In the Interest of H.S., Minor Child ( 2024 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1460
Filed November 13, 2024
IN THE INTEREST OF H.S.,
Minor Child,
H.S., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County,
Linda M. Fangman, Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Joseph G. Martin, Cedar Falls, for appellant mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Lisa Jeanes, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Tammy L. Banning of the Waterloo Juvenile Public Defender Office,
Waterloo, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Tabor, C.J., and Ahlers and Sandy, JJ.
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AHLERS, Judge.
The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of the mother and any
unknown father to a child born in 2022. Only the mother appeals. She implicitly
challenges one of the two statutory grounds for termination, contends termination
is not in the child’s best interests, and requests additional time to work toward
reunification.
We conduct de novo review of orders terminating parental rights. In re Z.K.,
973 N.W.2d 27, 32 (Iowa 2022). Our review follows a three-step process to
determine if a statutory ground for termination has been satisfied, whether
termination is in the child’s best interests, and whether any permissive exception
should be applied to preclude termination. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 294 (Iowa
2021). However, we do not address a step if the parent does not challenge it on
appeal. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). After reviewing a parent’s
claims within the three-step process, we consider any additional claims raised by
the parent. In re J.S., No. 24-1114, 2024 WL 4039439, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Sep.
4, 2024).
The juvenile court found statutory grounds authorizing termination of the
mother’s parental rights satisfied under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) and (h)
(2024). Yet the mother only implicitly challenges one of the two statutory grounds
found by the juvenile court, section 232.116(1)(h). As the mother’s rights were
terminated on multiple grounds, we may affirm on any one of those grounds. See
In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). The mother does not raise any type
of challenge to the statutory grounds for termination under section 232.116(1)(e),
waiving any challenge under that ground for termination. See, e.g., In re J.K.-O.,
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No. 24-0678, 2024 WL 3290381, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. July 3, 2024). Accordingly,
there is a statutory ground authorizing termination under section 232.116(1)(e).
We move to the next step in our three-step process—whether termination
is in the child’s best interests. When considering best interests, we “give primary
consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-
term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional
condition and needs of the child.” P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 40 (quoting Iowa Code
§ 232.116(2)). “It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency
after the State has proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by
hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable
home for the child.” Id. at 41.
As part of her best-interests argument, the mother contends that instead of
termination, it would be in the child’s best interests to return the child to her care
with appropriate safety planning in place. We disagree. The child tested positive
for illegal substances at birth. Shortly thereafter, the mother placed the child in a
guardianship with a friend because the mother could not care for the child. A little
over a year later, the guardian declined to continue in that role. Her reasons for
stepping down as guardian included her personal circumstances, but they also
included the fact that the mother was verbally abusive to the friend and would show
up for visits under the influence of drugs. As the mother still was not able to
assume care of the child at that time, the child was adjudicated to be in need of
assistance and placed in foster care. Eventually the child was placed with the
maternal grandmother, where she remained at the time of the termination hearing.
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Meanwhile, the mother continued to struggle with illegal substance use.
She completed in-patient substance-use treatment at the beginning of 2024, but in
February she tested positive for cocaine. Then, as the social worker described it,
the mother “just disappeared”—“[s]he stopped engaging in services,” [s]he
stopped going to treatment,” “[n]obody knew where she was.” She had not
attended a visit with the child for several months prior to the termination hearing.
Nor had the mother participated in the SafeCare program offered to her—a
program that would have developed the mother’s parenting skills. The mother also
has not maintained sobriety for any meaningful period outside a structured setting.
The mother conceded at the termination hearing that she could not take care of
the child by herself. Based on all this evidence, we are not persuaded that it was
in the child’s best interests to deny termination and place the child with the mother
with supervision.
As to other aspects of the best-interests-of-the-child determination, we note
that the mother lacks the level of stability necessary to safely parent a child. She
is unemployed. She has not addressed her mental-health issues and has difficulty
regulating her emotions.1 The mother’s relationship with the child is also limited.
The social worker explained that when she observed visits between the mother
1 The record reveals numerous acts of the mother’s concerning conduct. For
example, about six months before the termination hearing, the mother got upset
with her adult sister who has special needs. The mother assaulted the sister in the
presence of the child. Another example is an incident that occurred after a court
hearing shortly before the termination hearing. The mother followed the maternal
grandmother and the social worker into the parking lot. She tried to prevent the
maternal grandmother from leaving and shouted at her. When the social worker
attempted to deescalate the situation, the mother responded incoherently and then
sat on the hood of the social worker’s vehicle.
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and child, the child did not know who the mother was and was not comfortable with
the mother picking her up. Conversely, the child looks to her placement, the
maternal grandmother, to meet her needs and is comfortable in the grandmother’s
home. The grandmother has completed the necessary steps to serve as an
adoptive option. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2)(b). Following our de novo review,
we conclude termination is a necessary step in the adoptive process and would
best serve the child’s interests.
As to any permissive exceptions, while the mother’s petition on appeal cites
Iowa Code section 232.116(3), she does not explain what permissive exception, if
any, she seeks to invoke to avoid termination. Accordingly, any argument relating
to permissive exceptions to termination is waived, and we do not address it. See
In re K.B., No. 24-0284, 2024 WL 1757182, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2024).
Finally, we address the mother’s request for additional time to work toward
reunification. The court may grant a parent six additional months to work toward
reunification in lieu of termination under certain circumstances. See Iowa Code
§ 232.117(5) (permitting the court to enter a permanency order pursuant to
section 232.104 if it does not terminate parental rights); see also id.§ 232.104(2)(b) (providing a permanency option of giving an additional six months
to work toward reunification). But before the court may grant a parent such
additional time, it must be able to “enumerate the specific factors, conditions, or
expected behavioral changes which comprise the basis for the determination that
the need for removal of the child from the child’s home will no longer exist at the
end of the additional six-month period.” Id. § 232.104(2)(b).
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The mother points to recent progress she made without involvement of the
Iowa Department of Health and Human Services. Specifically, she completed
another in-patient substance-use program the month before the termination
hearing, secured housing at a transitional home where she could stay for up to a
year or perhaps longer, has a job interview, and has started mental-health
treatment. These are all crucial steps that will hopefully lead the mother to a more
stable and happy future, and we commend her for her recent progress.
Unfortunately, the mother’s efforts come too late to warrant additional time in this
proceeding. See In re A.H., 950 N.W.2d 27, 41 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020) (“And
because the parents’ efforts have come at the eleventh hour, we are not convinced
they are permanent changes signaling a safe and stable future for these
children.”). Given the mother’s past struggles, we do not believe she would be
able to demonstrate the level of stability necessary for reunification within the next
six months if she were granted more time to work toward reunification. Accordingly,
we do not grant the mother any additional time.
AFFIRMED.