State v. Cazee-Watkins ( 2022 )


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  •                            NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
    No. 124,030
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
    STATE OF KANSAS,
    Appellee,
    v.
    KYLE RAY CAZEE-WATKINS,
    Appellant.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appeal from Shawnee District Court; JASON GEIER, judge. Opinion filed October 7, 2022.
    Affirmed.
    Corrine E. Gunning, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.
    Steven J. Obermeier, assistant solicitor general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for
    appellee.
    Before SCHROEDER, P.J., MALONE, J., and TIMOTHY LAHEY, S.J.
    PER CURIAM: Kyle Ray Cazee-Watkins appeals the district court's restitution
    order following his conviction of aggravated battery and other charges. Cazee-Watkins
    claims: (1) the district court erred when it ordered him to pay $3,150 for the damage to
    the victim's car and (2) Kansas' criminal restitution statutory scheme violates Apprendi v.
    New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    , 
    120 S. Ct. 2348
    , 
    147 L. Ed. 2d 435
     (2000). We reject Cazee-
    Watkins' claims and affirm the district court's judgment.
    1
    FACTS
    In October 2019, the State charged Cazee-Watkins with nine felonies and one
    misdemeanor. Several of these charges related to a car crash that Cazee-Watkins caused
    while trying to flee from a police officer. Ultimately, Cazee-Watkins agreed to plead
    guilty to one count of felony aggravated assault, one count of criminal possession of a
    weapon, and one count of aggravated battery in exchange for a dismissal of the remaining
    charges. The aggravated battery count derived from the car wreck. As part of his plea
    agreement, Cazee-Watkins agreed "to pay all verifiable restitution including restitution
    for dismissed charges."
    At sentencing, the district court found Cazee-Watkins' criminal history score to be
    an A and sentenced him to 48 months' imprisonment followed by 12 months' postrelease
    supervision. The State then asked the court to order $8,940.03 in restitution on behalf of
    the victim of the car crash, Amanda Hall. This figure represented the bill for her
    ambulance ride and the value of the replacement car that she bought after the wreck.
    Cazee-Watkins asked the court to reserve ruling on the restitution issue and requested a
    separate hearing on the matter, which the court granted.
    At the restitution hearing, Hall testified about the losses she incurred as a result of
    the wreck. Hall testified that she was driving with her husband and son, when Cazee-
    Watkins crashed into them in an intersection. She described the damage to her 2018
    Dodge Journey, testifying, "The front end was smashed in and it was totaled, It was
    beyond repair for us to get it fixed." Hall testified that she had taken out a loan for
    $27,000 to purchase the car and had been making monthly payments of $350 for "at least
    eight or nine months." A few weeks after the wreck, Hall bought a 2015 Town & Country
    as a replacement car for $7,745.83 because she was not "going to be able to use the
    Journey anymore and [she] needed transportation." Hall did not have insurance coverage
    when the accident occurred, so the replacement car was an out-of-pocket expense. Hall
    2
    was also taken to the hospital in an ambulance after the accident, and although her health
    insurance covered most of the bills, she was left with a bill of $1,194.20.
    After the evidence was presented, the State requested that Cazee-Watkins be
    ordered to pay Hall for the value of her replacement car, $7,745.83, and $1,194.20 for the
    cost of her ambulance trip, for a total of $8,940.03. Cazee-Watkins did not contest the
    ambulance bill, but he argued that the loss for Hall's totaled Dodge Journey should be "at
    the maximum, what she invested in the vehicle." Alternatively, Cazee-Watkins contended
    that the fair amount of restitution for Hall's car should be "zero because . . . she would
    have paid $350.00 for those eight months if she was leasing it."
    The district court ordered Cazee-Watkins to pay $1,194.20 for the ambulance bill.
    As for the Dodge Journey, the district court rejected the State's request of $7,745.83 for
    the replacement cost of the new car, finding that amount was not the proper measure of
    damages. Instead, the district court found the proper measure of damages was Hall's
    "equity" in the Dodge Journey, which the court calculated as $3,150 based on her $350
    monthly payment for nine months. Incorrectly adding the two amounts, the district court
    ordered total restitution of $4,354.20, but the journal entry of judgment correctly states
    the total restitution as $4,344.20. The district court ordered Cazee-Watkins to begin
    paying restitution while in prison at the rate of $20 per month, with that amount rising to
    $100 per month upon his release. Cazee-Watkins timely appealed the district court's
    judgment.
    On appeal, Cazee-Watkins challenges only the district court's restitution order. He
    claims the district court erred when it ordered him to pay $3,150 for the damage to Hall's
    car. He also claims Kansas' criminal restitution statutory scheme violates Apprendi.
    Cazee-Watkins does not challenge the district court's payment plan for the restitution.
    3
    DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN ORDERING CAZEE-WATKINS TO PAY $3,150 IN
    RESTITUTION FOR HALL'S DODGE JOURNEY?
    Cazee-Watkins alleges that the portion of the district court's restitution order for
    Hall's Dodge Journey was erroneous in two respects. First, he asserts that the causal link
    between his crime and Hall's damage or loss is not supported by substantial competent
    evidence. Second, he disputes the amount of damages ordered by the district court. The
    State maintains that substantial competent evidence supports the causal link between
    Cazee-Watkins' conduct and Hall's loss of equity in her vehicle and that the district court
    did not abuse its discretion in crafting the amount of restitution.
    Appellate review of an order directing a criminal defendant to pay restitution can
    involve three standards of review. Appellate courts review the "'amount of restitution and
    the manner in which it is to be made to the aggrieved party'" for abuse of discretion. State
    v. Martin, 
    308 Kan. 1343
    , 1349, 
    429 P.3d 896
     (2018). Appellate courts affirm the district
    court's factual findings underlying the causal link between the crime and the victim's loss
    if substantial competent evidence supports these findings. 308 Kan. at 1349. Finally,
    appellate courts exercise unlimited review of legal questions involving the interpretation
    of the restitution statutes. 308 Kan. at 1350.
    Causal link between Cazee-Watkins' crime and Hall's loss
    Cazee-Watkins contends that the district court's restitution is erroneous because
    substantial competent evidence does not support a causal link between his actions and
    Hall's loss of her car. "'Substantial competent evidence is legal and relevant evidence a
    reasonable person could accept to support a conclusion.'" State v. Talkington, 
    301 Kan. 453
    , 461, 
    345 P.3d 258
     (2015). When analyzing whether substantial competent evidence
    supports a court's ruling, appellate courts will not reweigh the evidence or assess the
    credibility of witnesses. State v. Doelz, 
    309 Kan. 133
    , 138, 
    432 P.3d 669
     (2019).
    4
    K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-6604 sets out the dispositions that a district court may
    adjudge when a person is convicted of a crime, including restitution. And, K.S.A. 2021
    Supp. 21-6604(b)(1) provides that a district court "shall order the defendant to pay
    restitution, which shall include, but not be limited to, damage or loss caused by the
    defendant's crime." (Emphasis added.) Our Kansas Supreme Court has held that the
    statute does not require "the crime of conviction have a direct causal link to any
    damages." State v. Arnett, 
    307 Kan. 648
    , 653, 
    413 P.3d 787
     (2018). Rather "the causal
    link between a defendant's crime and the restitution damages for which the defendant is
    held liable must satisfy the traditional elements of proximate cause: cause-in-fact and
    legal causation." 307 Kan. at 655. To establish causation-in-fact, there must be proof that
    it is more likely than not that, but for the defendant's conduct, the victim's damages would
    not have occurred. 307 Kan. at 654. Even if a defendant's conduct is the cause-in-fact of
    the victim's loss, legal causation restricts liability to situations in which "it was
    foreseeable that the defendant's conduct might have created a risk of harm and the result
    of that conduct and any contributing causes were foreseeable." 307 Kan. at 655.
    Cazee-Watkins pled guilty to felony aggravated battery under K.S.A. 2019 Supp.
    21-5413(b)(2)(B) for recklessly causing bodily harm to Hall with his car. Although he
    points out that the statutory language of the offense does not contemplate harm to
    property, Cazee-Watkins concedes that the act underlying his conviction "might satisfy
    the requirement of direct or proximate cause for the damage to the Journey." Indeed,
    substantial evidence shows that Cazee-Watkins' conduct was the cause-in-fact of Hall's
    loss of her car—but for his decision to recklessly drive through an intersection while
    fleeing police, Hall's Dodge Journey would not have been totaled. The evidence was also
    sufficient to establish legal causation as it is reasonably foreseeable that driving through
    an intersection at high speeds would create a risk of harm and that the result of such
    conduct could be a car accident. There is thus no question that Cazee-Watkins' criminal
    conduct was the proximate cause of Hall's car being totaled.
    5
    Despite the existence of both cause-in-fact and legal causation, Cazee-Watkins
    argues that intervening events—that Hall had not fully paid off her car and was not
    covered by auto insurance at the time of the wreck—should absolve him of liability.
    Cazee-Watkins first points out that Hall did not fully own the vehicle when it was
    destroyed. He asserts that it cannot be said that Hall would have continued making the
    required loan payments on the car if the wreck had not occurred. But the district court did
    not order restitution based on potential future payments or Hall's full ownership of the
    vehicle, it based restitution on the amount of money that Hall had paid on the car loan at
    the time of the accident. Moreover, the fact that another driver on the road may not own
    the car they are driving outright is by no means unforeseeable. Hall did not need to own
    the vehicle outright to have sustained a loss.
    Cazee-Watkins also asserts that Hall's "failure to have legally required insurance
    was the ultimate cause of the loss of the [Dodge] Journey without recompense and which
    deprived her of the equity in [her car.]" This argument misses the mark. Cazee-Watkins
    concedes in his brief that vehicles need only have liability insurance. See K.S.A. 40-
    3104. But liability insurance would not have covered the loss to Hall's car. Cazee-
    Watkins also points out that "most companies who provide loans require a greater level
    of insurance, such as comprehensive and collision coverage." The record does not reflect
    whether Hall had to have casualty insurance on the vehicle because of her loan. But even
    if Hall had bought insurance covering damage to the vehicle, then the restitution would
    have been owed to the insurance company rather than to Hall. See State v. Robison, 
    58 Kan. App. 2d 380
    , 393-94, 
    469 P.3d 83
     (2020) (affirming restitution to officer's insurance
    carrier for paying medical bills even though officer was the direct victim of the crime),
    aff'd 
    314 Kan. 245
    , 
    496 P.3d 892
     (2021), cert. denied 
    142 S. Ct. 2868
     (2022).
    The district court's findings of a causal link between Cazee-Watkins' conduct,
    Hall's medical bills, and the loss of her car are supported by substantial competent
    evidence that a reasonable person would accept. Hall's lack of insurance and the fact that
    6
    she was still making payments on the car do not amount to an intervening cause severing
    the causal link between Cazee-Watkins' criminal conduct and Hall's loss.
    The amount of damages
    Cazee-Watkins next argues that the district court's conclusion that Hall suffered a
    loss of $3,150 for the Dodge Journey constituted an abuse of discretion. The State
    responds that Cazee-Watkins fails to show that no reasonable person could agree with the
    district court's determination of the amount of restitution.
    The same rigidness and proof of value required in a civil action does not apply to
    determining restitution in a criminal case. State v. Applegate, 
    266 Kan. 1072
    , 1079, 
    976 P.2d 936
     (1999). An appellate court should not disturb the district court's restitution
    award so long as it "'[is] based on reliable evidence'" and "'yields a defensible restitution
    figure.'" State v. Hall, 
    297 Kan. 709
    , 714, 
    304 P.3d 677
     (2013) (quoting State v.
    Hunziker, 
    274 Kan. 655
    , 660, 
    56 P.3d 202
     [2002]).
    "The measure of restitution to be ordered is the amount that reimburses the victim
    for the actual loss suffered" from the defendant's criminal act. Hall, 
    297 Kan. at 712
    .
    Kansas courts have consistently held that the usual standard for calculating "'loss or
    damage'" of property is "'fair market value,'" i.e., how much the property lost would have
    commanded in an exchange between a willing seller and buyer. 
    297 Kan. at 713
    . But the
    fair market value approach is not the only method to calculate restitution, and it is not
    specifically required under the language of the restitution statute. See K.S.A. 2021 Supp.
    21-6604; Hall, 
    297 Kan. at 713-14
    . Rather, "[r]estitution can include costs in addition to
    and other than fair market value" and "[t]he appropriate amount is that which
    compensates the victim for the actual damage or loss caused by the defendant's crime.
    And the most accurate measure of this loss depends on the evidence before the district
    court." 
    297 Kan. at 713-14
    .
    7
    The district court did not use a fair market value approach in assessing Hall's loss
    of her vehicle. Instead, it determined that the appropriate measure of damages was the
    "equity" Hall had in the Dodge Journey when Cazee-Watkins destroyed it. The district
    court calculated the equity as $3,150 based on her $350 monthly loan payment for nine
    months. As Cazee-Watkins points out, "equity is generally not an amount equal to the
    amount that you have paid on the loan." We agree that equity is better defined as the fair
    market value of the car less the balance of the loan. Although the district court did not
    apply the proper definition of equity, this fact does not mean the court erred in
    determining restitution.
    The court crafted a remedy to compensate Hall for the loss of her equity in the
    Dodge Journey that was directly caused by Cazee-Watkins' conduct. Hall testified that
    she had received a $27,000 loan to purchase the Dodge Journey and that she had made
    "eight or nine" payments of $350 by the time the accident occurred. The district court
    credited Hall's testimony and calculated her loss of equity as the amount of her monthly
    payments multiplied by the number of months that she had made payments to arrive at
    $3,150. This calculation was properly based on the facts and circumstances of the case.
    In sum, the district court's restitution award for the Dodge Journey was based on
    reliable evidence presented at the hearing and represents a defensible restitution figure for
    Hall's loss. Hall, 
    297 Kan. at 714
    ; Hunziker, 
    274 Kan. at 660
    . In fact, Cazee-Watkins
    argued at the restitution hearing that the loss for Hall's totaled Dodge Journey should be
    "at the maximum, what she invested in the vehicle." We find the $3,150 award for Hall's
    loss of the Dodge Journey was reasonable and did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
    DOES KANSAS' CRIMINAL RESTITUTION STATUTORY SCHEME VIOLATE APPRENDI?
    For the first time on appeal, Cazee-Watkins asserts that Kansas' restitution statutes
    violate his right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
    8
    Constitution. More specifically, he argues that restitution is punishment and, therefore,
    the restitution statutes violate his jury trial right because they allow the court to make a
    finding of fact that increased the penalty for his crime beyond the prescribed statutory
    maximum. See Apprendi, 
    530 U.S. at 476
    .
    Because the right to a jury trial is a fundamental right under the Sixth Amendment,
    this court may reach the merits of Cazee-Watkins' constitutional argument even though
    he did not raise it before the district court. State v. Rizo, 
    304 Kan. 974
    , 979-80, 
    377 P.3d 419
     (2016). Determining a statute's constitutionality is a question of law subject to
    unlimited review. State v. Soto, 
    299 Kan. 102
    , 121, 
    322 P.3d 334
     (2014).
    Cazee-Watkins' argument fails under the recently decided cases of State v. Brown,
    
    314 Kan. 292
    , 
    498 P.3d 167
     (2021), Robison, 
    314 Kan. 245
    , and State v. Arnett, 
    314 Kan. 183
    , 
    496 P.3d 928
     (2021), cert. denied 
    142 S. Ct. 2868
     (2022). In these cases, our Kansas
    Supreme Court addressed arguments identical to the one advanced by Cazee-Watkins,
    and in each case the court found that restitution does not implicate a defendant's Sixth
    Amendment right to a jury trial as contemplated by Apprendi and its progeny. Brown,
    314 Kan. at 308; Robison, 314 Kan. at 249-50; Arnett, 314 Kan. at 186-88. This court is
    duty bound to follow Kansas Supreme Court precedent unless there is some indication
    that the Supreme Court is departing from its previous position. State v. Rodriguez, 
    305 Kan. 1139
    , 1144, 
    390 P.3d 903
     (2017). We have no reason to find that our Supreme
    Court is departing from its holdings in these recent cases.
    Affirmed.
    9