Sigler v. State ( 2024 )

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Nos. 124,258
124,266
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
MARC SIGLER,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; WESLEY K. GRIFFIN, judge. Submitted without oral
argument. Opinion filed January 5, 2024. Appeal dismissed.
James M. Latta, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.
Kayla Roehler, assistant district attorney, Mark A. Dupree Sr., district attorney, and Derek
Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before BRUNS, P.J., COBLE and PICKERING, JJ.
PER CURIAM: Marc Sigler—who was convicted of two counts of attempted
second-degree murder in 2014—appeals from the district court's denial of his K.S.A. 60-
1507 motion. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion.
On appeal, Sigler contends the district court erred in denying his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion
for a variety of reasons. However, we find that Sigler failed to timely file his K.S.A. 60-
1507 motion and that he has failed to show manifest injustice in order to justify his
belated filing. Thus, for the reasons set forth in this opinion, we dismiss this appeal.
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FACTS
On September 4, 2013, the State charged Sigler with aggravated battery and
aggravated assault against a minor. The State later amended the charges to two counts of
attempted first-degree murder. After plea negotiations, Sigler pled no contest to two
counts of attempted second-degree murder, and the district court found him guilty of both
charges on January 24, 2014. The parties agreed to recommend a prison sentence of 110
months' imprisonment, and the district court sentenced Sigler according to that
recommendation. Sigler did not file a direct appeal from his convictions or sentence.
On April 3, 2015, an attorney entered his appearance on Sigler's behalf and filed a
motion claiming that the one-year period to seek K.S.A. 60-1507 relief was set to expire
on April 14, 2015. As such, Sigler requested an additional 30 days to file a motion
"should one be filed." We cannot tell from the record on appeal whether the motion was
granted, but it is evident that Sigler did not file a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion during that time
period. Moreover, on June 4, 2018, the attorney filed a motion to withdraw from Sigler's
case and represented to the district court that there were "no matters currently pending in
the above action." The next day, the district court granted counsel's motion to withdraw.
On July 9, 2018, Sigler filed a pro se motion that was captioned as a "Motion to
Correct Illegal Sentence." Over the next few weeks to months, Sigler submitted
additional pro se filings. The district court appointed counsel to represent Sigler, and
counsel withdrew Sigler's pro se motion to correct illegal sentence. Instead, the newly
appointed attorney filed a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion on Sigler's behalf in November 2019.
In the motion, Sigler claimed that he was not competent at the time he entered his pleas.
In addition, he asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective for various reasons and that
counsel had a conflict of interest.
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On October 1, 2020, the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Sigler's
K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. Significantly, the same district court judge who had presided
over Sigler's plea hearing and sentencing also presided over the evidentiary hearing. At
the hearing, four witnesses testified. Both Sigler and the State called expert witnesses to
testify about his competency when he entered his pleas. Likewise, Sigler's trial counsel
testified, and Sigler also testified on his own behalf. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
district court took the motion under advisement.
On June 9, 2021, the district court entered a 10-page order finding that trial
counsel did not provide ineffective representation to Sigler. Further, the district court
found that trial counsel did not have a conflict of interest. The district court also found
many of Sigler's claims to be speculative and conclusory. In addition, the district court
did not find Sigler's testimony to be credible.
About a week later, the district court entered an additional six-page "Retroactive
Competency Order." First, the district court reviewed caselaw regarding the feasibility of
a retroactive competency hearing and found that a valid determination was possible in
this case. After considering the evidence presented at the hearing—including that of the
expert witnesses and the information that Sigler provided in his pro se filings—the
district court confirmed that that Sigler had been competent to enter his pleas in 2014.
In its order, the district court explained:
"Events relating to meetings with his counsel and conversations with his family
show that [Sigler] had clear knowledge of what was occurring. He recalls numerous
aspects of his case: Duma's alleged conflicting representation; talking/arguing with his
Father regarding the facts of the prior representation and the facts of this case; arguments
establishing the failure of the State to fully investigate the true facts of the crime and how
that party jumped to an early opinion as to his guilt; at times Sigler expressed no
knowledge of what occurred on the night of the shootings but at other times he argues
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that his alleged facts established that he was overcharged or should not have been
charged at all; and he describes how officers forced him out of the house and set him on a
curb even though he was gravely wounded—the same officers went with him to the
hospital and kept him shackled to the gurney. His recollection of events before and after
the plea hearing are established in his pro se writings.
"With the vast recollection and knowledge that Sigler provides of the shootings,
the treatment at KU Medical Center, the discussion of his case with family and trial
counsel in the weeks before the plea hearing, it is hard to reconcile this with the claim
that he did not know what was going on from the time of his injury to when he entered
his plea. After the plea he and his family worked together to provide trial counsel with
letters of support for concurrent sentences or leniency in general."
In addition, the district court found that when entering his pleas, Sigler had
indicated that his "'mind [was] clear'" and that he was satisfied with his trial counsel's
assistance. The district court also explained that it had personally observed Sigler both at
the plea hearing and at the sentencing hearing. Based on these observations, the district
court found that "there did not appear to be any reason to question the ability of [Sigler]
to proceed with a plea or sentencing." Likewise, the district court found no reason to
order a competency evaluation.
On July 1, 2021, although the original pro se filings had previously been
withdrawn by counsel, the district court filed a third order in which it denied Sigler's
remaining pro se claims after Sigler had expressed some concern that the district court
was not considering all of his claims. Subsequently, on August 6, 2021, the district court
filed an order denying Sigler's motion to correct illegal sentence even though counsel had
previously withdrawn that motion. Thereafter, Sigler filed two appeals—one arising out
of his criminal case and the other arising out of his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion—and this
court consolidated the cases on appeal.
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ANALYSIS
On appeal, Sigler contends that the district court erred in denying his K.S.A. 60-
1507 motion. In response, the State contends that Sigler's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion was
untimely filed and should be dismissed. We agree.
K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(1) requires a motion to be filed one year from sentencing. In
this case, the statute required Sigler to file his motion within one year of sentencing
because he had not filed a direct appeal. Because the district court sentenced Sigler on
April 4, 2014, Sigler should have filed any issues appropriate for a K.S.A. 60-1507
motion by April 4, 2015. However, Sigler did not file his pro se motion until July 9,
2018, and he did not file his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion until November 21, 2019.
A district court must dismiss a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion as untimely if, "upon its
own inspection of the motions, files and records of the case, [it] determines the time
limitations under this section have been exceeded and that the dismissal of the motion
would not equate with manifest injustice . . . ." K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-1507(f)(3). In order
to prevent manifest injustice, a district court may extend that time to file the motion.
K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2). But if one who files an untimely motion fails to assert
manifest injustice, the movant is "'procedurally barred from maintaining the action.'"
State v. Roberts, 310 Kan. 5, 13, 444 P.3d 982 (2019).
Here, Sigler previously sought a 30-day extension of the deadline to potentially
file a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion back in 2015. But he did not file his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion
until several years later. And when he finally did so, he did not argue—or even
mention—manifest injustice. As Sigler has made no effort to show manifest injustice to
excuse the untimely filing of his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, we find that he is procedurally
barred from seeking relief under that statute. Although the district court did not deny
Sigler's claim on this basis, we may affirm where "an alternative basis exists for the
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district court's ruling." State v. Smith, 309 Kan. 977, 986, 441 P.3d 1041 (2019). Sigler
makes no claim on appeal that his sentence is illegal. Accordingly, because we conclude
that dismissal of the appeal on the ground of untimeliness is appropriate under the
circumstances presented in this case, we do not need to consider the other grounds upon
which Sigler's motions were denied.
Appeal dismissed.
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