In re Wrongful Conviction of Doelz ( 2024 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
No. 125,740
In the Matter of the Wrongful Conviction of
ROBERT WILLIAM DOELZ.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
Before a person can be compensated for time spent incarcerated while wrongfully
convicted of a crime, K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(C) requires the claimant for
compensation to prove three things. First, that he or she did not commit the crime of
conviction. Second, that he or she was not an accessory or accomplice to the crime. And
third, that by demonstrating the first two requirements, the claimant obtained one of three
possible outcomes: (1) the reversal of his or her conviction; or (2) dismissal of the
charges; or (3) a finding of not guilty upon retrial.
Appeal from Shawnee District Court; TERESA L. WATSON, judge. Oral argument held November
1, 2023. Opinion filed August 9, 2024. Affirmed.
Greg N. Tourigny, of The Tourigny Law Firm, LLC, of Kansas City, Missouri, argued the cause,
and Sophie Woodworth, of Holman Schiavone, LLC, of Kansas City, Missouri, was with him on the brief
for appellant.
Dwight R. Carswell, deputy solicitor general, argued the cause, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney
general, was with him on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
STEGALL, J.: In 2019, this court reversed Robert William Doelz' conviction for
possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. We found Doelz' Fourth
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Amendment rights had been violated by a warrantless search and concluded that the fruits
of that search should have been suppressed. State v. Doelz, 309 Kan. 133, 142, 432 P.3d
669 (2019). On remand, the State dropped the charge and did not pursue a retrial.
Doelz then filed a petition under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-5004 seeking
compensation for the more than four years he spent in prison for the now reversed
conviction. In order to recover statutory compensation under our wrongful conviction
scheme, a claimant must establish by a preponderance of evidence that:
"(A) The claimant was convicted of a felony crime and subsequently imprisoned;
"(B) the claimant's judgment of conviction was reversed or vacated and either the
charges were dismissed or on retrial the claimant was found to be not guilty;
"(C) the claimant did not commit the crime or crimes for which the claimant was
convicted and was not an accessory or accomplice to the acts that were the basis of the
conviction and resulted in a reversal or vacation of the judgment of conviction, dismissal
of the charges or finding of not guilty on retrial; and
"(D) the claimant did not commit or suborn perjury, fabricate evidence, or by the
claimant's own conduct cause or bring about the conviction. Neither a confession nor
admission later found to be false or a guilty plea shall constitute committing or suborning
perjury, fabricating evidence or causing or bringing about the conviction under this
subsection." K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1).
The State and Doelz filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The parties
agreed that Doelz had satisfied the requirements in K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(A),
(B), and (D)—he was convicted of a felony crime, imprisoned because of that conviction,
his conviction was reversed, the charges were dismissed, and he did not commit perjury
or fabricate evidence. At issue both in the district court—and now here on appeal—was
what, precisely, a claimant must prove under subsection (c)(1)(C).
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In denying both motions for summary judgment, the district court held that K.S.A.
2023 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(C) requires a claimant to establish that the fact the claimant
did not commit the crime resulted in one of three outcomes—either the reversal or
vacation of the conviction, the dismissal of the charges, or a finding of not guilty on
retrial. As to the first possible outcome, the lower court found that Doelz' conviction was
reversed on appeal because of a Fourth Amendment violation, not because Doelz did not
commit the crime. As to the third possible outcome, the court noted that Doelz was not
retried. Finally, considering the second option—a dismissal of the charges—the lower
court found that because the summary judgment record contained no evidence as to why
the charges were dismissed, there remained a disputed issue of material fact to be
resolved at trial.
The district court then conducted a bench trial in August 2022. Doelz testified that
he was innocent of the charged crime because the drugs were not his. After Doelz rested,
the State moved for judgment as a matter of law because Doelz did not produce any
evidence that the charge against him was dismissed because he did not commit the crime.
The district court granted the motion. In doing so, the district court declined to make a
factual finding one way or the other concerning Doelz' alleged innocence. Instead, the
district court found that Doelz "did not offer any evidence that the reason for the
dismissal was because he did not commit the crime for which Claimant was convicted."
As such, the district court held that this "lack of evidence of one element required to be
proven under the Act means the rest of the claim fails as well. Because Claimant has
failed to prove a necessary element of his claim, there is no need to address the other
elements."
Doelz timely filed a direct appeal to this court. See K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004(l)
("The decision of the district court may be appealed directly to the supreme court
pursuant to the code of civil procedure."). His appeal puts this question squarely before
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us: does K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(C) require—as an element of a claim for
compensation—a causal connection between a claim of innocence and an ultimate
outcome? We answer yes. Today we adopt the district court's interpretation of the statute
and affirm the district court's grant of the State's motion for judgment as a matter of law,
because Doelz failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the State dismissed
the charge against him because he did not commit the crime.
DISCUSSION
We apply the same standard as the district court when evaluating a district court's
ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, resolving all facts and inferences
drawn from the evidence in favor of the party seeking review. Scott v. Hughes, 294 Kan.
403, 412, 275 P.3d 890 (2012). When the district court's decision is based on the
interpretation of a statute, we exercise unlimited review. The most fundamental rule of
statutory interpretation is that the intent of the Legislature governs if that intent can be
ascertained. We look first to the plain language of the statute, giving common words their
ordinary meaning. Only if a statute is ambiguous will we resort to examining legislative
history or canons of statutory construction. State v. Angelo, 316 Kan. 438, 450-51, 518
P.3d 27 (2022).
Here, the plain language of the statute is inadequate to determine its meaning.
K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(C) reads in full:
"[T]he claimant did not commit the crime or crimes for which the claimant was
convicted and was not an accessory or accomplice to the acts that were the basis of the
conviction and resulted in a reversal or vacation of the judgment of conviction, dismissal
of the charges or finding of not guilty on retrial."
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The sentence structure is grammatically obtuse, if not simply wrong. The phrase
"and resulted in" has no predicate, leaving a reader to wonder without clear answer—
what resulted in? We cannot tell from the plain language. Although a simple word
substitute does fix the plain meaning into grammatically sensible prose. Changing the
phrase "and resulted in" to "which resulted in" makes the meaning plain and gives rise to
at least a suspicion that this is what the Legislature meant. We are not free, however, to
simply rewrite statutes or alter words to achieve greater clarity. League of Women Voters
of Kansas v. Schwab, 317 Kan. 805, 814, 539 P.3d 1022 (2023) (this court relies only on
the text of the statute, and cannot "determine what the law should or should not be");
State v. Gray, 306 Kan. 1287, 1294, 403 P.3d 1220 (2017) ("[W]e read the statutory
language as it appears, without adding or deleting words.").
Instead, we must conclude that this error in the language creates an ambiguity of
meaning. Thus, we will "move to construction—employing canons, searching legislative
history, and identifying substantive background considerations—to define and
accomplish legislative purpose." State v. Jordan, 303 Kan. 1017, 1021, 370 P.3d 417(2016).
The legislative history of K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004 demonstrates that the
Legislature only intended this statute to compensate the factually innocent. The three
legislators who explained their votes discussed the importance of providing compensation
for those that are wrongfully convicted and later exonerated because of actual innocence.
The written testimonies reflected the same concerns. The Innocence Project referred to
those who have spent time "behind bars for crimes they did not commit." Hearing on S.B.
336 Before the Kansas Senate Judiciary Committee (Feb. 14, 2018) (testimony of
Michelle Feldman). The ACLU Policy Director pointed to individuals that have been
proven innocent due to DNA testing. Hearing on H.B. 2579 Before the House Committee
on the Judiciary (Feb. 14, 2018) (testimony of Vignesh Ganapathy). The testimonies
frequently referenced Lamonte McIntyre, Richard Jones, and Floyd Bledsoe, all three of
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whom were exonerated after their convictions were set aside because they were
determined to be actually innocent. Professor Alice Craig referred to pop culture story
lines, "[f]rom Roger Thornhill in North by Northwest, Andy Dufresne in Shawshank
Redemption and Tom Robinson in To Kill a Mockingbird." Hearing on S.B. 336 Before
the Kansas Senate Judiciary Committee (Feb. 14, 2018) (testimony of Prof. Alice Craig).
And many of the testimonies discussed expungement and exoneration, rather than simply
reversed convictions. See Exonerate, Black's Law Dictionary 721 (11th ed. 2019) ("To
clear of all blame; to officially declare [a person] to be free of guilt."); Exoneree, Black's
Law Dictionary 722 (11th ed. 2019) ("Someone who is relieved of blame, responsibility,
or accusation; esp., someone who is officially cleared from a wrongful criminal
conviction."); Expunge, Black's Law Dictionary 727 (11th ed. 2019) ("To remove from a
record, list, or book; to erase or destroy."); Expungement of Record, Black's Law
Dictionary 727 (11th ed. 2019) ("The removal of a conviction . . . from a person's
criminal record.").
This history plainly indicates the Legislature intended to compensate only
individuals who are determined to be actually or factually innocent. It did not intend to
compensate every criminal defendant whose conviction was reversed on appeal. See In re
Spangler, 318 Kan. 697, 700, 706, 547 P.3d 516 (2024) (concluding the Legislature
intended to restrict compensation under K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004 to "[o]nly someone
innocent of the criminal conduct," and holding "the claimant must show factual
innocence from the charges giving rise to criminal liability before receiving
compensation").
Given this clear legislative purpose, it is apparent that the suspected meaning of
K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(C) is in fact its intended meaning—that is, the
Legislature intended to require in this subsection that a claimant for compensation must
prove three things. First, that he or she did not commit the crime of conviction. Second,
that he or she was not an accessory or accomplice to the crime. And third, that by
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demonstrating the first two requirements, the claimant obtained one of three possible
outcomes: (1) the reversal of his or her conviction; or (2) dismissal of the charges; or
(3) a finding of not guilty upon retrial. In other words, that the first two elements
"resulted in" one of three possible outcomes.
Below, the trial court provided Doelz the opportunity to prove up his central
claim—that the prosecutor, on remand, dismissed the charges because Doelz did not
actually commit the crime. But Doelz offered no evidence to show this, and in fact he
now admits there is no such evidence. Instead, he makes a legal argument that because
his conviction was reversed, he is once more cloaked in the presumption of innocence
which is sufficient as a matter of law to prove both that he "did not commit the crime"
and that his case was dismissed because of his innocence.
Doelz' arguments are unavailing. As demonstrated above, the statute's legislative
history makes it clear that the overarching intent of the statute is to provide redress for
individuals who are actually innocent. This is a distinct category from the "legal"
innocence that Doelz attempts to rely on. Legal innocence is "'"[t]he absence of one or
more procedural or legal bases"'" supporting a conviction and sentence, while "actual
innocence refers to '"[t]he absence of facts that are prerequisites for the sentence given to
a defendant."'" Nadeem v. State, 298 Neb. 329, 337, 904 N.W.2d 244 (2017).
Determining whether a person is "actually innocent" does not require inquiring into "the
legal status of a petitioner's conviction . . . . Rather, actual innocence is an inquiry of
historical fact." In re Lester, 602 S.W.3d 469, 475 (Tex. 2020). "In other words, actual
innocence means that a defendant did not commit the crime for which he or she is
charged. Or, as the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, 'A prototypical example of "actual
innocence" in a colloquial sense is the case where the State has convicted the wrong
person of the crime.'" Nadeem, 298 Neb. at 337. "The discretionary decision of the State
to dismiss the case does not establish actual innocence." Rhoades v. State, 880 N.W.2d
431, 447 (Iowa 2016).
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When K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(C) mandates a claimant for compensation
prove both that he "did not commit the crime" and that this "resulted in" either a reversal,
a dismissal, or a not guilty verdict, the statute is describing "actual innocence" as opposed
to mere "legal innocence." Doelz objects that because he cannot control the fact that he
was not retried, this result is "unfair" because it burdens him more heavily than other
claimants who could seek relief under one of the other two alternatives (either reversal or
a not guilty verdict because of actual innocence).
We take his point to heart—that it is possible a criminal defendant could be both
actually innocent and the victim of an unconstitutional search. But the Legislature clearly
anticipated this possibility by providing that a claimant can also prevail by demonstrating
that a charge was dismissed after remand because of actual innocence. Doelz—and
similarly situated claimants in the future—would have been free to use the evidentiary
tools of this civil proceeding to investigate and present to a fact-finder the motivating
reason and underlying facts that sit behind a prosecutor's decision not to continue to
pursue charges after a reversal by the appellate courts. But he did not.
Affirmed.
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