a recent Iowa Supreme Court case either way. We consider the
remainder of SCILA’s motion in our discussion below and address only those
issues properly raised.
8
adjudicat[e] anew those issues properly preserved and presented.’” Eldridge v.
Turner, No. 22-0227, 2022 WL 17826871, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2022)
(quoting In re A.R., 932 N.W.2d 588, 589 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019) (alterations in
original)).
III. Statute of Limitations
The Corwins appeal the district court’s conclusion that Iowa Code
section 614.14(5)(b) does not bar SCILA’s action to quiet title.5 See Iowa Code
§ 614.14(5)(b). We find Vaudt v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 4 N.W.3d 45, 54–55
(Iowa 2024) controls the Corwins’ arguments related to section 614.14(5).6
The Vaudt court held that section 614.14(5) does not apply to adverse
possession claims. Id. at 54–55. Section 614.14(5) applies exclusively to claims
for which the act of recording the trustee’s deed is essential for the claim to accrue.
Id. at 52. In so ruling, Vaudt overruled Heer v. Thola, 613 N.W.2d 658 (Iowa 2000),
a case relied on heavily by the Corwins in support of their statute-of-limitations
claim. Although Heer delt with a boundary-by-acquiescence claim, 613 N.W.2d at
660, Vaudt establishes the one-year bar in section 614.14(5)(b) does not apply to
either boundary-by-acquiescence or adverse possession claims. See Vaudt, 4
5 SCILA correctly identified that “[w]e review issues of statutory interpretation for
correction of errors at law.” State v. Doe, 903 N.W.2d 347, 350 (Iowa 2017)
(quoting Rhoades v. State, 848 N.W.2d 22, 26 (Iowa 2014)). However, because
an Iowa Supreme Court case filed in March 2024 addresses the statutory issues
raised by the Corwins, we need not address the district court’s interpretation of
section 614.14(5)(b) as protecting only bona fide purchasers and finding that the
Corwins were not protected. See Vaudt v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 4 N.W.3d 45,
54–55 (Iowa 2024). Even if the Corwins were bona fide purchasers, our supreme
court has ruled that section 614.14(5) does not apply to adverse possession
claims. See id.6 We recognize Vaudt was decided after briefing in the instant appeal.
9
N.W.3d at 54–55 (agreeing unanimously section 614.14(5)(b) should not apply to
adverse possession claims). These kinds of claims arise without any inherent legal
connection to a transfer by a trustee’s deed. Id. at 52.
Here, neither SCILA’s original claim of ownership nor the adverse
possession claim are inherently connected to the property transfer from the trust
to the Corwins. SCILA’s claim accrued independent of the transfer.
Section 614.14(5) does not apply. Id. The Corwins’ appeal of the district court’s
ruling on section 614.14(5) cannot succeed.
IV. Adverse Possession
The remaining claims of error brought by the Corwins concern the district
court’s finding that SCILA proved the elements of adverse possession. In brief,
the Corwins argue SCILA used the land too intermittently and minimally to satisfy
the actual, hostile, and continuous elements of adverse possession. SCILA
concedes this error was preserved for appeal. The Corwins also argue the district
court committed error in its rulings on SCILA’s evidence of ownership of the
disputed parcel, and SCILA’s claim to quiet title amounts to inverse condemnation.
SCILA disputes the Corwins preserved error on these arguments.
A. Error Preservation
“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily
be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on
appeal.” Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). Even if a party
has raised an issue before a district court, that alone “is not sufficient to preserve
it for review.” Hildreth v. City of Des Moines, No. 15-0961, 2016 WL 7403705,
at *1 n.3 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2016) (citing Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856,
10
862 (Iowa 2012)). If the district court did not address the issue presented, the party
presenting the issue must file a motion with the district court requesting a ruling.
Bank of Am., N.A. v. Schulte, 843 N.W.2d 876, 884 (Iowa 2014). Further, simply
“[f]iling a notice of appeal does not preserve an issue for appeal.” Iowa R. App. P.
6.903(2)(a)(8)(1). “It is not a sensible exercise of appellate review to analyze facts
of an issue ‘without the benefit of a full record or lower court determination.’” Meier,
641 N.W.2d at 537 (quoting Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 538 (1992)
(cleaned up)). When there has been no ruling and no rule 1.904 motion, the issue
is not preserved. Bank of Am., N.A., 843 N.W.2d at 884.
We find the inverse condemnation claim is not preserved for appeal. The
only record citation provided to establish the Corwins presented the inverse
condemnation claim to the district court is to one sentence in their post-trial
briefing: “One may question why a governmental agency with the power of eminent
domain considers it appropriate to take private property without following statutory
procedures and paying just compensation.” Nothing in the district court’s ruling
indicates the district court considered this one sentence or decided any issue
underlying it—a fact that the Corwins conceded in their appellate briefing. The
Corwins never moved to request a ruling. We conclude the inverse condemnation
claim is unpreserved, and we do not address it further.
Appellants’ briefs must also conform with the rules of appellate procedure.
See Carlson v. Bankers Tr. Co., 50 N.W.2d 1, 3–4 (Iowa 1951) (“Lack of substantial
compliance may result in dismissal of the appeal.”). Appellants must include in
their brief “[a] statement addressing how the issue was preserved for appellate
review, with references to the places in the record where the issue was raised and
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decided in the district court.” Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(a)(8)(1); see, e.g., Hildreth,
2016 WL 7403705, at *1. This requirement for a statement of error preservation
is not satisfied where the only citation is to the notice of appeal. Iowa R. App. P.
6.309(2)(a)(8)(1). Even so, “it is our duty to dispose of appeals on their merits
whenever it can be done without injustice to the complaining party.” Cupps v. S &
J Tube, Inc., No. 17-1922, 2019 WL 156583, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2019)
(citing Agans v. Gen. Mills, 48 N.W.2d 242, 243 (Iowa 1951)).
The Corwins’ brief does not comply with the requirements of
rule 6.903(2)(a)(8)(1). Their singular statement of error preservation states: “The
issues in this case were preserved for appellate review by Appellant’s timely filing
of their Notice of Appeal on August 3, 2023.”7 Nonetheless, our review of the
record shows their remaining claims of error about evidence of ownership were
argued by both sides, considered by the district, and ruled on. And SCILA provided
no legal authority in support of its claim these errors were unpreserved. Because
SCILA’s argument may be deemed waived, see id. at 6.903(2)(a)(8)(3), 6.903(3),
and the record shows error was preserved on these issues, there is no injustice to
SCILA in resolving these claims on their merits. See Cupps, 2019 WL 156583,
at *2.
B. Analysis
Courts do not favor title through adverse possession; “[t]he law presumes
the possession of land is under the regular title.” I-80 Assocs., Inc. v. Chi., Rock
7 Rule 6.903(2)(a)(8) requires each separately numbered issue contain under it
first a statement of error preservation, then a scope and standard of review
statement, and third the argument section. None of these elements are present
as required in the Corwins’ briefing.
12
Island & Pac. R.R., 224 N.W.2d 8, 10 (Iowa 1974). “A party claiming title by
adverse possession must establish hostile, actual, open, exclusive and continuous
possession, under claim of right or color of title for at least ten years.” Garrett v.
Huster, 684 N.W.2d 250, 253 (Iowa 2004) (quoting C.H. Moore Tr. Est. v. City of
Storm Lake, 423 N.W.2d 13, 15 (Iowa 1988)). These elements require clear and
positive evidence. C.H. Moore Tr. Est., 423 N.W.2d at 15. Evidence offered to
prove the doctrine will be strictly construed. I-80 Assocs., 224 N.W.2d at 10.
1. Hostile, Actual, and Continuous Possession
The Corwins dispute that SCILA satisfied the hostile, actual, and continuous
elements of adverse possession. We believe the evidence shows these elements
are satisfied.
Possession of property is hostile and actual if it “is the type of possession
or control owners ordinarily exercise in holding, managing and caring for property
of like nature and condition.” Burgess v. Leverett & Assocs., 105 N.W.2d 703, 706
(Iowa 1960). The amount of activity required to satisfy these elements—such as
a claimant’s physical presence on the land, enclosure of the area, and use of the
property—is dependent on the nature of the property. See C.H. Moore Tr. Est.,
423 N.W.2d at 15 (citing Whalen v. Smith, 167 N.W. 646, 647 (Iowa 1918)). As
the Iowa Supreme Court stated:
It is manifest that the acts of ownership and dominion necessary to
indicate adverse possession of a vacant lot need not and cannot be
the same which a court or jury might think essential with respect to a
lot covered with valuable improvements, or upon which there is a
place of residence. If one asserting ownership of a vacant lot goes
upon it at reasonable intervals, marks its limits or corners with visible
monuments, clears it of brush, grass, and weeds to the limits so
indicated, and points it out as his property to his neighbors and
friends, it constitutes adverse possession within the meaning of the
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law, and when continued without interruption for a period of 10 years,
his title becomes unassailable.
Whalen, 167 N.W. at 647.
SCILA’s operations were not solely conducted on the SCILA property, they
included actual use of the disputed property, too. This finding is consistent with
evidence throughout the record. The legal description of the area covered by the
special-use permits assigned to SCILA after the 1980 Rice-SCILA purchase
included the disputed property. Trial testimony established that SCILA controls
invasive vegetation using chemical sprays and overgrowth by scraping and
mowing. Throughout the years, SCILA used the disputed property for moving
equipment, hauling materials, and borrowing soil as SCILA prepared new waste
collection sites or transferred landfill contents from one area to another. Although
the fluctuation of a landfill’s physical footprint limits a landfill’s ability to enclose the
property with fencing, SCILA still attempted to exclude trespassers from the
property—including the disputed property—by maintaining locked gates on the
access roads, which exclusively came from Highway 92. Even more, SCILA
maintains the disputed property to provide a green space buffer from the active
waste collection site.
SCILA also has a history of maintaining monitoring wells on the disputed
property. The Iowa Department of Natural Resources (DNR) requires landfills to
conduct quarterly groundwater monitoring, which detects whether landfill leachate
is contaminating nearby groundwater. While the bulk of the well structure is hidden
underground, these wells stand around three to four feet above ground. The above
ground portion includes sealed and locked casing surrounding the exposed piping
14
to prevent unauthorized access. Each well is labeled with “MW” followed by an
identification number. According to trial testimony by a DNR civil engineer, the
placement of these wells is governed by DNR regulations, performed by the DNR,
and occurs only on property owned by a landfill. The record establishes that SCILA
has conducted groundwater monitoring on the disputed parcel at least as far back
as 2009.
The above evidence supports finding that SCILA conducted continuous,
actual landfill management operations on the disputed property for an
uninterrupted period of more than ten years in a manner consistent with what
owners of similar property would exercise. No evidence was presented that a
landfill operator in the ordinary course of business would handle, manage, or care
for a buffer space on the perimeter of its waste collection zones, on which the
organization conducts water monitoring, in any different manner.8 Instead, the
evidence on the monitoring wells, operational movements, soil borrowing, and
vegetation management proves SCILA went upon the land at reasonable intervals,
maintained visible monuments on the property, periodically cleared brush in the
area, and pointed it out to the general public as SCILA property. Under
circumstances here, these facts are sufficient to establish actual possession. See,
e.g., Clear Lake Amusement Corp. v. Lewis, 18 N.W.2d 192, 195 (Iowa 1945)
8 In their initial brief, the Corwins argue, “At best, SCILA’s periodic maintenance of
these monitoring wells may establish a license or easement on the disputed
property.” But the Corwins provide no record citation showing where this issue
was raised below, and the district court did not discuss or decide this issue in its
ruling. Therefore, whether SCILA’s use of the disputed property only entitles them
to a license or easement is not properly before this court. See Meier, 641 N.W.2d
at 537.
15
(awarding title by adverse possession where the business operators had
maintained at least one dock on the waterfront property, used the property for
certain business traffic, and excluded non-paying members of the public despite
there being no fences or barriers distinguishing the disputed property from any
other).
2. Claim of Right
The Corwins’ arguments related to SCILA’s evidence of ownership, at their
core, raise the issue of whether SCILA possessed the disputed property under a
claim of right. The Corwins argue the district court erred by considering SCILA’s
monitoring wells on the disputed property evidence of ownership. The Corwins
also claim the disputed property’s tax history—specifically that SCILA has never
paid taxes on it, while Leona paid property taxes on the disputed property before
2014—shows that SCILA did not own the disputed property.9
Evidence sufficient to establish possession under a claim of right will clearly
indicate the claimant believes himself to be the true property owner. C.H. Moore
Tr. Est., 423 N.W.2d at 15. “[A]cts and conduct clearly indicat[ing] a claim of
ownership is enough” to establish a claim of right. I-80 Assocs., Inc., 224 N.W.2d
at 11 (quoting 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse Possession § 101 (1962)); see also Council
Bluffs Sav. Bank v. Simmons, 243 N.W.2d 634, 636 (Iowa 1976) (“The actual
occupation, use, and improvement of the premises by the claimant, as if he were
in fact the owner thereof without payment of rent or recognition of title in another
9 In their reply brief, the Corwins also argue for the first time that the evidence
shows SCILA knew it did not own the disputed property. This argument is not
properly before this court. Young, 480 N.W.2d at 78 (“[A]n issue cannot be
asserted for the first time in a reply brief.”).
16
or disavowal of title in himself, will be sufficient to . . . establish the fact of a claim
of right.” (quoting 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse Possession § 101)). Such evidence of a
claim of ownership “may be evidenced by a void deed, or by receiving the rents,
issues, and profits of the property, or by conveying, devising, leasing,
encumbering, or improving it, or by paying for insurance thereon, or laying off the
land into town lots.” I-80 Assocs., Inc., 224 N.W.2d at 11 (quoting 3 Am. Jur. 2d
Adverse Possession § 101). A claim of right “also may be evidenced by . . . paying
real estate taxes.” Louisa Cnty. Conservation Bd. v. Malone, 778 N.W.2d 204, 207
(Iowa Ct. App. 2009).
Until the trust brought its intended sale to SCILA’s attention in 2019, no
other party ever disputed that SCILA was the true title holder.10 As soon as SCILA
learned that another party was alleging ownership, SCILA filed its affidavit of
possession to formally notify the public of its claim to exclusive title ownership.
Like SCILA’s actual use of the property, these facts related to the claim to
ownership are similar to Clear Lake Amusement Corp., in which the Iowa Supreme
Court found that for nearly twenty years, “[the claimant’s] ownership of the entire
amusement park, including the [disputed property], was not questioned . . . .”
18 N.W.2d at 195. SCILA’s ownership claim of the SCILA property and the
disputed property endured without dispute for a significantly greater time than in
10 For reasons unknown, a boundary dispute arose between SCILA and its
southern neighbor, Raccoon Valley Bank (RVB). That dispute ended in 1987 with
RVB granting SCILA a quitclaim deed that transferred to SCILA any interest RVB
held in the disputed property. While there is no argument that RVB held title to the
disputed property, this 1987 deed provides a foundation for SCILA to claim color
of title. See Grosvenor v. Olson, 199 N.W.2d 50, 52 (Iowa 1972) (“Color of title is
that which in appearance is title but in reality is no title.”).
17
Clear Lake Amusement Corp., nearly fifty years, lasting from the Gardner-Rice
sale in 1971 to 2019 when the trust contacted SCILA in 2019.11
We disagree with the Corwins’ arguments about evidence of ownership.
SCILA’s conduct—including the maintenance of monitoring wells on the disputed
parcel—supports possession under a claim of right.
The tax history creates no conflict with this conclusion. Although SCILA has
never paid property taxes on the disputed parcel because of its tax-exempt status,
the property taxes were nonetheless assessed to SCILA from 2014 to 2021. The
Corwins admit that SCILA was assessed the taxes on the disputed property after
2014. They also admit that, as a governmental 28E agency, SCILA was exempt
from paying the taxes. SCILA’s exemption from property taxes on the disputed
parcel cannot defeat SCILA’s adverse possession claim. See Wallis v.
Clinkenbeard, 242 N.W. 86, 87 (Iowa 1932) (“”[N]eglect to pay taxes does not
preclude [acquisition of title by adverse possession].”). Considered as a whole,
the evidence shows SCILA possessed the disputed property under a claim of right.
V. Conclusion
We affirm the district court’s ruling that concluded SCILA’s action to quiet
title was not barred by the statute of limitations in section 614.14(5)(b) and SCILA
proved ownership of the disputed parcel by adverse possession.
AFFIRMED.
11 Although the 1996 change of title certificate indicates that Leona had a claim
adverse to SCILA’s claim of ownership, Leona never raised an ownership dispute
or attempted to transfer any interest in the disputed parcel, despite transferring her
interest in the Corwin parcel to the trust in 2014. Even so, the period of unopposed
claim of ownership prior to 1996 lasted twenty-five years, more than the twenty
found relevant in Clear Lake Amusement Corp. See 18 N.W.2d at 195.