State of Iowa v. Antoine Mario Grisson, Jr. ( 2019 )


Menu:
  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 19-0736
    Filed December 18, 2019
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    vs.
    ANTOINE MARIO GRISSON, JR.,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Robert J. Richter,
    District Associate Judge.
    Antoine Grisson Jr. appeals his sentence for one count of burglary in the
    third degree. AFFIRMED.
    Sharon D. Hallstoos, Dubuque, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Israel Kodiaga, Assistant Attorney
    General, for appellee.
    Considered by Bower, C.J., and May and Greer, JJ.
    2
    GREER, Judge.
    Antoine Grisson Jr. appeals his sentence for burglary in the third degree,
    arguing the district court considered improper sentencing factors and gave
    insufficient justification for his sentence. Finding his argument meritless, we affirm.
    I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
    In a written plea, Grisson pleaded guilty to one count of burglary in the third
    degree, an aggravated misdemeanor, in violation of Iowa Code sections 713.1 and
    713.6A(2) (2018). At first glance, paragraph twelve of the guilty plea appears to
    state Grisson’s understanding of the “plea negotiations.” Yet the body of the
    paragraph sets forth each parties’ sentencing recommendations. The paragraph
    states in full,
    12. I understand plea negotiations to be:
          I will plead guilty to burglary in the third degree and the State
    will recommend a suspended two (2) year jail sentence, two
    (2) years of formal probation to the Department of Correctional
    Services, a fine of $625, an LEI surcharge of $125, payment
    of restitution to [the victim], and sentencing no contact order
    protecting [the victim].
          I will not join in this recommendation, and will instead request[]
    that the court sentence me to a suspended jail sentence of
    two (2) years, two (2) years of informal probation, a fine of
    $625, an LEI surcharge of $125, payment of restitution to [the
    victim], and sentencing no contact order protecting [the
    victim].
    (Capitalization modified.) The plea clarified that the court did not have to accept
    the “negotiations.” Grisson requested to be sentenced immediately, even if he
    were not present.
    On the same day, the district court accepted the guilty plea and sentenced
    Grisson.     The court imposed the sentence the State proposed, including
    supervised probation. In determining the sentence, the court considered the Iowa
    3
    Code section 907.5 sentencing factors and also stated “the nature and
    circumstances of the crime and the [p]lea [a]greement” were “the most significant
    in determining this particular sentence.” Grisson appeals.
    II. Standard of Review.
    “When a sentence imposed by a district court falls within the statutory
    parameters, we presume it is valid and only overturn for an abuse of discretion or
    reliance on inappropriate factors.” State v. Hopkins, 
    860 N.W.2d 550
    , 554 (Iowa
    2015). “An abuse of discretion will only be found when a court acts on grounds
    clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” 
    Id. at 553
    (quoting State
    v. Leckington, 
    713 N.W.2d 208
    , 216 (Iowa 2006)).              “[W]e do not decide the
    sentence we would have imposed, but whether the sentence imposed was
    unreasonable.” 
    Id. at 554
    III. Analysis.
    At the outset, we note that Grisson does not allege the sentence falls
    outside permissible statutory bounds. Instead, he argues the district court did not
    provide adequate reasons for the sentence and improperly considered a rejected
    plea offer when it adopted the State’s sentencing recommendation.1 Grisson asks
    to have his sentence vacated and his case remanded for resentencing.
    As a predicate to sentencing a defendant, the court must “state on the
    record its reason for selecting the particular sentence.”            Iowa R. Crim. P.
    1
    Effective July 1, 2019, criminal defendants have no right to appeal from a final judgment
    of sentence in a guilty plea. See 2019 Iowa Acts ch. 140, § 28 (codified at Iowa Code
    § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2019)). However in State v. Macke, the Iowa Supreme Court held these
    amendments “apply only prospectively and do not apply to cases pending on July 1, 2019.”
    
    933 N.W.2d 226
    , 235 (Iowa 2019). For that reason, we reach the merits of Grisson’s
    claim.
    4
    2.23(3)(d). This must include “at least a cursory explanation” to allow for appellate
    review of its exercise of sentencing discretion. State v. Jacobs, 
    607 N.W.2d 679
    ,
    690 (Iowa 2000). “The district court can satisfy this requirement by . . . placing the
    reasons in the written sentencing order.” State v. Thompson, 
    856 N.W.2d 915
    ,
    919 (Iowa 2014).
    While not detailed findings, we acknowledge the trial court performed its
    obligation. As reflected in its sentencing order, the district court based its sentence
    on the Iowa Code section 907.5 sentencing factors, the nature and circumstances
    of the crime, and the plea agreement. See Iowa Code § 907.5 (setting forth the
    relevant sentencing factors). The written guilty plea incorporated the minutes of
    testimony and set forth the details of the plea, including the sentencing
    recommendations. The guilty plea did not turn on Grisson receiving a particular
    sentence. For that reason, the parties’ differing sentencing recommendations did
    not constitute rejected plea offers. Moreover, the court was not required to accept
    either recommendation.      It was not improper for the court to consider, and
    ultimately choose to impose, one of the recommendations. State v. Schlachter,
    
    884 N.W.2d 782
    , 786 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) (“[I]t is the court’s prerogative to
    determine the appropriate sentence within the terms of the applicable statute
    based on the information available to it.”). Because the court did not rely on
    improper factors and the sentence is reasonable and supported by sufficient
    justification, we conclude the sentence is valid.
    IV. Disposition.
    For the above stated reasons, we affirm Grisson’s sentence.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-0736

Filed Date: 12/18/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/18/2019