State v. Hambright ( 2024 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
No. 124,878
STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,
v.
GERALD D. HAMBRIGHT,
Appellant.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, appellate
courts review the evidence in a light most favorable to the State to determine whether a
rational fact-finder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appellate courts do not reweigh evidence, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or weigh in on
witness credibility.
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed April 28, 2023.
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; BRUCE C. BROWN, judge. Oral argument held December 14, 2023.
Opinion filed April 5, 2024. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is reversed, and
the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals. Judgment of the district court on the single issue before us
is affirmed.
Kasper Schirer, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the briefs for
appellant.
Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Marc Bennett, district attorney,
Derek Schmidt, former attorney general, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, were with him on the
briefs for appellee.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
LUCKERT, C.J.: The Legislature has made it a crime for certain felons to possess a
weapon. In doing so, the Legislature defined a weapon as "a firearm or a knife" and
defined "knife" as "a dagger, dirk, switchblade, stiletto, straight-edged razor or any other
dangerous or deadly cutting instrument of like character." K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6304(c).
The State first charged Gerald D. Hambright with violating this statute by possessing a
knife. Before trial, it amended the charge to unlawful possession of a dagger.
A jury convicted Hambright. He appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising multiple
claims of error and seeking reversal of his conviction. The Court of Appeals addressed
only one issue—Hambright's claim the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he
possessed a dagger. The Court of Appeals agreed with his claim, holding that "the State
failed to present sufficient evidence of what characteristics the object Hambright
possessed made it a dagger." State v. Hambright, No. 124,878, 2023 WL 3143654, at *6
(Kan. App. 2023) (unpublished opinion).
On review of that decision, we reverse the Court of Appeals and hold the State
presented sufficient evidence for a jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that
Hambright possessed a dagger. The jury saw the dagger and heard details about the
length of its blade and other descriptive characteristics, including that it had a sharp edge
and pointed end. From this physical evidence, the jury could—and did—apply its
knowledge and common sense to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Hambright
possessed a dagger. Our rejection of Hambright's sufficiency issue does not end
Hambright's appeal, however, because he raised other issues the Court of Appeals did not
need to reach after it determined the evidence was insufficient. We remand his appeal to
the Court of Appeals for it to consider whether any other error occurred.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A Sedgwick County sheriff's deputy was dispatched to a rural area to investigate a
"suspicious character." He found Hambright resting on the side of a dirt road and asked
about Hambright's welfare. The deputy offered to give Hambright a ride to a gas station.
Hambright accepted and stood up to go with the deputy. The deputy noticed an object in
a sheath on Hambright's belt and asked Hambright to put the object in Hambright's
backpack. The deputy explained he would put the backpack in the trunk. Hambright
complied. The deputy later learned that Hambright had been convicted of a felony about
two years before the encounter. The conviction meant Hambright could not possess a
weapon, such as a knife or dagger.
The State charged Hambright with the unlawful possession of a knife in violation
of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6304. Shortly before trial, Hambright moved to dismiss the
prosecution, citing State v. Harris, 311 Kan. 816, 467 P.3d 504 (2020), for support. In
Harris, this court held the words "or any other dangerous or deadly cutting instrument of
like character" in the residual clause of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6304's definition of "knife"
are unconstitutionally vague on their face because they provide no explicit and objective
standard of enforcement. 311 Kan. at 824-25. Citing this holding, Hambright argued that
post-Harris "a defendant is guilty of a violation of K.S.A. 21-6304 only if it is found that
the defendant possessed a dagger, dirk, switchblade, stiletto, or straight-edged razor. . . .
In this matter, there is no evidence or accusations establishing that Mr. Hambright
possessed a 'knife' within the definition provided by K.S.A. 21-6304(c)(1)."
During a pretrial hearing on the motion, the State told the judge it would file an
amended information changing the charge from possession of a "knife" to possession of a
"dagger." The State specifically referenced language in the Harris dissent that quoted a
dictionary and defined "dagger" as a "'short, pointed blade, used for stabbing.'" Harris,
311 Kan. at 832 (Biles, J., dissenting) (citing Webster's New World College Dictionary
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372 [5th ed. 2014]). The district court allowed the State to amend the charge, which the
State did.
At the jury trial, the deputy testified about his interaction with Hambright. The
State also showed the jury a video recorded by the deputy's body camera. A sheathed
object hanging from Hambright's belt is visible in the recording. The State also admitted
the object and photographs of it. The photographs show a fixed, sharp-edged blade with a
pointed end and the nylon sheath. Two photographs include a ruler positioned to show
the length of the blade and the handle. The blade and the handle each measure roughly
4.5 to 5 inches long, making the object about 9 to 10 inches long. The deputy also
described the sharp, nonserrated blade. The deputy frequently used the word "knife"
when referring to the object but never used the word "dagger" during his testimony. The
State presented no evidence other than the deputy's testimony and the exhibits of the
object that had been on Hambright's belt, the photographs, and the video.
Hambright moved for a judgment of acquittal after the State presented its
evidence. He argued the State failed to prove the object he possessed was a dagger. The
district court denied the motion, and the case was ultimately submitted to the jury for
determination of Hambright's guilt.
The district court instructed the jury about the elements of criminal possession of a
weapon. In doing so, the court defined "weapon" to include a "firearm or knife" and
defined "knife" to mean a "dagger, dirk, switchblade, stiletto or straight razor." No
definition of "dagger" was included in the jury instructions. Nor did the instructions
include the residual clause in the definition of knife found in K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-
6304(c) that refers to "any other dangerous or deadly cutting instrument of like
character." The jury convicted Hambright of criminal possession of a weapon by a felon.
4
Hambright appealed, making several arguments. Along with the sufficiency
argument before us, he contended the instruction defining a "knife" was overly broad, the
prosecutor committed misconduct, and cumulative error required reversal of this
conviction. The Court of Appeals three-member panel considered only the sufficiency
argument. A majority of the panel held that the State had failed to present sufficient
evidence that Hambright possessed a dagger. That holding alone required reversal of
Hambright's conviction, leaving no need to address his other claims. 2023 WL 3143654,
at *6.
On the sufficiency issue, the Court of Appeals majority noted the jury instructions
did not define "dagger" and it concluded there was no commonly understood definition.
Based on those circumstances, the majority held that "the State provided no evidence,
expert or otherwise, that the object Hambright handed the officer . . . was a dagger. Faced
with these circumstances, we cannot say that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt
Hambright possessed a dagger in violation of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6304(c)(1)." 2023
WL 3143654, at *6.
One panel member dissented. She concluded the evidence sufficed to show
Hambright's object fit within a "reasonable and practical" understanding of the term
"dagger," which she defined to be "'a weapon with a short, pointed blade, used for
stabbing.'" 2023 WL 3143654, at *7 (Cline, J., dissenting) (quoting Webster's New
World College Dictionary 372 [5th ed. 2016]). She also criticized the majority for
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defense rather than the State as
required by the standard for reviewing sufficiency issues. 2023 WL 3143654, at *6-9
(Cline, J., dissenting).
The State petitioned for review. Hambright conditionally cross-petitioned for
review of the issues the panel had declined to address. We granted the State's petition for
review and Hambright's conditional cross-petition and have jurisdiction under K.S.A. 20-
5
3018(b) (providing for petition for review of Court of Appeals decisions) and K.S.A. 60-
2101(b) (Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review Court of Appeals decisions).
ANALYSIS
1. Sufficient Evidence
Appellate courts apply a well-established standard of review when a party
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence: We "review the evidence in a light most
favorable to the State to determine whether a rational fact-finder could have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Buchanan, 317 Kan. 443, 454, 531
P.3d 1198 (2023). In that review, we do not reweigh evidence, resolve evidentiary
conflicts, or weigh witness credibility. 317 Kan. at 454.
It is through that lens we consider the Court of Appeals majority's holding that the
State failed to prove the charge that Hambright possessed "a weapon, to wit: dagger" in
violation of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6304(a)(3)(A). Hambright, 2023 WL 3143654, at *6.
We reach a different conclusion than did the Court of Appeals majority and hold the
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient for a
rational fact-finder to return a verdict finding Hambright guilty of possessing a dagger.
Our analysis is straightforward and relies on two well-established legal principles.
First, we apply the principle that jurors may use their common knowledge and experience
when assessing witness testimony and examining evidence and may apply their
understanding of the common, ordinary words. State v. Sieg, 315 Kan. 526, 531-32,
509 P.3d 535 (2022) (jurors could use common knowledge and experience to conclude a
spoon was drug paraphernalia; evidence sufficient even though no direct evidence).
Second, we apply a corollary legal principle providing that courts will assume the
Legislature intends a word to be used in its "'"ordinary, contemporary, common
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meaning"'" if the Legislature does not define it. Midwest Crane & Rigging, LLC v.
Kansas Corporation Comm'n, 306 Kan. 845, 851, 397 P.3d 1205 (2017) (quoting Walters
v. Metro. Educ. Enterprises, Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 207, 117 S. Ct. 660, 136 L. Ed. 2d 644[1997]); see also State v. Sandoval, 308 Kan. 960, 425 P.3d 365 (2018) (applying same
rule to interpretation of Kansas sentencing statute). A common dictionary definition is a
good source to discern the ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning of a word.
Midwest Crane, 306 Kan. at 851.
Applying these principles to the facts in the light most favorable to the State, we
begin with a common dictionary's definition of dagger as a "weapon with a short, pointed
blade used for stabbing." Webster's New World College Dictionary 372 (5th ed. 2017).
This definition was quoted in the dissent in Harris, 311 Kan. at 832 (Biles, J., dissenting),
and referred to by the court, the prosecutor, and Hambright's attorney throughout the
court proceedings. While Hambright's attorney argued the definition was not found in the
Harris majority or in Black's Law Dictionary, those points are irrelevant because we are
not looking for a legal definition but for the ordinary, contemporary, and common
meaning of the word. See Midwest Crane, 306 Kan. at 851.
Considering that common meaning and using common knowledge, a reasonable
jury could conclude Hambright's object was a dagger. Dagger is not an unfamiliar term,
and the jury had the knife itself to examine. It also had pictures of the knife, two of which
included a ruler to help determine the length of the blade (about 4.5 to 5 inches) and the
handle (of equal length). Those pictures depict a blade with a pointed end. From this
evidence, a reasonable person could conclude the weapon was short, it had a pointed
blade, and it could be used for stabbing. From common knowledge and experience, a jury
could conclude the object was a dagger without having a witness use the term or describe
or define what is meant by "dagger."
7
With that analysis in mind, we next explain why we disagree with the Court of
Appeals majority and its holding that the evidence failed to support the jury verdict. The
Court of Appeals began its analysis on common ground with ours; it recited the well-
established standard of review for claims of insufficient evidence. But rather than looking
at the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, it examined the evidence in
Hambright's favor. In doing so, the Court of Appeals majority referred to illustrations in
some dictionaries and concluded the object Hambright possessed was more like a hunting
or Bowie knife than a dagger. 2023 WL 3143654, at *5. Reaching this conclusion
required the majority to reweigh the evidence.
To justify this reweighing, the Court of Appeals majority first noted that the jury
instructions did not define the word "dagger" and that no witness described the
characteristics of a dagger or identified the object in Hambright's possession as a dagger.
This led the majority to conclude that no evidence "support[ed] the jury finding the object
was actually a dagger as opposed to merely being a 'dangerous or deadly cutting
instrument of like character.' K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6304(c)(1)." Hambright, 2023 WL
3143654, at *2. This statement, quoting the residual clause from the statutory definition
of "knife," frames two of the majority's rationales for its decision. Neither rationale
justifies reversing Hambright's conviction.
First, the majority seemed concerned the jury might have relied on the portion of
the statute we found unconstitutionally vague in Harris. 2023 WL 3143654, at *2 (citing
Harris, 311 Kan. at 826). But as the State argues in its petition for review, there is no
reason to believe the jury relied on the unconstitutional residual clause. The judge did not
include language about a dangerous or deadly cutting instrument of like character in the
jury instruction. Nor did the parties or the court otherwise make the jury aware of the
residual clause. The majority's concern was thus misplaced.
8
Second, the Hambright Court of Appeals majority extended the Harris holding
and its underlying discussion of the legal concepts surrounding unconstitutional
vagueness to the circumstance of this case. The majority concluded that the State was
"effectively only paying lip service" to Harris because it left "the jury to resolve a point
of vagueness or ambiguity by its own subjective interpretation." 2023 WL 3143654, at
*2. But Harris' holding and its rationale do not apply here.
For starters, Hambright brings a sufficiency challenge, not a constitutional
vagueness challenge to the statute. He has thus waived any vagueness arguments. See
State v. Betts, 316 Kan. 191, 197, 514 P.3d 341 (2022). Given the difference in the issue
presented here and the one considered in Harris, the Harris analysis has little relevance
to the outcome of this appeal. Beyond that fundamental disconnect, we do not agree with
Hambright's argument and the majority's conclusion that requiring the jury to consider
whether an object is a dagger, dirk, switchblade, stiletto, or straight razor "effectively
only pay[s] lip service to Harris'" holding. 2023 WL 3143654, at *2. As written, K.S.A.
2018 Supp. 21-6304 conveys that the Legislature perceived the words dagger, dirk,
switchblade, stiletto, or straight razor to be ones that "are easily and reasonably
understood to describe per se dangerous or deadly cutting instruments." 311 Kan. at 832
(Biles, J., dissenting). We can reach this conclusion because courts assume the
Legislature intends the word to be used in its "'"ordinary, contemporary, common
meaning,''" if the Legislature does not define the word. Midwest Crane & Rigging, LLC,
306 Kan. at 851.
Throughout the proceedings, the district court implicitly adopted this concept. The
parties and the court discussed the common meaning of "dagger" during pretrial hearings
and at the instruction conference. At the pretrial hearing, the State referred to the
dictionary definition of "dagger" cited in the Harris dissent. 311 Kan. at 832 (Biles, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Webster's New World College Dictionary 372 [5th ed. 2014]). Then,
the State asked the district court to include that definition in the jury instructions.
9
Hambright objected because the definition was not in the Harris majority opinion or
Black's Law Dictionary. The district court chose not to define the word "dagger" for the
jury. This decision aligns with the principle the Legislature intended for the word to have
its ordinary meaning.
The district court's decision also reflects another corollary principle providing that
district courts need not define a term in a jury instruction if the term is widely used,
readily comprehensible, and has no technical, legal meaning. State v. Armstrong, 299
Kan. 405, 440, 324 P.3d 1052 (2014). The court also told the jury it could use its
common knowledge and experience when weighing the evidence. And the parties'
arguments to the jury implicitly acknowledged that the jurors could apply their common
understanding of the term "dagger." Both the prosecutor and defense counsel told the
jurors it was for them to decide whether the object was a dagger. These principles justify
the district court's decision.
On appeal, however, Hambright argues the State had to present evidence about the
characteristics of a dagger or provide expert testimony that the object Hambright
possessed was a dagger. The State, in its petition for review, argues the Court of Appeals
majority erred in entertaining Hambright's argument. It contends that Hambright, by
objecting to the State's proposed definition in the jury instructions, invited any error
arising from the failure to define the word "dagger." In making the argument, the State
concedes invited error usually has no role in a sufficiency analysis.
The State's concession correctly reflects our caselaw, and this appeal presents no
reason to deviate from that typical situation. Our task is to examine the evidence, and
Hambright's objection did not restrict the admission of evidence. Instead, it impacted the
wording of the jury instruction. But Hambright presents no issue of instructional error.
We thus conclude the invited error doctrine does not preclude Hambright's argument.
10
Our disagreement with the State on that procedural ground does little to advance
Hambright's overall argument because we reject his contention that the State had to
present expert testimony or that of another witness discussing the characteristics of a
dagger. The Court of Appeals majority also rejected this argument, at least in part, by
concluding "the State need not necessarily present expert testimony." 2023 WL 3143654,
at *5.
Hambright in his conditional cross-petition for review presents no authorities
suggesting the majority reached the wrong conclusion. In his briefing, he had cited cases
from other jurisdictions in which the government presented expert testimony about
whether a particular object was a dagger. See State v. Threlkeld, 314 Or. App. 433, 435-
36, 496 P.3d 1147 (2021); People v. Castillolopez, 63 Cal. 4th 322, 324-27, 371 P.3d 216(2016); People v. Willson, 272 A.D.2d 959, 959, 708 N.Y.S.2d 668 (2000). But none of
those cases suggest that discerning whether an object is a dagger requires scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge requiring expert testimony. See K.S.A. 2023
Supp. 60-456 (admission of opinion evidence).
That brings us to the fundamental point of our disagreement with the Court of
Appeals majority. While the majority recognized the general proposition that a jury may
rely on its common understanding of words in jury instructions, unless instructed
otherwise, it concluded "there does not appear to be a common definition of dagger for
the jury to apply. At the very least, there are ambiguities among the universe of potential
definitions of that term." 2023 WL 3143654, at *5. To support this conclusion, the
majority quoted 12 definitions of "dagger." These definitions span almost 50 years of
dictionary publications. They differ slightly from each other, and the Court of Appeals
majority seized on these differences and pointed out how Hambright's object did not
match every aspect of the various definitions.
11
For example, the Court of Appeals majority pointed out that a few definitions refer
to daggers as having "sharp edges" unlike the single, sharp edge on Hambright's object.
2023 WL 3143654, at *4 (citing, e.g., Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary
344-45 [1988]). Other definitions referred to a "swordlike" object or a "sword," which
again has dual, sharp edges. E.g., Random House Webster's College Dictionary 342
(1991); Random House American Dictionary and Family Reference Library 304 (1968).
Concluding these differences created ambiguities, the majority applied the rule of
lenity, a rule of statutory construction under which courts read any statutory ambiguity in
favor of the criminal defendant. The majority said little more about how a rule of
statutory interpretation applied to a sufficiency claim before it held that the State failed to
provide "evidence, expert or otherwise, that the object Hambright handed to the officer—
which the officer repeatedly described as a 'knife'—was a dagger. Faced with these
circumstances, we cannot say that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt Hambright
possessed a dagger in violation of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6304(c)(1)." 2023 WL 3143654,
at *6. Again, much of this reasoning focuses on whether the statute is vague—a separate
issue from sufficiency. In this way, as the Court of Appeals dissent notes, the majority
reached "beyond the issue Hambright brought before us." 2023 WL 3143654, at *8
(Cline, J., dissenting).
The remaining portion of the majority's holding is that "there does not appear to be
a common definition of dagger for the jury to apply." 2023 WL 3143654, at *5. We
disagree. While there are differences in the 12 definitions cited by the Court of Appeals
majority, at their core they say the same thing, which is captured in the most recent of the
quoted definitions. That definition states a common, contemporary understanding of a
dagger as a "weapon with a short, pointed blade used for stabbing." Webster's New
World College Dictionary 372 (5th ed. 2017).
12
The Court of Appeals majority also held that the evidence was insufficient to meet
that basic definition. It pointed out that, "[h]ere, the State presented no evidence the
object Hambright possessed was, by its design, to be used for stabbing." 2023 WL
3143654, at *4. Although the majority recognized Hambright's "object obviously could
be used for stabbing," it added "the same is true of many paring knives, letter openers,
kitchen knives, and numerous other pointed objects, all of which would not be considered
a dagger under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6304(c)(1)." 2023 WL 3143654, at *4. With this
analysis, the majority again strayed into vagueness principles not relevant to Hambright's
sufficiency challenge. As relevant to the evidence's sufficiency, the majority's
requirement of direct evidence about the purpose of the knife's design ignores that
circumstantial evidence can prove even the gravest offense. See State v. Gibson,
311 Kan. 732, 742, 466 P.3d 919 (2020).
Hambright's arguments to the jury implicitly recognized the object's design meant
it could be used as a weapon, but he told the jury he did not intend to use it as a weapon
or for stabbing. He suggested it view the video, which showed his peaceful behavior to
support that conclusion. His intent was not at issue, however. And the circumstantial
evidence and the jury's common knowledge could establish what the Court of Appeals
majority recognized: The object could be used for stabbing. Any reliance on a lack of
evidence about the possible use of the object for stabbing thus does not undermine the
sufficiency of the evidence.
In sum, a rational jury could use its knowledge and experience to apply the
common, contemporary, and ordinary meaning of the word "dagger" and conclude
Hambright's object was a "weapon with a short, pointed blade used for stabbing."
Webster's New World College Dictionary 372 (5th ed. 2017). In other words, the
evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the State was sufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Hambright possessed a dagger.
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2. Remand of Other Issues
Hambright raised other challenges that the Court of Appeals majority declined to
address because it concluded those issues were moot after it reversed Hambright's
conviction. We granted Hambright's conditional cross-petition for review on these issues.
See Hambright, 2023 WL 3143654, at *6.
When issues were presented to but not decided by the Court of Appeals and then
preserved for our review, we may "consider and decide the issues, remand the appeal to
the Court of Appeals for decision of the issues, or dispose of the issues as [we] deem
appropriate." Kansas Supreme Court Rule 8.03(j)(5) (2024 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 60). Here,
we remand to the Court of Appeals for its decision on the remaining issues.
Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is reversed, and the
case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. Judgment of the district
court on the single issue before us is affirmed.
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